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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
Japan's Diet passed the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) 2026 Amendment on 29 May 2026; the law was promulgated on 5 June 2026. The amendment represents the most significant overhaul of Japan's inbound FDI screening regime since FEFTA was first applied to national-security transactions in 2019. Three structural additions: (1) indirect-acquisition screening — extends mandatory prior-notification to acquisitions of Japanese sensitive-sector companies effected through intermediate holding structures or offshore parent vehicles, closing the principal gap exploited by Chinese and GCC SWF investors via SPV chains; (2) call-in powers — grants the Minister of Finance authority to open a review up to ten years retroactively where an acquisition was not pre-notified or where circumstances have materially changed since clearance, directly analogous to CFIUS § 721(b)(1)(D) retroactive jurisdiction; (3) cross-ministerial "Japan CFIUS" consultation framework — formally institutionalises a standing inter-agency committee (Finance, METI, MoD, NPA, MIAC) modelled on the US CFIUS committee, replacing the prior ad-hoc inter-ministerial process. Cross-ministerial and indirect-acquisition provisions entered into force immediately on promulgation (5 June 2026); remaining Cabinet-Order-level implementing provisions to follow within one year.
On 1 February 2026 Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, presenting the Union Budget 2026-27, announced the launch of India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 2.0 — the second-phase national semiconductor industrial-policy framework succeeding ISM 1.0 (2021, INR 76,000 crore). The Budget makes an initial INR 1,000 crore provision for ISM 2.0 in FY 2026-27 and raises the Electronics Components Manufacturing Scheme (ECMS) outlay from INR 22,919 crore to INR 40,000 crore. ISM 2.0's distinct architecture centres on four strategic priorities not in ISM 1.0: (i) indigenous semiconductor equipment, chemicals, gases and materials production, (ii) full-stack Indian semiconductor IP design, (iii) industry-led R&D and skills/training centres, and (iv) domestic and global supply-chain integration. Total mission outlay reported as approximately INR 1-1.2 lakh crore (~USD 12-14bn) is being finalised; Cabinet clearance and the formal scheme launch are expected by mid-2026.
Malaysia replaced its four-decade-old Promotion of Investments Act (PIA) 1986 manufacturing-incentive regime with the New Incentive Framework (NIF), effective 1 March 2026. Applications under PIA 1986 closed at 15:00 MYT on 28 February 2026; post-March applications are evaluated under the outcome-based National Investment Aspirations (NIA) Scorecard across six economic-outcome pillars. Companies choose between two mutually exclusive incentive options — a special corporate tax rate or an investment tax allowance — aligned with the Global Minimum Tax environment. A services-sector phase is scheduled for Q2 2026.
On 16 January 2026 the Yunnan Provincial People's Government issued Yunzhengfa [2026] No. 2, a package of 34 policy measures (effective through 2030) to support high-quality development of the Central Yunnan New Area (滇中新区), a national-level new area centred on Kunming. The measures span industrial upgrading, innovation, opening-up and fiscal/land support: transformation of traditional petrochemical and metallurgy industries into "hundred-billion-yuan" clusters, development of semiconductor materials/equipment, new-energy battery materials and non-ferrous/rare-precious-metals manufacturing using Yunnan's mineral and plateau-agriculture resources, and cultivation of low-altitude economy, biomanufacturing and new-materials industries. It also seeks to establish a South/Southeast Asia aircraft-delivery centre and one-stop aviation-maintenance base in the new area.
On 6 January 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 1 [2026] "On Strengthening Export Controls on Dual-Use Items to Japan" (商务部公告2026年第1号), the first PRC export-control instrument to single out a named country other than the United States. Effective immediately on publication with no wind-down period, the measure prohibits export of all dual-use items under PRC export-control law where the end-user is the Japanese Ministry of Defense or Self-Defense Forces, the end-use is Japanese military, or — under a novel catch-all standard — the transaction would "enhance Japan's military capabilities." The standard is explicitly extraterritorial, covering transfers of PRC-origin dual-use items through third countries and in-country transfers where the end-user / end-use falls within scope. The political trigger was Japanese PM Takaichi's November 2025 Diet remarks framing a Taiwan contingency as a Japanese "survival-threatening situation" justifying SDF deployment.
