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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: semiconductor. Company profile →
VIS is a Taiwan-headquartered specialty IC foundry (Hsinchu Science Park, founded 1994), running five 8-inch (200mm) wafer fabs in Taiwan and Singapore with combined capacity around 282,000-286,000 wafers/month. Rather than commodity high-volume logic, VIS focuses on mature-node specialty processes — Power Management ICs and Display Driver ICs are its largest revenue lines, alongside Bipolar-CMOS-DMOS (BCD), high-voltage, mixed-signal, embedded-memory, and MEMS processes serving automotive, industrial, and consumer customers. TSMC holds a long-standing minority equity stake and is VIS's technology-licensing partner but does not control the company.
VIS and NXP have also formed the VSMC joint venture in Singapore for a first 12-inch fab (initial production targeted 2027).
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
No production footprint is recorded in its dossier yet — its HQ country is 🇹🇼 Taiwan, a registration fact, not a production or sales claim. We say so rather than guess.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Gallium — structural component (in the GaN product line). VIS runs a GaN-on-Si and GaN-on-QST power-semiconductor platform on its mature 8-inch line, and in January 2026 licensed TSMC's 650V and 80V GaN process technology to extend that platform to 15V-1200V coverage for data-center, automotive, industrial-control and energy-management customers (production targeted H1 2028). Gallium is a direc…
Tungsten — structural component. Tungsten contact/via plugs are standard interconnect practice across sub-micron CMOS processes (VIS's 0.18µm-and-finer logic, BCD, and embedded-memory nodes fall squarely in that category), with no drop-in substitute at the contact layer.
Silicon — bulk input. Silicon wafers are the physical substrate for essentially all of VIS's products; high-purity electronic-grade wafer supply is concentrated among a small set of global makers (Shin-Etsu, SUMCO, GlobalWafers, Siltronic, SK Siltron), a supply-chain concentration risk distinct from raw-silicon scarcity.
Helium — trace/bulk consumable. Used industry-wide as an inert carrier/purge gas and backside wafer-cooling medium across CVD, etch, and lithography tool sets — a process input inherent to VIS's stated process portfolio rather than a company-specific disclosure. Global helium supply is concentrated (US reserve drawdown, Qatar, Russia's Amur plant) and has seen repeated…
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches galliumtungstensilicon · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Gallium — structural component (in the GaN product line). VIS runs a GaN-on-Si and GaN-on-QST power-semiconductor platform on its mature 8-inch line, and in January 2026 licensed TSMC's 650V and 80V GaN process technology to extend that platform to 15V-1200V coverage for data-center, automotive, industrial-control and energy-management customers (production targeted H1 2028). Gallium is a direc…
Tungsten — structural component. Tungsten contact/via plugs are standard interconnect practice across sub-micron CMOS processes (VIS's 0.18µm-and-finer logic, BCD, and embedded-memory nodes fall squarely in that category), with no drop-in substitute at the contact layer.
Silicon — bulk input. Silicon wafers are the physical substrate for essentially all of VIS's products; high-purity electronic-grade wafer supply is concentrated among a small set of global makers (Shin-Etsu, SUMCO, GlobalWafers, Siltronic, SK Siltron), a supply-chain concentration risk distinct from raw-silicon scarcity.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches tungsten · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 114d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Tungsten — structural component. Tungsten contact/via plugs are standard interconnect practice across sub-micron CMOS processes (VIS's 0.18µm-and-finer logic, BCD, and embedded-memory nodes fall squarely in that category), with no drop-in substitute at the contact layer.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches silicon · flagged 28 Jun 2026, 100d pending
The same Finance Bill 2026/27 already tabled (Parliament-passed 23 June 2026, effective 1 July 2026) inserts a NEW export levy of "10% of the FOB value of the cargo OR TZS 200 per kilogram, whichever is higher" on exports of quartz minerals (HS 25. 06) and feldspar (HS 2529. 10. 00) via amendment to the Export Tax Act, Cap. 196 — a distinct beneficiation-forcing EXPORT-TAX instrument that pushes raw quartz/feldspar exporters toward in-country value-addition. 196), and neither existing entry mentions it; (2) material-relevant — quartz HS 25. 06 covers high-purity/silica quartz feeding the silicon→semiconductor/solar value chain, so a Tanzanian export tax re-prices a raw-silica supply node; the same "rocks to riches" beneficiation logic Tanzania applies elsewhere; (3) part of the wider African raw-mineral-export-tax wave (cf. Zimbabwe 10% lithium-concentrate levy, Namibia unprocessed-mineral ban, Guinea bauxite reference price).
source ↗Silicon — bulk input. Silicon wafers are the physical substrate for essentially all of VIS's products; high-purity electronic-grade wafer supply is concentrated among a small set of global makers (Shin-Etsu, SUMCO, GlobalWafers, Siltronic, SK Siltron), a supply-chain concentration risk distinct from raw-silicon scarcity.
