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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 30 of 2026 on July 24, 2026, adding 14 EU-based entities to the Export Control Management List under the Export Control Law and Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations. The listing bars Chinese exporters from supplying dual-use items to the named entities, bars any overseas party from transferring or providing China-origin dual-use items to them, and orders ongoing related transactions to stop immediately; exporters may apply to MOFCOM for case-by-case exemption. It is the first MOFCOM entity-list action ever to target EU-domiciled entities and the first ever to name a university (Wrocław University of Science and Technology). The 14 entities span Germany (Rheinmetall AG, Sindlhauser Materials GmbH, Antraco Chemie-Handelsgesellschaft mbH), Italy (Lafert S.p.A., Garnet S.r.l.), France (InPACT S.A., III-V LAB, Cavok UAS), Poland (Vigo Photonics S.A., Politechnika Wrocławska), the Netherlands (IHC Merwede Holding B.V.), Czechia (TATRA TRUCKS a.s.), Bulgaria (Opticoelectron Group) and Lithuania (Ekspla UAB) — defence, drone, photonics, laser, semiconductor and maritime-engineering firms and research institutes. The action came roughly 24 hours after the EU's 21st Russia sanctions package (adopted July 23, 2026) added Chinese and Hong Kong dual-use-trading entities to its own restricted list, and is widely read as a reciprocal countermeasure.
China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 23 of 2026 on June 22, 2026, adding 10 US entities to the Export Control Management List under the Export Control Law and Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations. The listing prohibits Chinese exporters from supplying dual-use items to these entities and bars any global party from transferring China-origin dual-use goods to them; ongoing transactions are suspended pending MOFCOM approval. The 10 entities include the two largest non-Chinese rare earth producers — MP Materials Corp. (Mountain Pass, CA) and USA Rare Earth Inc. (Round Top, TX) — as well as eight US defence firms (Aveox, Red Cat Holdings, Teal Drones, IMSAR, Jaia Robotics, Ball Aerospace, Oshkosh Defense, L3Harris Maritime). MOFCOM explicitly framed the action as retaliation for the US DoD's June 8, 2026 update to the Section 1260H Chinese Military Companies list, which added ~80 Chinese parent firms and 188 affiliates.
Germany's Federal Economic Affairs Ministry (Bundesregierung) and BAFA issued Allgemeine Genehmigung Nr. 48 (AGG 48) on 20 March 2026, a time-limited general export licence simplifying the export of specified air-defence and maritime-defence equipment to Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Ukraine, in force until 15 September 2026. Exporters may register retrospectively up to 30 days after first shipment, replacing individual-licence applications for in-scope items and materially compressing per-shipment administrative lead times. The measure is framed as part of Germany's reinforced commitment to supplying defence equipment to allies countering regional threats and Russian aggression.
On 6 January 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 1 [2026] "On Strengthening Export Controls on Dual-Use Items to Japan" (商务部公告2026年第1号), the first PRC export-control instrument to single out a named country other than the United States. Effective immediately on publication with no wind-down period, the measure prohibits export of all dual-use items under PRC export-control law where the end-user is the Japanese Ministry of Defense or Self-Defense Forces, the end-use is Japanese military, or — under a novel catch-all standard — the transaction would "enhance Japan's military capabilities." The standard is explicitly extraterritorial, covering transfers of PRC-origin dual-use items through third countries and in-country transfers where the end-user / end-use falls within scope. The political trigger was Japanese PM Takaichi's November 2025 Diet remarks framing a Taiwan contingency as a Japanese "survival-threatening situation" justifying SDF deployment.
On 10 October 2025 Vietnam's Government issued Decree No. 259/2025/NĐ-CP, establishing the country's first comprehensive statutory framework for strategic trade control — covering the export, temporary import for re-export, transshipment, transit, and cross-border trade of strategic goods defined as: (a) WMD-related items, (b) conventional weapons, and (c) dual-use goods spanning nuclear, electronics, telecommunications, sensors, aviation, maritime, aerospace, biochemical, metals, and chemical categories. The decree creates a Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) licensing regime with an ICP (Internal Compliance Programme) fast-track for certified exporters of two or more years' standing, and includes catch-all provisions requiring licensing even for unlisted goods where WMD end-use or a designated end-user is suspected. Structurally, the decree represents Vietnam's transition from ad-hoc export-management provisions under legacy Decree 69/2018/NĐ-CP to a unified strategic-trade-control architecture analytically aligned with the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and MTCR control-list architecture. It positions Vietnam as a compliant strategic-goods manufacturing hub within the US-led friend-shoring supply chain, directly preceding the US announcement in February 2026 of Vietnam's removal from EAR Country Groups D:1–D:3.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed nine Russian persons from the Unverified List (UVL) and simultaneously added them to the Entity List after the Russian government failed to facilitate end-use checks for more than 60 days — the first application of BIS's October 2022 escalation policy. All nine entities are subject to a license requirement covering all items subject to the EAR, with a policy of denial and no license exceptions available. The list spans electronics traders, state maritime infrastructure, defense R&D, microelectronics, and industrial equipment manufacturers.
The Bureau of Industry and Security added 57 entities under 57 entries to the Entity List, effective September 30, 2022, in direct response to Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Ukrainian regions. Of the 57 entities, 56 are listed under Russia and one (Subsidiary Sevastopol Naval Plant of Zvezdochka Shipyard) under the Crimea Region of Ukraine. The additions span aviation repair and overhaul facilities, aerospace R&D institutes, naval propulsion, ballistic-missile producers, advanced-materials and quantum science institutes, and the federal metrology agency; 50 of the 57 receive footnote 3 designations as Russian military end users, subjecting them to the Russia/Belarus-Military End User Foreign Direct Product Rule. All are added with a license review policy of denial for all EAR-subject items except food and medicine designated EAR99.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding China National Offshore Oil Corporation Ltd. (CNOOC) to the Entity List on the basis of its involvement in the PRC's unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea and efforts to intimidate and coerce other South China Sea coastal states. In the same rule, Beijing Skyrizon Aviation Industry Investment Co., Ltd. was added to the Military End-User (MEU) List, while two Russian entities (Vsmpo-Avisma and Molot Oruzhie) were removed from the MEU List as duplicate entries. The rule took effect January 14, 2021, one day before publication in the Federal Register.