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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
President Trump signed a Section 232 proclamation on 13 August 2026 (published in the Federal Register 19 August 2026, FR doc 2026-16979) imposing tariffs on unmanned aircraft systems (UAS/drones) and components, following a Commerce Department finding that US reliance on foreign-produced (chiefly Chinese, e.g. DJI/Autel) drones and critical components creates supply-chain and cybersecurity national- security risk. A 100% ad valorem tariff applies to Annex I items (drones with maximum takeoff weight over 25kg, thermal-imaging drones, docking stations, and listed critical components); a 25% ad valorem tariff applies to Annex II items (other listed UAS). Qualifying-origin content from the EU, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan and Liechtenstein is capped at 15%; UK-origin content is capped at 10%. UAS duties take effect 3 September 2026; component duties take effect 9 February 2027. The proclamation also authorizes Commerce to set up an onshoring program giving temporary relief to firms committing to build or expand US production of covered drones and components.
On June 8, 2026, the US Department of Defense published its annual update to the Section 1260H Chinese Military Companies (CMIC) list, adding 65 entities (17 new parent companies and 48 subsidiaries), bringing the total to approximately 188–200 designated entities. Major additions span EV and battery manufacturing (BYD, NIO, CATL), consumer internet (Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent), semiconductors (SMIC, YMTC, CXMT), solar (JA Solar, Trina Solar), biotech (BGI Genomics, WuXi AppTec), drones/robotics (DJI, Unitree, RoboSense), and telecoms (TP-Link). Effective June 30, 2026, DoD is prohibited from procuring goods, services, or technology directly from listed entities; effective June 30, 2027, the ban extends to indirect supply-chain procurement through prime contractors and all sub-tiers.
BIS issued an Interim Final Rule (IFR) on 21 January 2026 (effective 20 January 2026) easing Export Administration Regulations (EAR) controls on certain civil unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related technology. The IFR makes two changes: (i) ECCN 9A012.a.1 commercial UAVs with maximum endurance under one hour can now be exported License-Free (NLR) to most Wassenaar Arrangement Participating States (Country Group A:1, excluding Malta, Russia, Ukraine), versus the prior limitation to UK / Australia / Canada only; and (ii) License Exception STA (Strategic Trade Authorization) is expanded to cover certain MT-controlled UAVs that cannot deliver a 500kg payload to 300+ km — including long-range cargo-delivery drones and ECCN 9A120 agricultural-spraying UAVs — for export to Country Group A:5 partners and allies. The IFR implements the export-promotion directive in §6 of EO 14307 (Unleashing American Drone Dominance, 6 June 2025). Comment period closes 19 February 2026.
On 22 December 2025 the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau released Public Notice DA-25-1086, adding to the Covered List (under section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA) all unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country, plus communications and video-surveillance equipment/services produced by DJI Technologies and Autel Robotics (and their subsidiaries, affiliates, and licensing/JV partners). The designation is comprehensive by scope — every foreign-made drone from consumer quadcopters to large uncrewed systems, with no size/performance carve-out — and blocks the FCC from granting any new equipment authorization to covered UAS/components going forward. Previously authorized models already in the US market are not revoked. A follow-on Public Notice (DA-26-22, 7 January 2026) narrowed the scope with a temporary exemption (see amendments).
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add 29 entries — 26 entities and 3 addresses — to the Entity List under the destinations of China (19), Turkey (9), and the United Arab Emirates (1). BIS determined these parties were diverting US-origin items to Iran, including to parties already on the BIS Entity List and on OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, in support of Iranian drone-parts and electronics-procurement networks. The rule is a final rule effective October 8, 2025; new license requirements apply to all items subject to the EAR for these listed parties under a presumption-of-denial review policy.
President Trump signed Executive Order 14307 on 6 June 2025 establishing the first whole-of-government Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) industrial-policy framework. The order (i) directs federal agencies to prioritise procurement and operation of US-manufactured UAS and to identify and rescind purchases of foreign-made drones where consistent with national security; (ii) tasks the FAA with proposing a Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) rule within 30 days and publishing a final BVLOS rule within 240 days; (iii) creates an eVTOL Integration Pilot Program (eIPP) with at least five projects selected within 180 days; and (iv) instructs the Federal Acquisition Security Council to publish a "Covered Foreign Entity List" within 30 days, operationalising the §1709 FY24 NDAA architecture that targets Chinese drone manufacturers (DJI, Autel and successor entities). Published in the Federal Register on 11 June 2025 (90 FR 24727).
