Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2677 actions· ✨ 92 recent

On 16 April 2026 the Korea Trade Commission (KTC), the trade-remedy authority operating under the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), issued a preliminary affirmative determination in its anti-dumping investigation of Chinese-origin zinc and zinc-alloy coated cold-rolled steel products (thickness <4.75mm; HS 7210/7212 and certain 7225/7226 codes), and recommended provisional anti-dumping duties of 22.34% (Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Union), 26.28% (Shougang Jingtang United Iron & Steel), 33.67% (Winstone Development Ltd), and 25.75% (other Chinese suppliers). The duties remain in force pending a final determination expected around September 2026, with the Ministry of Economy and Finance to operationalise the rates by public notice. The investigation was petition-driven by Korean steelmakers (Dongkuk CM, KG Steel, SeAH CM) in November 2025, responding to a surge in Chinese galvanized cold-rolled imports following the US Section 232 50% steel tariff escalation that redirected Chinese supply to Korea and SE Asia.

South Korea's 13th National Strategic Technology Special Committee (chaired by MSIT) adopted the 2026 Annual Implementation Plan for the First Basic Plan for National Strategic Technology Development (2024–2028), committing KRW 8.6 trillion in 2026 R&D investment — a ~30% YoY increase from KRW 6.5 trillion in 2025 — across 19 NEXT strategic-technology fields encompassing AI, semiconductors, quantum, displays, and secondary batteries, coordinated across 23 ministries. The plan is supplemented by KRW 46.6 trillion in policy finance delivered through Korea Development Bank (KDB), Industrial Bank of Korea (IBK), Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KCGF), and Korea Technology Finance Corporation (KOTEC), providing the horizontal funding-coordination architecture that operationalises all sector-specific Korean strategic-technology legislative instruments.

South Korea's National Assembly passed the "Special Act on Strengthening and Supporting the Competitiveness of the Semiconductor Industry" (반도체산업 경쟁력 강화 및 지원에 관한 특별법) on 29 January 2026 by 199 votes in favour out of 206 members present, after roughly 18 months of inter-party deadlock. The act establishes (i) a Presidential Commission for Enhancing Semiconductor Competitiveness as the central inter-ministerial coordination body, (ii) a statutory five-year master plan with annual implementation plans, (iii) a dedicated semiconductor industry special account ("반도체산업 특별회계") to ring-fence funding for fabs, materials, parts and equipment, and packaging across the full memory + system-LSI + design + manufacturing supply chain, and (iv) authority to designate semiconductor clusters outside the greater Seoul area with relocation incentives. Promulgation by the Cabinet is expected shortly after passage; effectiveness contingent on enforcement-ordinance finalisation, expected Q3 2026. The KRW 2tn anchor envelope of the special account does not begin disbursing until 2027 because companion amendments to the National Finance Act were not enacted in time.

Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) announced the K-Shipbuilding Strategy for Next-Generation Market Dominance on 15 November 2025 at the emergency economy ministerial meeting and exports-and-investment promotion meeting. The strategy deploys KRW 710 billion (~USD 534 million) by 2028 across three policy directions: (1) technology super-gap via autonomous self-navigating vessels, zero-emission ships (LNG/ammonia/hydrogen tri-fuel), and AI-driven design and smart shipbuilding; (2) manufacturing upgrade through smart shipyard investment, robotics distribution, and improved foreign-manpower visa pathways; and (3) legal infrastructure including a new dedicated "Promotion of Industrialization and Technological Innovation of the Next-Generation Shipbuilding Industry" Act. Korea's overarching target is to capture ≥80% of the next-generation shipbuilding market, explicitly in competition with China's state-subsidised fleet expansion.

On 3 September 2025 South Korea's Financial Services Commission announced an expanded KRW 1 trillion (approx. USD 720 million) Corporate Restructuring Fund No.6 (기업구조혁신펀드 6호), scaling up from the KRW 500 billion originally budgeted in the 2025 first supplementary budget. The fund targets marginal ("한계기업") companies in six export-oriented key industries — petrochemicals, steel, automotive, semiconductors, displays and secondary batteries — whose financial position is deteriorating due to recent US tariff actions. KAMCO ran a fund-manager recruitment call from 3-24 September 2025, selecting four operators to run blind funds, with formation targeted for October 2025. At least 60% of raised capital must be invested in the six target industries, and the subordinated (first-loss) capital contribution ratio was raised from 5% to 10% versus prior restructuring funds to attract private co-investment.

