Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2665 actions· ✨ 90 recent

On 23 April 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted the 20th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2026/506 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions) and Council Regulation (EU) 2026/511 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 120 additional individuals and entities, the largest single tranche in two years). The package operationalises and extends the crypto-sanctions architecture introduced in the 19th package and constructs the legal scaffolding for a future full prohibition on maritime services to vessels carrying Russian crude/petroleum products. Headline measures: (i) full sectoral prohibition on transactions with crypto-asset service providers and exchange platforms established in Russia or Belarus, plus designation of the rouble-backed stablecoin RUBx and the digital rouble (CBDC) on Annex LIII — effective 24 May 2026, with EU support for the digital rouble's development banned outright; (ii) 36 new energy-sector listings spanning upstream extraction, refining and transportation; (iii) prohibition on providing technical, financial, brokering and insurance services to Russia-flagged, Russian-certified or Russian-managed LNG tankers and icebreakers effective 25 April 2026, extending to foreign-flagged vessels operating in Russian interests by January 2027 and culminating in a categorical ban on LNG terminal services to Russian-controlled entities on 1 January 2027; (iv) full transaction ban on 20 Russian banks plus four third-country banks listed for SPFS connectivity / sanctions circumvention; (v) 46 newly listed shadow-fleet vessels and new tanker sale-due-diligence obligations on EU shipping operators; (vi) 58 designations of companies and associated individuals in the Russian military-industrial complex including drone developers/manufacturers; (vii) further Annex IV third-country circumvention enabler listings (China, Hong Kong, Turkey, UAE); (viii) parallel measures against Belarus. Entry into force on 24 April 2026 (day following publication in OJ L_202600506), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Order No. 834 on 31 March 2026 promulgating the "Provisions on Industrial Chain and Supply Chain Security" (18 articles), adopted at the State Council executive meeting on 13 March 2026 and effective on the date of publication. The Provisions are the first dedicated PRC administrative regulation on industrial- and supply-chain security and consolidate authorities drawn from the National Security Law, Foreign Relations Law, Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, and Foreign Trade Law into a horizontal defensive framework. They establish a cross-agency coordination mechanism spanning roughly 15 central departments (industrial, security, cyberspace, customs and financial regulators) plus provincial governments; create a security-investigation system; and vest broad countermeasure authority over both foreign states (Article 14 — import/export prohibitions and special levies) and foreign organisations and individuals (Article 15 — import/export bans, China-investment bars, transaction prohibitions, entry bars and revocation of work or residence permits, with extension to effectively-controlled subsidiaries). The Provisions also impose compliance, information-sharing, strategic-reserve and emergency-response obligations on PRC organisations and individuals, and authorise requisition, mandated production and directed transportation in the event of supply-chain disruption.

India's DGTR issued final findings on 18 March 2026 recommending anti-dumping duties on cryogenic Liquefied Natural Gas Fuel Tanks (LFT) originating in or exported from China PR, after determining that Chinese-origin LFTs were being sold in India at dumped prices causing material injury to domestic manufacturers. The investigation was initiated in December 2024 following a petition by Inox India Ltd. The DGTR found price undercutting and suppression of domestic prices, with the Finance Ministry to issue the implementing customs notification.

On 11 March 2026 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer initiated parallel Section 301 investigations into the acts, policies, and practices of 16 economies — China, the European Union, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India — relating to structural excess capacity and overproduction in manufacturing sectors. The Federal Register notice (FR doc 2026-05214; dockets USTR-2026-0067 and USTR-2026-0068) was published on 17 March 2026. Covered sectors include aluminum, automobiles, batteries, cement, chemicals, electronics, energy goods, glass, machine tools, machinery, paper, plastics, processed food and beverages, robotics, satellites, semiconductors, ships, solar modules, steel, and transportation equipment. Written comments were due by 15 April 2026; USTR held the public hearing beginning 5 May 2026. This is the most sweeping multi-economy Section 301 initiative since the 2018 China investigation and is structurally distinct from the China-only 2024-05-14 §301 tariff hikes and the 2025-07-15 Brazil §301 investigation.

