Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2662 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On 23 December 2024 the US Bureau of Industry and Security published a final rule (89 FR 104408; FR Doc 2024-30425; RIN 0694-AJ83) amending the Export Administration Regulations to implement decisions adopted at the Australia Group's 2023 and 2024 plenary meetings. The rule adds new ECCN 2B352.k controlling instruments for the automated chemical synthesis of peptides that are partly or entirely automated and capable of generating peptides at a system-synthesis scale of 1 mmol or greater, finalising the April 2023 BIS proposed rule. It also adds dipropylamine to ECCN 1C350.d.11, neosaxitoxin to ECCN 1C351.d.12, revises the 1C351.d.3 entry from "botulinum toxins" to "botulinum neurotoxins" to capture all serotypes, adds a "minimum detection limit" definition for toxic-gas monitors in 2B351.a, and explicitly captures single-use centrifugal separators in 2B352.c. License requirements (CB, AT, CW where applicable) apply for export to non-Australia-Group destinations; the rule is effective on publication.

On 16 December 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/3192 amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014, the 15th package of restrictive measures against Russia. The package adds 84 asset-freeze listings (54 individuals and 30 entities) under Regulation 269/2014 — for the first time including fully-fledged designations of seven Chinese individuals and entities supplying drone components, machine tools, and dual-use goods to the Russian military-industrial complex. It expands the EU shadow-fleet vessel- ban list by 52 tankers (total 79), activates the standalone EU hybrid- threats sanctions regime with its first 16-individual / 3-entity designations, extends the wind-down derogation for divestment from Russian subsidiaries to 31 December 2025, and reinforces anti- circumvention contractual clauses on EU exporters of dual-use goods.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding 8 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of Burma (2), China (2), and Russia (4), citing actions contrary to US foreign-policy interests, primarily enabling human-rights violations through aerial attacks on civilians (Burma), Uyghur surveillance (China), and facial-recognition targeting of protesters (Russia). All designated entities require licenses for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption of denial. The rule was effective immediately on publication, December 11, 2024.

Saudi Arabia's General Authority of Foreign Trade (GAFT), under Chairman Dr. Majed Alkassabi, issued a final affirmative determination imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on Sulphonated Naphthalene Formaldehyde (SNF) — a concrete superplasticiser/water- reducing admixture — originating in or exported from China and Russia. The decision was published in the official gazette on 2 December 2024 and took effect 3 December 2024, directing the Zakat, Tax and Customs Authority to collect duties in the range of 18.12%-34% for five years (to 2 December 2029). The investigation was initiated 20 November 2023 following a complaint from the Saudi domestic industry.

Government of Russia Resolution No. 1544, signed by Prime Minister Mishustin on 14 November 2024 and published 15 November 2024, amends Resolution No. 313 of 9 March 2022 (the framework counter-sanctions list of goods restricted for export to "unfriendly" jurisdictions) by adding HS code 2844 20 — uranium enriched in U-235 and its compounds — to Annex 2. The amendment imposes a temporary export ban on enriched uranium to the United States and to legal entities incorporated in US jurisdiction, in force from 16 November 2024 through 31 December 2025. Exports are permitted only under one-off licences issued by the Russian Federal Service for Technical and Export Control (FSTEC). The measure is an explicit tit-for-tat response to the US Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act (Public Law 118-50, 13 May 2024).

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 87261; FR Doc 2024-25411) added 40 entities under 42 entries plus four addresses to the Entity List under the destinations China (11), India (5), Malaysia (2), Russia (13), Singapore (1), and Turkey (14), and modified 52 existing entries across China, Estonia, Finland, India, Turkey, the UAE and the UK. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish, Indian, Malaysian and Singaporean entities listed for transshipping controlled US-origin items to Russian defense end users; the 13 Russia entries cover chemical and biological warfare R&D and defense procurement networks. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with a policy/presumption of denial; four China addresses get the narrower "CCL + EAR99 supp. 7" scope. Effective on publication 2024-11-01.