South Korea's National Assembly passed an amendment to the Korea Development Bank (KDB) Act on 2025-08-27 (428th session, 3rd plenary sitting, 164-1 with 164 votes in favour of 165 cast), raising KDB's statutory capital ceiling from KRW 30 trillion to KRW 45 trillion and creating a new "Advanced Strategic Industry Fund" inside KDB. The fund is capitalised at KRW 50 trillion or more over five years via low-rate government-guaranteed bonds and is earmarked for the ten officially designated advanced strategic industries (AI, semiconductors, bio/vaccines, defense, robotics, hydrogen, secondary batteries, displays, future mobility) via cheap loans and equity investment. KDB intends to use the fund as seed capital for a wider "National Growth Fund" that blends in private and pension capital to reach KRW 100 trillion+ in total strategic-industry financing over five years.

On 22 August 2025 South Korea's National R&D Program Evaluation Steering Committee, convened by MOTIE, finalized an exemption from the mandatory preliminary feasibility study (예비타당성조사 면제) for the "K-On-Device AI Semiconductor Technology Development" project, clearing the roughly KRW 689.15 billion (approx. USD 496 million) program to proceed toward FY2026 budget allocation without the standard multi-year vetting delay. The project funds full-stack development — custom AI chip design, software, and modules — across four demand-anchored industries: automotive (Hyundai Motor), IoT/home appliances (LG Electronics), machinery/robotics (Doosan Robotics, Daedong), and defense (Korea Aerospace Industries). MOTIE structured the program so end-user demand companies participated directly in project planning, pairing them with domestic fabless design and foundry manufacturing firms to build a domestic on-device AI semiconductor ecosystem, ahead of full budget confirmation and formal program launch.

On 2025-06-26, South Korea's National R&D Program Evaluation General Committee approved the preliminary feasibility study (예비타당성조사) for the "Korean-style Hydrogen Reduction Steelmaking Demonstration Technology Development Project," clearing state funding of KRW 308.8 billion (part of a KRW 814.6 billion total project cost) over 2026-2030. The program funds a 300,000-tonne-scale demonstration process using the domestic FINEX process to produce hydrogen-reduced iron and molten iron from iron ore and hydrogen, plus a parallel track for small and mid-sized firms to use hydrogen-reduced iron in existing electric-arc furnaces. The technology targets a 95%+ cut in per-tonne carbon emissions versus blast-furnace steelmaking, positioning Korean steel (POSCO, Hyundai Steel) for the EU CBAM and global green-steel premium markets.

South Korea's Ministry of Economy and Finance, at a joint Economic Ministers' Meeting and Industrial Competitiveness Strengthening Ministers' Meeting on 21 May 2025, approved a KRW 28.6 trillion ("Financial Support Plan for Addressing Trade Risks") to cushion domestic firms against US tariff exposure. The package allocates KRW 16.3 trillion to emergency management-stabilization funding for tariff-hit firms, KRW 7.4 trillion to low-interest loans and guarantees for new-market development, and KRW 4.9 trillion to equipment-investment support and industrial-restructuring assistance for competitiveness strengthening. The plan was published as Attachment 3 to the ministers' meeting press release and implemented through the relevant policy-finance institutions (KDB, IBK, Korea Eximbank, credit guarantee funds).

South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy issued the 36th amendment to the Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items (전략물자수출입고시) as MOTIE Notice No. 2025-20, with promulgation on 24 February 2025 and effect from 28 February 2025. The amendment adds 21 advanced-technology items and technologies — including quantum computers, AI-class semiconductors, 3D-printing equipment, isotopes for quantum computing, ultra-low-temperature measurement equipment, and high-temperature coatings — to the Strategic Items List, implementing recent updates from the Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Australia Group multilateral export-control regimes. The same amendment introduces a humanitarian-medical-device carve-out for exports of diagnostic X-ray and radiographic imaging equipment to Russia, simplifies end-user verification (intermediaries deemed final end-user where verification is "extremely difficult"), extends the post-transaction reporting period from 7 days to 3 months, creates a self-disclosure system for non-compliance, and allows one-time extensions of individual export licences beyond original validity.