On 10 February 2026 in Baku, US Vice President JD Vance and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership — a foundational bilateral instrument covering five cooperation tracks: economy and trade, energy, connectivity and digital development (including AI), security and defense, and critical-minerals transit. The Charter commits both governments to facilitate the transit of critical minerals via the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor to global markets, and formally recognises the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) as the multi-modal connectivity link between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The instrument builds on the 8 August 2025 MoU signed in Washington during the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Summit that established the Strategic Working Group tasked with drafting the Charter, and marks the first US Vice-Presidential visit to Azerbaijan since Dick Cheney in 2008.

China's Ministry of Finance, NDRC, People's Bank of China and National Financial Regulatory Administration jointly issued Cai Jin [2026] No. 2 on 2026-01-19, optimizing the central-fiscal interest-subsidy policy for equipment-renewal loans. The central government subsidizes 1.5 percentage points of loan principal interest on qualifying fixed-asset loans for equipment-renewal projects, capped at two years, and widens eligible sectors beyond traditional industrial/energy/transport/logistics categories to include construction, AI equipment, aerospace materials, agricultural facilities, cold-chain infrastructure and elderly-care equipment. It also folds bank-originated science-and-technology-innovation loans issued from 2026 (previously supported only via PBOC relending) into the fiscal interest-subsidy scope, and simplifies disbursement via a "pre-disbursement + settlement" mechanism across 26 participating banks. The policy runs through 2026-12-31, extendable.

On 11 December 2025 the US Department of State announced the inaugural Pax Silica Summit, held in Washington D.C. on 12 December 2025, at which the United States, Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Israel signed the non-binding Pax Silica Declaration. The declaration commits signatories to coordinate "trusted" supply chains across the full technology stack — software, frontier foundation models, network infrastructure, compute and semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, transportation logistics, minerals refining and processing, and energy — explicitly to reduce "coercive dependencies." The coalition has since expanded to add the United Arab Emirates, Greece, Qatar, Sweden and India (signed 20 February 2026 at the India AI Impact Summit), and on 26 March 2026 State announced a USD 250 million Pax Silica Fund intended to catalyse trusted-capital co-investment in critical-minerals processing and semiconductor supply chains.

On 1 December 2025, Brazil's national development bank BNDES approved a BRL 4.64 billion (~USD 850 million) financing package — split between BRL 4.24 billion in debenture subscriptions and a BRL 400 million Finem credit line — to expand, modernise and maintain 11 airports operated by Aena Brasil across four states (São Paulo, Mato Grosso do Sul, Pará and Minas Gerais). Congonhas Airport (São Paulo) is the largest single beneficiary at roughly BRL 2 billion. The operation is structured as non-recourse project finance, with debt service paid solely from the airports' own revenue, and was rated AAA.br by Moody's Local Brasil. Including a coordinated public offering with Santander, total financial support to Aena reaches approximately BRL 5.7 billion.

On 20 November 2025 the Federal Transit Administration announced USD 2,027,948,082 in combined FY2025 Grants for Buses and Bus Facilities and FY2025/2026 Low or No Emission (Low-No) Program awards, covering 165 projects across 45 states and the District of Columbia: USD 397.7 million for 62 Bus Facilities projects and USD 1.63 billion for 103 Low-No projects, funding roughly 2,400 replacement buses. Global Trade Alert logs the round as a public-procurement-localisation intervention because both programs carry standing Build America, Buy America Act (BABA) domestic-content requirements — buses and manufactured components funded by the awards must be produced with US-made iron, steel, and manufactured products and final-assembled domestically. FTA formalised the full project list via Federal Register notice on 15 January 2026.

Canada's Budget 2025 (released 4 November 2025) creates the First and Last Mile Fund (FLMF), allocating $371.8 million over four years starting in 2026-27 to Natural Resources Canada to address transport and utility bottlenecks connecting near-term critical-minerals production sites to deep-water ports and downstream processing facilities. The fund absorbs the existing Critical Minerals Infrastructure Fund and leverages its envelope to provide up to $1.5 billion in total support through 2029-30. The FLMF is structurally distinct from the CMSF (equity/debt vehicle), the CMETC (exploration tax credit), and the Clean Tech ITC (manufacturing tax credit) — it is the infrastructure-grant instrument completing Canada's critical-minerals programme architecture.

