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Japan's Diet passed the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) 2026 Amendment on 29 May 2026; the law was promulgated on 5 June 2026. The amendment represents the most significant overhaul of Japan's inbound FDI screening regime since FEFTA was first applied to national-security transactions in 2019. Three structural additions: (1) indirect-acquisition screening — extends mandatory prior-notification to acquisitions of Japanese sensitive-sector companies effected through intermediate holding structures or offshore parent vehicles, closing the principal gap exploited by Chinese and GCC SWF investors via SPV chains; (2) call-in powers — grants the Minister of Finance authority to open a review up to ten years retroactively where an acquisition was not pre-notified or where circumstances have materially changed since clearance, directly analogous to CFIUS § 721(b)(1)(D) retroactive jurisdiction; (3) cross-ministerial "Japan CFIUS" consultation framework — formally institutionalises a standing inter-agency committee (Finance, METI, MoD, NPA, MIAC) modelled on the US CFIUS committee, replacing the prior ad-hoc inter-ministerial process. Cross-ministerial and indirect-acquisition provisions entered into force immediately on promulgation (5 June 2026); remaining Cabinet-Order-level implementing provisions to follow within one year.

On 26 November 2025, Scotland's Deputy First Minister and Cabinet Secretary for Economy and Gaelic, Kate Forbes MSP, wrote to the Scottish Parliament's Economy and Fair Work Committee confirming that the preferred bidder for Glasgow Prestwick Airport had withdrawn from the sale process after a "robust commercial deal" had been negotiated. The letter discloses that the proposed acquisition was subject to mandatory notification to the UK Government under the National Security and Investment Act 2021, a reserved matter on which Scottish Ministers cannot comment. Media reporting (Global Trade Alert; Daily Business) identifies the withdrawn bidder as Turkish conglomerate Limak Holding and attributes the collapse directly to the UK national-security review process ("Westminster officials opening an investigation"). The airport, which employs over 500 people directly and anchors an Ayrshire aerospace cluster, remains in Scottish Government public ownership.

Japan's National Diet enacted the Cyber Response Capability Enhancement Act (重要電子計算機に対する不正な行為による被害の防止に関する法律, Law No. 42 of 2025) on 16 May 2025, together with companion arrangement legislation. Commonly known as the Active Cyber Defense (ACD) Law, the statute authorises (i) government monitoring of foreign-origin internet traffic transiting designated Japanese communication infrastructure for national-security threat indicators, (ii) pre-emptive access and neutralisation operations against attacker infrastructure abroad by the National Police Agency and the Self-Defense Forces under unified command, and (iii) mandatory cyber-incident reporting and government cooperation duties on critical-infrastructure operators. Implementation is phased through November 2027, with the NISC reorganised into the National Cybersecurity Office (NCO) under the Cabinet Secretariat from July 2025.

The National Assembly of Vietnam passed the Law on Data (Luật Dữ liệu), No. 60/2024/QH15, on 30 November 2024; it enters into force on 1 July 2025. The Law is Vietnam's first comprehensive horizontal data-governance statute, extending regulation beyond personal data (already covered by Decree 13/2023/ND-CP) to all digital data — public, private, and sectoral. It introduces statutory categories of "important data" (dữ liệu quan trọng) and "core data" (dữ liệu cốt lõi) tied to national-defence and national-security review for cross-border transfer, and establishes the National Data Centre under the Ministry of Public Security plus a statutory data-broker / data-services licensing framework.

