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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 30 of 2026 on July 24, 2026, adding 14 EU-based entities to the Export Control Management List under the Export Control Law and Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations. The listing bars Chinese exporters from supplying dual-use items to the named entities, bars any overseas party from transferring or providing China-origin dual-use items to them, and orders ongoing related transactions to stop immediately; exporters may apply to MOFCOM for case-by-case exemption. It is the first MOFCOM entity-list action ever to target EU-domiciled entities and the first ever to name a university (Wrocław University of Science and Technology). The 14 entities span Germany (Rheinmetall AG, Sindlhauser Materials GmbH, Antraco Chemie-Handelsgesellschaft mbH), Italy (Lafert S.p.A., Garnet S.r.l.), France (InPACT S.A., III-V LAB, Cavok UAS), Poland (Vigo Photonics S.A., Politechnika Wrocławska), the Netherlands (IHC Merwede Holding B.V.), Czechia (TATRA TRUCKS a.s.), Bulgaria (Opticoelectron Group) and Lithuania (Ekspla UAB) — defence, drone, photonics, laser, semiconductor and maritime-engineering firms and research institutes. The action came roughly 24 hours after the EU's 21st Russia sanctions package (adopted July 23, 2026) added Chinese and Hong Kong dual-use-trading entities to its own restricted list, and is widely read as a reciprocal countermeasure.
On 29 June 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 27 [2026], adding 20 Japanese entities to the dual-use-item export-control Control List (受控名单) under the Dual-Use Export Control Regulations. The designated entities include four defense research institutes (National Institute for Defense Studies plus ground-, naval- and air-systems research bodies) and 16 companies, primarily Mitsubishi Electric and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries subsidiaries. The Control List designation imposes an absolute prohibition on exporting PRC-origin dual-use items — including rare earths and gallium/germanium/antimony-class strategic minerals — to the listed parties, and bars any third-country transfer of Chinese-origin dual-use items to them; ongoing supply activity must cease immediately, with exceptions only via special MOFCOM application. MOFCOM stated the action targets entities "involved in enhancing Japan's military capabilities."
On 25 February 2026 Zimbabwe's Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, under Minister Polite Kambamura, announced an immediate and indefinite suspension of exports of all unprocessed minerals — including lithium-bearing spodumene concentrates, which had previously been exempt from the country's December 2022 ban on raw lithium ore (Statutory Instrument 213 of 2022). The directive was communicated by ministerial letter dated 17 February 2026 to the Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe and copied to lithium producers; the suspension took effect on 25 February and explicitly covered consignments already in transit, with the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) and the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) ordered to halt clearance at the border. The measure brings forward by roughly eleven months a lithium-concentrate export ban that had been telegraphed for January 2027, and broadens it to all raw mineral exports. The Minister cited "national interest", in-country beneficiation, transparency, and prevention of mineral export "leakages" (smuggling and under-invoicing) as the rationale. Bloomberg and Reuters reporting noted under-declaration of grade and value as a proximate trigger; the government later (April 2026) clarified that reinstated exports would require Quota Verification certificates, monthly reporting, on-site assay laboratories, and individual producer-level export ceilings — i.e. the suspension functions as a reset to a quota regime rather than a permanent embargo. Zimbabwe is the world's fifth-largest lithium producer (~6-7% of global supply on a contained-LCE basis) and exported 1.128 million tonnes of spodumene concentrate in 2025 (an 11% YoY increase). The producer base is overwhelmingly Chinese-owned: Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (Arcadia / Prospect), Sinomine Resource Group (Bikita Minerals), Chengxin Lithium (Sabi Star), and Sichuan Yahua (Kamativi) together account for the majority of output. The ban therefore primarily disrupts Chinese midstream lithium converters in Sichuan and Jiangxi that depend on Zimbabwean spodumene feedstock, while incrementally tightening the global seaborne concentrate market. The action is structurally a continuation of the EM resource-nationalism / upstream-capture template pioneered by Indonesia's nickel-ore ban (2020) and most recently extended by the DRC's ARECOMS cobalt suspension and quota system (Feb-Oct 2025). It reinforces a pattern in which producing-country governments capture processing margin from consuming-country smelters, and it does so in a commodity (lithium) where ex-China refining capacity is still thin, magnifying near-term price impact even though the headline share of global supply removed is moderate.
On 6 January 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 1 [2026] "On Strengthening Export Controls on Dual-Use Items to Japan" (商务部公告2026年第1号), the first PRC export-control instrument to single out a named country other than the United States. Effective immediately on publication with no wind-down period, the measure prohibits export of all dual-use items under PRC export-control law where the end-user is the Japanese Ministry of Defense or Self-Defense Forces, the end-use is Japanese military, or — under a novel catch-all standard — the transaction would "enhance Japan's military capabilities." The standard is explicitly extraterritorial, covering transfers of PRC-origin dual-use items through third countries and in-country transfers where the end-user / end-use falls within scope. The political trigger was Japanese PM Takaichi's November 2025 Diet remarks framing a Taiwan contingency as a Japanese "survival-threatening situation" justifying SDF deployment.
BIS published an interim final rule (FR Doc 2025-00711, 90 FR 4544-publication slot; companion to the AI Diffusion Framework signed three days earlier) revising the EAR to add explicit due-diligence procedures for advanced computing integrated circuits captured by ECCN 3A090. The rule (i) creates an Authorized IC Designer / Approved IC Packager regime so that foundries and OSATs can identify trustworthy customers via lists maintained by BIS, (ii) imposes new front-end-fabricator reporting requirements for any 3A090.a IC produced for an authorized IC designer to give the US government supply-chain visibility, and (iii) adjusts the scope of covered advanced-computing items. Effective 16 January 2025; compliance required from 31 January 2025; comment period extended to 14 March 2025. The rule was immediately followed by the 16 January Entity List additions (Sophgo et al.) targeting circumvention paths and was technically amended on 14 February 2025 to narrow the RS license requirement to ECCN 3A090.a only.
