Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2666 actions· ✨ 90 recent

Japan's Diet passed the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) 2026 Amendment on 29 May 2026; the law was promulgated on 5 June 2026. The amendment represents the most significant overhaul of Japan's inbound FDI screening regime since FEFTA was first applied to national-security transactions in 2019. Three structural additions: (1) indirect-acquisition screening — extends mandatory prior-notification to acquisitions of Japanese sensitive-sector companies effected through intermediate holding structures or offshore parent vehicles, closing the principal gap exploited by Chinese and GCC SWF investors via SPV chains; (2) call-in powers — grants the Minister of Finance authority to open a review up to ten years retroactively where an acquisition was not pre-notified or where circumstances have materially changed since clearance, directly analogous to CFIUS § 721(b)(1)(D) retroactive jurisdiction; (3) cross-ministerial "Japan CFIUS" consultation framework — formally institutionalises a standing inter-agency committee (Finance, METI, MoD, NPA, MIAC) modelled on the US CFIUS committee, replacing the prior ad-hoc inter-ministerial process. Cross-ministerial and indirect-acquisition provisions entered into force immediately on promulgation (5 June 2026); remaining Cabinet-Order-level implementing provisions to follow within one year.

The Overseas Investment (National Interest Test and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2025 (No 81 of 2025) is the largest rewrite of New Zealand's Overseas Investment Act 2005 since the 2018 residential-land amendment. The Bill (Government Bill 171) was introduced by the Minister of Finance in June 2025, passed all three readings in the House of Representatives, received Royal Assent on 19 December 2025, and was brought into force on 6 March 2026 by the Overseas Investment (National Interest Test and Other Matters) Amendment Act 2025 Commencement Order 2026 (SL 2026/2). The Act replaces the OIA's residual "investor test" discretion with a single statutory national-interest test applied to all "sensitive asset" transactions, introduces a new s 29B repeat-investor mechanism (Treasury does not re-litigate investor risk factors on subsequent applications outside strategically important businesses), creates new military / dual-use technology call-in transactions and critical-direct-supplier call-in transactions (amended s 85), and adds a no-change-of-control transaction category. Administered by The Treasury (policy lead) and Toitū Te Whenua LINZ (operations / case handling), with consent decisions issued by the responsible Ministers.

On 10 October 2025 Vietnam's Government issued Decree No. 259/2025/NĐ-CP, establishing the country's first comprehensive statutory framework for strategic trade control — covering the export, temporary import for re-export, transshipment, transit, and cross-border trade of strategic goods defined as: (a) WMD-related items, (b) conventional weapons, and (c) dual-use goods spanning nuclear, electronics, telecommunications, sensors, aviation, maritime, aerospace, biochemical, metals, and chemical categories. The decree creates a Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) licensing regime with an ICP (Internal Compliance Programme) fast-track for certified exporters of two or more years' standing, and includes catch-all provisions requiring licensing even for unlisted goods where WMD end-use or a designated end-user is suspected. Structurally, the decree represents Vietnam's transition from ad-hoc export-management provisions under legacy Decree 69/2018/NĐ-CP to a unified strategic-trade-control architecture analytically aligned with the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and MTCR control-list architecture. It positions Vietnam as a compliant strategic-goods manufacturing hub within the US-led friend-shoring supply chain, directly preceding the US announcement in February 2026 of Vietnam's removal from EAR Country Groups D:1–D:3.

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) revised its Foreign End-User List (外国ユーザーリスト) — the reference list of foreign organisations for which WMD/missile or, for the first time, conventional-weapons development concerns cannot be excluded, used to trigger catch-all export-licence requirements. The revision adds 92 entities (from China, Hong Kong, North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and the UAE) and removes 5 entities (from China, Iran and India), taking the list to 835 entities across 15 countries and regions — a net increase of 87. The revised list applies from 9 October 2025, the same date Japan's broader catch-all conventional-weapons supplementary export-control review took effect.

South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy issued the 36th amendment to the Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items (전략물자수출입고시) as MOTIE Notice No. 2025-20, with promulgation on 24 February 2025 and effect from 28 February 2025. The amendment adds 21 advanced-technology items and technologies — including quantum computers, AI-class semiconductors, 3D-printing equipment, isotopes for quantum computing, ultra-low-temperature measurement equipment, and high-temperature coatings — to the Strategic Items List, implementing recent updates from the Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Australia Group multilateral export-control regimes. The same amendment introduces a humanitarian-medical-device carve-out for exports of diagnostic X-ray and radiographic imaging equipment to Russia, simplifies end-user verification (intermediaries deemed final end-user where verification is "extremely difficult"), extends the post-transaction reporting period from 7 days to 3 months, creates a self-disclosure system for non-compliance, and allows one-time extensions of individual export licences beyond original validity.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 11 entities under 11 entries to the Entity List, all listed under the destination of China, People's Republic of (China). The rule also revises one existing entry on the Entity List under the destination of India. BIS determined the added entities have been involved in, are involved in, or pose a significant risk of becoming involved in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. License requirements apply to all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy. The rule was effective on publication, January 16, 2025. This action is the companion piece to the same-day 16-entity Sophgo-cluster addition (FR 2025-00480) — together totalling the "27 Chinese companies" referenced in trade-press coverage.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (IFR) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove list-based license requirements — including National Security Column 1 (NS1), Regional Stability Column 1 (RS1) and Missile Technology Column 1 (MT1) reasons-for-control — for exports, reexports and in-country transfers to or within Australia and the United Kingdom. The IFR also expands the availability of license exceptions and reduces the scope of end-use and end-user-based license requirements for the two AUKUS partners, while leaving firearms-related items (Crime Control / CC) and a narrow set of other ECCNs untouched. The rule is the EAR-side companion to a parallel DDTC proposed rule creating an ITAR §126.7 exemption for defense articles and services traded among authorised AU/UK/US users, and is the foundational regulatory implementation of the AUKUS Pillar 2 advanced-capability cooperation track.

The Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024 (C2024A00021) received Royal Assent on 8 April 2024 and created three new criminal offences in the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012: section 10A (supply of Defence and Strategic Goods List technology in Australia to a non-exempt foreign person); section 10B (secondary supply of DSGL Part 1 Munitions or Part 2 Dual-Use Sensitive/Very Sensitive goods or technology outside Australia when originally exported from Australia); and section 10C (provision of DSGL Part 1 services to foreign nationals outside Australia). All three offences carry maximum penalties of 10 years imprisonment or 2,500 penalty units (~A$782,500), or both. The offence framework commenced 1 September 2024 with a six-month compliance-transition period; criminal liability attached from 1 March 2025. The Act also codifies AUKUS-partnership exemptions, carving out supplies to and from citizens and permanent residents of the United Kingdom and United States, underpinning the licence-free trilateral technology-transfer environment sought under AUKUS Pillar 2.

On 23 February 2024, two years after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/745, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and comprising the EU's 13th Russia sanctions package. It adds new CN codes to the export-ban annexes (dual-use and advanced-technology goods) and adds 27 entities — including firms based in China, Hong Kong, India, Sri Lanka, Serbia, Kazakhstan, Thailand and Turkiye — to the list of parties barred from any exemption from the export ban, on the basis they are assessed to be supporting Russia's military-industrial complex via circumvention routes. Asset-freeze listings (106 individuals, 88 entities) under the parallel Council Decision took effect 23 February 2024; the sectoral trade measures took effect 24 February 2024.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 10 entities under 13 destination entries to the Entity List, effective February 24, 2023. The additions span three groups: (1) five Chinese entities operating in the commercial satellite and dual-use space sector — most notably Spacety Co., Ltd. and China HEAD Aerospace Technology Co., both suspected of supplying satellite imagery and space technology in support of the Russian military in Ukraine; (2) two Canadian procurement intermediaries (CPUNTO Inc. and Electronic Network Inc.) facilitating illicit acquisition of US-origin controlled items; and (3) three Russian defense-industrial procurement companies supplying the Russian military. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a policy of denial, except EAR99 food and medicine which receive case-by-case review.

Switzerland's Federal Council amended the Ordinance on measures related to the situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72) to align with the EU's ninth sanctions package, effective 6pm on 25 January 2023. The amendment bans new Swiss investment, equity provision, and participation (including joint ventures) in Russian mining-sector entities, with a carve-out for critical raw materials (aluminium/bauxite, chromium, cobalt, copper, iron ore, mineral fertilisers, molybdenum, nickel, palladium, rhodium, scandium, titanium, vanadium). It also extends export bans on aerospace goods to aircraft and drone engines, adds new controls on dual-use and military/security-enhancement goods, bans product testing/advertising/market-research services to Russia, and designates roughly 200 additional individuals and entities, including the Russian Regional Development Bank, to frozen-asset lists.

On 16 December 2022 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2474, the 9th package of restrictive measures against Russia, amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014. It entered into force on publication the following day (17 December 2022). The package extends the prohibition on new EU investment from the Russian energy sector to the Russian mining and quarrying sector, bans exports of aircraft and drone engines and their parts to Russia (and to any third country that could re-supply drones to Russia), adds 168 entities to the sectoral export- control annex covering chemicals, nerve agents, night-vision and radio- navigation equipment, electronics and IT components, and prohibits EU advertising, market-research, product-testing and technical-inspection services to Russia. A parallel Council Decision/Implementing Regulation designated a further 141 individuals and 49 entities to the EU asset-freeze and travel-ban list.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed nine Russian persons from the Unverified List (UVL) and simultaneously added them to the Entity List after the Russian government failed to facilitate end-use checks for more than 60 days — the first application of BIS's October 2022 escalation policy. All nine entities are subject to a license requirement covering all items subject to the EAR, with a policy of denial and no license exceptions available. The list spans electronics traders, state maritime infrastructure, defense R&D, microelectronics, and industrial equipment manufacturers.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 36 entities under 41 entries to the Entity List, effective June 28, 2022. The entities — located across China, Lithuania, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, the UAE, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam — were designated for acting contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests. Key grounds include support for China's military modernization and AI-enabled surveillance programs, Pakistan-based proliferation concerns, and supply-chain facilitation for Russia amid the Ukraine invasion. The rule also revised eleven existing entries (Belarus, China, Russia, Slovakia) and corrected one entry (Pakistan).

