Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2662 actions· ✨ 89 recent

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber Executive Committee (GECEX/CAMEX) extended for up to five years the definitive antidumping duty on imports of glass used in refrigeration appliances ("vidros para refrigeradores" / cooling-appliance glass) originating from the People's Republic of China, publishing Resolução GECEX nº 921/2026 in the Diário Oficial da União on 23 June 2026. The extension follows a DECOM sunset review (revisão de final de período) that concluded dumping and material injury to the Brazilian domestic glass-for-appliances industry would likely continue or recur if the measure were allowed to lapse. The action re-prices a China→Brazil component flow into the domestic white-goods and refrigeration-appliance manufacturing chain.

On 4 June 2026 USTR published a formal Notice of Determination in the Federal Register (doc 2026-11158, docket USTR-2025-0043) concluding that Brazil's acts, policies, and practices in six areas — digital trade and electronic payment services, unfair preferential tariffs, anti-corruption enforcement, IP protection, ethanol market access, and illegal deforestation — are unreasonable and burden US commerce. Simultaneously, USTR proposed a 25% ad valorem tariff on all Brazilian-origin goods, subject to ~1,600 HTS subheading exclusions including approximately 430 civil-aircraft lines. A public hearing is scheduled for 6 July 2026 and USTR faces a statutory deadline of 15 July 2026 to finalise any responsive action; the tariff has not yet taken effect.

Brazil enacted Lei 15.506 of 16 September 2026 (in force on publication, Art. 51), establishing the Política Nacional de Minerais Críticos e Estratégicos (PNMCE) — Brazil's first standalone critical-minerals sovereignty framework — and the Conselho Nacional para Industrialização de Minerais Críticos e Estratégicos (CIMCE). The law originated as Bill PL 2780/2024, approved by the Chamber of Deputies on May 6-7, 2026 (one day before the Lula-Trump White House meeting) and then by the Senate. It authorises the Union to create the Fundo Garantidor da Atividade Mineral (FGAM) with up to R$2bn (Art. 9) to guarantee critical-mineral projects, and a tax credit of up to 20% of spend on critical-mineral processing, transformation and urban mining. The Chamber-approved text (CMCE committee with prior-approval rights over takeovers and foreign participation, FGAM up to R$5bn, 0.3% gross-revenue R&D levy) was amended before enactment; see the 2026-09-16 amendment.

Brazil's Foreign Trade Chamber Executive Committee (GECEX/CAMEX) imposed a five-year definitive antidumping duty on imports of ethanolamines (monoethanolamine and diethanolamine, NCM 2922.11.00 and 2922.12.00) originating from China, adopted at the 235th Ordinary GECEX meeting on 26 March 2026 and published in the Diário Oficial da União on 6 April 2026. Duty rates range from 23.6% (Sailboat Petrochemical, the sole cooperating exporter with an individual rate) to 97.3% (residual rate applying to all other Chinese exporters), protecting Oxiteno SA (Indorama Ventures subsidiary), the sole Brazilian producer, against material injury from dumped Chinese imports.

On 21 February 2026 in New Delhi, during the State Visit of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, India and Brazil signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Critical Minerals between India's Ministry of Mines and Brazil's Ministry of Mines and Energy. The MoU establishes a bilateral framework spanning the entire critical-minerals value chain — exploration, mining, processing, recycling, and refining — with explicit focus on rare-earth elements, lithium, nickel, cobalt, niobium, manganese, and other strategic minerals. It was issued alongside a broader Joint Statement targeting USD 30 billion in bilateral trade by 2030 and a ten-year strategic-partnership roadmap covering AI, defence, energy, agriculture, and digital transformation.

Brazil's Câmara de Comércio Exterior (Gecex) published Resolução 857 in the Diário Oficial da União on 23 February 2026, reducing definitive anti-dumping duties on non-oriented electrical steel (aço GNO, NCM 7225.19.00 and 7226.19.00) originating in China, South Korea, Chinese Taipei and Germany. The measure follows a public-interest evaluation (avaliação de interesse público) concluded by SECEX/DECOM, which found that applying the full investigation-recommended duty level would create steel supply shortfalls and net welfare losses of approximately US$2.19 million, given that sole domestic producer Aperam South America cannot meet total Brazilian demand. New specific duties — US$90/ton for major named Asian producers, US$132.50/ton for other Asian exporters, and US$166.32/ton for German producers — are set below the DECOM recommendation and remain in force for the remainder of the 5-year window established by Gecex 758 of 10 July 2025 (expiring ~July 2030).

