Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2665 actions· ✨ 90 recent

The US Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations to impose a new "Regional Stability – Pakistan" (RS-PAK) licence requirement on exports, reexports, and in-country transfers to Pakistan of items classified under six previously-uncontrolled-for-Pakistan ECCNs: 1B999, 2A992, 2B999 (excluding 2B999.h.2), 3A992, 3A999, and 6A996. The covered items — process-control equipment, high-pressure piping and valves, oscilloscopes, electronic test equipment, magnetometers, and related dual-use industrial gear — are associated with unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic-missile end-uses. Licence applications are reviewed case-by-case to assess diversion risk to Pakistan's nuclear weapons or ballistic missile programmes, and to entities already on the Entity List or front companies acting on their behalf. Issued as a final rule under ECRA §1762(a) (no notice-and-comment); originally effective 25 November 2024 with the corresponding amendatory instructions, with the substantive licence requirement effective 26 December 2024 (post C1-2024-27648 correction published 29 November 2024).

Mongolia's State Great Hural adopted a comprehensive package of amendments to the 2009 Nuclear Energy Law on 21 November 2024 (approved by 68.1% of votes), restructuring the country's uranium-sector governance across three principal axes. The amendments introduce a dynamic three-tier uranium royalty framework — 5% basic (AMNAT) + 5% special + 0–9% price-linked incremental royalty, yielding approximately 14–19% aggregate — that replaces a flat-rate structure with a price-elastic mechanism designed to capture uranium supercycle upside for the Mongolian state. The law also prohibits export of radioactive minerals in raw ore form (mandatory domestic processing to at least yellowcake/U₃O₈ before export), prohibits import, transit, and disposal of foreign spent nuclear fuel in Mongolia, and provides the parliamentary legal underpinning for the ~USD 1.6 billion Orano (France)– Mongolia state investment agreement on the Zuuvch-Ovoo in-situ-leach uranium deposit (Dornogovi province), signed October 2024, targeting first production in 2028 with eventual ramp-up to ~2,500 t/yr uranium output.

On 31 October 2024, South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced strengthened export controls in response to North Korea's long-range ballistic missile launch earlier that day. The measure designates 15 "North Korea-customized" watch-list items across the solid-fuel missile production chain — including ammonium perchlorate, sodium chloride, liquid thiokol, carbon fiber, glass fiber fabric, thermal batteries and inertial-guidance components — that North Korea finds difficult to produce domestically. It operates under Korea's existing Special Notice on Trade for Fulfilling International Peace and Security Obligations, building on the June 2016 Nuclear and Missile Surveillance Items framework and Korea's NSG/MTCR commitments.

Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Decree No. 792 on 19 October 2024 promulgating the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Controls for Dual-Use Items, with effect from 1 December 2024. The regulation, organised in six chapters and 50 articles, consolidates the previously fragmented nuclear / biological / chemical / missile dual-use control regimes into a single State Council framework operationalising the 2020 Export Control Law. It introduces a control-list / temporary-control / watchlist architecture, a statutory end-user / end-use commitment regime, transit / transhipment / re-export controls, extraterritorial reach over PRC items downstream, and explicit linkage to the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. On 15 November 2024 MOFCOM, MIIT, GAC and SCA jointly issued Announcement No. 51 of 2024 publishing the consolidated Dual-Use Items Export Control List with a unified five-character ECCN-style coding system, also effective 1 December 2024.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued a final rule on 5 September 2024 (effective 6 September 2024, published in the Federal Register on the same day as 89 FR 73285) establishing multilateral export controls on four categories of emerging technologies: (1) quantum computing items including quantum computers, related cryogenic / control / measurement systems, and certain quantum software; (2) gate-all-around field-effect transistor (GAAFET) production technology — the next-node semiconductor architecture beyond FinFET; (3) advanced additive-manufacturing equipment for metals + alloys; (4) certain biotech-related items added in a parallel rule on 12 September 2024. The rule operates without country exceptions for some categories, with multilateral coordination via Wassenaar + Australia Group + Nuclear Suppliers Group frameworks.

Cabinet Resolution No. 97 of 2024 is the implementing regulation of UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 43 of 2021 on Commodities Subject to Non-Proliferation. It operationalises the UAE's horizontal dual-use export-control regime, empowering the Executive Office for Control & Non-Proliferation (EOCN) to designate prohibited and restricted goods on the National Control List and to issue export/transit/re-export permits within 20 working days. The Control List covers nuclear materials, chemicals and precursors, electronics, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation systems, avionics, marine and aerospace equipment, propulsion systems, and "national controlled commodities" (armoured vehicles, autonomous equipment). This is the regulatory architecture under which post-G42 advanced AI-chip outbound flows from the UAE are licensed.

Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLB), Bolivia's state lithium SOE, signed a contract in September 2024 with Uranium One Group — a subsidiary of Russia's Rosatom state nuclear corporation — for the design, construction, and initial operation of an industrial direct-lithium-extraction (DLE) carbonation plant at Salar de Uyuni, with initial capacity of 14,000 t/yr lithium carbonate (expandable to 25,000–45,000 t/yr), representing a total investment exceeding USD 970 million and a 51%/49% profit-split in Bolivia's favour. The contract was approved by Bolivia's Comisión de Economía Plural in February 2025 amid corruption allegations, then suspended by parliamentary motion on 14 February 2025; a Bolivian court issued a further precautionary suspension order on 27 May 2025 on human-rights, environmental, and Mother Earth rights grounds, while the Arce government continued to insist on legislative ratification through at least 29 May 2025.

The Defence and Strategic Goods List (DSGL) 2024 was registered on the Federal Register of Legislation on 16 August 2024 under the Customs Act 1901 and Defence Trade Controls Act 2012, repealing and replacing the DSGL 2021. It comprises the Munitions List (Part 1) and the Dual-Use List (Part 2, nine technology categories including nuclear materials, chemicals, electronics, sensors and marine and aerospace equipment) that Australia controls for export, brokering and intangible transfer. The 2024 instrument periodically realigns the list with changes agreed in the multilateral non-proliferation and export-control regimes Australia belongs to (Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group); most changes are clarifications to existing controls, with a smaller number of items entering or leaving control or having their approval requirements adjusted.

On 20–21 June 2024 Niger's Ministry of Mines, acting under the CNSP military-transition government, formally notified the Director General of Imouraren SA (the Orano subsidiary holding the Imouraren uranium permit) that the perimeter of the "IMOURAREN Permit" returned to the public domain of Niger and was freed of all derived rights, in application of articles 59 and 61 of Ordinance no. 93-16 of 2 March 1993 (Niger Mining Law). The decision followed a 7 June 2024 ministerial "note d'information" giving Orano until 19 June to engage development works under the earlier 19 March 2024 mise en demeure, and the Ministry's finding that Orano's 26 April 2024 exploitation plan "did not meet our expectations". Imouraren is one of the world's largest known uranium deposits at ~200,000 t U (Orano-disclosed reserves, originally permitted to AREVA in January 2009 with mine-build paused after the 2011 Fukushima uranium-price collapse). Orano had held 63.4% of Imouraren SA against 36.6% by Niger state-owned Sopamin. Orano notified the public on 20 June 2024 that it took note of the decision, and on 4 December 2024 initiated ICSID arbitration against the Niger state contesting the revocation. The action is the first leg of the 2024–2025 Niger-Orano break (followed by the December 2024 announcement of loss of operational control over Somaïr / Cominak / Imouraren and the June 2025 Somaïr nationalisation announcement).

The Kyrgyz Republic's parliament adopted on 13 June 2024 — and President Sadyr Japarov signed into law on 27 June 2024 — amendments to the Law "On Subsoil" (No. 49 of 19 May 2018) that lift the constitutional-status prohibition on geological exploration, prospecting, and development of uranium and thorium deposits enacted in 2019 under President Jeenbekov. The law simultaneously invalidates the standalone 2019 prohibition statute and introduces a voluntary state-equity transfer mechanism allowing mining-rights holders to transfer company shares to the state for strategically important gold and coal deposits. Together with the January 2024 Presidential Decree No. 5 (Polymetals and REE National Project), the amendment forms the second pillar of President Japarov's mining reset, re-opening the Kyzyl-Ompol uranium-REE-ilmenite deposit in Issyk-Kul oblast (est. 2,000+ tU resource + significant Th₂O₃, REE, and ilmenite by-products) to Western and Asian operators for the first time since 2019.

BIS published a two-part final rule amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for cameras, systems, and related components, effective March 8, 2024. Part one creates new ECCN 6A293 controlling ultra-high-speed cameras (minimum exposure time ≤1 microsecond AND throughput ≥13.43 Giga-pixels per second at 205,000 fps) for nuclear nonproliferation (NP) reasons with no License Exception STA eligibility, capturing instruments used in weapons-test diagnostics not previously covered by 6A003 or 6A203. Part two lifts military-end-user (MEU) restrictions on ECCNs 0A504, 6A002, 6A003, 6A993.a, and 8A002.d for Country Group A:1 destinations (32 closest US allies including EU member states, Canada, Japan, Australia, UK, and South Korea), aligning controls with commercial availability and established allied strategic relationships.