On 25 February 2022, the day after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/328, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. It prohibits the sale, supply, transfer or export of dual-use goods and technology to any person, entity or body in Russia, or for military use or military end-users there, and extends to goods and technology suited for use in the oil refining industry and for the aviation and space industry, alongside a ban on related technical assistance, brokering, financing and insurance/maintenance services. The Regulation entered into force on the day after its Official Journal publication (OJ L 49, 25.2.2022), i.e. 26 February 2022.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added eight entities to the Entity List — six based in Pakistan and two in the UAE — on grounds that they were acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests through involvement in proliferation to unsafeguarded nuclear activities. All EAR items destined for these entities require a license with a presumption of denial; no license exceptions are available. Separately, one China-based entity (Molecular Devices Shanghai Corporation) was removed from the Military End-User (MEU) List, and a second China MEU entry was renamed (Hutchison Optel Telecom Technology → Chongqing Optel Telecom Technology Co., Ltd.).

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended 15 CFR Part 742 to revise the license review policy for items controlled for National Security (NS) reasons destined to the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and Venezuela. The rule shifts the evaluation standard from assessing contributions to "military capabilities" to whether the export will make a "material contribution to the development, production, maintenance, repair, or operation of weapons systems" of those countries. Venezuela is added to the pre-existing China/Russia NS review framework, and BIS codifies a presumption of approval for civil end-uses and a presumption of denial for weapons-system contributions, supplemented by an illustrative list of review factors to guide license applications.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 47 entities across 51 entries to the EAR Entity List effective 22 September 2020, covering entities in China, Hong Kong, Iran, Pakistan, Canada, Malaysia, Oman, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and the UK. All 47 entities were determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests. For 39 of the 47 entities BIS imposed a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a presumption-of-denial review policy; the remaining eight face case-by-case review. The round targeted Iranian dual-use procurement networks, Chinese military-affiliated research institutes, and Pakistan-linked proliferators, reinforcing the layered export-control perimeter across multiple adversary programs simultaneously.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding sixty entities under sixty-one entries to the Entity List (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744), effective August 27, 2020. The designated entities, spanning China, Hong Kong, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Switzerland, and the UAE, were found to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests. The rule also revised five existing entries under Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, Iran, and the UAE.

The Investitionskontrollgesetz (InvKG, "Investment Control Act") is Austria's horizontal, statutory FDI screening regime. Published as Article 1 of the Federal Law BGBl. I Nr. 87/2020 on 24 July 2020 and entering into force on 25 July 2020, the Act replaced the previous narrow §§25a–25e Außenwirtschaftsgesetz 2011 (Foreign Trade Act) regime — under which fewer than 10 permits were issued from 2013 to mid-2020 — and transposes EU Regulation 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. The InvKG introduces mandatory ex-ante notification and approval of non-EU / non-EEA / non-Swiss acquisitions where the acquirer crosses any of the 10% / 25% / 50% voting-rights thresholds in an Austrian target operating in the critical sectors listed in Annex Part 1 (especially sensitive: defence, energy / water / telecoms critical infrastructure, dual-use technology, cybersecurity, AI, quantum technology, robotics, semiconductors, biotech, health, vaccines) and 25% / 50% in the sectors listed in Annex Part 2 (broader, including media, food-security, electronic communications infrastructure, financial infrastructure). Administered by the Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Wirtschaft (BMAW), with case decisions taken in coordination with the Komitee für Investitionskontrolle (inter-ministerial Investment Control Committee) and, where the case is escalated to the EU cooperation mechanism, the Commission and EU peer Member States. The InvKG is Austria's functional peer of US CFIUS / FIRRMA, UK NSI Act 2021, Germany AWG §§55–62, France Décret 2014-479 / R. 151-1 et seq., Italy Golden Power Decree, Netherlands Wet Vifo, Denmark investeringsscreeningsloven, and Belgium ISC. Sunset clause: originally limited to 30 June 2022 under §17(2) InvKG; permanently extended by BGBl. I Nr. 80/2022 of 14 July 2022.

South Korea's Foreign Trade Act (대외무역법, Act No. 5211, enacted 31 December 1986 and repeatedly amended) is the foundational statutory framework of the Republic of Korea's foreign trade and export-control regime. It establishes the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) as the administering authority for foreign trade policy and empowers it to designate strategic items, issue and revoke export licences, operate catch-all controls over non-listed goods destined for WMD-development end-uses, and coordinate with the Nuclear Suppliers Group-administered National Security Authority for Strategic Commerce (NSASC) on Category-0 nuclear items and the Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA) on military goods. Every MOTIE strategic-items notification (the "Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Materials," currently encompassing Categories 1-9 dual-use items harmonised with Wassenaar, MTCR, AG, and NSG) and every MOTIE outbound-investment screening measure derives its legal authority from the Act.