President Trump signed Executive Order "Ending Certain Tariff Actions" on 20 February 2026 (Federal Register doc 2026-03832, published 25 February 2026), terminating the additional ad-valorem duties imposed under nine prior IEEPA-based executive orders. The order followed within hours of the US Supreme Court's 6-3 decision the same day in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (2026), holding that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize the President to impose tariffs and vacating the Trump 2.0 IEEPA tariff regime. The EO directs CBP to cease collection "as soon as practicable"; CSMS guidance set the collection-end date at 12:00 a.m. eastern on 24 February 2026. The order explicitly preserves all underlying national-emergency declarations and all non-IEEPA trade actions — Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, Section 301 of the Trade Act, Section 122 of the Trade Act, and Section 201 — so the Section 232 cascade and the paired Section 122 10% temporary surcharge (effective 24 Feb 2026) remain in force. This is the first SCOTUS-driven repeal of a presidential tariff regime in the modern era and recalibrates the entire post-2024 US tariff architecture by removing IEEPA as a legal pillar.

President Trump signed a Presidential Proclamation on 20 February 2026 invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2132) to impose a temporary 10% ad-valorem import surcharge on articles imported into the United States, effective 12:01 a.m. EST on 24 February 2026. The proclamation was issued within hours of the US Supreme Court's 20 February 2026 ruling in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, which held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the president to set tariffs and vacated the IEEPA-based reciprocal-tariff regime previously in effect. The Section 122 surcharge is statutorily limited to 150 days (terminates 24 July 2026 absent Congressional extension) and the statute caps any such surcharge at 15% ad valorem. Goods qualifying as USMCA originating from Canada or Mexico are exempt; CAFTA-DR textile/apparel articles meeting specified rules of origin are exempt; and a substantial product-exception list excludes critical minerals, energy products, certain pharmaceuticals, electronics, vehicles, aerospace products, specified agricultural goods, and goods already subject to Section 232 duties (the Section 122 duty does not stack on Section 232).

Portaria Normativa GM/MME nº 120/2025, published in the Diário Oficial da União on 14 November 2025 by the Ministério de Minas e Energia, regulates the Política de Debêntures para Projetos de Transformação de Minerais Estratégicos para a Transição Energética. It sets the eligibility criteria, classification methodology and project-approval pipeline (under Decreto 11.964/2024 and Leis 12.431/2011 and 14.801/2024) for tax-exempt incentivised debentures and infrastructure debentures financing the downstream transformation of cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel and rare earths into battery and permanent-magnet inputs (lithium carbonate/hydroxide, cobalt sulfate, nickel sulfate, battery-grade copper foil, rare earth oxides/ chlorides/metals/alloys). MME estimates ~R$5.2 bn/year in unlocked private investment (R$3.7 bn transformation + R$1.5 bn mining/ beneficiation, with up to 49% of bond proceeds usable on linked upstream activities).

President Trump signed Executive Order 14323, "Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil," on 30 July 2025 (published in the Federal Register on 5 August 2025 as FR doc 2025-14896). Invoking IEEPA and the National Emergencies Act, the order declared a country- specific national emergency citing "policies, practices, and actions" of the Lula government — including the criminal prosecution of former president Jair Bolsonaro, asserted infringement of the free-expression rights of US persons via DSA-style platform-content rules, and retaliatory measures targeting US digital firms — as constituting an "unusual and extraordinary threat" to US national security, foreign policy, and economy. The EO imposed a 40% additional ad valorem duty on Brazilian-origin goods effective for entries on or after 12:01 a.m. EDT on 6 August 2025; stacked on top of the 10% baseline reciprocal rate from EO 14257/14326, the cumulative rate reached 50% for non- exempt goods. Annex I exempted civil aircraft and parts, orange juice, certain machinery, certain metals, and energy/energy products. The EO was amended on 20 November 2025 (effective for entries on or after 13 November 2025) to exempt 238+ HTSUS codes for agricultural products (beef, tropical produce, nuts, coffee, cocoa, cassava derivatives, etc.) following initial Trump-Lula bilateral negotiations on 6 October 2025. The IEEPA-tariff component was terminated by EO of 20 February 2026 ("Ending Certain Tariff Actions") within hours of the SCOTUS 6-3 ruling in *Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump* holding that IEEPA does not authorize the imposition of tariffs.

