Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2668 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On 15 April 2026 Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) published the interim summary "Manufacturing Base Strengthening Report" from the Study Group on Strengthening Manufacturing Base in Light of Geopolitical Risks. The report frames Japan's manufacturing base as the source of national power and proposes shifting economic-security support for "autonomy assurance" from "point" measures to "area"-wide measures — expanding the scope of Specified Critical Materials under the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) beyond narrowly defined inputs to cover foundational petrochemicals (ethylene, propylene, methanol, synthetic rubber) and process-industry technologies (casting, forging), plus components for emerging technologies (humanoid-robot actuators and sensors, lasers for quantum computing). It is the cornerstone framework document operationalising METI's FY2026 strategic-budget package (~¥3.07 trillion overall envelope; ~¥1.23 trillion specifically for semiconductors and AI, including ¥150bn for Rapidus and ¥387.3bn for AI development) as Japan's coordinated response to deepening Chinese export-control pressure on dual-use items, gallium/germanium, graphite, antimony and heavy rare earths.

On 17 February 2026, Prime Minister Mark Carney launched Canada's first standalone Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS), introducing the "Build–Partner–Buy" framework as the central guiding principle of Canadian defence procurement. The strategy mobilises over half a trillion CAD across the next decade — including ~CAD 180 bn in defence procurement opportunities, ~CAD 290 bn in defence-related capital investment, and ~CAD 125 bn in anticipated downstream economic benefit by 2035 — and targets 125,000 new high-paying jobs. Operationally, the DIS introduces Canadian Content Value (CCV) requirements with a proposed Canadian Company Boost for firms meeting 70–100% domestic-content thresholds, sets a 10-year goal of awarding 70% of defence procurements to Canadian firms, and signals willingness to invoke the national security exception to set aside trade-agreement obligations and exclude foreign bidders for "sovereign capability" contracts. It is the first standalone industrial-strategy document covering the Canadian defence-industrial base, distinct from prior DPA-narrow filings.

On 26 September 2025, Japan's Minister of Finance Katsunobu Kato announced the establishment of the Japan Strategic Investment Facility, a JBIC-administered financing vehicle operationalising the USD 550bn investment pledge from the July 2025 US-Japan tariff and investment agreement. The facility launched 1 October 2025 and runs through March 2029, supporting the overseas expansion of Japanese companies across nine economic-security sectors: semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, steel, shipbuilding, critical minerals, aviation, energy, automobiles, and AI/quantum technology. Funding draws on three sources — dollar-denominated JBIC bonds, yen-denominated Japanese government loans to JBIC, and a "supplemental" transfer from Japan's USD 1.324tn foreign-currency reserves — with private-sector loans and NEXI-backed loan guarantees supplementing JBIC's own financing.

On 8 September 2025, the UK Ministry of Defence published the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 — "Making Defence an Engine for Growth" (CP 1388) — the first comprehensive cabinet-level UK defence industrial strategy in over a decade and the sector plan for Defence under the UK Modern Industrial Strategy umbrella (IS-8). The strategy was published alongside the Strategic Defence Review 2025 and operationalises the largest sustained defence- spending increase since the Cold War (rising to 2.6% of GDP by 2027 with ambition to 3% in the next Parliament). It defines six priority outcomes (growth, backing UK businesses, defence innovation, resilient industrial base, procurement transformation, enduring partnerships); establishes UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) within the MOD with a ringfenced £400m budget to accelerate dual-use technology; identifies priority defence capabilities (combat air, complex weapons, directed-energy weapons, next- generation land and maritime systems) plus dual-use sub-sectors (quantum, drones/autonomy, space, AI, cyber, engineering biology, advanced connectivity); and flags resilience priorities in steel, construction, energetic materials, batteries, semiconductors and rare earths.

The French state, via the Agence des participations de l'État (APE), signed a contract on 1 August 2025 to acquire Atos's Advanced Computing division — encompassing the High Performance Computing & Quantum and Business Computing & AI units, commercially known as Bull — for an enterprise value of up to EUR 410 million (later adjusted to up to EUR 404 million after scope changes). The division employs over 2,500 people, mostly in France, generates roughly EUR 800 million in expected 2025 revenue, and operates Europe's only supercomputer manufacturing plant (Angers), including delivery of the EuroHPC JUPITER exascale system. The Ministry of Economy and Finance framed the acquisition as keeping "strategic industrial activities and key technologies" in French hands; the deal closed on 31 March 2026 with the French state as Bull's sole shareholder.

On 1 July 2025 India's Union Cabinet approved the Research Development and Innovation (RDI) Scheme, a six-year, ₹1,00,000 crore (≈USD 11.68 bn) fund to catalyse private-sector investment in research, development and innovation, with ₹20,000 crore allocated for FY2025-26. The scheme finances transformative RDI projects (TRL 4 and above) in strategic and sunrise sectors — deep tech, AI, biotechnology, quantum computing, robotics, space, energy transition and the digital economy — through long-tenor, low-or-nil-interest loans and equity, up to 50% of assessed project cost. Grants and short-term loans are explicitly excluded. Funds flow through a Special Purpose Fund under ANRF (first-level) to second-level fund managers — Alternate Investment Funds, Development Finance Institutions, NBFCs, and focused research bodies including the Technology Development Board (TDB) and BIRAC — which began issuing project calls in February 2026.

On 19 February 2025 Vietnam's 15th National Assembly adopted Resolution 193/2025/QH15 at its 9th Extraordinary Session, establishing 12 pilot policy categories that operationalise the Politburo's December 2024 Resolution 57-NQ/TW without requiring full-statute enactment. The resolution's most structurally novel element is an R&D risk-acceptance framework — the first in Southeast Asia — that exempts organisations and individuals from civil liability for damage caused to the State in the course of state-funded R&D activities conducted in compliance with prescribed procedures, directly addressing Vietnam's long-standing chilling effect on state-sector innovation. Additional pilots cover expedited procurement for sci-tech and digital-transformation projects, special tax and immigration incentives for high-skilled AI/semiconductor/ quantum R&D personnel, accelerated permitting pathways for priority-sector R&D investments, a start-up grant and venture framework, and an open-data regime for state-held datasets. Implementing Decree 88/2025/ND-CP was issued shortly after adoption; the resolution provides the legal-framework architecture that complements the financial-instrument side (Decree 182/2024/ND-CP, VND 30 trillion Investment Support Fund) and the sectoral-law cluster enacted in late 2025.