On 24 September 2025 the Federal Railroad Administration published in the Federal Register a withdrawal-and-reissue of the Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) for the FY2024-2025 National Railroad Partnership Program / Federal-State Partnership for Intercity Passenger Rail Program for projects off the Northeast Corridor (FSP-National), making up to USD 5,070,784,989 available for competitive intercity passenger-rail capital awards, including roughly USD 2.4bn de-obligated from the California High-Speed Rail project. Global Trade Alert logs the NOFO as a public-procurement-localisation intervention because FRA capital-assistance grants carry standing Build America, Buy America Act (BABA) domestic-content and final-assembly requirements. The reissue also withdrew DEI- and climate-related selection criteria attached to the prior Biden-era version of the NOFO. Applications were due 7 January 2026.

The California Energy Commission, via its Clean Transportation Program and the state's Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund, opened a USD 55 million incentive window under the California Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Project (CALeVIP) "Fast Charge California Project." The program funds up to 100% of direct-current fast-charger installation costs statewide, at USD 55,000 per port for 150-274.99 kW chargers and USD 100,000 per port for chargers over 275 kW, with priority given to tribal, disadvantaged, and low-income communities. Applications closed October 29, 2025; the window built on the CALeVIP program's first Fast Charge California window, which had already awarded roughly USD 54 million toward more than 1,200 fast-charging ports across 35 counties.

On 4 August 2025, IRCON International Limited — a Government of India public-sector enterprise under the Ministry of Railways — launched a tender for the manufacture, supply, transportation and delivery of 60 kg Prime Rail (13M length) of Grade IRS-T-1, valued at INR 97.37 crore (approx. USD 11.7 million). The tender embeds a domestic-content preference under India's Public Procurement (Preference to Make in India) Order, 2017 (as amended), consistent with the wider batch of India localisation-preference tenders already tracked in this register. GTA records the intervention as announced/implemented on 4 August 2025.

The Polish Sejm passed the Act of 9 July 2025 amending the Act of 24 July 2015 on the Control of Certain Investments, signed by the President on 21 July 2025 and effective 24 July 2025. The amendment removes the time-limited "Specialised Rules" tier (introduced in 2020 under the Anti-COVID Shield) and makes Poland's FDI screening regime permanent. Review competence is transferred from the President of UOKiK (the competition authority) to the minister responsible for economic affairs (currently the Minister of Finance and Economy), and a new trigger covering "an international situation distorting the market or competition" is added alongside the existing public-order, security and health grounds.

On 25 June 2025 the Government of Ontario announced the CAD 15 million (~USD 11 million) Ontario Shipbuilding Grant Program (OSGP), part of a wider CAD 215 million package to support the province's shipbuilding and marine sector. OSGP offers non-repayable grants covering up to 50% of eligible project costs for skills training, infrastructure improvements, and machinery/equipment purchases at Ontario shipyards. The stated purpose is to expand provincial shipbuilding capacity in support of Canada's National Shipbuilding Strategy and to bolster Ontario manufacturers facing US tariffs and economic uncertainty; applications opened in late July 2025 via Transfer Payment Ontario, with a first intake running July-September 2025.

Federal Law No. 116-FZ, signed 23 May 2025, amends Articles 9 and 10 of Federal Law No. 580-FZ "On the Organisation of Passenger and Baggage Transportation by Passenger Taxi in the Russian Federation" to require, from 1 March 2026, that vehicles entered into regional taxi registries either meet a government-set localisation score (the same points system used for public-procurement eligibility under Government Resolution No. 719, with a floor reported at 3,200 points, rising to 3,500 in 2027 and 3,700 in 2028) or have been produced under a special investment contract concluded between 1 March 2022 and 1 March 2025. Vehicles already on regional registries before 1 March 2026 are grandfathered, with an extended transition to 1 March 2028 in Kaliningrad and the Siberian Federal District; a subsequent December 2025 amendment let self-employed taxi drivers keep using non-localised cars until 2033, capped at 25% of a region's registry.

