Loading…
Loading…
Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 84460, Doc 2024-24562) adding 26 entities to the Entity List across four destinations: six in China (aviation simulation for PLA modernisation; procurement for Iran WMD/UAV programs; evasive conduct), one in Egypt and three in the UAE (acquiring US civil aircraft parts for Russian buyers post-Ukraine invasion), and sixteen in Pakistan (nine front companies of Advanced Engineering Research Organization for Pakistan's cruise-missile and strategic-UAV programs, plus seven contributing to Pakistan's ballistic- missile program). The rule also removes two existing entries. All additions are licensed under a presumption-of-denial policy for all EAR-subject items.
On 18 October 2024 the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan approved Government Resolution No. 868 adopting the Concept of Investment Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2029. The Concept sets a binding strategic-document target to attract at least US$150 billion in foreign direct investment over 2024-2029 and to raise fixed-capital investment from approximately 15.1% of GDP (2023) toward 23-25.1% of GDP by 2029. Its principal new instruments are (i) Development Bank of Kazakhstan (DBK / BDK) concessional lending at 6% interest for a 10-year tenor for the engineering infrastructure of new industrial projects, (ii) regional investment headquarters (one per oblast) modelled on the existing national Investment Headquarters under the Prime Minister, (iii) a national digital investment platform (invest.gov.kz) for streamlined permitting and investor aftercare, (iv) a unified register of investor issues and complaints administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the designated FDI-attraction owner, and (v) counter-obligations (localisation, employment, technology transfer) imposed on recipients of state preferences. The Concept is the principal implementing instrument under the 2021 Law on Industrial Policy (Law No. 86-VII ZRK) on the investment-attraction side and is designed to operate alongside the 2023 REE Comprehensive Plan and the 2025 Subsoil Code amendments on the minerals-extraction side.
The Council of the EU adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2697, implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1529 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran's military support to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. The listing adds 7 individuals and 7 legal entities to the EU asset freeze. The entities include three Iranian state and private airlines (Saha Airlines, Mahan Air, Iran Air) named as repeat carriers of Iranian-made UAVs and related technology to Russia, a UAV-procurement network (Basamad Electronic Pouya Engineering Co., Teyf Tadbir Engineering Company) run through EU-listed businessman Hossein Hatefi Ardakani, and two entities tied to Iran's ballistic-missile programme: Iran Alumina Company (IAC), Iran's sole producer of alumina powder used in solid rocket-fuel propellant, and Shahid Haj Ali Movahed Research Center, a missile R&D subsidiary of the EU-listed Shahid Hemmat Industries Group. All funds and economic resources of the listed parties are frozen within the EU, and EU persons/entities are barred from making funds available to them.
Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs amended the Eksportkontrollforskrift (Regulations on the export of defence- related products, dual-use items, technology and services) to add a new national control list — Annex III ("List III") — for emerging and disruptive technologies not yet covered by the EU dual-use list. Exports of items on Annex III require a licence from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regardless of destination, including a catch-all licensing obligation. Controls cover semiconductor manufacturing equipment (including dry-etch apparatus), enriched silicon/germanium substrates, high- performance integrated circuits, quantum computers above specified controlled-qubit thresholds, quantum software and technology, software/technology for reverse-engineering integrated-circuit layouts, and additive-manufacturing equipment for metal/alloy components. The amendment, announced 3 October 2024 and effective 1 November 2024 (with a one-month transitional period), aligns Norway with parallel national measures adopted by the United States (BIS 6 Sep 2024 emerging- technology IFR), the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Japan, Spain, Denmark and Finland.
On 3 April 2024 the European Commission opened two simultaneous FSR Phase II in-depth investigations — the second and third ever under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (Regulation 2022/2560) — concerning a Romanian public-procurement procedure for the design, construction and operation of a 454.97 MW EU-co-funded photovoltaic park (Rovinari Est). The first investigation targeted the ENEVO Group consortium including LONGi Solar Technologie GmbH (German subsidiary wholly owned by HK-listed LONGi Green Energy Technology Co., Ltd.); the second targeted Shanghai Electric UK Co. Ltd. and Shanghai Electric Hong Kong International Engineering Co., Ltd. (Chinese SOE). Both respondents withdrew from the procurement procedure after the Commission's opening; the Commission subsequently closed both investigations. This was the first FSR Phase II enforcement action in the renewable-energy / solar-PV sector and the first targeting a private Chinese-listed company's EU subsidiary.
