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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: industrial. Company profile →
Pittini Group SpA is an Italian electric-arc-furnace (EAF) steelmaker producing roughly 3 million tonnes of long steel per year across 17 companies and 26 facilities in Italy, Austria, Slovenia, Germany, Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Its core output is wire rod, rebars, electro-welded wire mesh, drawn/bright steel for mechanical applications, and welding wires (via the Pittarc division). All steel is produced from recycled ferrous scrap, making the group entirely dependent on the EAF route and its associated ferroalloy and electrode inputs rather than on iron ore or coking coal.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Pittini Group SpA produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Graphite (electrodes): EAF steelmaking consumes ultra-high-power graphite electrodes at ~1.5–2.
Manganese: Ferromanganese is a deoxidiser and essential alloying element in every grade of wire rod and rebar Pittini produces (~6–8 kg Mn-units per tonne). China, South Africa, and Gabon together control the bulk of global manganese ore and refined ferromanganese supply; EU sourcing is structurally dependent on imports.
Silicon: Ferrosilicon is used for deoxidation in EAF heats and as an alloying addition in wire rod. China accounts for ~65–70% of global ferrosilicon output.
Vanadium: Ferrovanadium (FeV) microalloying is standard practice for high-strength rebar conforming to EN 10080 B500B/C grades — the dominant product across Ferriere Nord, Acciaierie di Verona, and Siderpotenza. A ~0.
Niobium: Ferroniobium is used in HSLA wire rod and some rebar grades for grain refinement and toughness (microalloying at ~0.02–0.
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches graphitemanganeseniobium · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 108d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Graphite (electrodes): EAF steelmaking consumes ultra-high-power graphite electrodes at ~1.5–2.
Manganese: Ferromanganese is a deoxidiser and essential alloying element in every grade of wire rod and rebar Pittini produces (~6–8 kg Mn-units per tonne). China, South Africa, and Gabon together control the bulk of global manganese ore and refined ferromanganese supply; EU sourcing is structurally dependent on imports.
Niobium: Ferroniobium is used in HSLA wire rod and some rebar grades for grain refinement and toughness (microalloying at ~0.02–0.
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Brazil supplies 93% of world niobium mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Brazil supplies 4.0% of world manganese mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Brazil supplies 3.6% of world graphite mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid Brazil entirely: niobium supply outside BR is 🇨🇦 CA 80%, 🇨🇩 CD 13%, 🇷🇺 RU 4.0% (shares renormalised after removing BR); manganese supply outside BR is 🇿🇦 ZA 42%, 🇬🇦 GA 28%, 🇬🇭 GH 11% (shares renormalised after removing BR).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches graphiteniobium · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 53d pending
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.
source ↗Graphite (electrodes): EAF steelmaking consumes ultra-high-power graphite electrodes at ~1.5–2.
Niobium: Ferroniobium is used in HSLA wire rod and some rebar grades for grain refinement and toughness (microalloying at ~0.02–0.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
graphite — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇨🇳 CN 81% · 🇲🇬 MG 4.6% · 🇹🇿 TZ 4.4% · 🇧🇷 BR 3.8% — shares renormalised after removing MW.
No alternative in our corpus is currently producing — every name below is pre-production, possibly captured, or unverified. Treat this list as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
niobium — Malawi holds no measurable share of world mining production in our table (2025 data), so this measure removes little measurable supply for you today; its weight is as precedent, not as a supply loss.
Supply outside 🇲🇼 MW: 🇧🇷 BR 93% · 🇨🇦 CA 5.4% · 🇨🇩 CD 0.9% · 🇷🇺 RU 0.3% — shares renormalised after removing MW.
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches graphiteniobium · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 101d pending
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax exemptions granted under individual mining Framework Agreements and introduces standard operating procedures — reduces discretionary government risk for large mining investors (Panda Hill niobium, graphite juniors, Buzwagi gold); parallel VAT amendments give equivalent statutory certainty for VAT exemptions; taken together, the bill moves Tanzania from discretionary tax administration toward a rule-of-law-based investor regime for all critical-mineral projects; budget targets Tanzania for top-4 niobium producer status (Panda Hill DA already signed March 24, 2026) and 50% geophysical survey coverage by 2030
source ↗Graphite (electrodes): EAF steelmaking consumes ultra-high-power graphite electrodes at ~1.5–2.
Niobium: Ferroniobium is used in HSLA wire rod and some rebar grades for grain refinement and toughness (microalloying at ~0.02–0.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
GA · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches manganese · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 101d pending
Gabon (CTRI transitional government, President Oligui Nguema) announced at Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi (May 2026) its intention to subscribe to Eramet SA's €500M capital increase, giving the Gabonese state direct equity in the French-listed parent of COMILOG (its primary manganese mining subsidiary in Moanda). Gabon already holds 29% of COMILOG; a stake in Eramet SA itself would give Gabon leverage over the global operations of the parent group (smelting, nickel, lithium, manganese across France, Norway, Senegal, and Indonesia) and a seat at the Eramet Board. Eramet AGM (May 27, 2026) approved the capital raise resolution. Capital raise planned for H2 2026. Distinct from: filed 2025-05-30-gabon-raw-manganese-export-ban-2029 (the export ban forcing value-addition); filed 2024-07-02-gabon-decret-0276-regimes-des-substances-souveraines (35% state free-carry in new mines) — this is an equity purchase in the parent company, not a free-carry in a Gabonese concession; new vector of state resource-control
source ↗Manganese: Ferromanganese is a deoxidiser and essential alloying element in every grade of wire rod and rebar Pittini produces (~6–8 kg Mn-units per tonne). China, South Africa, and Gabon together control the bulk of global manganese ore and refined ferromanganese supply; EU sourcing is structurally dependent on imports.
This changes the form of what GA exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your GA-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a GA processing partner, not a supplier switch.
GA supplies 25% of world manganese mining — that is the stake if its terms tighten.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid GA entirely: manganese supply outside GA is 🇿🇦 ZA 55%, 🇬🇭 GH 14%, 🇦🇺 AU 12% (shares renormalised after removing GA).
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches graphitemanganesesiliconniobium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 112d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Graphite (electrodes): EAF steelmaking consumes ultra-high-power graphite electrodes at ~1.5–2.
Manganese: Ferromanganese is a deoxidiser and essential alloying element in every grade of wire rod and rebar Pittini produces (~6–8 kg Mn-units per tonne). China, South Africa, and Gabon together control the bulk of global manganese ore and refined ferromanganese supply; EU sourcing is structurally dependent on imports.
Silicon: Ferrosilicon is used for deoxidation in EAF heats and as an alloying addition in wire rod. China accounts for ~65–70% of global ferrosilicon output.
+1 more touched material — see the composition section (3) above.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever…
Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…
Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rat…
Gabon = ~25% world manganese reserves, world's 2nd largest manganese ore exporter (~8 Mt/year via COMILOG/Eramet); ban on raw ore exports forces domestic processing investment (silicomanganese, EMD,…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
If adopted, creates a unified mining regulatory framework across Cameroon, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad — harmonising licensing regimes, fiscal terms, transparency oblig…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
4 of 43 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (industrial) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-05), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
No alternative in our corpus is currently producing — every name below is pre-production, possibly captured, or unverified. Treat this list as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
+11 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
No deployment evidence in our corpus for the names below. Treat them as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
No deployment evidence in our corpus for the names below. Treat them as a research bench, not a switch you can make today.
+2 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.