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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On 3 June 2026 the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal to amend and substantially expand the EU Chips Act (Regulation (EU) 2023/1781), as part of the European Technological Sovereignty Package. The proposal raises the mobilisation target from €43bn to €120bn, introduces new demand-side "Demand Accelerators" to aggregate public procurement, expands "Grand Challenges" to cover AI-optimised chips, caps permitting at 12 months, and widens the Strategic Partnerships on Semiconductors framework. As a Commission legislative proposal it now enters co-decision (European Parliament + Council) before becoming law; the 2023 regulation remains in force during this process.
South Korea's National Assembly passed the "Special Act on Strengthening and Supporting the Competitiveness of the Semiconductor Industry" (반도체산업 경쟁력 강화 및 지원에 관한 특별법) on 29 January 2026 by 199 votes in favour out of 206 members present, after roughly 18 months of inter-party deadlock. The act establishes (i) a Presidential Commission for Enhancing Semiconductor Competitiveness as the central inter-ministerial coordination body, (ii) a statutory five-year master plan with annual implementation plans, (iii) a dedicated semiconductor industry special account ("반도체산업 특별회계") to ring-fence funding for fabs, materials, parts and equipment, and packaging across the full memory + system-LSI + design + manufacturing supply chain, and (iv) authority to designate semiconductor clusters outside the greater Seoul area with relocation incentives. Promulgation by the Cabinet is expected shortly after passage; effectiveness contingent on enforcement-ordinance finalisation, expected Q3 2026. The KRW 2tn anchor envelope of the special account does not begin disbursing until 2027 because companion amendments to the National Finance Act were not enacted in time.
Regulation (EU) 2024/1735 - the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) - was published in the Official Journal on 22 June 2024 and entered into force on 12 July 2024 (twenty days after OJ publication). It sets a binding target that at least 40% of the EU's annual deployment needs for net-zero technologies be manufactured within the EU by 2030. It establishes a streamlined permitting regime for Net-Zero Strategic Projects (NZSP) capped at 18 months for construction permits (9 months for smaller projects), creates Net-Zero Regulatory Sandboxes, and requires public procurers and auction designers to include resilience and sustainability criteria that effectively favour non-China-sourced equipment. The Act is the manufacturing-capacity complement to the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA, Reg 2024/1252, filed separately) and was explicitly designed to close the EU's competitive gap with US IRA manufacturing incentives.
METI committed up to 732 billion yen (~US$4.86 billion) in direct subsidies for Japan Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing K.K. (JASM) to build a second wafer fab adjacent to the first JASM facility in Kikuyo, Kumamoto Prefecture. Confirmed by METI Minister Ken Saito at the Fab 1 opening ceremony on 24 February 2024, two weeks after TSMC, Sony Semiconductor Solutions, Denso, and Toyota jointly announced the Fab 2 expansion (6 February 2024). Fab 2 will produce 6/7nm and 40nm logic for automotive, industrial, consumer, and HPC end-markets, with combined Fab 1 + Fab 2 capacity exceeding 100,000 12-inch wafers per month. Construction targets year-end 2024; operations target year-end 2027. Combined with the 476 billion yen Fab 1 grant, total JASM subsidies reach ~1.208 trillion yen, the largest single direct manufacturing subsidy in Japanese history. METI conditions require >=10 years of post-startup production and >=50% Japanese-domestic procurement of silicon wafers, materials, and components.
Regulation (EU) 2023/1781, published in the Official Journal on 18 September 2023 and in force from 8 October 2023, establishes the EU Chips Act: a three-pillar framework targeting 20% of global semiconductor production by 2030 (up from approximately 9% in 2022) by mobilising EUR 43bn in public and private investment. Pillar 1 (Chips for Europe Initiative, EUR 3.3bn committed from EU budget) funds R&D, pilot production lines, and design infrastructure. Pillar 2 creates a fast-track permitting regime for "Integrated Production Facilities" (IPFs) and "Open EU Foundries" (OEFs) that qualify as being in the Union's interest. Pillar 3 establishes a supply-chain monitoring mechanism and grants the Commission power to mandate priority orders from designated facilities during a declared semiconductor crisis.
