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On 29 June 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 27 [2026], adding 20 Japanese entities to the dual-use-item export-control Control List (受控名单) under the Dual-Use Export Control Regulations. The designated entities include four defense research institutes (National Institute for Defense Studies plus ground-, naval- and air-systems research bodies) and 16 companies, primarily Mitsubishi Electric and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries subsidiaries. The Control List designation imposes an absolute prohibition on exporting PRC-origin dual-use items — including rare earths and gallium/germanium/antimony-class strategic minerals — to the listed parties, and bars any third-country transfer of Chinese-origin dual-use items to them; ongoing supply activity must cease immediately, with exceptions only via special MOFCOM application. MOFCOM stated the action targets entities "involved in enhancing Japan's military capabilities."

On 24 February 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce simultaneously issued Announcement No. 11 and Announcement No. 12 [2026], activating for the first time the Control List (受控名单) mechanism under Article 28 and the Watch List (关注名单) mechanism under Article 26 of the Dual-Use Export Control Regulations (effective 1 December 2024), designating 40 Japanese entities in total. The Control List (20 entities, led by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Shipbuilding Co.) imposes an absolute prohibition on any person or entity worldwide supplying PRC-origin dual-use items to listed parties; the Watch List (20 entities, led by SUBARU Corporation) bars general licensing and requires exporters to file risk assessments and non-military-use commitments. MOFCOM framed both measures as a response to Japan's "remilitarization" trajectory, escalating well beyond the blanket enhanced- review framework established by Announcement No. 1 [2026] in January.

On 6 January 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 1 [2026] "On Strengthening Export Controls on Dual-Use Items to Japan" (商务部公告2026年第1号), the first PRC export-control instrument to single out a named country other than the United States. Effective immediately on publication with no wind-down period, the measure prohibits export of all dual-use items under PRC export-control law where the end-user is the Japanese Ministry of Defense or Self-Defense Forces, the end-use is Japanese military, or — under a novel catch-all standard — the transaction would "enhance Japan's military capabilities." The standard is explicitly extraterritorial, covering transfers of PRC-origin dual-use items through third countries and in-country transfers where the end-user / end-use falls within scope. The political trigger was Japanese PM Takaichi's November 2025 Diet remarks framing a Taiwan contingency as a Japanese "survival-threatening situation" justifying SDF deployment.

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry amended the Export Trade Control Order (輸出貿易管理令) to add four technology categories to the prior-notification-of-transfer list under the Technology Management Scheme through Public-Private Dialogue (TMS-PPD): quantum-dot materials, TADF (thermally-activated delayed fluorescence) emissive materials, phase-difference film, and flexible endoscopes. Announced 11 November 2025, promulgated 19 November 2025, and effective 19 January 2026. This is the first list-control update produced by the TMS-PPD mechanism, which was established in December 2024 as an annual METI–industry review process for adding emerging-technology items to prior-notification controls outside the slower Wassenaar Arrangement / FEFTA catch-all channels.

Japan's Cabinet adopted a Cabinet Order on 11 November 2025 (promulgated 14 November 2025, effective 14 February 2026) amending Appended Table 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (輸出貿易管理令) to add three new list-control item categories: (i) peptide synthesizers and related components (Item group mapping to Australia Group 2023–2024 plenary dual-use biotechnology controls, aligning Japan with the US BIS implementation promulgated December 2024), (ii) powders of refractory metals or their alloys below specified particle-size and purity thresholds — tungsten, molybdenum, niobium, tantalum, and rhenium powders used as additive- manufacturing feedstocks (Item 5(20), implementing a Wassenaar Arrangement plenary outcome on metal-powder dual-use), and (iii) modules, assemblies, or devices incorporating field-programmable logic devices (FPGAs) above specified gate-count and process-node thresholds (Item 7(10-2), extending Japan's semiconductor-component AI-compute perimeter). This is the first discrete Appended Table 1 list-control amendment filed under the post-October-2025 FEFTA catch-all- controls overhaul architecture.

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) revised its Foreign End-User List (外国ユーザーリスト) — the reference list of foreign organisations for which WMD/missile or, for the first time, conventional-weapons development concerns cannot be excluded, used to trigger catch-all export-licence requirements. The revision adds 92 entities (from China, Hong Kong, North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and the UAE) and removes 5 entities (from China, Iran and India), taking the list to 835 entities across 15 countries and regions — a net increase of 87. The revised list applies from 9 October 2025, the same date Japan's broader catch-all conventional-weapons supplementary export-control review took effect.