Final rule (RIN 0694-AJ93, FR Doc 2024-25445, 89 FR 87279) under which BIS expands the Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions of the Export Administration Regulations to cover an enumerated list of chemical precursors used in the synthesis of chloropicrin and riot-control agents (CS, CN, CR), and adds associated technical clarifications. The action is the export- control complement to the US Department of State's annual report to Congress on Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, which determined that Russia had used riot-control agents as a method of warfare against Ukrainian forces in violation of the CWC. Effective on publication, 1 November 2024.

Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1400 of 23 October 2024, signed by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, sets temporary export quotas on mineral fertilisers from Russia for the six-month period 1 December 2024 – 31 May 2025. The aggregate cap is approximately 19.2 million tonnes, comprising about 11.2 Mt for nitrogen fertilisers and roughly 8 Mt for compound (NPK / NP / NPS) fertilisers. As with prior cycles, the quota is allocated across exporters by historical share and motivated by domestic-market supply stabilisation rather than revenue capture. Russia is the world's largest mineral-fertiliser exporter (~15-20% of global trade depending on segment), so the semi-annual quota is one of the principal global ag-input policy instruments.

The Türkiye Ministry of Trade's Imports General Directorate published Communiqué No. 2024/33 in Resmî Gazete No. 32689 on 11 October 2024, imposing definitive ad valorem anti-dumping duties on hot-rolled flat steel products originating in the People's Republic of China, India, Japan and the Russian Federation. Duties range from 6.10% to 43.31% CIF and run for a five-year initial term from the date of publication, subject to interim or expiry review. The measure covers roughly 90 tariff lines under CN/HS chapters 7208, 7211, 7212, 7225 and 7226 — the principal hot-rolled flat-steel customs codes. China-origin producers face the widest dispersion (residual 43.31% on unsampled producers, named-producer rates 15–36%); Japan applies a flat 9% to all producers; India and Russia residuals sit at 9% with named- producer rates as low as 6.0–6.10%. Imports of "plate rolled in a plate mill" accompanied by a Producer's Certificate under Notice 2002/1 are exempt. The petition was filed by TÇÜD (Türkiye Çelik Üreticileri Derneği — Turkish Steel Producers' Association) on behalf of integrated mills Erdemir, İsdemir, Çolakoğlu, Habaş and Tosçelik, and addresses Chinese HRC diversion to the Türkiye market following US Section 232 steel tariffs and EU CBAM/safeguard tightening.

FinCEN issued a final order, published in the Federal Register on 11 October 2024 (signed 26 September 2024), prohibiting US covered financial institutions from engaging in transmittals of funds to or from PM2BTC, a virtual-currency exchange operating outside the United States and identified as a primary money-laundering concern in connection with Russian illicit finance. The order is the first use of FinCEN's special- measure authority under Section 9714(a) of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act, as amended by the FY 2022 NDAA (codified at 31 U.S.C. 5323). The action was coordinated with same-day OFAC SDN designations of related entities (Cryptex) and individuals (Sergey Sergeevich Ivanov of Taleon Holdings).

MOTIE brought the 35th amendment of the Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Items into force on 9 September 2024, adding 243 items (notice Annex 2-2 numbers 1160-1402) to the situational-licence list for Russia and Belarus, taking that list to 1,402 items. The added items are described as having a high likelihood of military diversion (metal-cutting machinery, machine-tool parts, optical-equipment parts, sensors). Exports of the added items are prohibited in principle from 9 September, with licence applications admitted only for contracts concluded by 8 September and case-by-case categories such as exports to Korean companies' local subsidiaries. The same release tightens administrative penalties for deliberate export-control violations.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 68544; FR Doc 2024-19130) added 123 entities under 131 entries to the Entity List with destinations Russia (63), China (42), Iran (11), Turkey (8), and one each in Canada, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Crimea Region of Ukraine, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish and other third-country firms (e.g., MAK Logistics, Megatek Ltd., Wellgo International, AllChips Limited, Chipgoo Electronics) named for supplying U.S.-origin electronics and dual-use items to Russian industry and military, plus designation of large numbers of Russian military manufacturers (e.g., JSC 75 Arsenal, FSE Aleksinsky Chemical Plant) as military end users. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy/presumption of denial; case-by-case for EAR99 food and medicine to certain Russian military end users. Effective on publication 2024-08-27.

