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1 critical material scored · binding chokepoint: Uranium (🇷🇺 RU 45% of refining) · 25 restrictive government measures on record
A verification pass re-checked this dossier's ownership/corporate-structure fields against their cited sources. It did not re-read the material_exposures claim the score, band and stress figures below are built on — treat those as not yet independently re-checked.
Uranium Energy Corp. produces 1 of the 1 scored material above (Uranium). For those, a supply restriction by the controlling country is a tailwind, not a headwind — the exposure is to disruption of a market this company supplies, not to a chokepoint it depends on. Every scored material here sits on its output side, so the Elevated · 67/100 band should be read as chokepoint salience, not as buyer vulnerability, and the Art. 24 input-side duties below are qualified accordingly.
Role from an explicit dossier role: tag or the producer-sector classifier behind the /minerals alternatives bench (one classifier on disk, generated 2026-10-07) — the same source the company page uses. A material the classifier has no entry for defaults to a buyer dependency, which can understate a producer's output side. Descriptive classification only: it enters no score.
The binding exposure is Uranium — 🇷🇺 RU controls 45% of global refining. On this company's production footprint that scores 67/100 (adversarial chokepoint; global 57). The register holds 25 restrictive government measures touching this company's materials — each traced to its primary source below.
Peer rank · Uranium Uranium Energy Corp. is the 19th-most-exposed of the 56 named companies we track on 🇷🇺 RU's Uranium chokepoint; the most-exposed is Appia Rare Earths & Uranium Corp. (67/100). Ranked on the same footprint-adjusted buyer score as above — a relative read of an existing metric, not a new one.
Uranium Energy Corp. ranks 161st of 460 verified mining metals companies, tied with 17 others at 67.
Same sector_primary, ranked on the company supply-risk index. Restricted to hand-verified dossiers — 133 further mining metals companies are tracked but auto-onboarded, and excluded here because their exposure list is a sector template rather than company research. A peer scoring lower is the useful read: it usually means a different production geography or a qualified second source.
Company supply-risk index 67/100 — the binding chokepoint dominates, with a modest add for exposure breadth across 1 scored material. Buyer-relative (first-order): weighted by where the company produces (US 100%, estimated split — no cited source states these exact shares), applied across all materials — it does not yet trace each input to its specific sourcing step.
Disclosed production sites
Named plants and what they make, from the company's disclosures. Descriptive detail — the buyer score above is still driven by country-level footprint weights, not per-site material intensity.
> The exposure report this dossier powers is at > /intelligence/dossiers/uranium-energy/report.
Uranium Energy Corp. (NYSE American: UEC) describes itself in its own annual report as "a pure-play uranium company." It mines uranium by in-situ recovery (ISR) on two hub-and-spoke platforms in the United States: a South Texas platform anchored by the 100%-owned Hobson Processing Facility (the "hub") taking uranium-loaded resin from the Palangana Mine and, in future, the Burke Hollow Project (the "spokes"); and a Wyoming platform anchored by the Irigaray central processing plant, which takes loaded resin trucked from the Christensen Ranch Mine and is central to the Reno Creek and Ludeman projects. It also owns the conventional Sweetwater Plant in southwestern Wyoming, acquired in December 2024. Drums of U3O8 — yellowcake — are, in the 10-K's words, "our only sales product and source of revenue."
Production is at an early ramp-up stage rather than at nameplate. UEC restarted extraction at the previously producing Christensen Ranch ISR operation in August 2024; across all of fiscal 2025 (year ended 31 July 2025) that ramp-up yielded 103,545 lb of precipitated uranium and 26,421 lb of dried and drummed concentrate. Cumulatively, Hobson has processed 578,000 lb of U3O8 between November 2010 and 31 July 2025. Against licensed capacity of 4.0M lb/yr at each of Irigaray and Hobson, the gap between licence and output is the company's central operational question, not a rounding detail.
Separately from mining, UEC runs a Physical Uranium Program — it buys and warehouses drummed uranium at spot. It held 1,356,000 lb of purchased uranium at 31 July 2025 (excluding the fiscal-2025 production above), and had agreed to buy a further 300,000 lb during fiscal 2026 at a volume-weighted average price of approximately $37.05/lb. This inventory is materially larger than annual output, so a meaningful part of the company's uranium position is bought rather than mined.
case where the exposure needs no engineering inference: the 10-K states outright that drummed U3O8 is UEC's only sales product and only source of revenue, which is why the magnitude band is recorded as high with that disclosure as its basis. The exposure is tagged role: producer, meaning UEC sits on the supply side — an export restriction or sanction on uranium by another jurisdiction is a tailwind to its realised price, not a headwind to its input costs. Producing assets are entirely within the United States (Wyoming and Texas), which is itself the commercial thesis: US utilities buying domestically mined uranium are insulated from restrictions on Russian-origin and Central Asian supply in a way importers are not.
