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On 11 March 2026 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer initiated parallel Section 301 investigations into the acts, policies, and practices of 16 economies — China, the European Union, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India — relating to structural excess capacity and overproduction in manufacturing sectors. The Federal Register notice (FR doc 2026-05214; dockets USTR-2026-0067 and USTR-2026-0068) was published on 17 March 2026. Covered sectors include aluminum, automobiles, batteries, cement, chemicals, electronics, energy goods, glass, machine tools, machinery, paper, plastics, processed food and beverages, robotics, satellites, semiconductors, ships, solar modules, steel, and transportation equipment. Written comments were due by 15 April 2026; USTR held the public hearing beginning 5 May 2026. This is the most sweeping multi-economy Section 301 initiative since the 2018 China investigation and is structurally distinct from the China-only 2024-05-14 §301 tariff hikes and the 2025-07-15 Brazil §301 investigation.

Vietnam's 15th National Assembly adopted Law No. 54/2024/QH15 on Geology and Minerals on 29 November 2024 (446 of 448 votes), promulgated by Presidential Order on 20 December 2024 and effective 1 July 2025 (Articles 110.2 and 110.3 effective earlier on 15 January 2025). The law replaces the 2010 Mineral Law and introduces a four-group mineral classification, with Group I — covering metallic minerals (including rare earths), energy minerals, precious/semi-precious stones, and industrial minerals — placed under state-controlled licensing, national master-plan approval by the Prime Minister, and a "supply-the-domestic-industrial-ecosystem" priority that operates as a de-facto export curb on raw and minimally-processed strategic minerals. Vietnam holds the world's second-largest rare-earth reserves after China, making the new statute a foundational instrument for a state-controlled midstream gateway in non-China REE supply.

On 27 June 2024 the Argentine Congress passed Law 27.742, the "Ley de Bases y Puntos de Partida para la Libertad de los Argentinos" ("Ley Bases"), the flagship economic reform of the Milei administration. The law was published in the Boletín Oficial on 8 July 2024 and Title VII established the Régimen de Incentivo para Grandes Inversiones (RIGI) — a promotional regime designed to attract large-scale capex into mining, energy, oil & gas, LNG, steel, forestry, tourism, infrastructure, and technology. Implementing Decree 749/2024 was issued on 23 August 2024 and the regime became fully operational with Resolution 1074/2024 on 22 October 2024. RIGI offers single-project vehicles ("VPUs") that commit at least USD 200M (with sector-specific thresholds rising to USD 600M and up to USD 2B for long-term "strategic export" projects) a 30-year regulatory, tax, customs and foreign-exchange stability guarantee. Headline benefits include a reduced 25% corporate income tax (vs. 35% standard), accelerated depreciation, full deductibility of inflation adjustments, an import-duty exemption on capital goods and inputs, a phased relaxation of central-bank obligations to repatriate and convert export proceeds (20% free after year one, 40% after year two, 100% after year three), and reduced dividend withholding tax. Disputes are subject to international arbitration under ICSID or UNCITRAL rules. As of mid-2025, RIGI's project pipeline reached USD 33.9B in submitted applications, of which roughly USD 15.7B (46.5%) had been approved across nine projects spanning steel (Sidersa), energy/LNG (PAE Southern Energy, YPF Argentina LNG), three mining projects, and infrastructure. The flagship approval was Rio Tinto's USD 2.5B Rincón battery-grade lithium carbonate plant in Salta (initial 53,000 t/yr, scaling to 60,000 t/yr by 2028) — the first mining project approved under the regime, on 21 May 2025. Strategically, RIGI is Argentina's bid to compete with Chile's lithium framework and Brazil's industrial policies for upstream-critical-minerals capex. Combined with the lifting of Argentina's FX controls (cepo cambiario) in April 2025 it sharply re-rates the country's project-economics math for multinationals — particularly in the Lithium Triangle, the Vaca Muerta shale, and pipeline/LNG infrastructure. Whether the 30-year stability guarantee survives a future change of government is the dominant political-risk overhang on the regime.

Regulation (EU) 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council, published in OJ L 130 on 16 May 2023 and entering into force on 17 May 2023, establishes the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) — the Union's primary instrument for preventing carbon leakage at the external border. The regulation applies an equivalent carbon price to embedded greenhouse gas emissions in imports of six sector groups (iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen) from non-EU/EEA/Swiss counterparts, complementing the EU Emissions Trading System's domestic coverage. A transitional reporting-only phase operated from 1 October 2023 through 31 December 2025; the definitive certificate-purchase-and-surrender regime entered full application from 1 January 2026.

The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered its definitive phase on 1 January 2026 following a transitional reporting period that began October 2023. Under Regulation (EU) 2023/956, importers of goods in six carbon-intensive sectors (iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen) must now purchase CBAM certificates corresponding to embedded carbon emissions. The Q1 2026 certificate price was set at EUR 75.36 per tonne CO2, calculated from EU ETS auction prices. In 2026, the adjustment factor is 2.5%, rising annually to 100% by 2034.

Indonesia accelerated the implementation of its raw nickel ore export ban, originally scheduled for 2022, to take effect on 1 January 2020. Announced 30 August 2019 by Minister Ignasius Jonan via ESDM Regulation No. 11/2019, the ban prohibits the export of nickel ore with grades below 1.7% Ni (effectively all Indonesian saprolite and limonite ore that previously flowed to Chinese stainless-steel and ferronickel mills) and forces ore to be processed domestically into intermediate products (nickel pig iron, ferronickel, mixed hydroxide precipitate, nickel sulfate). The policy is part of the long-running "hilirisasi" (downstream-isation) strategy and was the trigger for the >$30B wave of Chinese-led nickel- processing investment in Sulawesi (Morowali, Weda Bay) that has since made Indonesia the dominant global nickel producer.