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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 860/2025 on 25 November 2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 41 legal entities that collectively own 56 maritime vessels. The vessels are alleged to have made illegal port calls at Sevastopol and Feodosia — Ukrainian ports under temporary Russian occupation — to load and export stolen Ukrainian wheat, sunflower seeds, and other food commodities between 2022 and 2025. The sanctions (asset freezes, restrictions on commercial transactions and transit, and foreign- customer limitations) apply for a term of 10 years and entered into force on 27 November 2025, the date of official publication.
On 19 September 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office designated two Georgian nationals — Otar Partskhaladze and Levan Vasadze — and two companies, UK-based Aeza International Ltd and Russia-based HeliCo Group LLC, under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, citing their roles in supporting Russian disinformation and Georgia's Kremlin-aligned political network. In the same package OFSI proscribed two oil tankers, Bavly and Karakuz, for allegedly delivering Russian-origin crude to the port of Batumi, Georgia, barring both vessels from UK ports and the UK Ship Register. Designated individuals face asset freezes, travel bans and director-disqualification sanctions.
The Parliament of Georgia adopted the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence (Law No 4194-XIV) on 14 May 2024 by an 84–4 vote, overriding a presidential veto on 28 May 2024. The law requires NGOs, broadcasters, and online/print media that derive 20% or more of their funding from a "foreign power" in any calendar year to register as "organisations pursuing the interests of a foreign power," with reporting and transparency obligations and fines of up to GEL 25,000 (~EUR 8,400) per violation. The European Council immediately froze Georgia's EU accession negotiations citing the law's incompatibility with EU values, the European Commission suspended EUR 30M+ of annual direct budget support, and the US State Department announced visa restrictions targeting Georgian officials, establishing the measure as a pivotal FDI-climate and geopolitical inflection event for the country.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 37 entities under 40 entries to the Entity List, effective December 17, 2021. The additions span three distinct threat rationales: (1) support for Chinese military modernization across semiconductors, submarine cables, armored vehicles, and defense electronics; (2) the Academy of Military Medical Sciences and 11 affiliated institutes pursuing biotechnology processes for military end uses, including purported brain-control weaponry under EAR §744.11(b); and (3) a cross-border Iran sanctions-evasion network operating across China, Georgia, Malaysia, and Turkey that diverted US-origin items to Iran's defense industries and advanced conventional weapons programs. All 40 entries carry a presumption-of-denial licensing policy for all items subject to the EAR, with no license exceptions available.