On 2 June 2024, Treasurer Jim Chalmers signed the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers (Disposal of Interests in Northern Minerals Limited) Orders 2024 (F2024N00475), directing five China-linked foreign investors to divest a combined 613,573,632 shares in Northern Minerals Limited (ASX: NTU) to non-associates by 2 September 2024 on national-security grounds. The five named investors are Yuxiao Fund Pte Ltd, Black Stone Resources Limited, Indian Ocean International Shipping and Service Company Limited, Ms Ximei Liu, and Mr Xi Wang, together holding approximately 10.4% of NTU's total shares. NTU owns the Browns Range Heavy Rare Earths Project in the East Kimberley region of Western Australia — one of the few commercial-scale dysprosium and terbium deposits outside China. This is the foundational FATA s.69(2) disposal-order instrument; non-compliance led to an AUD 14 million Federal Court penalty in January 2026 and a second tranche of disposal orders against six further China-linked investors in May 2026.

The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA), enacted as Division H of P.L. 118-50 (21st Century Peace through Strength Act), prohibits app stores and internet hosting services from distributing, maintaining, or updating "foreign adversary controlled applications" — defined explicitly to include ByteDance Ltd and its subsidiaries (TikTok). ByteDance was given 270 days from enactment (until January 19, 2025) to execute a "qualified divestiture" — selling TikTok to an owner with no operational relationship with a foreign adversary — or face a nationwide distribution ban. The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the law's constitutionality in TikTok, Inc. v. Garland (January 17, 2025), rejecting First Amendment challenges and affirming the national-security rationale grounded in data-collection concerns.

Latvia's Saeima adopted on 27 March 2024 amendments to the National Security Law (Nacionālās drošības likums), entering into force on 24 April 2024, that widen the perimeter of foreign-investment and ownership transactions subject to Cabinet of Ministers pre-clearance over "companies of significance to national security." The amendments expand the universe of regulated subjects beyond registered companies to include foundations and associations, tighten the rules on beneficial-ownership disclosure, and bring additional sensitive activities — energy security including LNG-terminal acquisitions, electronic communications, cybersecurity, and critical-raw-materials processing — under the regime, while clarifying Cabinet authority to impose conditions or unwind transactions retroactively. The law functions as Latvia's horizontal FDI-screening instrument under the EU-wide cooperation framework of Regulation 2019/452.

On 22 January 2024, Brazil's National Council for Industrial Development (CNDI), reactivated by President Lula in 2023, launched Nova Indústria Brasil (NIB) — Brazil's first comprehensive national industrial policy since the 2011-2014 Plano Brasil Maior. The framework commits roughly R$300 billion (~USD 60 billion) in financing through 2026, distributed across loans, non-refundable grants and equity participations administered by BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank), Finep (Research and Projects Financing Company) and Embrapii (Brazilian Industrial Research and Innovation Company), with quantitative targets running to 2033. The R$300bn envelope combines R$106bn announced at the first CNDI meeting in July 2023 with R$194bn redirected from existing budget lines. NIB is structured around six "missions": (1) sustainable and digital agro-industrial chains, (2) health-industrial complex resilience (medicines, vaccines, devices), (3) urban infrastructure and green mobility, (4) digital transformation and Industry 4.0 including semiconductors, (5) bioeconomy and energy transition, and (6) defence, sovereignty and national-security technologies. Two presidential decrees signed the same day establish local-content preferences for New PAC public-procurement bids and create an Interministerial Public Procurement Commission. As of February 2025, BNDES had approved R$220bn in NIB-aligned operations, and the plan has anchored downstream sectoral programmes including Brasil Semicon, the Mover automotive programme and Mais Inovação.

The Significant Investments Review Act 2024 (Act No. 1 of 2024) is Singapore's first horizontal, cross-sector statutory FDI screening regime. The Bill was passed by Parliament on 9 January 2024, assented to by the President on 6 February 2024 and gazetted on 14 February 2024; the Act commenced on 28 March 2024 under the SIRA 2024 (Commencement) Notification (S 228/2024), together with the Significant Investments Review Regulations 2024 (S 229/2024). The Act creates an "ownership-and-control" layer over a limited number of "designated entities" the Minister for Trade and Industry has identified as critical to Singapore's national-security interests, plus an "any entity" call-in power exercisable against firms that have acted against Singapore's national-security interests, regardless of whether they are designated. Acquisitions of ≥5% require post-closing notification within 7 days; acquisitions of ≥12% / ≥25% / ≥50% and cessations of ≥50% / ≥75% controller status require prior ministerial approval. Administered by the Office of Significant Investments Review (OSIR) within MTI. SIRA is the Singaporean structural peer of US CFIUS, EU Regulation 2019/452, the German AWG §§55-62, the French Décret 2014-479, the UK NSI Act 2021, the Netherlands Wet Vifo, and the Canada ICA national-security review.