Indonesia's Ministry of Trade promulgated Peraturan Menteri Perdagangan (Permendag) No. 10 of 2024 on 30 May 2024, amending Permendag 22/2023 on Goods Prohibited for Export. The regulation set 31 December 2024 as the final cutoff for copper-concentrate and anode-sludge exports — extending the original 1 June 2024 ban deadline by seven months — and enforced a full prohibition starting 1 January 2025. The measure is paired with ESDM Regulation No. 6 of 2024 covering the upstream mining-product side, completing the legal architecture of Indonesia's copper "hilirisasi" (downstream-isation) mandate. The ban forces all domestically mined copper concentrate to be smelted and refined inside Indonesia. Two operators are directly affected: PT Freeport Indonesia (PTFI), majority-owned by state holding MIND ID with Freeport-McMoRan as minority partner, which operates the Grasberg mine in Papua and the new Manyar/Gresik smelter in JIIPE; and PT Amman Mineral Nusa Tenggara (subsidiary of PT Amman Mineral Internasional, IDX:AMMN), which operates the Batu Hijau mine in Sumbawa with a smelter under commissioning. A fire at Freeport's Gresik smelter in October 2024 disrupted ramp-up and forced the government to grant a discretionary export-permit extension into 2025 for PTFI, signalling that the ban — while now legally in force — is being enforced flexibly during smelter commissioning rather than as a hard stop. Permendag 10/2024 is the copper-sector equivalent of the 2020 nickel- ore export ban (ESDM 11/2019) and the planned bauxite-ore ban (effective June 2023). Together these three measures complete Indonesia's resource-nationalism package across its three highest-value mineral exports: nickel, bauxite, and copper. Combined domestic smelter capex commitments tied to the copper rule (Freeport Manyar + Amman Sumbawa) total ~USD 6 billion. Indonesia's Finance Ministry estimated forgone export revenue of ~Rp 10 trillion (~USD 640 million per year) from the copper-concentrate ban alone, which the government is treating as an acceptable downstream-policy cost. Severity is set at 4: the action is binding, durable, and reshapes a globally relevant supply chain (Indonesia is ~5% of global mined copper, rising), but discretionary export extensions during smelter commissioning soften near-term enforcement and limit the immediate market shock relative to the harder 2020 nickel rule.
On 9 April 2024, Türkiye's Ministry of Trade restricted exports of 1,019 tariff lines across 54 product groups to Israel — including cement, marble, sulphur, aluminium wire, ceramics, varnishes and mineral fertilisers — in response to Israel's conduct of the Gaza war and its refusal of a Turkish request to participate in aid airdrops. The government stated the restriction would remain in force until Israel declared an immediate ceasefire and allowed unimpeded humanitarian aid into Gaza. The measure was superseded three weeks later, on 2 May 2024, when the Ministry halted all exports, imports and transit trade with Israel across every product category.
On 25 October 2023 the Bureau of Industry and Security published an interim final rule (88 FR 73424; FR Doc 2023-23055) making substantive revisions to the October 7 2022 advanced-computing IFR, incorporating 43 public comments covering 78 topics. The rule replaced the prior TOPS-based performance metric with a new "Total Processing Performance" (TPP) / performance-density dual-threshold structure for ECCN 3A090, splitting the control into tiers 3A090.a (full licence requirement for highest-capability datacenter AI chips) and 3A090.b (new License Exception NAC with 25-day prior notification for the intermediate tier). Geographic scope was expanded from China-and-Macau to Country Groups D:1/D:4/D:5 to block diversion via third-country intermediaries and offshore datacenters.
India's Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, issued Notification No. 20/2023 on 20 July 2023 amending the export policy of non-basmati white rice (semi-milled or wholly milled rice, whether or not polished or glazed; HS 1006 30 90) from "Free" to "Prohibited" with immediate effect. The stated objective was to stabilise domestic prices and ensure adequate availability after uneven monsoon onset and rising retail rice inflation. Limited carve-outs applied for cargo already loaded prior to the notification and for government-to-government supplies authorised on food-security grounds. The blanket ban was lifted by DGFT Notification 31/2024 on 28 September 2024, replaced first by a USD 490/tonne minimum export price (MEP) and then by free export after the MEP was withdrawn in late October 2024.
China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly announced an export licensing regime covering eight gallium-related items (including gallium metal, gallium arsenide, gallium nitride wafers and ingots) and six germanium- related items (including germanium metal, germanium oxide, germanium tetrachloride). Effective 1 August 2023, exporters must obtain a dual-use-item licence from MOFCOM citing the end-user and end-use, with licences granted at MOFCOM's discretion. The measure was framed as protecting national security and interests, though the timing immediately followed the Dutch ASML DUV controls and US chip-equipment escalations.
Indonesia accelerated the implementation of its raw nickel ore export ban, originally scheduled for 2022, to take effect on 1 January 2020. Announced 30 August 2019 by Minister Ignasius Jonan via ESDM Regulation No. 11/2019, the ban prohibits the export of nickel ore with grades below 1.7% Ni (effectively all Indonesian saprolite and limonite ore that previously flowed to Chinese stainless-steel and ferronickel mills) and forces ore to be processed domestically into intermediate products (nickel pig iron, ferronickel, mixed hydroxide precipitate, nickel sulfate). The policy is part of the long-running "hilirisasi" (downstream-isation) strategy and was the trigger for the >$30B wave of Chinese-led nickel- processing investment in Sulawesi (Morowali, Weda Bay) that has since made Indonesia the dominant global nickel producer.