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On 7 February 2026 Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed Presidential Decree No. 103/2026, enacting a National Security and Defence Council (NSDC) decision to apply personal special economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions) against 42 individuals and 35 legal entities based in Russia, Kyrgyzstan and the United Arab Emirates. The tranche specifically targets the "A7" cryptocurrency payment ecosystem, which Ukraine assesses is used to settle payments for components supplied for Russian missile production, alongside wider financial-sector sanctions-circumvention activity. Designation imposes asset freezes and a bar on commercial transactions and investment instruments involving the designees; the decree entered into force on 10 February 2026.

On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 19th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2035 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 22 individuals + 42 entities, total 69 listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (parallel Belarus measures). The package closes the Russian-LNG import loophole left open by the 18th package and establishes the architectural template for crypto-asset sanctions. Headline measures: (i) full prohibition on imports of Russian-origin LNG into the EU — short-term contracts banned six months from entry into force (effective 25 April 2026), long-term contracts (> 1 year, executed before 17 June 2025) phased out by 1 January 2027; (ii) full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (tightening prior partial measures); (iii) five additional Russian banks added to Annex XIV transaction ban (Alfa-Bank, MTS Bank among them; effective 12 November 2025); (iv) full transaction bans on the Mir card payment system and the Faster Payments System (SBP), effective 25 January 2026; (v) first-ever EU sanctions on a stablecoin — the rouble-backed A7A5 (issuer + developer designated) — and a Paraguay-based cryptocurrency exchange used as a circumvention rail; (vi) prohibition on EU operators contracting with 11 listed Russian Special Economic Zones (Annex LII), with mandatory divestment from Alabuga (Tatarstan) and Technopolis Moscow effective 25 January 2026 — no five-year wind-down available; (vii) 45 entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (28 Russian + 17 third-country: 12 Chinese/Hong Kong, 3 Indian, 2 Thai); (viii) new export restrictions on electronic components, microelectronics, acyclic hydrocarbons, pneumatic rubber tires and propellant chemicals (~EUR 155 m of EU 2024 exports); (ix) prohibition on supply of AI, HPC, and quantum-computing services to Russian persons (effective 25 November 2025); (x) tourism-services ban (1 January 2026 wind-down); (xi) 117 additional shadow-fleet vessels listed (cumulative 557, exceeding the 18th package's 444); (xii) four Belarus + Kazakhstan banks listed for SPFS use (effective 2 December 2025); (xiii) binding ownership/control definitions added to Reg. 269/2014 (50 % proprietary-rights threshold + eight-criterion control test). Entry into force on 24 October 2025 (day following publication in OJ L_202502033), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

FinCEN issued a final rule under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act (31 U.S.C. § 5318A) prohibiting US covered financial institutions from opening or maintaining a correspondent account for, or on behalf of, Cambodia-based Huione Group, a foreign financial institution found to be of primary money-laundering concern. Treasury determined that Huione Group and its subsidiaries — including Haowang Guarantee, Huione Pay PLC, and Huione Crypto — laundered at least $4 billion of illicit proceeds between August 2021 and January 2025, including funds tied to North Korean cyber-heist actors and Southeast Asian "pig-butchering" investment-scam compounds. The rule also imposes a special-due-diligence requirement on US covered institutions to guard against indirect access via foreign correspondent accounts. Effective November 17, 2025.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two Iranian financial facilitators — Alireza Derakhshan and Arash Estaki Alivand — along with more than a dozen Hong Kong- and UAE-based individuals and entities for operating a shadow-banking network that laundered proceeds from Iranian oil sales through front companies and cryptocurrency. The designated addresses account for over $600 million in total inflows, including more than $100 million in cryptocurrency purchases tied to oil sales between 2023 and 2025. Proceeds are alleged to benefit the IRGC-Qods Force and Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). This is the second round of OFAC sanctions targeting Iran's shadow-banking infrastructure since National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) directed a maximum-pressure campaign on Iran in February 2025.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated a Russian national (Vitaliy Sergeyevich Andreyev), a Russia-based DPRK economic and trade consular official (Kim Ung Sun), a Chinese front company (Shenyang Geumpungri Network Technology Co., Ltd), and a DPRK trading company subordinate to the DPRK Ministry of People's Armed Forces General Political Bureau (Korea Sinjin Trading Corporation) for facilitating a fraudulent overseas IT-worker scheme that funds North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. The action expands on the prior designation of Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company, an entity tied to the DPRK defense ministry that deploys IT worker delegations in Russia and Laos. Treasury said Andreyev and Kim Ung Sun facilitated cryptocurrency-to-cash conversions worth nearly USD 600,000 since December 2024, and that Shenyang Geumpungri's delegation of DPRK IT workers has earned Chinyong and Sinjin over USD 1 million in profits since 2021. Designations were made under Executive Order 13687, blocking all US-jurisdiction property of the four parties and barring US persons from transactions with them.

On 20 August 2025 the UK government, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated three individuals and five entities — OJSC Capital Bank of Central Asia, Grinex LLC, CJSC Tengricoin, Old Vector LLC (all Kyrgyzstan-based) and Altair Holding SA (Luxembourg-based) — for helping Russia evade Western financial sanctions via opaque Kyrgyz banking channels and cryptocurrency rails. The designations target the A7A5 rouble-backed stablecoin network, which the FCDO says moved USD 9.3bn in transactions over four months, and the Grinex/Meer crypto exchanges used to convert and route the proceeds; designated parties face UK asset freezes and trust-services prohibitions.

On 14 August 2025 OFAC re-designated the cryptocurrency exchange Garantex Europe OU under its cyber authority (E.O. 13694, as amended) for processing over USD 100 million in transactions tied to ransomware and darknet-market actors since 2019, and designated its successor exchange Grinex — created by former Garantex staff to move customer deposits and continue operations after a March 2025 US Secret Service-led takedown of Garantex's infrastructure. OFAC also designated three Garantex executives, the A7A5 ruble-backed stablecoin issuer Old Vector (Kyrgyzstan), and Russian settlement-platform firm A7 and its subsidiaries A71 and A7 Agent — entities linked to sanctioned Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor and sanctioned Promsvyazbank — for supplying the A7A5 token used to compensate Garantex customers and route funds through Grinex.

El Salvador's Legislative Assembly adopted Decreto Legislativo No. 199 on 29 January 2025 with 55 of 60 votes, reforming six articles and repealing three articles of the original Ley Bitcoin (Decreto 57, June 2021). The reform downgrades Bitcoin from compulsory legal tender to voluntary acceptance only — private parties are no longer obliged to accept BTC payments, and Bitcoin can no longer be used to pay taxes or settle public-sector debts. The State also withdraws from operational involvement in the Chivo Wallet platform. The reform is an explicit prior action under the IMF's US$1.4 billion Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programme (IMF Country Report 25/58), published in the Diario Oficial on 30 January 2025 and entering into force 90 days later on 30 April 2025.