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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: battery. Company profile →
Qujing Lintie Technology is a lithium-iron-phosphate (LFP) cathode-material maker in Qujing, Yunnan. Its main product is nano LFP (纳米磷酸铁锂). It was set up in November 2018.
After a 2019 capital increase it is a joint venture of Shenzhen Dynanonic (深圳市德方纳米科技股份有限公司, SZSE: 300769) with 60 % and CATL (300750) with 40 %. The 2019 plan was a first phase of 10,000 t/yr of LFP. The plant also covers the iron-source and lithium-source precursor materials used in production. CATL lists it as an associate (联营企业). In H1 2026 CATL bought LFP plus tolling from it worth RMB 512.8 m, against an approved cap of RMB 1,000 m.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Qujing Lintie Technology Co., Ltd. (曲靖市麟铁科技有限公司) produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Lithium — *bulk input*: LFP is a lithium compound, and the lithium source (carbonate or hydroxide) is a main feedstock. China dominates lithium-chemical refining, and China has put LFP-cathode preparation and lithium-processing technology under export control.
Phosphate — *bulk input*: the iron-phosphate framework of the cathode. Qujing sits in Yunnan's phosphate-chemical belt.
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
CN · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches phosphate · flagged 25 Jul 2026, 74d pending
Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.
source ↗Phosphate — *bulk input*: the iron-phosphate framework of the cathode. Qujing sits in Yunnan's phosphate-chemical belt.
phosphate — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches lithium · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 110d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Lithium — *bulk input*: LFP is a lithium compound, and the lithium source (carbonate or hydroxide) is a main feedstock. China dominates lithium-chemical refining, and China has put LFP-cathode preparation and lithium-processing technology under export control.
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
lithium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches lithium · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 115d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Lithium — *bulk input*: LFP is a lithium compound, and the lithium source (carbonate or hydroxide) is a main feedstock. China dominates lithium-chemical refining, and China has put LFP-cathode preparation and lithium-processing technology under export control.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
lithium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches lithiumphosphate · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 114d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Lithium — *bulk input*: LFP is a lithium compound, and the lithium source (carbonate or hydroxide) is a main feedstock. China dominates lithium-chemical refining, and China has put LFP-cathode preparation and lithium-processing technology under export control.
Phosphate — *bulk input*: the iron-phosphate framework of the cathode. Qujing sits in Yunnan's phosphate-chemical belt.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
MA · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · touches lithiumphosphate · flagged 4 Sept 2026, 33d pending
Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025. Three structural changes: (1) a National Commission for Strategic and Critical Minerals empowered to designate an official list of "strategic and critical minerals" — Morocco's first formal legal mechanism to do so, which would sit upstream of and interact directly with the phosphate chokepoint (Morocco holds ~70% of world phosphate-rock reserves via OCP); (2) the digital mining cadastre (governance/transparency layer — this component has ALREADY gone live, launched 2026-04-07, and is queued separately to filing. md as an enacted action); (3) sharply increased penalties for illegal mining/prospecting (unauthorised prospecting: MAD 100k-1m; illegal extraction/transport/sale: up to MAD 2m). Morocco is chokepoint-tier and thinly covered (only 4 prior MA actions: 2022 Investment Charter, an AfDB agriculture loan, the 2026 Loi de Finances, and a Feb-2026 mining-tender notice — none creates a minerals-designation regime).
source ↗Lithium — *bulk input*: LFP is a lithium compound, and the lithium source (carbonate or hydroxide) is a main feedstock. China dominates lithium-chemical refining, and China has put LFP-cathode preparation and lithium-processing technology under export control.
Phosphate — *bulk input*: the iron-phosphate framework of the cathode. Qujing sits in Yunnan's phosphate-chemical belt.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
lithium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
phosphate — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Chinese battery-materials major Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (603799.
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all fo…
Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining…
Replaces 2016 Code Minier; embeds 'sovereignty doctrine' with stronger state participation, local-transformation mandate, and WAEMU-conformity requirements; President Faye targeted adoption before en…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
On 28-Nov-2025 European Metals Holdings announced the Czech government approved a grant of up to EUR 360M under the Ministry of Industry and Trade's "Strategic Investments for a Climate-Neutral Econo…
In March 2026 the outgoing Boric administration reportedly fast-tracked and submitted to the Contraloría General de la República (Chile's comptroller) a batch of ~5 further Contratos Especiales de Op…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rat…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
Introduced 28-Apr-2026 by Sen.
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
On 11 May 2026 Huayou Cobalt announced an all-cash agreement to acquire ASX/AIM-listed Atlantic Lithium for USD 210m, taking control of the Ewoyaa project (~1.
On 11 Feb 2025 the Attorney General of Canada filed a Notice of Application (Federal Court file T-472-25) seeking a court order under ICA s.
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
2 of 41 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 2 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ev vehicles — read via the graph's ev batteries node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of lithium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the lithium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of phosphate. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the phosphate chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.