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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On 18 September 2026 the U.S. Department of State published an interim final rule amending the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to remove certain uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) from U.S. Munitions List Category XX(a), effective 19 October 2026. Vessels removed from the scope of Category XX(a)(10) that are not separately described elsewhere on the USML become subject to the Commerce Department's Export Administration Regulations (EAR) instead — a reclassification from the stricter State Department license regime to Commerce jurisdiction, not a full decontrol. The Department states the removed vessels "do not warrant control under the ITAR" and is separately soliciting comments on further refining UUV controls and license exemptions.
The US Department of State published an interim final rule removing from the US Munitions List (USML) certain civil aircraft modified to incorporate aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) — directed infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) and the missile-warning systems that operate them, used to protect aircraft from MANPADS and other guided-weapon threats. Qualifying aircraft (FAA- or allied-NATO-certificated transport/commuter types before modification) move from State/ITAR licensing jurisdiction to the less restrictive Commerce/EAR regime under ECCN 9A991.b. The rule also excludes certain reexport and temporary-import activities involving such ASE from ITAR licensing requirements entirely. Effective October 13, 2026, with public comments accepted through September 28, 2026.
The US Department of State extended, through 30 August 2028, a standing temporary modification of Category XI(b) of the US Munitions List (USML) — the ITAR category covering electronic systems and software specially designed for collecting, surveying, monitoring or exploiting the electromagnetic spectrum for intelligence purposes. The modification reinstates pre-30-December-2014 control scope by reinserting the phrase "analyze and produce information from" and adding software to the Category XI(b) description, after a 2014 USML revision was read by some exporters as narrowing coverage of intelligence-analytics software. This is the latest in a chain of extensions dating to the original July 2014 rule (79 FR 37536), most recently extended through August 2026 (86 FR 48021); no new items are added to or removed from the Munitions List by this action.
Singapore issued a package of four companion instruments in 2025 to modernise its strategic-goods control architecture: (i) the Strategic Goods (Control) Order 2025 (SGCO 2025), which revokes and replaces SGCO 2024 (S 641/2024) and expands the Singapore Strategic Goods Control List to align with the 2024 Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List and 2024 EU List of Dual-Use Items, effective 1 December 2025; (ii) the Strategic Goods (Control) (Brokering) (Amendment) Order 2025 (S 662/2025), published 1 October 2025, updating Singapore's extraterritorial brokering regime for controlled goods; (iii) Singapore Customs Circular 01/2025 of 8 April 2025, amending import/export declaration requirements to mandate disclosure of the final destination country of goods rather than the consignee address on the commercial invoice; and (iv) a 4 April 2025 joint MTI–Singapore Customs advisory explicitly warning Singapore-based businesses and intermediaries that their compliance obligations extend beyond Singapore's own controls — i.e., that Singapore authorities will not condone deliberate circumvention or violation of US, EU, or Japanese export controls by Singapore-domiciled intermediaries. This package constitutes the first Singapore export-control-architecture filing in the IPTM register and is directly framed by the February 2025 Singapore–NVIDIA–Inspur–DeepSeek GPU-diversion case in which three Singapore residents were charged for fraudulent re-export of restricted AI accelerators to PRC end-users.
China's Ministry of Commerce announced on 3 December 2024 (MOFCOM Announcement No. 46 of 2024) a formal ban on dual-use exports to the United States of gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials including diamond and cubic boron nitride. The measure also imposed strict end-use review on graphite exports to the US, with extra scrutiny of military end-uses. It came one day after BIS issued a major export- control package on 2 December 2024 expanding controls on Chinese semiconductor equipment and adding 140 entities to the Entity List, and was framed by MOFCOM as a national- security countermeasure.
The Defence and Strategic Goods List (DSGL) 2024 was registered on the Federal Register of Legislation on 16 August 2024 under the Customs Act 1901 and Defence Trade Controls Act 2012, repealing and replacing the DSGL 2021. It comprises the Munitions List (Part 1) and the Dual-Use List (Part 2, nine technology categories including nuclear materials, chemicals, electronics, sensors and marine and aerospace equipment) that Australia controls for export, brokering and intangible transfer. The 2024 instrument periodically realigns the list with changes agreed in the multilateral non-proliferation and export-control regimes Australia belongs to (Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group); most changes are clarifications to existing controls, with a smaller number of items entering or leaving control or having their approval requirements adjusted.
The Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024 (C2024A00021) received Royal Assent on 8 April 2024 and created three new criminal offences in the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012: section 10A (supply of Defence and Strategic Goods List technology in Australia to a non-exempt foreign person); section 10B (secondary supply of DSGL Part 1 Munitions or Part 2 Dual-Use Sensitive/Very Sensitive goods or technology outside Australia when originally exported from Australia); and section 10C (provision of DSGL Part 1 services to foreign nationals outside Australia). All three offences carry maximum penalties of 10 years imprisonment or 2,500 penalty units (~A$782,500), or both. The offence framework commenced 1 September 2024 with a six-month compliance-transition period; criminal liability attached from 1 March 2025. The Act also codifies AUKUS-partnership exemptions, carving out supplies to and from citizens and permanent residents of the United Kingdom and United States, underpinning the licence-free trilateral technology-transfer environment sought under AUKUS Pillar 2.