On 30 December 2025 the General Office of the Shanghai Municipal People's Government issued Hufubangui [2025] No. 20, a three-year action plan (1 January 2026 - 31 December 2028) to support the transformation and upgrading of advanced manufacturing. The plan sets quantitative targets — 100 new manufacturing enterprises with annual output above CNY 1 billion by 2028 (cumulative 600+), 500 new above-designated-size supply-chain enterprises, 100+ new national-level green factories, a robot density of 600 units per 10,000 workers, and 70%+ digital-equipment penetration — across next-generation electronics, intelligent connected new-energy vehicles, high-end equipment, advanced materials, green low-carbon and fashion consumer-goods industries, plus emerging bets on the low-altitude economy, commercial aerospace, embodied intelligence (robotics) and biomanufacturing. It is funded through tiered direct subsidies rather than tax relief: one-off R&D subsidies up to CNY 10 million, equipment/new-materials cost-share up to 30% of contract value (capped at CNY 20 million), technical- transformation loan/leasing interest support up to CNY 20 million cumulative, and 0.8-1.3% interest subsidies on component/material backup-inventory financing.
On 26 December 2025, Japan's Cabinet approved the FY2026 (Reiwa 8) national budget, which Global Trade Alert logs as including a "Next-Generation Aircraft Development Support" financial-grant programme administered by METI, effective with the fiscal year on 1 April 2026 and running through 31 March 2027. The line item corresponds to METI's "Next-Generation Aircraft Development Support Project" (jiki kokuki kaihatsu-to shien jigyo), funded through the Decarbonisation Growth-type Economic Structure Transition Promotion Subsidy (GX Transition Bond proceeds) and disbursed via a designated implementing body to aerospace-supply-chain firms. The FY2026 allocation is JPY 150 billion, up from JPY 81 billion in FY2025 -- an 85% increase -- aimed at strengthening Japan's aircraft-parts and materials supply chain (composites, advanced materials, engine and airframe components) and its international-competitiveness and economic-security positioning in next-generation aircraft programmes.
Canada Growth Fund Inc. (CGF), an arm's-length investment vehicle wholly owned by the Government of Canada, announced on 31 October 2025 an approximately CAD 25 million (USD ~17.8M) investment in Rio Tinto's scandium oxide operation at its Critical Minerals and Metallurgical Centre in Sorel-Tracy, Quebec. The investment, structured as an equity-like financial royalty, will help expand the facility's nameplate capacity to 9 tonnes of scandium oxide per year. Alongside the investment, the Government of Canada agreed to an offtake agreement committing to purchase a volume of the scandium produced, and a marketing and storage agreement under which Rio Tinto will market and store scandium on Canada's behalf.
On 8 September 2025, the UK Ministry of Defence published the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 — "Making Defence an Engine for Growth" (CP 1388) — the first comprehensive cabinet-level UK defence industrial strategy in over a decade and the sector plan for Defence under the UK Modern Industrial Strategy umbrella (IS-8). The strategy was published alongside the Strategic Defence Review 2025 and operationalises the largest sustained defence- spending increase since the Cold War (rising to 2.6% of GDP by 2027 with ambition to 3% in the next Parliament). It defines six priority outcomes (growth, backing UK businesses, defence innovation, resilient industrial base, procurement transformation, enduring partnerships); establishes UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) within the MOD with a ringfenced £400m budget to accelerate dual-use technology; identifies priority defence capabilities (combat air, complex weapons, directed-energy weapons, next- generation land and maritime systems) plus dual-use sub-sectors (quantum, drones/autonomy, space, AI, cyber, engineering biology, advanced connectivity); and flags resilience priorities in steel, construction, energetic materials, batteries, semiconductors and rare earths.
On 5 August 2025 the municipal government of Xianning (Hubei Province) launched the "Hubei-Xianning High-Tech Industry Regional Mother Fund" (湖北咸宁高新产业区域母基金) at a launch ceremony attended by a Hubei provincial Finance Department official and Xianning's executive vice mayor. The fund was jointly capitalised by the Hubei Provincial Government Guidance Fund, Changjiang Growth Capital, the Xianning Municipal Government Guidance Fund, Xianning Chengfa Group, and Xianning Gaotou Group at a total scale of CNY 3 billion (~USD 420 million), the first city-level regional mother fund set up under Hubei's provincial guidance-fund restructuring programme. It operates a "sub-fund + direct project investment" model and is projected to leverage CNY 15 billion in social capital toward Xianning's "5+5" modern industrial system (big health, electronic information, clean energy, and new materials, among other priority sectors). At launch it signed cooperation-intent agreements with 5 sub-funds (CNY 2 billion combined scale) and investment agreements with 5 enterprises (CNY 200 million combined).
Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) signed a loan agreement on 2025-06-30 for USD 180 million (JBIC portion) with Toray Composite Materials America, Inc. (CMA), the US subsidiary of Toray Industries, Inc. Co-financed with Mizuho Bank and seven other Japanese financial institutions, the total co-financing package reaches USD 300 million. Proceeds fund CMA's manufacturing and sale of carbon fiber for high-pressure gas tanks used in hydrogen-powered fuel cell vehicles (FCVs), which JBIC states supports maintaining and improving the international competitiveness of Japan's carbon fiber industry and strengthening supply-chain resilience.
On 11 June 2025, at the second Belt and Road Science and Technology Exchange Conference in Chengdu, Sichuan Province formally launched the "Sichuan Sci-Tech Achievement Transformation Investment Guidance Fund" (四川省成果转化投资引导基金) with a total scale of CNY 5 billion (~USD 700 million). The fund is capitalised 40% by the Sichuan Provincial Industrial Investment Guidance Fund, 40% by other in-province state funds, and 20% by capital raised from outside the province. It targets "invest early, invest small, invest in hard tech" bets across seven priority areas — tech/communications, new materials, advanced manufacturing, clean energy, medical and pharmaceutical, energy conservation/environmental protection, and specialised industries — aligned to Sichuan's "15+N" priority industrial-chain plan. Seven sub-funds (one seed-stage, three angel-stage, three venture-stage) totalling CNY 4.05 billion were already established at launch, and the fund's operator (Sichuan Industrial Revitalization Fund Investment Group) stated a 2025 investment target of over CNY 500 million, with CNY 150 million already committed across 4 AI and energy-equipment projects and a further CNY 390 million quasi-approved across 10 projects.
China Chengtong Holdings Group, a SASAC-supervised central state capital operation company, completed business registration of the "Chengtong Science and Technology Innovation Investment Fund (Beijing) Limited Partnership" in late May/early June 2025, jointly capitalised with Sinopec, China Aviation Oil, and the Haidian District Government of Beijing. The fund has a total planned scale of CNY 30 billion (~USD 4.2 billion) with a first-phase scale of CNY 10 billion (~USD 1.4 billion) and a 15-year term. It prioritises "early-stage, small-scale, long-term, hard-technology" equity investment across new materials, advanced manufacturing, and next-generation information technology, targeting industry-leading tech firms, "little giant" specialised-and-innovative enterprises, technology-transfer projects, and upstream/downstream suppliers in central-SOE industrial chains.
On 7 May 2025 the Xiangxi Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture People's Government (Hunan Province) approved the establishment of a CNY 1 billion ($~140 million) Xiangxi Industrial Development Guidance Fund, publicised the following day on the Hunan provincial government portal. The fund runs a "1+X+N" mother-fund structure — 30% of its scale for direct investment, 70% seeded into sub-funds with social capital — and is earmarked for 11 priority industry chains, including manganese-zinc and aluminium-based composite materials and vanadium-lithium battery new-energy and electronics, alongside ecological-culture tourism, liquor/tobacco, traditional Chinese medicine/biopharma, and specialty agriculture. It is managed by the prefecture finance bureau and capitalised by consolidating existing industrial-subsidy funds, rolling investment returns, and new budget allocations.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued a final rule on 5 September 2024 (effective 6 September 2024, published in the Federal Register on the same day as 89 FR 73285) establishing multilateral export controls on four categories of emerging technologies: (1) quantum computing items including quantum computers, related cryogenic / control / measurement systems, and certain quantum software; (2) gate-all-around field-effect transistor (GAAFET) production technology — the next-node semiconductor architecture beyond FinFET; (3) advanced additive-manufacturing equipment for metals + alloys; (4) certain biotech-related items added in a parallel rule on 12 September 2024. The rule operates without country exceptions for some categories, with multilateral coordination via Wassenaar + Australia Group + Nuclear Suppliers Group frameworks.
Malaysia's New Industrial Master Plan 2030 (NIMP 2030) is the fourth-edition national industrial master plan launched on 1 September 2023 by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim under the Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI). Spanning seven years to 2030, NIMP 2030 adopts a mission-based approach with 4 missions, 21 strategies and 62 action plans, mobilising an RM95bn investment envelope (predominantly private-sector capital channelled through private equity and the capital markets). The plan targets a step-change in manufacturing-sector economic complexity, deeper local-industry linkages and expanded participation in global supply chains, with explicit numerical targets for the manufacturing sector's GDP contribution and annual growth by 2030.
