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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
In a final rule effective December 9, 2021 (FR Doc 2021-26633), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add Cambodia to Country Group D:5 (US arms-embargoed destinations), consistent with a simultaneous Department of State final rule adding Cambodia to ITAR §126.1. The rule also subjects Cambodia to military end-use (MEU) controls under EAR §744.21 and military-intelligence end-use/end-user (MIEU) controls under EAR §744.22. The stated rationale was deepening Chinese military presence at Ream Naval Base, growing corruption, and human-rights abuses by the Cambodian government.
Effective 5 October 2021, BIS published a final rule (86 FR 55268, FR Doc 2021-20649) making targeted editorial corrections and clarifications across eleven parts of the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR Parts 732, 734, 736, 738, 740, 744, 748, 750, 770, 772, and 774). The errors corrected were inadvertent inconsistencies between different EAR parts where outdated or slightly divergent language had accumulated; the rule aligns those sections with the most-current language used elsewhere in the regulations. No substantive changes to licensing requirements, control lists, or end-use restrictions were made — this is a regulatory maintenance action.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added eight entities to the Entity List — six based in Pakistan and two in the UAE — on grounds that they were acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests through involvement in proliferation to unsafeguarded nuclear activities. All EAR items destined for these entities require a license with a presumption of denial; no license exceptions are available. Separately, one China-based entity (Molecular Devices Shanghai Corporation) was removed from the Military End-User (MEU) List, and a second China MEU entry was renamed (Hutchison Optel Telecom Technology → Chongqing Optel Telecom Technology Co., Ltd.).
Regulation (EU) 2021/821, adopted 20 May 2021 and applied from 9 September 2021, establishes the Union regime for controlling exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit, and transfer of dual-use items, repealing Regulation (EC) No 428/2009. Annex I lists controlled items implementing internationally agreed dual-use controls under the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, NSG, and Chemical Weapons Convention. The regulation introduces a new catch-all control on cyber-surveillance technologies that could facilitate human-rights violations (Art. 5 and Annex IV), and strengthens cooperation between Member States and the European Commission, placing specific obligations on exporters. It serves as the statutory anchor for all EU export licences, every multilateral-regime transposition into EU law, and coordination mechanisms with US BIS, UK ECJU, JP METI, and KR MOTIE export-control regimes.
Denmark's foundational cross-sector horizontal FDI screening statute. Lov nr 842 of 10 May 2021 — investeringsscreeningsloven — was adopted by the Folketing on 4 May 2021, signed on 10 May 2021, and entered into force on 1 July 2021 (with application to transactions implemented from 1 September 2021). The Act is administered by Erhvervsstyrelsen (Danish Business Authority) and combines (i) a mandatory pre-closing authorisation regime for foreign investments in "particularly sensitive sectors" — defence, dual-use products, IT-security functions/services, critical technology, critical infrastructure — triggered at 10% ownership / voting rights or equivalent control, with (ii) a voluntary notification scheme (typically engaged at 25%+) for foreign investments and special economic agreements in other sectors. Enforcement runs through blocking orders, unwinding orders, and criminal sanctions including fines and imprisonment. Structural peer of the US CFIUS regime, EU Regulation 2019/452, the German AWG §§55-62, the French Décret 2014-479 / R. 151-1 et seq., the UK NSI Act 2021, the Netherlands Wet Vifo, the Italian Golden Power Decree, and the Swedish FDI screening regime.
The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (c.25), receiving Royal Assent on 29 April 2021 and entering full force on 4 January 2022, created the UK's first standalone investment-screening regime, separating national-security review from the Competition and Markets Authority merger-control process. The Act empowers the Secretary of State to call in any acquisition of "control or influence" over a qualifying entity or asset on national-security grounds, and designates 17 sensitive sectors in which acquisitions crossing 25%/50%/75% share-or-voting-rights thresholds (or material influence) require mandatory pre-completion notification to the Investment Security Unit (Cabinet Office); completion before clearance is void and criminal sanctions of up to 5 years imprisonment apply to non-notifying parties. The Act is the structural peer of US CFIUS/FIRRMA (2018), EU Regulation 2019/452, Germany AWG §§55–62, France Décret 2014-479, Netherlands Wet Vifo, and the broader allied FDI-screening parent-statute lattice, and the enabling statute under which all UK mandatory-notification schedule amendments operate.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security added 14 entities across Russia, Germany, and Switzerland to the Entity List under 15 CFR Part 744, effective March 4, 2021. Ten Russian entities — including the 27th Scientific Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense (associated with Russia's chemical weapons activities) and nine members of the Chimmed Group distribution network (Chimmed Group, Femteco, Interlab, LabInvest, OOO Analit Products, OOO Intertech Instruments, Pharmcontract GC, Rau Farm, Regionsnab) — were listed for proliferation activities supporting Russia's WMD programs. Three German entities (Chimconnect GmbH, Pharmcontract GmbH, Riol-Chemie) and one Swiss entity (Chimconnect AG) were simultaneously listed as foreign-front nodes in the same procurement network. A license is required for all EAR-subject items; no license exceptions apply. The rule also corrects six pre-existing entries (one Germany, five China).
Czech Republic's foundational horizontal FDI screening statute. Zákon č. 34/2021 Sb., o prověřování zahraničních investic — adopted by Parliament in January 2021, published in Sbírka zákonů on 29 January 2021, and entered into force on 1 May 2021 — transposes the cooperation obligations of EU Regulation 2019/452 and creates the first cross-sector pre-clearance regime for non-EU investments into Czech firms. The Act is administered by the Ministerstvo průmyslu a obchodu (MPO) and combines (i) a mandatory ex-ante consent regime for non-EU investments acquiring ≥10% in companies producing military material, selected dual-use goods, or operating critical / critical-information infrastructure, with (ii) a discretionary ex-officio review available up to 5 years post-closing for any other "public-order or internal-security" sensitive investment. The Government decides on MPO's recommendation; remedies include conditions, prohibition, and forced divestment, with fines up to 1% of the global net turnover of the foreign investor.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the State Department's December 14, 2020 rescission of Sudan's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SSOT). The rule removes Sudan from Country Group E:1 (State Sponsors of Terrorism), which had imposed a blanket denial of license exceptions and a policy of denial for most dual-use exports. Following this change, Sudan exporters may now utilise applicable EAR license exceptions and benefit from a more permissive licensing review policy, though Sudan retains arms-embargo status under Country Group D:5.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR, 15 CFR Part 710) and Export Administration Regulations (EAR, 15 CFR Parts 712 and 745) to implement two OPCW Conference of States Parties decisions (C-24/DEC.4 and C-24/DEC.5) from November 2019. The rule adds four chemical families — two families of alkyl phosphonamidic fluorides, O-alkyl phosphoramidofluoridates, and quaternary/bisquaternary carbamates — to CWC Schedule 1(A), effective immediately upon publication. The rule also clarifies the definition of "production" in 15 CFR § 710.1 to include intermediates, by-products, and waste products generated within a defined manufacturing sequence.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) extended for one year the temporary unilateral export control on software classified as ECCN 0D521 — "software specially designed for training a Deep Convolutional Neural Network to automate the analysis of geospatial imagery and point clouds" — adding a second year of control through January 6, 2022. The extension was required because COVID-19 prevented the Wassenaar Arrangement from formally convening in 2020 to consider the US multilateral control proposal submitted that year. Only License Exception GOV (§ 740.11(b)(2)(ii)) is available; all other exports require a specific licence from BIS.