Lov 2023-06-20 nr. 77 (Lov om endringer i sikkerhetsloven — eierskapskontroll og lovens virkeområde), adopted by the Storting on 9 June 2023, signed 20 June 2023, in force 1 July 2023, is Norway's first substantive overhaul of Chapter 10 (Eierskapskontroll / ownership control) of the 2018 Security Act (Sikkerhetsloven). The amendment widens the scope of undertakings that can be brought under ownership control beyond entities directly linked to a "grunnleggende nasjonal funksjon" (fundamental national function) to include businesses of vital importance to national-security interests and businesses of significant importance to fundamental national functions, lowers and adds notification thresholds, and equips the King in Council with enhanced powers to block, condition, or unwind qualifying acquisitions. The reform converts a narrow security-classified regime into a broad horizontal FDI-screening architecture for Norway, the host of the world's largest sovereign wealth fund and a NATO frontline state.

On 28 October 2022, Canada's Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry (François-Philippe Champagne) and Minister of Natural Resources (Jonathan Wilkinson) issued a new policy on how the Investment Canada Act applies to investments by foreign state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Canada's critical minerals sector. Acquisitions of control of a Canadian critical-minerals business by a foreign SOE will now only be approved "on an exceptional basis," and any SOE participation in a Canadian business operating in a critical-minerals sector or supply chain will automatically trigger national-security scrutiny. The policy applies to the 31 minerals on Canada's Critical Minerals List (established 11 March 2021) and preceded, by five days, the 2 November 2022 orders forcing three Chinese-controlled companies to divest lithium-junior stakes.

The Wet veiligheidstoets investeringen, fusies en overnames ("Vifo Act") is the Netherlands' cross-sector statutory FDI screening regime. Adopted by the States-General on 18 May 2022 (Stb. 2022, 215) and entered into force on 1 June 2023 together with two implementing decrees (Stb. 2023, 173 — main implementing decree; Stb. 2023, 172 — decree defining the scope of "sensitive technology"), the Act establishes mandatory pre-closing notification and a security review by the Bureau Toetsing Investeringen (BTI, part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate) for transactions affecting (i) "vital providers" in critical infrastructure sectors — energy, transport, telecoms, port operators, banking infrastructure — and (ii) Dutch undertakings active in "sensitive technology", defined to include EU Reg 2021/821 Annex I dual-use items, military goods, and additional national-security technologies. The regime applies retrospectively to transactions completed after 8 September 2020. It is the foundational instrument under which the Dutch national export-control measures on ASML DUV immersion lithography (filed: 2023-06-30 and 2024-09-07) operate, and the Dutch peer of US CFIUS, EU Regulation 2019/452, the German AWG §§55-62, the French Décret 2014-479 / R. 151-1 et seq., and the UK NSI Act 2021.

The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (c.25), receiving Royal Assent on 29 April 2021 and entering full force on 4 January 2022, created the UK's first standalone investment-screening regime, separating national-security review from the Competition and Markets Authority merger-control process. The Act empowers the Secretary of State to call in any acquisition of "control or influence" over a qualifying entity or asset on national-security grounds, and designates 17 sensitive sectors in which acquisitions crossing 25%/50%/75% share-or-voting-rights thresholds (or material influence) require mandatory pre-completion notification to the Investment Security Unit (Cabinet Office); completion before clearance is void and criminal sanctions of up to 5 years imprisonment apply to non-notifying parties. The Act is the structural peer of US CFIUS/FIRRMA (2018), EU Regulation 2019/452, Germany AWG §§55–62, France Décret 2014-479, Netherlands Wet Vifo, and the broader allied FDI-screening parent-statute lattice, and the enabling statute under which all UK mandatory-notification schedule amendments operate.