Greece enacted Law 5202/2025 on 22 May 2025, published in Government Gazette ΦΕΚ A' 84 on 23 May 2025 and effective the same day, establishing the country's first national mandatory and suspensory foreign direct investment screening mechanism, aligned with Regulation (EU) 2019/452. The Interministerial Committee for the Control of Foreign Direct Investment (ICC-FDI), with initial procedure run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reviews non-EU acquisitions in "sensitive" sectors (energy, transportation, healthcare, ICT, digital infrastructure) and "particularly sensitive" sectors (national security, defence, cybersecurity, AI, ports and critical subsea infrastructure, borderland tourism). A two-phase review applies — 30 days Phase I, up to 150 days Phase II with EU Cooperation Mechanism notification — and the regime became fully operational on 11 November 2025.

The Iraqi Council of Representatives adopted Law No. 4 of 2025 on 2 February 2025 (176 deputies present, majority vote), amending Article 12 of the Federal General Budget Law for Fiscal Years 2023-2024-2025 (Law No. 13 of 2023). The amendment mandates that the federal government pay international oil companies (IOCs) operating in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) USD 16 per barrel in advance for crude production and transportation costs — more than doubling the USD 6/bbl rate in the original budget law — with all KRI crude to be delivered to and marketed exclusively through the State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO). An international consulting firm, jointly appointed by Baghdad and Erbil within 60 days, is mandated to audit field-level production and transportation costs, with cost-recovery adjustments applied retroactively from the date pipeline flows resume. The law was published in the Iraqi Official Gazette (Al-Waqai al-Iraqiyya) Issue No. 4814 on 17 February 2025.

Jiangsu's provincial Development and Reform Commission and Department of Finance jointly issued a notice on 2025-01-22 expanding the province's 2025 equipment-renewal and consumer trade-in support package under the national "ultra-long-term special treasury bond" program. For qualifying enterprise equipment-renewal bank loans — including transportation, logistics, energy, industrial and agricultural-machinery equipment — Jiangsu's provincial finance department layers an additional 1 percentage point of loan-interest subsidy on top of the 1.5-point central-fiscal subsidy already provided nationally, with a financing-guarantee subsidy covering 80% of guarantee fees (capped at 3 years) for small and micro enterprises accessing renewal loans through the province's "Equipment Guarantee" (设备担) scheme.

On 2 August 2024, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva sanctioned Lei nº 14.948/2024 (with partial veto, Mensagem nº 741) at a ceremony in the Pecém Industrial-Port Complex in Ceará, following Senate and Chamber approval of PL 2308/2023; the law was published in the Diário Oficial da União on 5 August 2024. The statute establishes Brazil's first comprehensive legal framework for low-carbon hydrogen: it (i) creates the National Low-Carbon Hydrogen Policy (PNH2BC) under the National Energy Policy umbrella, (ii) sets a statutory definition of "low-carbon hydrogen" as fuel/industrial input with lifecycle GHG intensity ≤ 7 kg CO₂e/kg H₂, (iii) institutes the Brazilian Hydrogen Certification System (SBCH2) for origin and emissions accreditation, (iv) creates the Special Incentive Regime for Low-Carbon Hydrogen Production (Rehidro), suspending PIS/Pasep and Cofins for five years on capital-goods, raw-materials and services purchases by qualified producers, and (v) authorises the Programa de Desenvolvimento do Hidrogênio de Baixa Emissão de Carbono (PHBC) — a tax-credit envelope capped at BRL 18.3 bn between 2028 and 2032 (subsequently regulated by Lei nº 14.990/2024 sanctioned 30 September 2024). ANP gains regulatory authority over hydrogen transportation, storage and import/export licensing, while the law amends Leis nºs 9.427/1996 (ANEEL) and 9.478/1997 (Petroleum Law) to integrate hydrogen into the energy-policy and electricity-regulation framework. Industry reporting at sanction cited >USD 30 bn in announced project pipeline, concentrated in Northeast renewable-rich states (Ceará, Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte) leveraging Pecém, Suape and Açu as hydrogen-derivative export terminals.

