Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2665 actions· ✨ 90 recent

Kazakhstan's Department of Atomic Energy signed a new Subsoil Use Agreement (SUA) for production at the Akdala uranium deposit, effective 29 March 2026, replacing the expired March 2001 contract. Subsoil rights are held by YUGHK LLP (South Mining and Chemical Company Joint Venture), in which Uranium One (a Rosatom subsidiary) owns 70% and Kazatomprom 30%. The deposit holds approximately 1,500 tonnes of uranium reserves and is expected to operate through 2030, after which the asset is subject to trust management transfer to Kazatomprom as the national company. The renewal was signed expressly to prevent disruption to the technological process and maintain social stability in the region, preserving Rosatom's controlling stake in a single producing Kazakhstani deposit at a time when Kazakhstan is otherwise tightening state control over strategic mineral assets.

On 2 February 2026 Kazatomprom disclosed in its 4Q25 Operations and Trading Update that it had amended multiple Subsoil Use Agreements (SUAs) to reduce the total 2026 licensed annual production ceiling from 32,777 tU to 29,697 tU — a reduction of approximately 3,080 tU (~9.4%). The primary driver is construction and commissioning delays at the Budenovskoye uranium deposit (JV with Uranium Energy Corp / UrAsia, Kazatomprom 51%), preventing the planned ramp-up. Revised 2026 production guidance of 27,500–29,000 tU on a 100% basis sits below the revised licensed ceiling, indicating that actual deliveries will be further constrained; force-majeure notices were issued to long-term offtake counterparties affected by the Budenovskoye shortfall. Kazakhstan accounts for approximately 43% of global primary uranium mine supply, making even a licensed-capacity adjustment a material signal for the global U3O8 and UF6 supply curve.

On 6 November 2025, the US Department of the Interior (DOI) and the US Geological Survey (USGS) released the final 2025 List of Critical Minerals under the Energy Act of 2020 (30 U.S.C. § 1606), expanding the designation from 50 to 60 minerals. The final list adds 10 newly designated commodities — boron, copper, lead, metallurgical coal, phosphate, potash, rhenium, silicon, silver, and uranium — based on updated supply-chain disruption modelling, public comment, and interagency recommendations. The list constitutes the foundational statutory anchor for downstream US critical-minerals policy instruments including DPA Title III awards, DOE LPO Title 17 loan eligibility, IRA Section 45X Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit eligibility, Section 30D FEOC determinations, BIS export-control predicate assessments, Section 232 trade-investigation predicates, and CFIUS critical-technology triggers under 31 CFR § 800.215.

The MoEFCC Impact Assessment Division issued an Office Memorandum on 8 September 2025 categorically exempting all mining projects involving atomic minerals (uranium, thorium and the 12 minerals under the Atomic Energy Act 1962), the 30 critical minerals notified by the Ministry of Mines on 28 June 2023, and separately designated strategic minerals from the mandatory public-consultation stage (para 7(i)) of the EIA Notification 2006, invoking the existing national-defence and strategic-considerations clause. Exempted projects will instead undergo comprehensive appraisal by the relevant Sectoral Expert Appraisal Committee (SEAC/EAC) at the central level regardless of project size, bypassing the standard Category-A/B thresholding architecture. The measure was issued in response to formal requests from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), and directly accelerates the approval pipeline for the National Critical Mineral Mission (Rs 34,300 crore, 2025-2031).

The Kyrgyz Republic's parliament adopted on 13 June 2024 — and President Sadyr Japarov signed into law on 27 June 2024 — amendments to the Law "On Subsoil" (No. 49 of 19 May 2018) that lift the constitutional-status prohibition on geological exploration, prospecting, and development of uranium and thorium deposits enacted in 2019 under President Jeenbekov. The law simultaneously invalidates the standalone 2019 prohibition statute and introduces a voluntary state-equity transfer mechanism allowing mining-rights holders to transfer company shares to the state for strategically important gold and coal deposits. Together with the January 2024 Presidential Decree No. 5 (Polymetals and REE National Project), the amendment forms the second pillar of President Japarov's mining reset, re-opening the Kyzyl-Ompol uranium-REE-ilmenite deposit in Issyk-Kul oblast (est. 2,000+ tU resource + significant Th₂O₃, REE, and ilmenite by-products) to Western and Asian operators for the first time since 2019.

From 1 January 2021, the end of the EU exit transition period, the UK introduced a standalone import licensing requirement — the Nuclear Materials Import Licence (NMIL) — for "relevant" nuclear materials entering the UK, administered at the time by the Office for Nuclear Regulation under an Open General Import Licence framework and published via GOV.UK guidance on 31 December 2020. Coverage spans tariff heading 2612 (uranium ore and concentrates) and 2844 (plutonium, uranium-233, enriched uranium, natural uranium and related compounds/alloys, including spent or irradiated fuel elements). The requirement replaced the free-circulation treatment nuclear material imports from EU member states previously had inside the single market.

On 27 December 2017 President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed Code No. 125-VI ZRK "On Subsoil and Subsoil Use," a wholesale recodification replacing the 2010 Subsoil Use Law that entered into force on 29 June 2018 (with certain provisions deferred to 1 January 2019). The Code establishes the licensing architecture for all mineral extraction in Kazakhstan — the world's leading uranium producer (~40% of global U₃O₈ output, ~22,000 tU/yr) and a top-11 oil exporter (~1.8 mbpd) — covering solid minerals, hydrocarbons, and uranium under a single codified framework. For solid minerals the Code introduces a liberalised "first-come first-served" auction-free licence model for non-strategic deposits and a state-tender model for strategic deposits, alongside subsoil-use rights transfer and pledge provisions governing all M&A in the sector. For uranium the Code codifies the National Atomic Company Kazatomprom's statutory role as state operator over all uranium blocks, with government priority pre-emption rights and mandatory Kazatomprom participation in all production licences. For hydrocarbons the Code establishes the concession and production-sharing framework governing the pre-salt Caspian mega-projects (Tengiz, Karachaganak, Kashagan) and the model contract architecture for petroleum products. Horizontal obligations — local Kazakh-content procurement floors, social-package requirements, and environmental-restoration mine-closure security — apply across all subsoil-use categories. Structurally this Code is the parent statute for every subsequently filed KZ action: the 2023-12-28 REE Comprehensive Plan and the 2025-12-26 Kazatomprom uranium-priority amendments both operate under delegated authority created by this Code.

South Korea's Foreign Trade Act (대외무역법, Act No. 5211, enacted 31 December 1986 and repeatedly amended) is the foundational statutory framework of the Republic of Korea's foreign trade and export-control regime. It establishes the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) as the administering authority for foreign trade policy and empowers it to designate strategic items, issue and revoke export licences, operate catch-all controls over non-listed goods destined for WMD-development end-uses, and coordinate with the Nuclear Suppliers Group-administered National Security Authority for Strategic Commerce (NSASC) on Category-0 nuclear items and the Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA) on military goods. Every MOTIE strategic-items notification (the "Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Materials," currently encompassing Categories 1-9 dual-use items harmonised with Wassenaar, MTCR, AG, and NSG) and every MOTIE outbound-investment screening measure derives its legal authority from the Act.