In its first major export-regulatory action of the second Trump administration, BIS amended the EAR to add 70 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of China (42), Iran (2), Pakistan (19), South Africa (3), and the United Arab Emirates (4), and modified four existing entries (France, Iran, Senegal, UK). New listings carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions available. Stated objectives include restricting China's acquisition of high-performance computing and quantum technologies for military use, impeding hypersonic-weapons development, disrupting Iran's UAV and defense procurement, and impairing Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic-missile programs. The rule also targets the Test Flying Academy of South Africa for using U.S.-origin items to train Chinese military pilots.
The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule expanding the scope of the Iran Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement the "No Technology for Terror Act" (Public Law 118-50, Division N), signed by President Biden on April 24, 2024. The expanded rule extends EAR jurisdiction to additional foreign-produced items destined for Iran — including a broader set of items derived from U.S.-origin technology or software, or produced by plants/components that are themselves direct products of U.S.-origin technology — and requires a BIS license for their export, reexport, or in-country transfer to Iran. The rule also provides specified exclusions from the otherwise-applicable license requirements. The rule became effective on July 23, 2024 (publication July 26, 2024).
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule (FR Doc 2024-08622; Docket 240417-0112; 89 FR 30119) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to expand the product scope of two Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules — the Iran FDP rule and the Russia/Belarus/Temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine FDP rule in 15 CFR 734.9(f) — to cover the entirety of the Common High Priority List (CHPL), an HTS-6 list developed jointly with the EU, Japan and the UK that identifies items used in Russian weapons production. The CHPL scope adds basic commercial-grade microelectronics (integrated circuits, RF transceiver modules), test/manufacturing equipment for electronic components, and CNC machine tools to the perimeter, requiring a BIS licence when these foreign-produced items are exported, reexported or transferred to Iran, Russia, Belarus or occupied Crimea. The rule was issued in response to Iran's 13 April 2024 attack on Israel and Iran's ongoing military support for the Russian war in Ukraine; it became effective 18 April 2024 (Federal Register publication 22 April 2024) with a transit grace period for in-flight shipments until 20 May 2024.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 25503; FR Doc 2024-07760) added 11 entries to the Entity List under China (6), Russia (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2), effective 2024-04-11. The primary rationale for the Russia and UAE tranches — and at least one China entity (Shenzhen Jiasibo Technology) — is procurement of US-controlled dual-use aerospace and UAV components for Iran's Shahed- series UAV programme via the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA); those drones have been used against oil tankers in the Middle East and deployed by Russia in Ukraine. The remaining five China entities were designated for acquiring US-origin items to support China's military modernisation. The rule also adds one alias to the existing entry for Shanghai Biren Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. This action was the first Entity List final rule published after BIS implemented the 50 Percent Rule for controlling foreign subsidiaries of listed entities.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed three persons from the Unverified List (UVL) effective January 19, 2024 because BIS was able to verify their bona fides pursuant to § 744.15(c)(2) of the EAR. The three removed parties are Skymount Drones (Canada), Plexus (Xiamen) Co., Ltd. (China), and Delma Industrial Supply & Marine Services (UAE). Removal restores eligibility for EAR license exceptions and removes the requirement for a signed UVL Statement before US exporters ship items subject to the EAR to these parties.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 42 entities under 44 entries to the Entity List, effective December 7, 2023. The majority — 28 entities in Russia — are sanctioned for procuring or contracting on behalf of Russia's defense sector, including avionics, military-grade drones, and military electronics. Fourteen additional entities across Armenia, Belarus, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, China, and the UAE were added for operating diversion and transshipment networks that supply U.S.-origin items to Russian military end-users. All listed entities face a license requirement for all EAR-controlled items with a presumption of denial.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) §742.5 to change the license review policy for a subset of MTCR Category I unmanned aerial systems (UAS). UAS that meet the Category I thresholds (payload ≥500 kg, range ≥300 km) but have a maximum true airspeed below 800 km/h will now be reviewed on a case-by-case basis under the more permissive MTCR Category II review policy, rather than under the strict Category I presumption-of-denial. The rule implements the UAS export policy announced by President Trump on 24 July 2020, and is intended to improve the commercial viability of US-made heavy subsonic UAS exports to allied customers while preserving oversight via per-licence review.