The UK government published its National Semiconductor Strategy on 19 May 2023, under Secretary of State Michelle Donelan at the newly established Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT). The strategy commits GBP 1 billion in long-run support to the UK semiconductor sector, explicitly focusing on the UK's identified strengths: chip design (Arm, Imagination Technologies, Dialog), compound and wide-bandgap semiconductors (III-V, SiC, GaN -- centred on the Cardiff/Newport cluster and IQE plc), and upstream academic R&D. Unlike the US CHIPS Act or EU Chips Act, the strategy explicitly declined to fund advanced silicon wafer fabrication at scale, acknowledging the prohibitive capital cost and the UK's lack of existing fab infrastructure at leading nodes. A UK Semiconductor Advisory Panel was established to guide delivery and assess emerging requirements. The strategy is enabled by the UK Subsidy Control Act 2022 (in force January 2023), which freed UK public authorities to grant large technology subsidies without prior EU Commission approval.
The Korean National Assembly passed an amendment to the Restriction of Special Taxation Act (조세특례제한법, Act No. 19234) on 30 March 2023, promulgated 31 March 2023 and retroactive to 1 January 2023. The amendment enhanced the investment tax credit (ITC) for "national strategic technology" (국가전략기술) semiconductor facility investment: large companies receive a 15% ITC on qualifying capital expenditure (up from 8% in the December 2022 base version); small and medium enterprises receive 25%. An additional temporary 10% incremental credit applies for annual investment exceeding the prior 3-year average (effective 2023-2025). Internationally termed the "K-Chips Act," the measure directly mirrors the US CHIPS Act's 25% advanced- manufacturing investment tax credit. Principal beneficiaries are Samsung Electronics (Samsung Foundry plus DRAM/NAND capex of KRW 20-30 trillion per year) and SK Hynix (memory fabs at Icheon and Cheongju, HBM expansion). In the same session the National Assembly passed companion legislation on secondary-battery (EV) investment with equivalent credit rates. The Korean government projected annual tax savings for the semiconductor sector of approximately KRW 1-2 trillion.
The Legislative Yuan of Taiwan (ROC) passed amendments to Articles 10-2 and 72 of the Statute for Industrial Innovation ("產業創新條例") on third reading on 7 January 2023. The amendment, internationally termed the "Taiwan Chips Act," is implemented from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2029. Article 10-2 grants Taiwan-registered companies that occupy key positions in international supply chains a 25% investment tax credit on qualifying forward-looking innovative R&D expenditure (capped at 30% of the year's profit-seeking enterprise income tax payable), plus a 5% credit on the purchase of brand-new machinery or equipment used in own-account advanced manufacturing processes (also capped at 30%). Eligibility thresholds set by the Ministry of Finance require annual R&D spend of at least NT$6bn, R&D intensity (R&D / net operating revenue) of at least 6%, and an effective tax rate of at least 15% (12% for FY2023 only); the 5% equipment credit additionally requires equipment expenditure of at least NT$10bn. The measure is Taiwan's principal supply- side response to the US CHIPS Act, the EU Chips Act, the K-Chips Act, and Japan's METI subsidy programme, and is designed to retain TSMC, MediaTek, and other leading-edge silicon investment onshore as overseas subsidies pull capacity to Arizona, Kumamoto, Dresden, and elsewhere.
METI committed 476 billion yen (~$3.3bn) in direct subsidies covering approximately half the construction cost of Japan Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing K.K. (JASM), a purpose-built joint venture fab at Kikuyo Town, Kumamoto Prefecture. JASM shareholders are TSMC (86.5%), Sony Semiconductor Solutions (6%), Denso (6%), and Toyota Motor (1.5 %). The fab manufactures 12nm, 16nm, 22nm, and 28nm mature-node chips targeting automotive-grade, industrial, and IoT applications. A groundbreaking ceremony was held on 13 April 2022; the facility officially opened on 24 February 2024 and reached commercial production in December 2024. JASM represents Japan's first new leading-edge wafer fab in decades and the largest single foreign direct investment in Japanese manufacturing history.