Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2678 actions· ✨ 92 recent

FinCEN published the Beneficial Ownership Information Access and Safeguards Final Rule (FR Doc 2023-27973, 88 FR 88732, December 22, 2023; effective February 20, 2024), implementing the access and disclosure provisions of Section 6403(c) of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) enacted as part of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020. The rule defines six categories of authorized recipients permitted to access the FinCEN BOI database — US federal agencies engaged in national security/intelligence/law enforcement, state/local/tribal law enforcement, foreign law enforcement and competent authorities (via intermediary federal agency), financial institutions using BOI for customer due diligence (CDD), federal functional regulators assessing financial-institution CDD compliance, and Treasury officers/employees. Access is to be phased in, beginning with a 2024 pilot for key federal agencies before extending to financial institutions and their supervisors. The rule establishes data-security standards, re-disclosure prohibitions, and oversight mechanisms governing each recipient category.

On 25 October 2023 the Bureau of Industry and Security published an interim final rule (88 FR 73424; FR Doc 2023-23055) making substantive revisions to the October 7 2022 advanced-computing IFR, incorporating 43 public comments covering 78 topics. The rule replaced the prior TOPS-based performance metric with a new "Total Processing Performance" (TPP) / performance-density dual-threshold structure for ECCN 3A090, splitting the control into tiers 3A090.a (full licence requirement for highest-capability datacenter AI chips) and 3A090.b (new License Exception NAC with 25-day prior notification for the intermediate tier). Geographic scope was expanded from China-and-Macau to Country Groups D:1/D:4/D:5 to block diversion via third-country intermediaries and offshore datacenters.

BIS published a final rule on August 18, 2023, amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement decisions reached at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) plenary meetings in Nur-Sultan (June 2019) and Warsaw (June 2022). The rule revises five existing Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) on the Commerce Control List (CCL) to align with multilateral commitments made by NSG participating governments. Changes include decontrolling water-hydrogen sulfide exchange tray columns from ECCN 1B22, clarifying isotope purification scope in ECCN 1B231, and updating mass-unit terminology in ECCN 3A233. The rule takes effect immediately upon publication.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR, 15 CFR Part 710) to lower the concentration threshold above which mixtures containing a Schedule 2A chemical trigger declaration and export/import reporting obligations — from 30% to 10% by weight or volume. The three affected Schedule 2A chemicals are Amiton (a nerve-agent precursor), PFIB (a fluoromonomer byproduct), and BZ (an incapacitating agent). The change implements OPCW Conference of States Parties Decision C-14/DEC.4 (2009) and takes immediate effect on publication; 10% is the statutory floor set by the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA).

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 28 entities under 32 entries to the Entity List effective April 12, 2023, targeting front companies and logistics networks attempting to evade US export controls to acquire US-origin items in support of Russia's military and defense industrial base. Twelve of the entities are Chinese electronics and semiconductor distributors operating as procurement intermediaries; ten are Russian logistics and trading firms; six are spread across Armenia, Malta, Singapore, Spain, Syria, Turkey, UAE, and Uzbekistan as diversion facilitators. All listed entities are subject to a license review policy of denial for virtually all EAR-controlled items.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 10 entities under 13 destination entries to the Entity List, effective February 24, 2023. The additions span three groups: (1) five Chinese entities operating in the commercial satellite and dual-use space sector — most notably Spacety Co., Ltd. and China HEAD Aerospace Technology Co., both suspected of supplying satellite imagery and space technology in support of the Russian military in Ukraine; (2) two Canadian procurement intermediaries (CPUNTO Inc. and Electronic Network Inc.) facilitating illicit acquisition of US-origin controlled items; and (3) three Russian defense-industrial procurement companies supplying the Russian military. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a policy of denial, except EAR99 food and medicine which receive case-by-case review.