Finland's parent foreign-direct-investment screening statute. Laki ulkomaalaisten yritysostojen seurannasta (172/2012) — originally enacted in 2012 to replace the 1992 act — was comprehensively amended by Act 682/2020, which entered into force 11 October 2020 to align Finnish national procedure with EU Regulation 2019/452 establishing the EU FDI cooperation mechanism. The Act establishes (i) mandatory ex-ante notification to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (TEM) for non-EU/EEA acquisitions of Finnish entities producing or supplying defence equipment, dual-use goods, or products/services critical to functions vital to society, and (ii) voluntary notification for any acquisition of a Finnish company with "critical interests for securing societal vital functions." Foreign-owner triggers apply at 10%, one-third, and 50% of voting rights or equivalent influence. TEM is designated the Finnish FDI contact point under Reg 2019/452. Confirmation is granted by TEM unless a key national interest is endangered, in which case the matter is referred to a Government plenary session (Valtioneuvoston yleisistunto); a denied transaction obliges the foreign owner to dispose of the shares within a stated period.

Decreto-Legge 15 marzo 2012 n. 21 (GU n. 63 of 15 March 2012), converted with amendments into Legge 11 maggio 2012 n. 56 (GU n. 111 of 14 May 2012), establishes Italy's "Golden Power" special-powers regime — the foundational statute authorising the Italian Government to impose conditions on, veto, or prescribe remedies for corporate transactions in strategic sectors. The decree marked Italy's transition from a golden-share model (applicable only to privatised companies) to a sector-wide golden-power model applicable to any company carrying out activities of strategic relevance. Administered by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (DICA), the regime has been progressively extended from its original defence + national-security + energy/transport/ communications scope to cover 5G, cloud, critical-raw-materials, financial-credit-insurance, agri-food, healthcare, media, space, and AI through a series of amending decrees from 2019 to 2026.

The Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA), Act No. 5559, is the foundational statute governing all inbound foreign direct investment into the Republic of Korea. Enacted 16 September 1998 by the National Assembly under President Kim Dae-jung as part of IMF-conditionality-driven economic-liberalisation reforms following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, it replaced the 1966 Foreign Capital Inducement Act (외자도입법). FIPA establishes the MOTIE-chaired Foreign Investment Committee, the Invest Korea (KOTRA) operational arm, and national-security/public-order restrictions on FDI in sensitive industries under Article 4 — the primary legal authority for all inward-FDI screening, conditional-approval, and prohibition decisions. It also creates the Foreign Investment Zone (FIZ) and Cash Grant Programme incentive architecture that continues to underpin major semiconductor and EV-battery FDI into Korea.

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Pub. L. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872), signed into law by President Kennedy on 11 October 1962 and codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1991, is the foundational US statute granting the executive branch broad authority to negotiate tariff reductions and, critically via Section 232 (19 U.S.C. § 1862), to adjust imports of any article found by the Secretary of Commerce to threaten to impair national security. Section 232 empowers the President — on receipt of a Commerce Department affirmative national-security finding — to impose tariffs, quantitative restrictions, or other import-adjustment measures without congressional approval or WTO-required safeguard procedures. From 1962 to the Trump Administration's 2018–2026 wave of Section 232 Proclamations, the authority was invoked primarily for petroleum and machine-tool imports; since 2018 it has become the legal vehicle for national-security tariffs on steel, aluminum, automobiles, copper, timber, critical minerals, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals, with 19+ IPTM-filed implementing instruments citing Pub. L. 87-794 / 19 U.S.C. § 1862 as their statutory parent.