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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Order No. 835 on 13 April 2026 promulgating the "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Countering Foreign States' Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction" (20 articles), effective on the date of publication. The Regulations are the first State Council–level administrative regulation to operationalise the PRC's framework for identifying and countering foreign extraterritorial measures on a horizontal basis, complementing the 2021 Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and the March 2025 AFSL implementation regulations. Article 5 establishes a State Council–led inter-agency coordination mechanism; Article 6 vests the State Council legal affairs department (the Ministry of Justice in practice) with authority to identify "improper" foreign extraterritorial measures and to grant exemptions; Article 8 authorises a new Malicious Entity List targeting foreign organisations and individuals that "promote or participate in implementing" such measures, with nine countermeasure categories spanning visa denial, asset freezing, trade restrictions and fines; Article 11 codifies an exemption-application channel under which Chinese persons facing conflicting legal demands may request approval to comply with foreign measures within a defined scope; Article 14 authorises a private right of action for harmed Chinese citizens and organisations to sue parties enforcing such measures; and Article 18 elevates enforcement beyond administrative penalties by referencing potential criminal liability.
Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Order No. 834 on 31 March 2026 promulgating the "Provisions on Industrial Chain and Supply Chain Security" (18 articles), adopted at the State Council executive meeting on 13 March 2026 and effective on the date of publication. The Provisions are the first dedicated PRC administrative regulation on industrial- and supply-chain security and consolidate authorities drawn from the National Security Law, Foreign Relations Law, Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, and Foreign Trade Law into a horizontal defensive framework. They establish a cross-agency coordination mechanism spanning roughly 15 central departments (industrial, security, cyberspace, customs and financial regulators) plus provincial governments; create a security-investigation system; and vest broad countermeasure authority over both foreign states (Article 14 — import/export prohibitions and special levies) and foreign organisations and individuals (Article 15 — import/export bans, China-investment bars, transaction prohibitions, entry bars and revocation of work or residence permits, with extension to effectively-controlled subsidiaries). The Provisions also impose compliance, information-sharing, strategic-reserve and emergency-response obligations on PRC organisations and individuals, and authorise requisition, mandated production and directed transportation in the event of supply-chain disruption.
On 6 January 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 1 [2026] "On Strengthening Export Controls on Dual-Use Items to Japan" (商务部公告2026年第1号), the first PRC export-control instrument to single out a named country other than the United States. Effective immediately on publication with no wind-down period, the measure prohibits export of all dual-use items under PRC export-control law where the end-user is the Japanese Ministry of Defense or Self-Defense Forces, the end-use is Japanese military, or — under a novel catch-all standard — the transaction would "enhance Japan's military capabilities." The standard is explicitly extraterritorial, covering transfers of PRC-origin dual-use items through third countries and in-country transfers where the end-user / end-use falls within scope. The political trigger was Japanese PM Takaichi's November 2025 Diet remarks framing a Taiwan contingency as a Japanese "survival-threatening situation" justifying SDF deployment.
On 11 December 2025 the Council of the EU presidency, the European Parliament, and the European Commission reached provisional political (trilogue) agreement on the revision of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union, concluding interinstitutional negotiations on the Commission's proposal of 24 January 2024. The revised regime upgrades the 2019 cooperation-mechanism-only framework into a hybrid harmonised/mandatory regime: all 27 Member States must establish FDI screening mechanisms (replacing the current patchwork in which some Member States have no mechanism at all); mandatory minimum sectoral scope is set EU-wide and covers dual-use items, military equipment, hyper-critical technologies (general-purpose AI with space/defence relevance, quantum technologies, semiconductors), critical raw materials, critical entities in energy/transport/digital infrastructure, electoral infrastructure, and certain financial-system entities; foreign investments routed through EU subsidiaries fall within the perimeter; a shared database prevents Member-State arbitrage; and an optional single electronic-filing portal becomes available if requested by at least nine Member States. Screening decisions remain the exclusive responsibility of the Member State in which the investment is made. Once the Regulation enters into force (after Council and Parliament formal adoption and OJ publication, both pending as of the political-agreement date), the new rules will apply after an 18-month transition period — implementation expected toward the end of 2027.
On 8 December 2025 the Council of the EU gave final approval to Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), the first dedicated EU defence-industrial regulation. The regulation was signed on 17 December 2025 and entered into force on 30 December 2025 following publication in the Official Journal. EDIP provides EUR 1.5bn in grants for 2025-2027 plus an earmarked EUR 300m Ukraine Support Instrument, sets a statutory cap limiting non-EU/EEA components to 35% of estimated component cost in end-products procured with Union funding, and creates EU-level demand-aggregation, common procurement and security-of-supply frameworks for defence products.
