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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
Following President Xi Jinping's September 2026 Washington summit with President Trump, the newly formed US-China Board of Trade released its first concrete output: "30-FOR-30" lists naming US and Chinese products recommended for reciprocal reduced-tariff treatment, covering roughly $30 billion of goods on each side. US exports named include agricultural products, wood products and cosmetics; Chinese exports named include small appliances, toys and decorations. The Board — established after the May 2026 Trump-Xi Beijing summit and preceded by a June 2026 USTR request for comments — describes the lists as recommendations only: any actual preferential tariff treatment remains subject to further decisions by both governments, so no tariff rate has yet changed.
USTR published Federal Register notice 2026-11291 on June 5, 2026, opening a public comment period through July 10, 2026 (rebuttals by July 27, 2026) on the scope and operation of a proposed US-China Board of Trade — a standing government-to-government mechanism to manage bilateral trade in non-sensitive goods through reciprocal tariff modifications. The notice flows from commitments made at the May 15-17, 2026 Trump-Xi Beijing Summit and marks the first institutionalised bilateral trade-management architecture between the US and China. The Board of Trade would identify eligible products on each side and agree to modify tariffs on an equal-value basis, with regular meetings to monitor trade flows and update product lists. This is a process-initiation step (notice of inquiry); no tariff change or binding measure is enacted by this notice.
On May 1, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated China-based independent ("teapot") refinery Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. — described as China's second-largest teapot — together with approximately 40 shipping firms and vessels operating as part of Iran's shadow fleet. OFAC sanctioned 19 shadow-fleet vessels (crude, LPG, and petrochemical tankers) as blocked property of designated owners or managers. The action was taken under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors) in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. Treasury press release SB0472. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License W authorising the wind-down of transactions involving the persons newly blocked on May 1, 2026, and published a structurally novel Iran-related Alert, "Sanctions Risks of Iranian Demands for Strait of Hormuz Passage." The Alert states that payments to the Government of Iran or the IRGC — directly or indirectly — for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz are not authorised for US persons (including US financial institutions) or US-owned/-controlled foreign entities. OFAC also issued new FAQ 1250 to accompany the Alert and GL W. The wave is one of the largest single-day Iran enforcement actions of the Trump 2.0 administration. Treasury characterises it as part of a campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The Strait of Hormuz Alert is the operational US response to Iranian regulatory threats against the ~20% of global oil and ~25% of global LNG transiting Hormuz, putting tanker owners, P&I clubs, flag states, and oil-buyer compliance teams on direct notice.
On April 24, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added 19 entities and 19 vessels to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors), in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. The action is the first OFAC designation of a Chinese independent ("teapot") refinery — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd., described as one of Iran's largest single customers for crude oil and petroleum products, having purchased billions of US dollars' worth since at least 2023 from cargoes brokered by Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (the oil sales arm of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff, controlled by the Ministry of Defense / MODAFL). Co-designations span shipping firms and vessels registered in China, Hong Kong, Panama, Marshall Islands, Liberia, and Vietnam. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License V authorising a 30-day wind-down (through May 24, 2026) of transactions involving Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. and certain majority-owned entities. Treasury press release SB0472 ("Economic Fury Targets Global Network Fueling Iran's Oil Trade and Shadow Fleet") frames the action as part of the maximum-pressure campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The April 24 designations directly triggered the first-ever operational use of China's Blocking Rules (MOFCOM Announcement No. 21 of May 2, 2026) and preceded a second OFAC Iran wave on May 1, 2026 (General License W + Strait of Hormuz Sanctions Risk Alert).
Presidential decree signed by President Claudia Sheinbaum and published in the evening edition of the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 23 April 2026, in force 24 April 2026. The decree amends the Tariff of the Ley de los Impuestos Generales de Importación y de Exportación (LIGIE/TIGIE) and the Decreto que establece diversos Programas de Promoción Sectorial (PROSEC), imposing MFN import duties at 5%, 10%, 15%, 25%, 30% or 35% ad valorem on 185 tariff fractions covering chemical products, cosmetics, paper and cardboard, textiles, steel, graphic arts, aluminum manufactures, auto parts, electrical material, bicycles, musical instruments, furniture, wind turbines, and trailers. Goods originating in countries with which Mexico has a free-trade agreement remain eligible for preferential treatment, so practical incidence falls on China and other non-FTA suppliers (Korea, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia, Taiwan, UAE, South Africa). Paired PROSEC modifications add tariff fractions to Article 5 sections I, II.b and XIX (electrical, electronic, automotive and auto-parts industries) at exempt (EX) rates.
On March 20, 2026, OFAC issued Iran-related General License U (GL U), temporarily authorizing the sale, delivery, offloading and — notably, for the first time in decades — importation into the United States of Iranian-origin crude oil and petroleum products, but only for cargo already loaded onto vessels as of 12:01 a.m. EDT that day. The window ran through April 19, 2026, after which the authorization lapsed. The license excluded any transaction touching Cuba, North Korea, or Russian-government-controlled areas of Ukraine, and did not waive any other, non-Iran sanctions program. OFAC formally published GL U (and the separate, entity-specific GL V wind-down license for Hengli Petrochemical) in the Federal Register on June 10, 2026 — a retrospective publication of licenses already issued and, by then, already expired.
President Trump signed Executive Order "Ending Certain Tariff Actions" on 20 February 2026 (Federal Register doc 2026-03832, published 25 February 2026), terminating the additional ad-valorem duties imposed under nine prior IEEPA-based executive orders. The order followed within hours of the US Supreme Court's 6-3 decision the same day in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. ___ (2026), holding that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorize the President to impose tariffs and vacating the Trump 2.0 IEEPA tariff regime. The EO directs CBP to cease collection "as soon as practicable"; CSMS guidance set the collection-end date at 12:00 a.m. eastern on 24 February 2026. The order explicitly preserves all underlying national-emergency declarations and all non-IEEPA trade actions — Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, Section 301 of the Trade Act, Section 122 of the Trade Act, and Section 201 — so the Section 232 cascade and the paired Section 122 10% temporary surcharge (effective 24 Feb 2026) remain in force. This is the first SCOTUS-driven repeal of a presidential tariff regime in the modern era and recalibrates the entire post-2024 US tariff architecture by removing IEEPA as a legal pillar.
On 16 January 2026 the Yunnan Provincial People's Government issued Yunzhengfa [2026] No. 2, a package of 34 policy measures (effective through 2030) to support high-quality development of the Central Yunnan New Area (滇中新区), a national-level new area centred on Kunming. The measures span industrial upgrading, innovation, opening-up and fiscal/land support: transformation of traditional petrochemical and metallurgy industries into "hundred-billion-yuan" clusters, development of semiconductor materials/equipment, new-energy battery materials and non-ferrous/rare-precious-metals manufacturing using Yunnan's mineral and plateau-agriculture resources, and cultivation of low-altitude economy, biomanufacturing and new-materials industries. It also seeks to establish a South/Southeast Asia aircraft-delivery centre and one-stop aviation-maintenance base in the new area.