South Korea's National Assembly passed the Special Act on the Expansion of the National Electricity Network (Law No. 20844) on 19 February 2025 as part of the bipartisan "Energy Trifecta Bill," with promulgation on 25 March 2025 and entry into force on 26 September 2025. The act creates an expedited siting, permitting, and compensation framework for trunk transmission-grid construction, consolidating 35 previously separate regulatory approvals into a single streamlined procedure and targeting a >30% reduction in grid-build timelines. It directly addresses the electricity-infrastructure bottleneck constraining semiconductor fab clusters (Yongin, Pyeongtaek, SK Hynix HBM), sovereign AI datacenter build-out, and EV/battery gigafactory load growth — structurally distinct from the K-Chips Act (fiscal incentives) and the Semiconductor Special Act (regulatory framework), as it unblocks the physical power-delivery constraint those programmes depend on.

South Korea's Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) committed in its 2025 Work Plan to establish a National AI Computing Center via public-private partnership (PPP), with an anchor envelope of KRW 2 trillion rising to KRW 4 trillion through 2030. In July 2025 MSIT executed the first major tranche: KRW 1.46 trillion (approx. USD 1.1 billion) to procure approximately 13,000 high-performance GPUs (NVIDIA B200 and H200) distributed across three domestic cloud operators — Naver Cloud, NHN Cloud, and Kakao. This is Korea's first PPP-structured sovereign-AI compute procurement instrument, structurally distinct from the AI Basic Act (horizontal regulatory framework) and the Semiconductor Special Act (fab investment incentives), as it directly addresses the compute- infrastructure supply constraint for AI model training and national AI research.

The Republic of Korea's National Assembly passed the Framework Act on the Development of Artificial Intelligence and the Establishment of a Foundation for Trustworthiness ("AI Basic Act") in plenary session on 26 December 2024, consolidating 19 separate AI bills tabled in the 22nd National Assembly. The statute was promulgated on 21 January 2025 and takes effect on 22 January 2026 after a one-year preparation period. Korea becomes the second jurisdiction worldwide — after the EU AI Act — to enact a comprehensive horizontal AI law, and the first in the Asia-Pacific. The Act establishes a risk-tiered regime targeting "high-impact" AI in healthcare, energy, public services, employment decisions, and generative-AI labelling, with extraterritorial reach over foreign providers whose systems affect the Korean market or users (mandatory local representative). It creates an AI Safety Institute, a national AI policy "control tower," and R&D / standardisation programmes under MSIT. Penalties are modest by international comparison — fines up to KRW 30 million plus a one-year grace period before full enforcement.

On 31 October 2024, South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced strengthened export controls in response to North Korea's long-range ballistic missile launch earlier that day. The measure designates 15 "North Korea-customized" watch-list items across the solid-fuel missile production chain — including ammonium perchlorate, sodium chloride, liquid thiokol, carbon fiber, glass fiber fabric, thermal batteries and inertial-guidance components — that North Korea finds difficult to produce domestically. It operates under Korea's existing Special Notice on Trade for Fulfilling International Peace and Security Obligations, building on the June 2016 Nuclear and Missile Surveillance Items framework and Korea's NSG/MTCR commitments.

MOTIE brought the 35th amendment of the Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Items into force on 9 September 2024, adding 243 items (notice Annex 2-2 numbers 1160-1402) to the situational-licence list for Russia and Belarus, taking that list to 1,402 items. The added items are described as having a high likelihood of military diversion (metal-cutting machinery, machine-tool parts, optical-equipment parts, sensors). Exports of the added items are prohibited in principle from 9 September, with licence applications admitted only for contracts concluded by 8 September and case-by-case categories such as exports to Korean companies' local subsidiaries. The same release tightens administrative penalties for deliberate export-control violations.