BIS final rule (FR Doc 2024-19132, 89 FR 68539, published 27 August 2024) expanding the Russia/Belarus-Military End User (MEU) Foreign-Direct Product (FDP) rule under the Export Administration Regulations so that it also applies to transactions involving Entity List entries posing a significant diversion risk to Russia's and Belarus's defense industry or intelligence services — the rule is renamed accordingly. The rule also imposes new export, reexport, and in-country transfer controls on software for the operation of computer numerical control (CNC) machine tools destined for Russia or Belarus, and makes corrections eliminating obsolete cross- references introduced by the BIS 25 January 2024 and 18 June 2024 Russia/Belarus final rules. Effective 27 August 2024, except amendatory instruction 11 effective 16 September 2024.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a final rule amending three sanctions programs. The rule adds a new general license at 31 CFR § 525.512 to the Burma Sanctions Regulations authorizing the provision of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components for medical devices, and software updates for medical devices to individuals whose property and interests in property are blocked. It also updates the authorities section of the Burma Sanctions Regulations to reflect recent legislation, replaces "the Office of Foreign Assets Control" / "the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control" with the acronym "OFAC" in three sections of the Sudan Stabilization Sanctions Regulations, and corrects a cross-reference in the Ukraine-/Russia- Related Sanctions Regulations. The rule is effective on publication.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published in the Federal Register reporting instructions implementing Section 104(a) of the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity (REPO) for Ukrainians Act (P.L. 118-50, Division F, enacted April 24, 2024). All US financial institutions at which Russian sovereign assets are located — or that know or should know of such assets, including in correspondent or payable-through accounts — must report those holdings to OFAC using Form TD-F 93.09. Initial reports were due by August 2, 2024, with rolling reports required within 10 days of detecting newly identified Russian sovereign assets. The notice is the predicate step for any future US seizure or transfer of frozen Russian central bank, National Wealth Fund, or Russian Ministry of Finance assets to benefit Ukraine.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 55033; FR Doc 2024-14635) added six entries to the Entity List under the destinations of the People's Republic of China (2), South Africa (1), the United Arab Emirates (2), and the United Kingdom (1). The two PRC-based entries (Global Training Solutions Limited; Smartech Future Limited) were added for ties to an existing Entity List party and for training elements of the PRC military. The two UAE-based entries (Mega Fast Cargo LLC; Mega Technique General Trading) were added for repeated dilatory or evasive conduct during BIS end-use checks, including the provision of false, misleading, or incomplete information. The South Africa and United Kingdom entries were added for shipping or attempting to ship US export-controlled items to Russia in violation of EAR controls. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy of presumption of denial. The rule is effective on publication, 2024-07-03.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 8. Additions are under five destinations: China (8), Türkiye (2), Cyprus (1), Kyrgyzstan (1), and the United Arab Emirates (1). Removals span China (6), UAE (1) and Russia (1). The single Russian entry (EFO Ltd.) was removed from the UVL because BIS simultaneously moved it to the Entity List, allowing BIS to delete Russia entirely as a UVL destination. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting items subject to the EAR. Published and effective the same day, 3 July 2024 (89 FR 55036, FR Doc 2024-14642).