This changes the form of what TZ exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your TZ-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a TZ processing partner, not a supplier switch.
Secondary — only if you need to avoid TZ entirely: silicon supply outside TZ is 🇨🇳 CN 86%, 🇧🇷 BR 3.9%, 🇳🇴 NO 2.8% (shares renormalised after removing TZ).
EU · stage consultation-closed (pre-proposal; CFE + OPC both closed 2026-07-29) → elevated likelihood · touches galliumtungsten · flagged 30 Jul 2026, 68d pending
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence on CRM value chains**; (b) steer and de-risk finance into strategic projects with public and private partners; (c) support **strategic stockpiling**; and (d) run **joint purchasing** by pooling company orders and matchmaking demand with supply (a "raw materials platform" pooling orders and creating joint stocks, with an EU-coordinated stockpiling pilot to become operational in the following year). A **call for evidence + public consultation opened 19 May 2026**, and the Commission announced a **legislative proposal for Q2 2026**. Supply-relief on the material axis (EU-side aggregation, stockpiles and de-risking finance directly loosen chokepoint exposure for EU industrial buyers), but it also creates a new EU purchasing/allocation gatekeeper whose membership and priority rules will be contested. If it carries reporting or data-submission duties on participating companies, it becomes a second corporate-facing CRM information obligation alongside CRMA Art. 24.
source ↗Gallium — structural component (in the GaN product line). VIS runs a GaN-on-Si and GaN-on-QST power-semiconductor platform on its mature 8-inch line, and in January 2026 licensed TSMC's 650V and 80V GaN process technology to extend that platform to 15V-1200V coverage for data-center, automotive, industrial-control and energy-management customers (production targeted H1 2028). Gallium is a direc…
Tungsten — structural component. Tungsten contact/via plugs are standard interconnect practice across sub-micron CMOS processes (VIS's 0.18µm-and-finer logic, BCD, and embedded-memory nodes fall squarely in that category), with no drop-in substitute at the contact layer.
This is support, not a threat — it funds, fast-tracks or relaxes rather than restricts. If you have operations, projects or purchases inside its scope, check your eligibility against the measure's own text above.
MN · stage draft-published → moderate likelihood · touches tungsten · flagged 27 Jun 2026, 101d pending
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising holding fees (to curb speculative licence-trading/flipping); (ii) introduces a STATUTORY definition of "critical minerals" (aligned to Mongolia's 11-mineral list: molybdenum, manganese, nickel, copper, fluorspar, graphite, REEs, cobalt, lithium, PGMs, tungsten) and a SEPARATE licensing regime for downstream beneficiation plants; (iii) mandates mine-closure plans + financial bonding once a mine reaches 75% of its life; aims to accelerate licence issuance and expand the resource base. Mongolia is a structural China/Russia-flanked chokepoint pursuing Western REE/copper partnerships (US FORGE, JP, KR), so a domestic critical-minerals statutory regime + downstream-processing licensing reprices the entry terms for any foreign developer of Mongolian copper/REE/fluorspar (Oyu Tolgoi-adjacent, Erdenes critical-minerals SOE pipeline).
source ↗Tungsten — structural component. Tungsten contact/via plugs are standard interconnect practice across sub-micron CMOS processes (VIS's 0.18µm-and-finer logic, BCD, and embedded-memory nodes fall squarely in that category), with no drop-in substitute at the contact layer.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
Requires US allies — primarily the Netherlands (ASML) and Japan (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu) — to align their national export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment with US BIS res…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligat…
Taiwan ITA (International Trade Administration, MOEA) launched a 60-day public consultation on planned revisions to the SHTC (Sensitive High-Tech Commodity) controlled-goods export list to add AI chi…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
Reuters (exclusive, multiple sources) reported 31 Dec 2025 that Chinese authorities have been requiring domestic chipmakers to source at least 50% of equipment spend from Chinese toolmakers when appl…
If enacted, first Taiwan restriction covering all Chinese customers (not just blacklisted entities); would require Taiwanese OEMs (Foxconn, Pegatron, ASUS, Quanta, Wiwynn), server makers, and compone…
3 of 38 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in semiconductors. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
For each bought material: the ex-controller producers a procurement team can actually reach, from the alternatives map (derived 2026-10-06), viability-gated — each name carries its deployment status (with the verbatim dossier phrase it rests on), a capture check against the measure being escaped, and any contracted-capacity evidence. Deployable-now names sort first; a developer with zero tonnes is shown demoted, never dressed up as a switch you can make today. Tradability is inherited from the listing layer, never guessed.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+5 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
+1 more tradable names, ranked below these by the same gate.
No listed, tradable substitute passes the screen — 3 tracked ex-bloc producers remain a research starting point.
Full substitution matrix →lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.