On 24 February 2023 the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions on 22 individuals and 83 entities, which Treasury describes as targeting key sectors, evasion efforts and military supplies. Treasury issued a determination under Executive Order 14024 identifying the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy as a sector subject to sanctions, and designated 11 Russian financial institutions, including Credit Bank of Moscow, plus Russian defence and advanced-materials enterprises and third-country evasion facilitators. General Licenses 60 and 61 authorise wind-down of dealings with newly blocked entities through 25 May 2023.
The Bureau of Industry and Security added 57 entities under 57 entries to the Entity List, effective September 30, 2022, in direct response to Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Ukrainian regions. Of the 57 entities, 56 are listed under Russia and one (Subsidiary Sevastopol Naval Plant of Zvezdochka Shipyard) under the Crimea Region of Ukraine. The additions span aviation repair and overhaul facilities, aerospace R&D institutes, naval propulsion, ballistic-missile producers, advanced-materials and quantum science institutes, and the federal metrology agency; 50 of the 57 receive footnote 3 designations as Russian military end users, subjecting them to the Russia/Belarus-Military End User Foreign Direct Product Rule. All are added with a license review policy of denial for all EAR-subject items except food and medicine designated EAR99.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Commerce Control List (CCL) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement four emerging and foundational technology decisions agreed at the December 2021 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting, pursuant to ECRA Section 1758. The rule adds new export controls on ultra-wide bandgap semiconductor substrates (gallium oxide Ga₂O₃ and diamond), ECAD software for Gate-All- Around Field-Effect Transistor (GAAFET) integrated circuit development, and Pressure Gain Combustion (PGC) technology for advanced gas turbine engines. Controls require a licence for items destined to countries listed in the NS:1 and AT:1 columns of the Commerce Country Chart; ECAD software controls (ECCN 3D006) have a delayed compliance date of October 14, 2022.
The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (c.25), receiving Royal Assent on 29 April 2021 and entering full force on 4 January 2022, created the UK's first standalone investment-screening regime, separating national-security review from the Competition and Markets Authority merger-control process. The Act empowers the Secretary of State to call in any acquisition of "control or influence" over a qualifying entity or asset on national-security grounds, and designates 17 sensitive sectors in which acquisitions crossing 25%/50%/75% share-or-voting-rights thresholds (or material influence) require mandatory pre-completion notification to the Investment Security Unit (Cabinet Office); completion before clearance is void and criminal sanctions of up to 5 years imprisonment apply to non-notifying parties. The Act is the structural peer of US CFIUS/FIRRMA (2018), EU Regulation 2019/452, Germany AWG §§55–62, France Décret 2014-479, Netherlands Wet Vifo, and the broader allied FDI-screening parent-statute lattice, and the enabling statute under which all UK mandatory-notification schedule amendments operate.
BIS amended the Commerce Control List (CCL) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement decisions agreed at the December 2019 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting, revising 22 ECCNs across nine CCL categories — including nuclear and conventional arms-related items, materials, manufacturing equipment, semiconductors, laser/sensor systems, and aerospace. The rule harmonises US controls with those of Wassenaar Participating States, maintaining competitive parity among allied exporters while preserving national-security licensing for non-partner destinations. Separately, the rule eliminated email notification and self-classification reporting obligations for most mass-market encryption products and publicly available encryption source code, reducing associated compliance submissions by an estimated 60–80%.
South Korea's Foreign Trade Act (대외무역법, Act No. 5211, enacted 31 December 1986 and repeatedly amended) is the foundational statutory framework of the Republic of Korea's foreign trade and export-control regime. It establishes the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) as the administering authority for foreign trade policy and empowers it to designate strategic items, issue and revoke export licences, operate catch-all controls over non-listed goods destined for WMD-development end-uses, and coordinate with the Nuclear Suppliers Group-administered National Security Authority for Strategic Commerce (NSASC) on Category-0 nuclear items and the Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA) on military goods. Every MOTIE strategic-items notification (the "Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Materials," currently encompassing Categories 1-9 dual-use items harmonised with Wassenaar, MTCR, AG, and NSG) and every MOTIE outbound-investment screening measure derives its legal authority from the Act.