Not listed, and why — the Alto Paraná titanium project. UEC's 10-K discloses one non-uranium asset: "In addition to our uranium properties, we also own the Alto Parana titanium project in Paraguay." The deposit is an ilmenite sand ("'heavy mineral' particles between 45µm and 1mm ... containing an average of 50% TiO2"), and the 10-K estimates that "the inferred resources contain between 4 and 5% ilmenite." Titanium is a scored material in this platform (SCORED_MATERIALS, lib/minerals-supply-risk.ts; verified against the live list on 2026-09-05, not from memory). It is nonetheless deliberately not entered as a role: producer exposure, because the disclosed resource is inferred and the project is not producing: tagging UEC as a titanium producer would let a titanium policy action score against a company that has never shipped a tonne of it. Recorded here so the asset is visible and so the next pass does not treat its absence as an oversight. Revisit if UEC advances Alto Paraná to a reserve statement or begins production.
Canadian and Paraguayan uranium assets are held, not produced. The Athabasca Basin portfolio (Roughrider, bought from a Rio Tinto subsidiary in October 2022; the UEX Corporation portfolio bought in August 2022, including 49.1% of Shea Creek and 100% of Horseshoe-Raven) is development- and exploration-stage — the 10-K calls Roughrider "an exploration stage asset" and has published only an S-K 1300 Initial Assessment for it. These are excluded from the production footprint for that reason; they are a pipeline, not a current supply position.
Ranked by buyer-relative risk, highest first.
| Material | Controlled by | You | Global | Band | Art. 5 | Input share | Substitute | Laws | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Uranium | 🇷🇺 RU 45% refining | 67 | 57 | Elevated | — | High | limited | 25 | ▲ rising |
You = buyer-relative score (this company's disclosed footprint vs. the controller). Global = buyer-agnostic supply risk. Substitute = ease of swapping the material out (none = locked in). Input share = the material's disclosed magnitude in the company's input basket (HIGH/MED/LOW only where a public filing quantifies it; — = unrated). Descriptive effect-size, never scored.
Art. 5 = does the global top single-country share breach the EU's own CRMA Art. 5 diversification ceiling (no more than 65% of a strategic raw material from a single third country)? A conservative global-production PROXY for the EU-import denominator — descriptive only, sits beside the score, never merged into it (— = non-strategic material). Reg. (EU) 2024/1252 Art. 5 ↗
Per-material factor scoring on a 1–5 likelihood×impact scale, mapped to the Art. 24(2)(b) risk-factor framework. The headline score above is a portfolio RAG; this matrix is the assessment — it is where two companies with the same binding chokepoint diverge.
| Material | Geopolitical | Concentration | Price / market | Substitutability | Import reliance | Logistics · ESG · Supplier |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Uranium | 4 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 3 | company input |
1 = very low … 5 = very high — a standard supply-risk likelihood×impact scale (the form a competent authority expects for the Art. 24(2)(b) factor analysis, not a CRMA-numbered scale). Public-source factors are pre-filled from the engine's primary sources (USGS concentration, IPTM government actions, EU import data); the three rightmost factor categories need company / Tier-1 supplier data and are flagged as input under Art. 24(3). Hover any cell for its evidence.
Every new filing and every amendment (rate change, scope change, repeal) touching this company's materials in the window above. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date.
No filings or amendments in this window — the register has been quiet on this company's materials.
Restrictive government measures on this company's materials, newest first — each links to its primary government source.
+ 10 more in the register.
The Art. 24(2)(c) vulnerability assessment, made explicit. For each leading exposure we model the move in this company's buyer-relative score under two distinct supply-disruption scenarios — the production footprint held fixed, only one lever moved at a time so each delta isolates one shock:
Under the 🇷🇺 RU shock, these disclosed plants carry the binding Uranium exposure:
| Type | Scenario | Today | Stressed | Δ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy | Uranium — 🇷🇺 RU escalates uranium controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime | 67 | 74 | +7 |
| Concentration | Uranium — 🇷🇺 RU becomes the single source for uranium — the second source is lost (full 45%+ monopoly) | 67 | 92 | +25 |
A zero delta means that lever is already modelled at maximum on that material — today's score already prices it in. This is why the two scenarios are shown together: where a material's policy lever is already maxed (zero policy delta), the concentration shock still carries a real delta, and vice-versa. Each stressed score isolates its one lever; all other factors are held at current values.
No material crosses the significant-vulnerability threshold on the input side — every scored material here is one Uranium Energy Corp. produces, and Art. 24 addresses the use of a strategic raw material as an input. The Art. 24(4) mitigation duty is not triggered on the public-source evidence; the mitigations below are precautionary.
Stated threshold (so the conclusion is reproducible and auditable): buyer-relative band ≥ High AND substitutability hard/none AND ≥ 1 in-force restrictive measure on the material, assessed over the 0 materials this company buys (the 1 it produces are excluded from the test and listed above). The CRMA does not fix a numeric definition of “significant”; the company may adopt a stricter or looser threshold and should record it here.
