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Base rate computed from analyst-asserted responds_to: edges in the reverse direction (target-country → issuer-country) for prior issuer-actions on the same target. Modal type + lag percentiles only — not a model output. Treat as a historical anchor for sizing counter-response scenarios, not a forecast in itself.
COM(2026) 100 final is the Commission's flagship horizontal industrial-policy instrument of the von der Leyen II term — the binding regulatory follow-through for the high-level 2025-02-26 Clean Industrial Deal roadmap. Where NZIA (2024-06-22) targeted clean-tech manufacturing share, CRMA (2024-05-23) targeted upstream raw materials, and the EV CVDs (2024-10-29) targeted a single sector, the IAA is the first EU instrument that combines demand-side procurement mandates, FDI conditionality, and permitting acceleration in one regulation spanning batteries, EVs, solar PV and critical raw materials.
Public procurement and "certain public support schemes" gain low-carbon and EU-content preferences for strategic-sector products. Initial scope covers the four strategic sectors (batteries, EVs, solar PV, CRMs); the Commission flags potential extension to steel, cement, aluminium, automotive and chemicals. This is the legally binding evolution of the NZIA's 65%-single- country procurement-resilience criterion, applied across a broader sectoral perimeter.
For greenfield or M&A investments above €100 million in the four strategic manufacturing sectors, where the foreign investor's home country represents more than 40% of global manufacturing capacity in that sector, the IAA authorises member states to impose conditions on:
acquisition triggers the regime),
Approval requires at least 4 of 6 conditions to be met. The 40% threshold effectively targets PRC-controlled investments in batteries, EVs, solar PV and CRMs — the exact perimeter where Chinese global manufacturing share already exceeds 40-80%. This is a step-change beyond the existing 2019 EU FDI Screening Regulation, which is purely defensive (block on national-security grounds); IAA conditionality instead seeks to extract industrial benefits from foreign capital that does enter.
Each member state designates Industrial Acceleration Areas with pre-completed site permits and a unified digital "one-stop-shop" for project authorisation. Mirrors the NZIA Net-Zero Strategic Project regime (≤18 months) but generalises the model.
Manufacturing share of EU GDP: 14.3% (2024) → ≥20% by 2035. The Draghi report (Sep 2024) framed deindustrialisation as the existential challenge; IAA is the first hard-instrument response.
Hungary, BYD Hungary, Geely-Volvo, Envision AESC UK/France, JinkoSolar Sicily, LONGi greenfield discussions — any new project >€100m faces JV-style conditions on EU equity/IP/employment. Expect re-routing through Korean or Japanese intermediaries, or downsizing to sub-€100m phased projects.
Korea is below the 40% global-share trigger in batteries — IAA conditionality does not bind. EWY exposure benefits.
Meyer Burger) gains procurement-side demand pull.** EZU/VGK clean-tech sub- baskets benefit; LIT and REMX gain from CRMA-IAA reinforcement.
IRA architecture** — direct subsidy + supply-chain mandate + FDI gate. The EU has caught up structurally; Commission negotiating leverage with PRC rises ahead of the next EU-China summit.
designations are member-state-implemented; expect divergence between France/Italy (protectionist enthusiasm) and Germany/Sweden (preserving open- market access for Chinese cell suppliers to domestic OEMs).
DE/SE/NL push for softer) and Parliament (industrial-policy left vs single- market right) negotiations through 2026-27.
the final text? The Commission flagged this as optional.
and FDI conditions on EU content are vulnerable to challenge by China, US, Korea, Japan absent strategic-sector public-procurement carve-outs.
measured (volume vs value, who certifies)? Audit-style implementation will determine real bite.