On 24 June 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745, the 14th package of restrictive measures against Russia, amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014. The package introduces the EU's first targeted measures against Russian LNG (a ban on EU-port transhipment to third countries after a 9-month transition, and a prohibition on EU investment and goods/services exports to Russian LNG projects under construction such as Arctic LNG 2 and Murmansk LNG), bans EU entities outside Russia from using the SPFS Russian financial-messaging system, designates 27 named "shadow-fleet" tankers under a new vessel-specific port-access ban, and imposes a "best-efforts" obligation on EU parents to ensure non-EU subsidiaries do not engage in sanctions circumvention. It adds 116 new listings (69 individuals, 47 entities), including third-country circumvention enablers, to the asset-freeze and travel-ban regime.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding three Kaspersky entities to the Entity List under End-User Review Committee (ERC) determinations — AO Kaspersky Lab (Moscow), OOO Kaspersky Group (Moscow), and Kaspersky Labs Limited (London). All three are designated for cooperation with Russian military and intelligence authorities in support of Russian government cyber-intelligence objectives. Exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of all items subject to the EAR to the three entities now require a BIS licence reviewed under a policy of presumption of denial, with no licence exceptions available. The action is paired with a same-week Commerce ICTS final determination prohibiting Kaspersky cybersecurity and anti-virus software transactions in the United States.

BIS final rule (FR Doc 2024-13148, 89 FR 51644, RIN 0694-AJ87) expanding the Export Administration Regulations' Russia and Belarus sanctions architecture. Effective 12 June 2024 (most provisions) and 16 September 2024 (the EAR99 enterprise-software paragraph at §746.8(a)(8)), the rule introduces a new licence requirement for thirteen named categories of EAR99 enterprise software (ERP, CRM, BI, SCM, EDW, CMMS, project management, PLM, BIM, CAD, CAM, ETO) destined for Russia or Belarus; permits address-only Entity List designations to capture high-diversion addresses; adds eight Hong Kong addresses to the Entity List; and refines the Russia/Belarus Industry Sector Sanctions and Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule. Released the day before the G7 Italy summit alongside coordinated OFAC, State, and Treasury actions that together designated 300+ persons and entities.

Presidential Decree No. 442 of 23 May 2024 establishes a special judicial-administrative procedure by which the Russian Federation or the Central Bank of the Russian Federation can claim, before a Russian court, that an "unjustified deprivation" of Russian sovereign property has been effected by a state body or judicial authority of the United States — and, on a court finding to that effect, receive equivalent-value US-affiliated property located in Russia (real assets, securities issued by Russian companies, cash held in Russian bank accounts, and other property rights) by way of compensation. The mechanism is an explicit reciprocal counter-instrument to the US REPO for Ukrainians Act (Title II of H.R.815, signed 24 April 2024) authorising US executive confiscation of immobilised Russian sovereign assets in US jurisdiction. The decree is structurally extensible: by separate presidential decision, the same procedure may be applied to any other state Russia designates as "unfriendly". Implementing procedural acts and amendments to Russian legislation were required to be adopted by 23 September 2024.