MOTIE brought the 33rd amendment of the Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Items into force on 24 February 2024 (announced 20 February 2024), adding 682 items to the Russia/Belarus situational-licence (상황허가) list, taking that list to 1,159 items. The added items span construction machinery, secondary batteries, machine tools and aircraft components judged to have high military-diversion potential. Situational- licence items are prohibited from export in principle from the effective date, with narrow exceptions such as pre-existing contracts and case-by- case review categories.

MOTIE finalised the 31st amendment of the Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Items on 24 April 2023, effective 28 April 2023, adding 741 items to the Russia/Belarus situational-licence (상황허가) list. The added items span industrial machinery, petroleum and gas refining equipment, steel, chemicals, automotive goods and quantum computers judged to have high military-diversion potential. MOTIE stated the amendment brings Korea's export-control coverage of Russia/Belarus closer to that of the US, EU and Japan, incorporating 2022 international export-control-regime agreements and reflecting the US's 2nd-6th Russia sanctions rounds and a substantial part of the EU's measures.

Korea's National Assembly passed amendments to Chapter V of the Act on the Adjustment of International Taxes (AITA) on 23 December 2022; promulgated 31 December 2022. The amendment codifies the OECD/G20 Pillar Two GloBE (Global Anti-Base Erosion) rules — specifically the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) — directly within Korea's existing international-tax statute (Articles 60–83), making Korea the first jurisdiction globally to enact binding primary legislation implementing Pillar Two. The IIR applies to Korean members of MNE groups with consolidated revenue ≥ EUR 750 million for fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 2024; the Undertaxed Profits Rule (UTPR) was subsequently delayed by the 2024 tax reform bill to fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 2025. Korea did not initially adopt a Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT); proposals to add one have been debated in subsequent amendment cycles. The law directly interacts with the K-Chips Act (2023) enhanced investment tax credits: those credits reduce Korean effective tax rates and may trigger Pillar Two top-up exposure unless structured as Qualifying Refundable Tax Credits.

On 6 March 2022, the South Korean government determined that Belarus had materially supported Russia's invasion of Ukraine and announced it would extend the export-control measures already applied to Russia to Belarus as well. Effective 7 March 2022, Korea designated two Belarusian entities (Belarus's Ministry of Defence and a second entity) to its "parties of concern" list, triggering a case-by-case licensing requirement for strategic items under Korea's multilateral export-control regime, and tightened review of non-strategic dual-use items destined for Belarus.

The Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA), Act No. 5559, is the foundational statute governing all inbound foreign direct investment into the Republic of Korea. Enacted 16 September 1998 by the National Assembly under President Kim Dae-jung as part of IMF-conditionality-driven economic-liberalisation reforms following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, it replaced the 1966 Foreign Capital Inducement Act (외자도입법). FIPA establishes the MOTIE-chaired Foreign Investment Committee, the Invest Korea (KOTRA) operational arm, and national-security/public-order restrictions on FDI in sensitive industries under Article 4 — the primary legal authority for all inward-FDI screening, conditional-approval, and prohibition decisions. It also creates the Foreign Investment Zone (FIZ) and Cash Grant Programme incentive architecture that continues to underpin major semiconductor and EV-battery FDI into Korea.

South Korea's Foreign Trade Act (대외무역법, Act No. 5211, enacted 31 December 1986 and repeatedly amended) is the foundational statutory framework of the Republic of Korea's foreign trade and export-control regime. It establishes the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) as the administering authority for foreign trade policy and empowers it to designate strategic items, issue and revoke export licences, operate catch-all controls over non-listed goods destined for WMD-development end-uses, and coordinate with the Nuclear Suppliers Group-administered National Security Authority for Strategic Commerce (NSASC) on Category-0 nuclear items and the Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA) on military goods. Every MOTIE strategic-items notification (the "Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Materials," currently encompassing Categories 1-9 dual-use items harmonised with Wassenaar, MTCR, AG, and NSG) and every MOTIE outbound-investment screening measure derives its legal authority from the Act.