On 28 March 2024 the Cabinet Office Committee on National Space Policy adopted Japan's Space Technology Strategy, the country's first national space-industrial roadmap establishing priority technology areas (space transportation, satellites, space science and exploration, shared technologies) and the operating framework for the ¥1 trillion (≈USD 6.4 billion) ten-year Space Strategy Fund jointly managed by JAXA on behalf of METI, MEXT and the Cabinet Office. The Strategy sets headline targets of doubling Japan's space-industry market to ¥8 trillion by the early 2030s and reaching ≈30 launches per year. A METI/MEXT/CAO Basic Policy of 26 April 2024 operationalised the Fund's grant architecture, and JAXA opened the first calls in July 2024. The Strategy is the parent authority for subsequent JAXA Space Strategy Fund grant programmes and is Japan's structural counterpart to the EU Space Act (2025) and US National Space Policy.

Panama's Asamblea Nacional enacted Ley 407 on 3 November 2023, sanctioned by President Laurentino Cortizo Cohen and published in Gaceta Oficial Digital N° 29904 of the same date. The law declares an indefinite moratorium on the granting of concessions for exploration, extraction, transportation, and benefit of metallic mining throughout national territory under the precautionary principle, bars the Ministerio de Comercio e Industrias (MICI) from issuing any new concessions and requires flat rejection of all pending applications from the date of enactment. Ley 407 constitutes the legislative instrument in the paired judicial-legislative architecture under which Panama effectively exits large-scale metals mining: it operates as the prospective, horizontal concession ban, while the Corte Suprema's November 2023 Sentencia (filed separately) is the retrospective judicial nullification of the Cobre Panamá contract. Together they structurally withdraw ~1% of global mined copper supply and affect ~5% of Panama's GDP.

On 25 July 2023 Egypt published Law No. 160 of 2023 in the Official Gazette, amending Investment Law No. 72 of 2017 to expand and modernise the country's foreign-direct-investment incentive architecture. The law universalises General Incentives (stamp-duty exemptions, land-registration-fee relief, reduced customs duties on capital goods) to all investment projects regardless of establishment date, broadens the Golden License single-permit regime to strategic/national projects and PPP infrastructure, and unlocks the Free Zones system for previously excluded energy-intensive sectors — petroleum manufacturing, fertilizers, iron and steel, LNG liquefaction and transportation — subject to Supreme Council of Energy approval. A Special Incentive of 33–55% tax credit on income from qualifying new industrial investment projects was introduced; the Special Incentives establishment window was subsequently extended three years to October 2026 by Cabinet Decree No. 1203 of 2024. As of December 2025 GAFI had approved 44 Golden Licenses under this architecture.

Canada amended the Special Economic Measures (Belarus) Regulations via SOR/2022-075, registered and in force 5 April 2022, in response to Belarus's support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The amendment prohibits any person in Canada and any Canadian outside Canada from providing insurance, reinsurance or underwriting services for aviation and aerospace products owned, controlled, registered to, chartered by or operated by Belarus or a Belarusian person. A new section 3.6 separately establishes export prohibitions on goods and technologies listed on a Belarus Restricted Goods and Technologies List, incorporated by reference, aligning Canada's Belarus measures with its parallel Russia export-control regime. The same instrument added nine individuals (Belarusian oligarchs and defence officials) to the Schedule 1 asset-freeze list, outside this action's scope.

Canada amended the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations via SOR/2022-067, registered and in force 24 March 2022, establishing a new "Restricted Goods and Technologies List" and prohibiting any person in Canada, and any Canadian outside Canada, from exporting, selling, supplying or shipping any listed good or technology to Russia or to any person in Russia. The list is maintained and published separately by Global Affairs Canada and covers items with dual civilian/military applications across electronics, computers, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation and avionics, marine, aerospace and transportation equipment.

On 1 March 2022, OFAC published an interim final rule adding the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (RuHSR) at 31 CFR Part 587, codifying into Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations all prohibitions previously imposed by Executive Order 14024 of 15 April 2021. The regulations were issued in abbreviated form to provide immediate public guidance, with OFAC indicating an intent to supplement them with additional definitions, general licenses, and interpretive guidance. All transactions prohibited under EO 14024 — including prior sectoral determinations and directives targeting Russia's financial services sector, sovereign debt markets, and key state institutions — are formally prohibited under Part 587, giving domestic courts and compliance teams a stable regulatory anchor.