President Biden signed into law on 13 May 2024 the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act (Division H of the National Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, Public Law 118-50). The law bans imports to the United States of unirradiated low-enriched uranium (LEU) produced in Russia or by Russian state entities, effective immediately, with a waiver mechanism allowing the Department of Energy to grant case-by-case exceptions through 2027 where no alternative supply is available. The law also authorised up to $2.72B to support US uranium enrichment capacity via CENTRUS and allied enrichment partnerships.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 41706; FR Doc 2024-10485) added 37 entities under 37 entries to the Entity List, all listed under the destination of the People's Republic of China. BIS designated these parties for one or more of three rationales: (i) shipping US-controlled items to Russia in violation of EAR controls, (ii) attempting to acquire US-origin items to support China's military modernisation or quantum-technology capabilities, and (iii) ties to the PRC high-altitude balloon that overflew the United States in late January–early February 2023. The designations span PRC technology companies (predominantly quantum-computing firms), manufacturing companies, and research institutes. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with a policy of presumption of denial and no license exceptions available. The rule is effective 2024-05-09, with publication in the Federal Register on 2024-05-14.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule amending the Russia and Belarus sanctions under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add License Exception Medical Devices (MED) at 15 CFR 740.23. The new exception authorises, without an individual licence, exports, reexports, and in-country transfers of EAR99 medical devices and EAR99 parts/components/accessories for exclusive use with such devices to Russia, Belarus, the temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine, and the other covered regions of Ukraine. The exception carries verification conditions and excludes Entity List / military end-user recipients, "production" facilities, and any case where the exporter has knowledge the items will be diverted to weapons production.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule (FR Doc 2024-08622; Docket 240417-0112; 89 FR 30119) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to expand the product scope of two Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules — the Iran FDP rule and the Russia/Belarus/Temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine FDP rule in 15 CFR 734.9(f) — to cover the entirety of the Common High Priority List (CHPL), an HTS-6 list developed jointly with the EU, Japan and the UK that identifies items used in Russian weapons production. The CHPL scope adds basic commercial-grade microelectronics (integrated circuits, RF transceiver modules), test/manufacturing equipment for electronic components, and CNC machine tools to the perimeter, requiring a BIS licence when these foreign-produced items are exported, reexported or transferred to Iran, Russia, Belarus or occupied Crimea. The rule was issued in response to Iran's 13 April 2024 attack on Israel and Iran's ongoing military support for the Russian war in Ukraine; it became effective 18 April 2024 (Federal Register publication 22 April 2024) with a transit grace period for in-flight shipments until 20 May 2024.

OFAC issued two determinations under Executive Orders 14068 and 14071 banning the import into the United States of Russian-origin aluminum, copper, and nickel produced on or after April 13, 2024, and separately prohibiting the provision of warranting/deliverable services for these metals on global exchanges (LME, CME) and their use to settle over-the-counter derivative contracts. Metal produced before the effective date is grandfathered. The action was coordinated with the United Kingdom, which imposed parallel exchange-listing prohibitions the same day, following G7 statements on reducing Russia's metals revenue.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 25503; FR Doc 2024-07760) added 11 entries to the Entity List under China (6), Russia (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2), effective 2024-04-11. The primary rationale for the Russia and UAE tranches — and at least one China entity (Shenzhen Jiasibo Technology) — is procurement of US-controlled dual-use aerospace and UAV components for Iran's Shahed- series UAV programme via the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA); those drones have been used against oil tankers in the Middle East and deployed by Russia in Ukraine. The remaining five China entities were designated for acquiring US-origin items to support China's military modernisation. The rule also adds one alias to the existing entry for Shanghai Biren Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. This action was the first Entity List final rule published after BIS implemented the 50 Percent Rule for controlling foreign subsidiaries of listed entities.

On 5 April 2024 Japan's Cabinet adopted an amendment to the Export Trade Control Order, following a 1 March 2024 Cabinet understanding, extending the export prohibition on goods that strengthen Russia's industrial base. The additional goods span parts of HS chapters 27 (mineral fuels and oils), 28 (inorganic chemicals), 39, 73, 81 (tungsten powder, molybdenum, cobalt, zirconium, rhenium), 82, 84, 85 (including lithium-ion and nickel-metal-hydride batteries), 89 and 90, with the specific goods fixed by ministerial ordinance and notices issued on 10 April. The export ban applies from 17 April 2024. A separate METI notice bans imports of non-industrial diamonds of Russian origin from 10 May 2024, regardless of port of shipment.