Proposed, announced or draft regulation that is not yet in force but would touch this company's at-risk materials if it passes. Forward-looking early-warning — the likelihood shown is an honest band derived from the legislative stage, not a forecast or a fabricated probability. Kept separate from the enacted register above: nothing here is law yet.
Likelihood band is derived deterministically from the legislative stage (announced → low; draft-published / in-consultation → moderate; passed-committee → elevated; passed-vote / awaiting-signature → high) — a reproducible, source-traceable proxy, not a probability estimate. Where shown, the modelled impact-if-passed re-uses the same buyer-relative stress engine as the enacted scenarios above: it holds this company's production footprint fixed and escalates the proposed measure to a full export-licensing / control regime — the conservative upper bound for a measure that may pass only as a partial cap. The delta is the move from today's score to that stressed score; companies with no modelled production footprint show no delta.
Forward-looking read on the binding chokepoint, from the recent trajectory of policy on these materials. Directional, not a forecast.
Every scored material here is one Uranium Energy Corp. produces, so the Art. 24(4) buyer levers — qualify an alternative supplier, re-source, substitute the input — do not apply to this company. The output-side items below are what a concentrated producer's risk office actually acts on. We render them rather than a generic diversification list because a prescription addressed to the wrong side of the market is worse than none.
Under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (Reg. (EU) 2024/1252), a Member State identifies the large companies (Art. 2(29): >500 employees and >€150M net worldwide turnover) using strategic raw materials to manufacture a listed strategic technology (batteries, renewables, hydrogen, traction motors, heat pumps, aircraft, data-storage equipment, robotics, drones, satellites, advanced chips). Those companies must, at least every three years and to the extent the information is available to them (Art. 24(2)), assess their strategic-raw-material supply chain. Where suppliers do not provide the data on request, the assessment may rely on the Commission's monitoring dashboard (Art. 20(4)) or other publicly available information (Art. 24(3)) — which is the evidence base this report assembles. Board reporting (Art. 24(5)) is voluntary unless the Member State mandates it (Art. 24(6)).
| CRMA provision | Obligation | Where addressed |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 24(1) | Member State identifies the company as in-scope (uses an SRM to make a listed strategic technology). | Scope & applicability |
| Art. 24(2)(a) | Map where the strategic raw materials are extracted, processed and recycled. | Exposure register + Supply-risk factor analysis |
| Art. 24(2)(b) | Analyse the factors that might affect supply. | Supply-risk factor analysis (factor matrix) + The laws that threaten it |
| Art. 24(2)(c) | Assess vulnerabilities to supply disruptions. | Stress test + significant-vulnerability conclusion |
| Art. 24(3) | Where supplier data is unavailable, rely on Commission (Art. 20(4)) / public sources. | This report's basis — see Methodology & sources |
| Art. 24(4) | Where significant vulnerabilities are found, assess diversifying or substituting. | Significant-vulnerability conclusion + Priority mitigations |
| Art. 24(5)–(6) | Report results, sources, significant risks and mitigations to the board. | This document — board-ready, PDF-exportable |
This report pre-fills the Art. 24(3) public-source half of the assessment. The company-specific inputs — employee/turnover thresholds, bill-of-materials volumes, the tiered supplier map, and formal board adoption — remain the company's to complete; they are flagged as “company input” where they appear.
Article 24 applies only when both size thresholds are met and a Member State has identified the company as making a listed strategic technology with strategic raw materials.
| Threshold test | This assessment |
|---|---|
| Average employees (last FY) > 500 | company input |
| Net worldwide turnover (last FY) > €150M | company input |
| Uses a strategic raw material as an input | company input — all 1 scored SRM here is one this company produces, not buys; input use is not evidenced by this assessment |
| Manufactures a listed strategic technology | mining-metals (confirm against Annex) |
| Formally identified by a Member State authority | company input |
Production-concentration figures: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 + the production dataset behind each material page. Policy measures trace to the primary government sources below.
Each material's global supply-risk index blends five weighted factors: concentration of refining/processing (35%), active trade-control & policy pressure (25%), import reliance (15%), substitutability (15%), and price stress (10%). The buyer-relative score then scales the relational factors (concentration / policy / import) by this company's production-footprint alignment against each material's controlling country — bloc-neutral factors (substitutability, price) are left intact.
Caveats. The footprint is the company's assembly / manufacturing geography applied uniformly across all materials — a first-order proxy, not per-material input tracing. Scores are an analytical judgement on public data with a transparent weighting, not a market forecast or investment advice. Production shares reflect 2024-2025 figures and the policy position as of 2026-08-21; the register is continuously maintained and should be re-pulled against each new policy action.
MACROLENS · CICONIALABS · GEOPOLITICAL SUPPLY-RISK REPORT (EU CRMA ART. 20–25) · report generated 2026-10-07
Tip: the change log above defaults to the last 30 days. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date (e.g. ?since=2026-04-01).
This is a description of the actual automated pipeline (verifiable against this repo's own cron schedule), not a contractual commitment.