On 3 December 2025 the European Commission adopted the RESourceEU Action Plan (COM(2025) 945 final), a horizontal critical-raw-materials supply-security instrument complementing the 2023 Critical Raw Materials Act. The plan mobilises €3 billion in EU funds within twelve months for priority CRM projects, creates a European Critical Raw Materials Centre operational from 2026 (modelled on Japan's JOGMEC) acting as portfolio manager for diversified supply chains, joint purchasing and stockpiling, and activates the Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act (IMERA) "vigilance" and "emergency" modes from May 2026 with mandatory information requests, priority deliveries and coordinated stockpile distribution. A targeted CRMA amendment expands product labelling for permanent-magnet recycling and adds export controls on permanent-magnet and aluminium scrap. Targets a 30-50% reduction by 2029 in single-country dependency for battery, rare-earth and defence raw-material value chains.
On 15 October 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 39 entities and specified 51 vessels — including, for the first time, Russia's two largest integrated oil majors PJSC Rosneft Oil Company and PJSC Oil Company Lukoil — for supporting Russia's energy, defence and financial sectors. 51 vessels (44 identified as "shadow fleet" tankers) were specified for transporting Russian crude oil and LNG in evasion of the G7 price cap. The package also introduced a ban on importing oil products refined in a third country from Russian-origin crude, closing a refined-product loophole in the price-cap regime.
On 27 May 2025 the Council of the EU adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument. Published in the Official Journal of the EU and entering into force on 29 May 2025, SAFE is the EU's flagship financial pillar of the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan: it provides up to EUR 150bn in competitively priced long-maturity loans — raised by the Commission on capital markets via NGEU-style EU borrowing — to Member States for joint procurement of defence capabilities. Funded equipment must meet a 65% EU/EEA/Ukraine local-content rule, and procurement must involve at least one SAFE-beneficiary Member State plus another Member State (Ukraine, EEA-EFTA members and SAFE-associated countries also eligible).
China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs announced on 4 April 2025 export licensing requirements on seven medium and heavy rare-earth elements: samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium. Exporters must apply for individual licences citing the end-user and end-use, with licences granted at MOFCOM's discretion. The announcement came two days after the 2 April Trump reciprocal-tariff package and was widely interpreted as a proportional response. Unlike the December 2024 Ga/Ge/Sb ban this is not US-specific on its face — but in practice licence approvals through April-June 2025 were heavily skewed away from US-bound shipments.
Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Decree No. 792 on 19 October 2024 promulgating the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Controls for Dual-Use Items, with effect from 1 December 2024. The regulation, organised in six chapters and 50 articles, consolidates the previously fragmented nuclear / biological / chemical / missile dual-use control regimes into a single State Council framework operationalising the 2020 Export Control Law. It introduces a control-list / temporary-control / watchlist architecture, a statutory end-user / end-use commitment regime, transit / transhipment / re-export controls, extraterritorial reach over PRC items downstream, and explicit linkage to the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. On 15 November 2024 MOFCOM, MIIT, GAC and SCA jointly issued Announcement No. 51 of 2024 publishing the consolidated Dual-Use Items Export Control List with a unified five-character ECCN-style coding system, also effective 1 December 2024.
On 4 March 2022 Switzerland's Federal Council adopted a total revision of the Ordinance on Measures Relating to the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), taking effect the same day at 18:00, to fully implement the EU's sanctions packages of 23 and 25 February 2022. The revision bans export of all dual-use goods to Russia regardless of end use or end user, bans export of goods that could contribute to Russia's military or technological strengthening or its defence and security sector, and prohibits export of specified goods and services to the oil sector, as well as goods for aviation, space and oil-refining/gas-liquefaction use.
On 24 February 2022, hours after Russia's invasion of Ukraine began, the UK Foreign Secretary announced a full asset freeze on VTB, Russia's second-largest bank (£154bn in assets, 95,000 employees), alongside a freeze on all Russian bank assets in the UK and a ban on Russian companies raising finance on UK markets. The package designated more than 100 companies and individuals -- including five major defence firms (Rostec, Uralvagonzavod, Tactical Missile Corporation, United Aircraft Corporation, United Shipbuilding Corporation) and Putin-inner-circle figures such as Kirill Shamalov -- for asset freezes and travel bans. Aeroflot was banned from UK airspace and new export controls were imposed on electronics, telecommunications and aerospace goods to Russia.