On 29 February 2024 Switzerland's WBF decided to align with the EU's 13th Russia sanctions package by amending the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), effective 1 March 2024 at 18:00 CET. The amendment adds over 100 individuals and nearly 90 entities — mainly Russian military-industrial-complex firms and suppliers of DPRK-sourced weapons to Russia — to the asset-freeze and designation lists, and extends the dual-use/military-technology export ban to 27 additional companies believed to be circumventing existing controls.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 14385; FR Doc 2024-03969; Docket 240215-0050; RIN 0694-AJ54) added 93 entities under 95 entries to the Entity List, effective 23 February 2024, with destinations Russia (63), Turkey (16), China (8), UAE (4), Kyrgyzstan (2), India (1), and South Korea (1). The dominant rationale is enforcement of Russia-diversion controls: 46 Russian defense manufacturers are designated as military end users acquiring US-origin items for Russia's armed forces, five Chinese entities (including Dennex Enterprises Limited and Shenzhen Speed Industrial Materials Co.) are cited for facilitating diversion of controlled microelectronics to Russia, and 16 Turkish firms are cited as procurement hubs obtaining US-origin items of importance to Russia's war effort. Four UAE entities are designated for transshipment networks serving both Russia and Iran. All entities are subject to a presumption of denial for EAR-controlled items; Russian military end users are additionally subject to the Russia/Belarus FDP rule (15 CFR 734.9(g)).

On 23 February 2024, two years after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/745, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and comprising the EU's 13th Russia sanctions package. It adds new CN codes to the export-ban annexes (dual-use and advanced-technology goods) and adds 27 entities — including firms based in China, Hong Kong, India, Sri Lanka, Serbia, Kazakhstan, Thailand and Turkiye — to the list of parties barred from any exemption from the export ban, on the basis they are assessed to be supporting Russia's military-industrial complex via circumvention routes. Asset-freeze listings (106 individuals, 88 entities) under the parallel Council Decision took effect 23 February 2024; the sectoral trade measures took effect 24 February 2024.

Canada made SOR/2024-32, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, registered and effective 2024-02-21 on the second anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The regulations add 163 persons to Schedule 1 — 10 individuals and 153 entities, predominantly Russian organizations tied to military-industrial production, logistics, insurance and oil-sector support — triggering Canadian dealing/asset bans. A parallel amendment to Schedule 7 adds five new goods categories under the Harmonized System (explosives and pyrotechnics; data-processing units and components; ball and roller bearings; semiconductor manufacturing equipment; optical and navigational instruments), banning their export to Russia or Russian persons.

MOTIE brought the 33rd amendment of the Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Items into force on 24 February 2024 (announced 20 February 2024), adding 682 items to the Russia/Belarus situational-licence (상황허가) list, taking that list to 1,159 items. The added items span construction machinery, secondary batteries, machine tools and aircraft components judged to have high military-diversion potential. Situational- licence items are prohibited from export in principle from the effective date, with narrow exceptions such as pre-existing contracts and case-by- case review categories.

On 31 January 2024 Switzerland's Federal Council decided to align with the EU's 12th sanctions package (adopted 18 December 2023) by amending the Ordinance on Measures Relating to the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), entering into force the same day at 18:00. The update extends Switzerland's Russia-sanctions perimeter to match the EU's additions — including the Russian diamond, steel and other import-revenue restrictions — and adds a new financial-sector prohibition barring Russian nationals and Russia-resident individuals from controlling Swiss crypto-asset service providers, aimed at closing sanctions-circumvention and enforcement gaps.

BIS final rule (FR Doc 2024-01408, 89 FR 4804, effective 23 January 2024) strengthens the EAR sanctions architecture against Russia and Belarus by adding 94 HTS-6 entries to the Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions (§746.5/§746.8) — covering hand tools, parachutes, aircraft training simulators, and airplane/helicopter components — and expands the de minimis threshold for foreign-made goods incorporating US-origin 600-series and 9×515 items destined for Russia or Belarus. A parallel provision targets Iran's supply of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia by adding HTS code 852910 (antennas and antenna reflectors) to the §746.7 Iran export-control list. The rule also refines Crimea licensing to permit exports supporting Ukrainian Armed Forces deployments in occupied territories.