On 15 July 2025 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer initiated a Section 301 investigation into six categories of Brazilian "acts, policies, and practices" alleged to be unreasonable or discriminatory and to burden US commerce: (1) digital trade and electronic payment services (specifically the Banco Central do Brasil's operation of the Pix instant-payments system, alleged to disadvantage US payment providers); (2) unfair, preferential tariffs (Brazil's preferential tariff treatment for selected partners that excludes US exports); (3) anti-corruption enforcement (alleged interference with US-linked enforcement matters); (4) intellectual property protection (insufficient enforcement against piracy and counterfeiting); (5) ethanol market access (Brazil's reversal of near-zero ethanol tariffs imposed during the 2017-2024 window); and (6) illegal deforestation (the trade-distorting effect of unenforced environmental rules on Brazilian commodity exports). The Federal Register notice (USTR-2025-0043, FR doc 2025-13498) published on 18 July 2025 set written-comment and hearing-request deadlines for 18 August 2025 and a public hearing for 3 September 2025 at the US International Trade Commission. A determination on whether Brazil's practices are actionable, and what remedies (including retaliatory tariffs, withdrawal of trade concessions, or formal WTO action) USTR will pursue, is statutorily due within 12 months of initiation — i.e. by 15 July 2026.

Decreto No. 12.549, signed 10 July 2025 and published in the Diário Oficial da União on 11 July 2025, updates the IPI (Tax on Industrialised Products) incidence table (TIPI, HS headings 87.03 passenger vehicles and 87.04 goods vehicles) under Brazil's Programa Mover bonus-malus framework. Diesel-only vehicles face an IPI increase of up to 12 percentage points, while electric and hybrid vehicles receive reductions of up to 2 percentage points with a floor of 0%. Vehicles certified as "Carro Sustentável" — compact, energy-efficient models manufactured in Brazil meeting MDIC lifecycle-emissions and recyclability thresholds — qualify for a zero-IPI rate. The government designed the rebalancing as fiscally neutral, estimating the reduced rate applies to roughly 60% of 2024 vehicle sales volumes, with validity through December 2026.

On 11 April 2025, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva sanctioned without vetoes Lei nº 15.122/2025 ("Lei da Reciprocidade Econômica"), published in the Diário Oficial da União on 14 April 2025 and effective the next business day. The statute — Brazil's first standalone economic-retaliation framework — empowers the Executive to suspend (i) trade concessions on imports of goods and services, (ii) intellectual-property rights and obligations under Lei 12.270/2010, and (iii) concessions or commitments assumed under trade agreements, as countermeasures against unilateral measures by individual countries or economic blocs that negatively impact Brazilian international competitiveness, including environmental requirements stricter than Brazil's own. Decreto nº 12.551 of 14 July 2025 (DOU 15 July 2025) regulates the law, creating the Comitê Interministerial de Negociação e Contramedidas Econômicas e Comerciais (CINCEC), chaired by MDIC with seats for Casa Civil, Fazenda and Itamaraty (Relações Exteriores), and establishes both a fast-track provisional countermeasure procedure (CINCEC-only) and an ordinary track (≥5 months) routed through SE-CAMEX, GECEX, the CAMEX Strategic Council and a 30-day public consultation.