On 26 February 2024, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed Republic Act No. 11981 ("Tatak Pinoy Act"), the first standalone national industrial policy law in Philippine history. It mandates the formulation, funding, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of a multi-year Tatak Pinoy Strategy organised around five pillars (human resources, infrastructure, technology and innovation, investments, sound financial management) and establishes the Tatak Pinoy Council, chaired by the DTI Secretary with NEDA and Finance secretaries as vice-chairs. On 24 October 2025, Marcos issued Memorandum Circular No. 104 approving the implementing Tatak Pinoy Strategy and directing all national agencies, GOCCs, and LGUs to prioritise local products in procurement, with local suppliers eligible for award if their bids are within 25% of the lowest foreign offer.
Three-year export-promotion policy issued by the Bangladesh Ministry of Commerce on 25 February 2024 covering FY2024-25 through FY2026-27. Sets a $110bn merchandise+services export target by FY2026-27 (vs. ~$56bn FY2023-24 base), restructures the cash-incentive regime, and designates "highest priority" and "special development" sectors including ready-made garments, leather, jute, ICT, pharmaceuticals, agro-processing, light engineering, and plastics. Explicitly designed as the transition framework for navigating Bangladesh's LDC graduation (effective 24 November 2026), at which point the country will lose EU Everything-But-Arms duty-free access and face an estimated 10% average MFN tariff on EU exports.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 71 entities to the Entity List effective May 19, 2023, as part of the continuing US export-control response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Of the 71 additions, 69 are Russian entities (aircraft repair plants, ammunition and gunpowder manufacturers, shipyards, tractor and automobile factories, and engineering centres), one is Armenian, and one is Kyrgyz — the latter two for facilitating diversion of controlled goods to Russia. The majority of Russian entities received "footnote 3" designations as Russian or Belarusian military end users, triggering the Russia/Belarus Military End-User FDP Rule and subjecting them to a license review policy of denial.
Switzerland's Federal Council amended the Ordinance on measures in connection with the situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72) to align with the EU's eighth sanctions package, effective 6pm on 23 November 2022. The amendment creates the Swiss legal basis for an oil price-cap mechanism — banning maritime transport to third countries of Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products unless purchased at or below a price cap to be set later (the G7/EU $60/bbl cap followed on 3 December 2022; see the companion US OFAC determination of 2022-12-05). It also extends import/export restrictions to additional iron and steel products and aerospace goods, bans the provision of IT, engineering, architecture and legal services to the Russian government and Russian companies, bans Swiss nationals from holding board seats at certain Russian state-owned companies, fully bans crypto-asset wallet/account/custody services to Russian persons regardless of value, and adopts an arms embargo against Russia (extended in part to Ukraine for reasons of Swiss neutrality).
On 6 October 2022 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1904, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, as the EU's eighth package of restrictive measures against Russia. It entered into force 7 October 2022. The regulation's headline measure creates the legal basis for an oil price-cap mechanism: a ban on maritime transport to third countries of Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products, becoming operational once the Council sets an actual cap level by a separate decision (the G7/EU $60/bbl cap followed on 3 December 2022). The package also expands import bans on steel products (phased through 2024), firearms and ammunition, wood pulp and paper, and certain chemicals, cosmetics and jewellery materials; extends export bans on aviation-sector goods; bans the provision of architectural, engineering, IT-consultancy and legal advisory services to the Russian government and Russian companies; and imposes restrictions on Russian-flagged vessels at the Russian Maritime Register.
Bangladesh's Cabinet approved the National Industrial Policy 2022 on 11 August 2022, replacing the National Industrial Policy 2016 as the country's foundational umbrella industrial-policy statute; the Ministry of Industries gazetted it on 29 September 2022. The policy sets a target to raise industry's share of GDP to 40% by 2027 and introduces a sector taxonomy covering export-diversification, special-development (electronics, automotive assembly, semiconductors, renewable energy, defence-electronics), priority, reserved, and controlled categories. CMSMEs (Cottage, Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises) are designated the "main driving force of industrialisation," with sector-specific concessional finance, tax holidays, and cluster-development frameworks, alongside FDI incentives including Bangladeshi citizenship for investors committing USD 1 million. The policy for the first time formally incorporates Bangladesh's informal sector within a national industrial-policy framework, mandating a National Informal Sector Database and a 2022–2027 implementation action plan.
The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding seven entities under seven entries to the Entity List, effective February 14, 2022, on nuclear nonproliferation and national security grounds. Five Pakistani engineering and chemical companies, one Chinese metal-powder manufacturer (Jiangsu Tianyuan Metal Powder Co. Ltd.), and one UAE-based trading company (Odyssey General Trading FZC) were determined to be acting contrary to US foreign policy or national security interests. All seven entries impose a license requirement covering all EAR-jurisdiction items, with no license exceptions available; the license review policy is presumption of denial for the Chinese entity and per 15 CFR § 744.2(d) for the Pakistani and UAE entities.