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) overhauled the catch-all export-control framework under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) — the first comprehensive review of Japan's catch-all controls in 12 years (since 2013). Cabinet decisions were taken on 25 March 2025 and 4 April 2025 with METI's consolidated announcement on 9 April 2025; the amended Cabinet Order entered into force on 9 October 2025. The reform (i) splits catch-all-controlled items into "core items" (high dual-use risk, including certain semiconductors and machine tools) and a general catch-all tier, (ii) adds a new end-user requirement alongside the existing end-use requirement and extends both from UN-arms-embargo countries only to "general countries" (everywhere outside Group A), materially expanding the perimeter of items requiring METI export licences for general-country end-users including China, and (iii) introduces an "informed" condition for exports to Group A countries — once METI notifies an exporter of a defined risk pattern, a Group A export becomes licence-required, addressing transit-export-circumvention to Russia. Structurally distinct from the 23-category equipment-specific 2023 amendment (2023-03-31-japan-meti-semi-equipment-export-controls); this is the underlying horizontal catch-all reform and brings Japan's framework closer to US BIS EAR catch-all controls.

On 5 April 2024 Japan's Cabinet adopted an amendment to the Export Trade Control Order, following a 1 March 2024 Cabinet understanding, extending the export prohibition on goods that strengthen Russia's industrial base. The additional goods span parts of HS chapters 27 (mineral fuels and oils), 28 (inorganic chemicals), 39, 73, 81 (tungsten powder, molybdenum, cobalt, zirconium, rhenium), 82, 84, 85 (including lithium-ion and nickel-metal-hydride batteries), 89 and 90, with the specific goods fixed by ministerial ordinance and notices issued on 10 April. The export ban applies from 17 April 2024. A separate METI notice bans imports of non-industrial diamonds of Russian origin from 10 May 2024, regardless of port of shipment.

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 14403, Doc 2024-03674) adding two entities under seven entries to the Entity List, effective February 27, 2024. Sandvine Incorporated, a Canadian deep packet inspection vendor, is listed across six destinations (Canada, India, Japan, Malaysia, Sweden, UAE) because it supplies DPI technology to the Government of Egypt where it is used for mass web-monitoring and censorship. Chengdu Beizhan Electronics Co., Ltd. is listed under China for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items on behalf of the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC), a PLA-affiliated institution already on the Entity List. All items subject to the EAR require a license with a presumption-of-denial review policy for both entities. The rule also revises entries for two existing Chinese entities and removes one UAE entry.

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) announced on 31 March 2023 amendments to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act adding 23 categories of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to the export-licensing list. The measure, effective from 23 July 2023, is the Japanese counterpart to the US October 2022 BIS rule (filed: 2022-10-07-us-bis-advanced-ai-chip-controls-china) and the Dutch DUV controls. Items covered span lithography (mostly ArF and KrF), deposition (CVD, ALD, sputtering), etch, and cleaning + advanced inspection — broadly the toolset used at ≤14/16nm logic, advanced DRAM, and advanced 3D NAND. The controls are formally non-discriminatory but in practice capture exports to China; non-China destinations get general licences.

The Bureau of Industry and Security added 36 entities — 35 in China, 1 in Japan — to the Entity List under a presumption of denial for all EAR-controlled items, effective December 16, 2022. The most consequential additions are Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC, simultaneously removed from the Unverified List), eight Cambricon AI-chip subsidiaries, and Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE), China's sole domestic lithography producer. Three existing entries were revised: CETC 13 and two affiliates gained a Footnote 3 Russian-military-end-user designation, bringing them under the Russia/Belarus Foreign Direct Product rule with a blanket denial policy.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) effective November 26, 2021, by adding 28 entries to the Entity List across China (12), Japan (1), Pakistan (13 including 2 individuals), Singapore (1), and Taiwan (1). Designations span three distinct threat clusters: (1) eight Chinese entities supporting military applications of quantum computing, including QuantumCTek Co. and the Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale; (2) approximately twelve Pakistani procurement entities and three Chinese suppliers facilitating Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic missile program; and (3) the Corad Technology network across China, Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan that sold Western technology to Iran's military/space programs and North Korean front companies. Additionally, the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology was added to the Military End-User (MEU) List for producing military products. All Entity List entries carry presumption-of-denial licensing policy with no exceptions available.