President Trump signed Executive Order 14257 on 2 April 2025 declaring a national emergency over US trade deficits and imposing a baseline 10% ad-valorem tariff on imports from nearly all trading partners effective 5 April, with higher country-specific "reciprocal" rates effective 9 April. The rate schedule was constructed from a formula tied to bilateral goods-trade deficits and ranged from 10% (UK, Singapore, Brazil, Australia, others) through 20% (EU), 24% (Japan), 25% (Korea), 32% (Taiwan, Indonesia, Switzerland), 34% (China, later raised to 84% then 125% during the April escalation), 46% (Vietnam), 49% (Cambodia). Multiple subsequent EOs paused the country-specific rates for 90 days for non-China destinations on 9 April while keeping the 10% baseline, pending bilateral negotiations.

President Trump signed two Presidential Proclamations on 11 February 2025 reinstating a universal 25% ad-valorem tariff on all steel-mill products and raising the aluminum tariff from 10% to 25% on all imports into the United States, effective 12 March 2025. The proclamations revoked every bilateral exclusion and quota arrangement negotiated by the Biden administration with the EU, UK, Japan, Korea, Australia, and others under the 2021-2022 "alternative measures" frameworks, returning all trading partners to the baseline Section 232 rate without product-level or country-level carve-outs.

Law 14.968/2024 establishes the Brasil Semicon program, extending and expanding semiconductor industry incentives through 2073 (aligned with Manaus Free Trade Zone benefits). Provides R$7 billion annually in tax incentives for semiconductor and ICT sectors, with R$21 billion committed through 2026. Expands PADIS eligibility to include chip design services and software, and calculates R&D credits on total revenue rather than domestic sales alone, encouraging exports.

On 2 August 2024, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva sanctioned Lei nº 14.948/2024 (with partial veto, Mensagem nº 741) at a ceremony in the Pecém Industrial-Port Complex in Ceará, following Senate and Chamber approval of PL 2308/2023; the law was published in the Diário Oficial da União on 5 August 2024. The statute establishes Brazil's first comprehensive legal framework for low-carbon hydrogen: it (i) creates the National Low-Carbon Hydrogen Policy (PNH2BC) under the National Energy Policy umbrella, (ii) sets a statutory definition of "low-carbon hydrogen" as fuel/industrial input with lifecycle GHG intensity ≤ 7 kg CO₂e/kg H₂, (iii) institutes the Brazilian Hydrogen Certification System (SBCH2) for origin and emissions accreditation, (iv) creates the Special Incentive Regime for Low-Carbon Hydrogen Production (Rehidro), suspending PIS/Pasep and Cofins for five years on capital-goods, raw-materials and services purchases by qualified producers, and (v) authorises the Programa de Desenvolvimento do Hidrogênio de Baixa Emissão de Carbono (PHBC) — a tax-credit envelope capped at BRL 18.3 bn between 2028 and 2032 (subsequently regulated by Lei nº 14.990/2024 sanctioned 30 September 2024). ANP gains regulatory authority over hydrogen transportation, storage and import/export licensing, while the law amends Leis nºs 9.427/1996 (ANEEL) and 9.478/1997 (Petroleum Law) to integrate hydrogen into the energy-policy and electricity-regulation framework. Industry reporting at sanction cited >USD 30 bn in announced project pipeline, concentrated in Northeast renewable-rich states (Ceará, Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte) leveraging Pecém, Suape and Açu as hydrogen-derivative export terminals.

Lei 14.902/2024, sanctioned 27 June 2024 (DOU 28 June 2024), institutes the Programa Mobilidade Verde e Inovação (Programa Mover), Brazil's successor framework to Rota 2030 for the automotive ecosystem (passenger cars, trucks, buses, auto parts). The law converts Provisional Measure 1.205/2023 into permanent statute and authorises approximately R$19.3 billion (~USD 4.8 billion) in financial credits for R&D and decarbonisation projects through 2028, alongside an IPI (Industrialised Products Tax) bonus-malus regime tied to lifecycle CO2 emissions, recyclability and energy-efficiency thresholds. Vehicles meeting the strictest "Carro Sustentável" criteria (≤83 gCO2/km, ≥80% recyclability) qualify for zero-IPI treatment, while non-compliant vehicles face higher tax rates. The programme is regulated by Decreto 12.435/2025 (15 April 2025), with mandatory emissions-labelling and commercialisation requirements taking effect from 1 June 2025. The law also permits a 2% reduced import tariff rate for qualifying vehicles where the importer commits R&D spend equivalent to 2% of customs value.