Effective 24 February 2022 — the date of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine — the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule (87 FR 12226, FR Doc 2022-04300) adding sweeping new export license requirements under a new § 746.8 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The rule requires a licence for any item in CCL Categories 3–9 (electronics, computers, telecommunications, sensors, lasers, navigation/avionics, marine, aerospace, propulsion) exported, reexported, or transferred to Russia, with a review policy of denial. Two new Russia-specific Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules extend US jurisdiction to foreign-manufactured goods: the Russia FDP Rule (§ 734.9(f)) covers all foreign-made items using US technology/equipment destined for Russia, and the Russia-MEU FDP Rule (§ 734.9(g)) covers items destined to 47 designated military-end-user (MEU) entities with no licence exceptions available. All three restrictions carry a presumption of denial, making this the most sweeping peacetime expansion of the EAR since its modern codification.
The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (c.25), receiving Royal Assent on 29 April 2021 and entering full force on 4 January 2022, created the UK's first standalone investment-screening regime, separating national-security review from the Competition and Markets Authority merger-control process. The Act empowers the Secretary of State to call in any acquisition of "control or influence" over a qualifying entity or asset on national-security grounds, and designates 17 sensitive sectors in which acquisitions crossing 25%/50%/75% share-or-voting-rights thresholds (or material influence) require mandatory pre-completion notification to the Investment Security Unit (Cabinet Office); completion before clearance is void and criminal sanctions of up to 5 years imprisonment apply to non-notifying parties. The Act is the structural peer of US CFIUS/FIRRMA (2018), EU Regulation 2019/452, Germany AWG §§55–62, France Décret 2014-479, Netherlands Wet Vifo, and the broader allied FDI-screening parent-statute lattice, and the enabling statute under which all UK mandatory-notification schedule amendments operate.
The Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China was adopted by the Standing Committee of the 13th National People's Congress on 17 October 2020 (Presidential Order No. 58) and entered into force on 1 December 2020. Comprising 5 chapters and 49 articles, it establishes the unified statutory framework governing China's export-control regime over dual-use items, military items, nuclear items, and other goods, technologies, services, and data whose export could affect national security or China's non-proliferation obligations. The law introduces comprehensive licensing requirements, end-user and end-use certification, deemed-export and re-export controls with extraterritorial reach, a Controlled Entities List (CEL) with matching-entity restrictions, and substantial criminal and administrative penalties — and it is the parent statutory authority under which every China export-control implementing instrument in the IPTM register operates.
The modern French FDI-screening regime is codified in Code monétaire et financier (CMF) Art. L151-1 to L151-7, substantially restructured by Loi PACTE n° 2019-486 du 22 mai 2019 (Art. 152-158) and operationalised by Décret n° 2019-1590 du 31 décembre 2019 (in force 1 April 2020) with implementing Arrêté du 31 décembre 2019. The regime requires prior authorisation from DG Trésor for non-EU/EEA acquisitions reaching ≥25% of a French target's voting rights across 17 sensitive sectors enumerated in CMF Art. R151-3, and for ≥10% acquisitions in listed-company targets (threshold made permanent by Décret 2023-1293 from 1 January 2024, having been originally introduced during COVID-19 by Décret 2020-892). Approximately 310 notifications are received annually; the regime closes the last major G7 EU-member-state FDI-screening parent-statute gap after DE AWG §§55-62, IT Golden Power DL 21/2012, NL Wet Vifo, UK NSI Act 2021, US CFIUS, JP FEFTA, AU FATA, and CH IPG.
The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA, Subtitle B Part I of Pub. L. 115-232, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for FY2019, signed 13 August 2018 by President Trump, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 4801–4852) provides permanent statutory authority for the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), replacing the long-lapsed Export Administration Act of 1979 and resolving a decades-long gap in which the EAR operated on emergency authority alone. ECRA is the foundational parent statute of the modern US dual-use export-control regime: it authorises the Commerce Control List, the Entity List, the Unverified List, the Military End-User (MEU) List, the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR), the emerging-and-foundational technology control framework (§1758), and BIS enforcement and civil/criminal penalty authority — the entire regulatory toolkit under which every BIS-administered export-control action filed in the IPTM register derives its legal authority. ECRA also codified ongoing US participation in the multilateral export-control regimes (Wassenaar, NSG, MTCR, Australia Group) and created the interagency Technology Alert List process.
Russia Federal Law No. 127-FZ of 4 June 2018 "On measures (countermeasures) regarding the unfriendly actions of the United States of America and other foreign states" establishes the statutory authority under which the President and Government of the Russian Federation may impose counter-measures against states that engage in "unfriendly actions" toward Russia. The law enumerates permissible countermeasure categories — including import/export prohibitions, restrictions on foreign participation in Russian state procurement, suspension of international cooperation obligations, and prohibition of foreign-company services and transactions — and delegates implementation authority to the President (primary) and Government. It entered into force on the day of official publication (4 June 2018) and is the foundational parent statute for every major Russian counter-sanctions presidential decree and government resolution subsequently issued, including the gas-for-roubles payment regime, capital controls, parallel- imports authorisation, and asset-confiscation counter-mechanism.
