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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On 11 March 2026 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer initiated parallel Section 301 investigations into the acts, policies, and practices of 16 economies — China, the European Union, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India — relating to structural excess capacity and overproduction in manufacturing sectors. The Federal Register notice (FR doc 2026-05214; dockets USTR-2026-0067 and USTR-2026-0068) was published on 17 March 2026. Covered sectors include aluminum, automobiles, batteries, cement, chemicals, electronics, energy goods, glass, machine tools, machinery, paper, plastics, processed food and beverages, robotics, satellites, semiconductors, ships, solar modules, steel, and transportation equipment. Written comments were due by 15 April 2026; USTR held the public hearing beginning 5 May 2026. This is the most sweeping multi-economy Section 301 initiative since the 2018 China investigation and is structurally distinct from the China-only 2024-05-14 §301 tariff hikes and the 2025-07-15 Brazil §301 investigation.
The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated five entities and one individual based in Iran, Hong Kong, Taiwan and China for procuring CNC (computer numerical control) machine tools on behalf of Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA), the state-owned defense-ministry subsidiary that builds Iran's Ababil-series military UAVs used by the IRGC. Designated parties include Javad Alizadeh Hoshyar, CEO of Iran-based Control Afzar Tabriz Co Ltd, which used Hong Kong-based Clifton Trading Limited as an intermediary to obscure CNC-machine shipments to HESA, and Taiwan-based Mecatron Machinery Co Ltd and Joemars Machinery and Electric Industrial Co Ltd, which shipped CNC machines toward Iran through similar concealment channels. The action was taken pursuant to National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), which directs that Iran be denied conventional and asymmetric weapons capabilities. All designated parties' US property and interests are blocked and US persons are generally barred from transacting with them.
BIS final rule (FR Doc 2024-19132, 89 FR 68539, published 27 August 2024) expanding the Russia/Belarus-Military End User (MEU) Foreign-Direct Product (FDP) rule under the Export Administration Regulations so that it also applies to transactions involving Entity List entries posing a significant diversion risk to Russia's and Belarus's defense industry or intelligence services — the rule is renamed accordingly. The rule also imposes new export, reexport, and in-country transfer controls on software for the operation of computer numerical control (CNC) machine tools destined for Russia or Belarus, and makes corrections eliminating obsolete cross- references introduced by the BIS 25 January 2024 and 18 June 2024 Russia/Belarus final rules. Effective 27 August 2024, except amendatory instruction 11 effective 16 September 2024.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule (FR Doc 2024-08622; Docket 240417-0112; 89 FR 30119) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to expand the product scope of two Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules — the Iran FDP rule and the Russia/Belarus/Temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine FDP rule in 15 CFR 734.9(f) — to cover the entirety of the Common High Priority List (CHPL), an HTS-6 list developed jointly with the EU, Japan and the UK that identifies items used in Russian weapons production. The CHPL scope adds basic commercial-grade microelectronics (integrated circuits, RF transceiver modules), test/manufacturing equipment for electronic components, and CNC machine tools to the perimeter, requiring a BIS licence when these foreign-produced items are exported, reexported or transferred to Iran, Russia, Belarus or occupied Crimea. The rule was issued in response to Iran's 13 April 2024 attack on Israel and Iran's ongoing military support for the Russian war in Ukraine; it became effective 18 April 2024 (Federal Register publication 22 April 2024) with a transit grace period for in-flight shipments until 20 May 2024.