Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2665 actions· ✨ 90 recent

On 23 April 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted the 20th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2026/506 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions) and Council Regulation (EU) 2026/511 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 120 additional individuals and entities, the largest single tranche in two years). The package operationalises and extends the crypto-sanctions architecture introduced in the 19th package and constructs the legal scaffolding for a future full prohibition on maritime services to vessels carrying Russian crude/petroleum products. Headline measures: (i) full sectoral prohibition on transactions with crypto-asset service providers and exchange platforms established in Russia or Belarus, plus designation of the rouble-backed stablecoin RUBx and the digital rouble (CBDC) on Annex LIII — effective 24 May 2026, with EU support for the digital rouble's development banned outright; (ii) 36 new energy-sector listings spanning upstream extraction, refining and transportation; (iii) prohibition on providing technical, financial, brokering and insurance services to Russia-flagged, Russian-certified or Russian-managed LNG tankers and icebreakers effective 25 April 2026, extending to foreign-flagged vessels operating in Russian interests by January 2027 and culminating in a categorical ban on LNG terminal services to Russian-controlled entities on 1 January 2027; (iv) full transaction ban on 20 Russian banks plus four third-country banks listed for SPFS connectivity / sanctions circumvention; (v) 46 newly listed shadow-fleet vessels and new tanker sale-due-diligence obligations on EU shipping operators; (vi) 58 designations of companies and associated individuals in the Russian military-industrial complex including drone developers/manufacturers; (vii) further Annex IV third-country circumvention enabler listings (China, Hong Kong, Turkey, UAE); (viii) parallel measures against Belarus. Entry into force on 24 April 2026 (day following publication in OJ L_202600506), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

On 10 February 2026 in Baku, US Vice President JD Vance and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership — a foundational bilateral instrument covering five cooperation tracks: economy and trade, energy, connectivity and digital development (including AI), security and defense, and critical-minerals transit. The Charter commits both governments to facilitate the transit of critical minerals via the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor to global markets, and formally recognises the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) as the multi-modal connectivity link between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The instrument builds on the 8 August 2025 MoU signed in Washington during the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Summit that established the Strategic Working Group tasked with drafting the Charter, and marks the first US Vice-Presidential visit to Azerbaijan since Dick Cheney in 2008.

Italy's Department for Digital Transformation (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri) and Invitalia S.p.A. signed an implementing agreement on 4-5 February 2026 establishing the EUR 733 million "Fondo Nazionale per la Connettività" (National Connectivity Fund), financed under PNRR Mission 1, Component 2, Investment 7. The fund provides non-repayable public grants to private telecom operators for ultra-broadband network build-out through 2029, targeting a minimum 1 Gbit/s download / 200 Mbit/s upload connection for covered property units, and requires a minimum 30% private co-financing share per project. Invitalia manages the fund through 31 December 2030.

On 8 September 2025, the UK Ministry of Defence published the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 — "Making Defence an Engine for Growth" (CP 1388) — the first comprehensive cabinet-level UK defence industrial strategy in over a decade and the sector plan for Defence under the UK Modern Industrial Strategy umbrella (IS-8). The strategy was published alongside the Strategic Defence Review 2025 and operationalises the largest sustained defence- spending increase since the Cold War (rising to 2.6% of GDP by 2027 with ambition to 3% in the next Parliament). It defines six priority outcomes (growth, backing UK businesses, defence innovation, resilient industrial base, procurement transformation, enduring partnerships); establishes UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) within the MOD with a ringfenced £400m budget to accelerate dual-use technology; identifies priority defence capabilities (combat air, complex weapons, directed-energy weapons, next- generation land and maritime systems) plus dual-use sub-sectors (quantum, drones/autonomy, space, AI, cyber, engineering biology, advanced connectivity); and flags resilience priorities in steel, construction, energetic materials, batteries, semiconductors and rare earths.

BIS (acting through its Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services, OICTS) published a final rule under Executive Order 13873's ICTS authority prohibiting certain connected-vehicle (CV) transactions involving hardware and software designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China or the Russian Federation. The rule reaches the Vehicle Connectivity System (VCS — hardware/software enabling external RF connectivity above 450 MHz) and the Automated Driving System (ADS) software stack. Effective 17 March 2025, with phased prohibitions: import/sale of CVs incorporating covered software prohibited from model year 2027; import of covered VCS hardware prohibited from model year 2030 (or 1 January 2029 for hardware not associated with a model year). Importers and connected-vehicle manufacturers must file annual Declarations of Conformity.

On 26 July 2018 the Serbian government agreed to sell a 63% stake in RTB Bor — the state-owned copper mining complex in eastern Serbia — to Zijin Mining Group (HKG:2899) for approximately USD 350 million plus a committed investment of USD 1.26 billion over five years. The transaction closed on 24 September 2018 after Chinese MOFCOM and Serbian government approvals. RTB Bor operates the Bor open-pit copper mine and the Čukaru Peki underground mine. Under Zijin's management, combined annual copper output reached 296,000 tonnes in 2025, making Zijin the second-largest copper producer in Europe after KGHM (Poland). The complex also produces significant gold as a by-product. The acquisition was facilitated by the China-Serbia comprehensive strategic partnership and BRI connectivity framework. The Serbian government accepted Chinese investment at a discount to assessed asset value in exchange for committed capital expenditure in a region with limited Western private-sector appetite for brownfield copper. EU membership negotiations and EU state-aid rules complicated alternative European financing structures. Zijin financed the acquisition through a combination of corporate balance sheet and China Development Bank-syndicated loans. The Čukaru Peki mine, which was not included in the initial RTB Bor asset base, received a separate Zijin investment commitment exceeding USD 800 million.