Germany's Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG, Foreign Trade and Payments Act; BGBl. I 2013 S. 1482 of 6 June 2013, replacing the original 1961 Act) is the foundational parent statute of the modern German economic-statecraft toolkit, providing the legislative authority for (i) export licensing of dual-use goods and technology administered by BAFA under the Außenwirtschaftsverordnung (AWV) implementing regulation — the national complement to EU Dual-Use Recast Regulation 2021/821; (ii) inward FDI screening by BMWK under §§ 55–62 AWG covering non-EU/non-EFTA acquisitions of ≥ 25% of voting rights cross-sectorally and ≥ 10%/20% in 27 sensitive-sector activities including defence, semiconductors, AI, quantum, biotech, space, and critical infrastructure; and (iii) German implementation of EU-level and autonomous trade and sanctions restrictions. As the EU's largest economy and a top-tier dual-use exporter, Germany's AWG-based regime is structurally peer-foundational to JP FEFTA 1949, UK NSI Act 2021, US ECRA 2018, CN Export Control Law 2020, and NL Wet Vifo 2022 in the G7+CN economic- statecraft parent-statute cluster.
Decreto-Legge 15 marzo 2012 n. 21 (GU n. 63 of 15 March 2012), converted with amendments into Legge 11 maggio 2012 n. 56 (GU n. 111 of 14 May 2012), establishes Italy's "Golden Power" special-powers regime — the foundational statute authorising the Italian Government to impose conditions on, veto, or prescribe remedies for corporate transactions in strategic sectors. The decree marked Italy's transition from a golden-share model (applicable only to privatised companies) to a sector-wide golden-power model applicable to any company carrying out activities of strategic relevance. Administered by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (DICA), the regime has been progressively extended from its original defence + national-security + energy/transport/ communications scope to cover 5G, cloud, critical-raw-materials, financial-credit-insurance, agri-food, healthcare, media, space, and AI through a series of amending decrees from 2019 to 2026.
The Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA), Act No. 5559, is the foundational statute governing all inbound foreign direct investment into the Republic of Korea. Enacted 16 September 1998 by the National Assembly under President Kim Dae-jung as part of IMF-conditionality-driven economic-liberalisation reforms following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, it replaced the 1966 Foreign Capital Inducement Act (외자도입법). FIPA establishes the MOTIE-chaired Foreign Investment Committee, the Invest Korea (KOTRA) operational arm, and national-security/public-order restrictions on FDI in sensitive industries under Article 4 — the primary legal authority for all inward-FDI screening, conditional-approval, and prohibition decisions. It also creates the Foreign Investment Zone (FIZ) and Cash Grant Programme incentive architecture that continues to underpin major semiconductor and EV-battery FDI into Korea.
South Korea's Foreign Trade Act (대외무역법, Act No. 5211, enacted 31 December 1986 and repeatedly amended) is the foundational statutory framework of the Republic of Korea's foreign trade and export-control regime. It establishes the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) as the administering authority for foreign trade policy and empowers it to designate strategic items, issue and revoke export licences, operate catch-all controls over non-listed goods destined for WMD-development end-uses, and coordinate with the Nuclear Suppliers Group-administered National Security Authority for Strategic Commerce (NSASC) on Category-0 nuclear items and the Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA) on military goods. Every MOTIE strategic-items notification (the "Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Materials," currently encompassing Categories 1-9 dual-use items harmonised with Wassenaar, MTCR, AG, and NSG) and every MOTIE outbound-investment screening measure derives its legal authority from the Act.
The Defense Production Act of 1950 (Pub. L. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§4501–4568) is the foundational US statute governing wartime and emergency industrial mobilization. Signed by President Truman on 8 September 1950 during the Korean War, the Act empowers the President to compel industrial priority-rated ordering (Title I / DPAS), authorize direct investment in domestic production capacity for critical industries (Title III), and conduct investment security review (Title VII, precursor to CFIUS). Reauthorized approximately 50 times, most recently extended through September 2025 by Pub. L. 115-263 (2018) and further extended under NDAA FY2026; it has been invoked by every Administration since 1950 and has accelerated dramatically since 2020 to target critical-minerals processing, semiconductor manufacturing, battery supply chains, biopharmaceuticals, and energy infrastructure.