On 22 January 2024, Brazil's National Council for Industrial Development (CNDI), reactivated by President Lula in 2023, launched Nova Indústria Brasil (NIB) — Brazil's first comprehensive national industrial policy since the 2011-2014 Plano Brasil Maior. The framework commits roughly R$300 billion (~USD 60 billion) in financing through 2026, distributed across loans, non-refundable grants and equity participations administered by BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank), Finep (Research and Projects Financing Company) and Embrapii (Brazilian Industrial Research and Innovation Company), with quantitative targets running to 2033. The R$300bn envelope combines R$106bn announced at the first CNDI meeting in July 2023 with R$194bn redirected from existing budget lines. NIB is structured around six "missions": (1) sustainable and digital agro-industrial chains, (2) health-industrial complex resilience (medicines, vaccines, devices), (3) urban infrastructure and green mobility, (4) digital transformation and Industry 4.0 including semiconductors, (5) bioeconomy and energy transition, and (6) defence, sovereignty and national-security technologies. Two presidential decrees signed the same day establish local-content preferences for New PAC public-procurement bids and create an Interministerial Public Procurement Commission. As of February 2025, BNDES had approved R$220bn in NIB-aligned operations, and the plan has anchored downstream sectoral programmes including Brasil Semicon, the Mover automotive programme and Mais Inovação.

Signed by President Javier Milei and the entire cabinet on 20 December 2023 and published in the Boletín Oficial extraordinario on 21 December 2023, Decreto de Necesidad y Urgencia 70/2023 declares a public emergency across economic, financial, fiscal, administrative, pension, tariff, sanitary, and social matters until 31 December 2025 (Article 1) and enacts 366 articles across 16 titles that fundamentally restructure Argentina's regulatory framework. The DNU repeals or amends dozens of statutes to deregulate foreign trade (repealing the Compre Nacional buy-preference law Ley 18.875 and the price-control framework Ley 27.345), opens privatisation of state enterprises (Aerolíneas Argentinas, ENARSA, Banco Nación, Correo Argentino, Trenes Argentinos), dismantles the Ley de Abastecimiento price-control regime, liberalises civil aviation cabotage to foreign carriers, deregulates hydrocarbons export and mining permitting, and replaces the severance-pay regime with a capitalisation-fund system. It is the foundational enabling framework for all subsequent Milei-administration deregulatory instruments filed on the IPTM register, including RIGI (Law 27.742), Decreto 38/2025, Decreto 449/2025, and Decreto 563/2025.

Resolução Gecex/Camex nº 532, deliberated 10 November 2023 and published in the Diário Oficial da União on 22-23 November 2023, re-establishes Brazilian import duties on battery-electric (BEV), plug-in hybrid (PHEV) and hybrid (HEV) passenger vehicles under NCM chapter 8703 after a multi-year zero-tariff exemption. Tariffs phase up on a progressive schedule beginning January 2024 and reaching a uniform 35 % by July 2026 (BEV: 10 %→18 %→25 %→35 %; PHEV: 12 %→20 %→28 %→35 %; HEV: 15 %→25 %→30 %→35 %). The resolution also opens transitional tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) — roughly USD 660 million of EV/hybrid imports plus USD 39 million of electric trucks may enter at zero duty across the 2024-2026 phase-in window — and is operationalised by Portaria SECEX nº 291/2023, which sets the quota allocation rules. The measure is the first re-tariffing of Brazil's auto sector against Chinese EV/hybrid exports since the Inovar-Auto regime ended in 2017.

Regulation (EU) 2023/1115, adopted 31 May 2023 and in force 29 June 2023, requires all EU operators and traders placing seven in-scope commodities and their derived products on the EU market — or exporting them from the EU — to file due-diligence statements certifying that goods are deforestation-free (no land cleared after 31 December 2020) and produced in compliance with the relevant legislation of the country of origin. A Commission-administered risk-classification system assigns producer countries to low, standard, or high-risk tiers with differentiated due-diligence burdens. Application was subsequently postponed twice: to 30 December 2026 for large operators (Reg (EU) 2024/3234 and Reg (EU) 2025/2650).