Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2663 actions· ✨ 89 recent

The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (DOD, GSA, and NASA) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 17 February 2026 (FR Doc 2026-03065, 91 FR 7223) implementing Section 5949(a) of the NDAA FY2023 (Pub. L. 117-263), which bars executive agencies from acquiring electronic products or services containing semiconductor components designed, produced, or provided by SMIC, CXMT, YMTC, or their affiliates. A Part B prohibition extends the restriction to "critical systems" whose subsystems incorporate covered semiconductors regardless of COTS sourcing. The comment period closed 20 April 2026; proposed prohibitions take effect 23 December 2027.

The Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation (WEDC) board approved a second contract amendment with Foxconn (Hon Hai Technology Group) on 25 November 2025, authorising up to USD 16 million in additional performance-based tax credits under the state's Electronics, Information Technology, and Manufacturing Zone (EITMZ) programme. The amendment backs a further USD 569 million expansion of Foxconn's Mount Pleasant, Racine County operations, projected to create 1,374 new jobs over four years. It raises Foxconn's cumulative EITMZ credit ceiling to USD 96 million (through 31 December 2029) against a cumulative committed investment of USD 1.2 billion and 2,616 jobs -- up from the 2021 amendment's USD 80 million ceiling tied to a USD 672 million investment and 1,454 jobs by end-2025.

On 5 February 2026, USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Argentine Foreign Minister Pablo Quirno signed in Washington the United States-Argentina Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment (ARTI), formalising the framework jointly announced on 13 November 2025. The agreement is the first standalone bilateral trade-and-investment instrument concluded by the second Trump administration and the first FTA-style agreement signed under the post-IEEPA reciprocal-tariff architecture (Executive Order 14257, "Liberation Day"). On the US side, the ARTI sets out three tariff schedules: (i) Schedule 2A suspends additional reciprocal tariffs under EO 14257 for specified Argentine-origin goods (covering "unavailable natural resources" and non-patented pharmaceutical inputs); (ii) Schedule 2B grants a zero additional reciprocal tariff for designated Argentine agricultural products under EO 14360; and (iii) caps additional ad-valorem duties on other goods at 10% above MFN rates, inclusive of IEEPA reciprocal tariffs. On the Argentine side, illustrative tariff-rate quotas include duty-free access for 80,000 MT of US beef in calendar year 2026, 1,000 MT for cheese, 870 MT for almonds, 40 MT in-shell + 40 MT shelled for pistachios, 80,000 litres for wine (<2 L bottles), and preferential treatment for 10,000 motor vehicles meeting defined technical parameters. Argentina additionally commits to broader preferential market access on medicines, chemicals, machinery, information-technology products, medical devices, and a wide range of agricultural goods, alongside IP-enforcement upgrades (counterfeit/pirated-goods enforcement, patentability criteria, patent-backlog reduction, geographical indications) and investment-facilitation commitments that align Argentina's regime with US-preferred standards on regulatory cooperation, labour and environment.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated a Russian national (Vitaliy Sergeyevich Andreyev), a Russia-based DPRK economic and trade consular official (Kim Ung Sun), a Chinese front company (Shenyang Geumpungri Network Technology Co., Ltd), and a DPRK trading company subordinate to the DPRK Ministry of People's Armed Forces General Political Bureau (Korea Sinjin Trading Corporation) for facilitating a fraudulent overseas IT-worker scheme that funds North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. The action expands on the prior designation of Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company, an entity tied to the DPRK defense ministry that deploys IT worker delegations in Russia and Laos. Treasury said Andreyev and Kim Ung Sun facilitated cryptocurrency-to-cash conversions worth nearly USD 600,000 since December 2024, and that Shenyang Geumpungri's delegation of DPRK IT workers has earned Chinyong and Sinjin over USD 1 million in profits since 2021. Designations were made under Executive Order 13687, blocking all US-jurisdiction property of the four parties and barring US persons from transactions with them.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated the Korea Sobaeksu Trading Company (also known as Sobaeksu United Corporation) and three associated individuals — Kim Se Un, Jo Kyong Hun, and Myong Chol Min — for evading US and UN sanctions and clandestinely generating revenue for the DPRK government, including through fraudulent information-technology worker schemes. Sobaeksu operates as a front company for the US-designated Munitions Industry Department, which oversees North Korea's nuclear program and ballistic-missile development. The action was coordinated with a Department of Justice unsealing of indictments against seven DPRK nationals over counterfeit- cigarette sanctions evasion, and State Department reward offers of up to USD 7 million for information on the individuals involved. Designations block all US-jurisdiction property of the four parties and bar US persons from transacting with them.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding three Kaspersky entities to the Entity List under End-User Review Committee (ERC) determinations — AO Kaspersky Lab (Moscow), OOO Kaspersky Group (Moscow), and Kaspersky Labs Limited (London). All three are designated for cooperation with Russian military and intelligence authorities in support of Russian government cyber-intelligence objectives. Exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of all items subject to the EAR to the three entities now require a BIS licence reviewed under a policy of presumption of denial, with no licence exceptions available. The action is paired with a same-week Commerce ICTS final determination prohibiting Kaspersky cybersecurity and anti-virus software transactions in the United States.

BIS finalized changes to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) governing controls on cybersecurity items — primarily intrusion software, command-and-control platforms, and surveillance tools capable of disrupting or monitoring information systems without authorization. The final rule, effective May 26 2022, revises License Exception ACE (Authorized Cybersecurity Exports) originally established by an October 2021 interim rule and narrows end-user carve-outs for government end users in Country Group D:5 and A:6 destinations. Exports of affected ECCNs (4A005, 4D001, 4D004, 4E001, 5A001.j, 5B001, 5D001, 5E001) to Country Groups E:1 and E:2 remain prohibited; D:1 through D:5 government-end-user transactions require a license.

BIS published an interim rule on January 12, 2022 delaying the effective date of its October 21, 2021 cybersecurity items interim final rule by 45 days, from January 19, 2022 to March 7, 2022. The underlying October 2021 rule establishes new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) for cybersecurity items — including intrusion software, command-and-control platforms, and surveillance tools — and introduces License Exception ACE (Authorized Cybersecurity Exports) for national security and anti-terrorism purposes. The delay was granted after twelve public comments highlighted significant compliance challenges, with BIS acknowledging the need for additional time for industry to update procedures and for BIS to issue supplemental guidance before the controls took effect.

On November 4, 2021, BIS added four entities to the Entity List under a policy of denial: NSO Group and Candiru (Israel), Positive Technologies (Russia), and Computer Security Initiative Consultancy PTE (Singapore). NSO Group and Candiru were designated for supplying commercial spyware to foreign governments used to maliciously surveil government officials, journalists, activists, and academics; Positive Technologies and CSIC for trafficking cyber tools enabling unauthorized access to information systems. All four entities now require BIS licenses for any export, re-export, or in-country transfer of EAR-controlled items, with a presumption of denial.

BIS published an interim final rule on October 21, 2021 establishing new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs 4A005, 4D004, 4E001.c, and 5A001.j) for intrusion software systems, command-and-control platforms, and IP network surveillance tools, implementing the Wassenaar Arrangement 2017 cybersecurity decisions into the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The rule simultaneously created License Exception ACE (Authorized Cybersecurity Exports), codified at § 740.22, to authorize exports to most destinations while imposing licence requirements — or outright prohibitions — for sales to Country Groups E:1/E:2 governments and certain D-group government end-users. Carve-outs for vulnerability disclosure and cyber-incident-response activities were included to protect legitimate security research. The effective date was subsequently delayed from January 19, 2022 to March 7, 2022 by a separate interim rule (FR 2022-00448), and the rule was finalized with revisions on May 26, 2022 (FR 2022-11282).

The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding 34 entities under 43 entries to the Entity List, effective July 12, 2021. The largest cluster — 14 Chinese entities — comprises suppliers of surveillance infrastructure enabling the Chinese government's human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, including video analytics firms, network equipment makers, and geolocation platforms deployed in the Uyghur Region. Six Russian individuals and entities were added for participation in military procurement networks acquiring US-origin electronics and components in violation of the EAR. Additional listings cover Iran sanctions evaders (Canada, Lebanon), a UAE-based nuclear-proliferation facilitator, and one entity elevated from the Unverified List to the Entity List under China. All items subject to the EAR require a BIS licence to export, re-export, or transfer in-country to the listed parties, with a presumption-of-denial review policy.