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On 29 June 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 27 [2026], adding 20 Japanese entities to the dual-use-item export-control Control List (受控名单) under the Dual-Use Export Control Regulations. The designated entities include four defense research institutes (National Institute for Defense Studies plus ground-, naval- and air-systems research bodies) and 16 companies, primarily Mitsubishi Electric and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries subsidiaries. The Control List designation imposes an absolute prohibition on exporting PRC-origin dual-use items — including rare earths and gallium/germanium/antimony-class strategic minerals — to the listed parties, and bars any third-country transfer of Chinese-origin dual-use items to them; ongoing supply activity must cease immediately, with exceptions only via special MOFCOM application. MOFCOM stated the action targets entities "involved in enhancing Japan's military capabilities."

Japan's Diet passed the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) 2026 Amendment on 29 May 2026; the law was promulgated on 5 June 2026. The amendment represents the most significant overhaul of Japan's inbound FDI screening regime since FEFTA was first applied to national-security transactions in 2019. Three structural additions: (1) indirect-acquisition screening — extends mandatory prior-notification to acquisitions of Japanese sensitive-sector companies effected through intermediate holding structures or offshore parent vehicles, closing the principal gap exploited by Chinese and GCC SWF investors via SPV chains; (2) call-in powers — grants the Minister of Finance authority to open a review up to ten years retroactively where an acquisition was not pre-notified or where circumstances have materially changed since clearance, directly analogous to CFIUS § 721(b)(1)(D) retroactive jurisdiction; (3) cross-ministerial "Japan CFIUS" consultation framework — formally institutionalises a standing inter-agency committee (Finance, METI, MoD, NPA, MIAC) modelled on the US CFIUS committee, replacing the prior ad-hoc inter-ministerial process. Cross-ministerial and indirect-acquisition provisions entered into force immediately on promulgation (5 June 2026); remaining Cabinet-Order-level implementing provisions to follow within one year.

On 23 May 2026 President Javier Milei, Economy Minister Luis Caputo, and Chief of Staff Manuel Adorni announced the "Régimen de Incentivo para Grandes Inversiones en Nuevas Industrias" (Super RIGI), and on 26 May 2026 submitted the bill (Mensaje 181/2026, expediente 0005-PE-2026) to the Cámara de Diputados — pending Congressional approval as of filing. The regime applies a US$1 billion minimum investment threshold (with ≥20% committed in the first two years), a 15% corporate income tax rate (vs 25% under the base 2024 RIGI), accelerated depreciation of 60%/20%/20% over three years, immediate export-duty exemption (vs year 3 under RIGI), import-tariff exemption, and 30-year regulatory stability across tax, customs, social security, and FX matters. A progressive FX-liberalisation schedule allows 20% / 40% / 100% free disposal of export-generated foreign currency in years 1 / 2 / 3+. Target sectors are industries that "do not currently exist or are in experimental/pilot phase in Argentina," including semiconductors, AI data centres, advanced biotech, 100% electric vehicles, lithium value chain (downstream processing, cathode, battery), green hydrogen, solar panels, wind turbines, onshore LNG, SMR nuclear, aerospace, uranium value chain, potassium and phosphorus fertilisers, and new petrochemicals.

On 22 May 2026, DRC Minister of Mines Louis Watum Kabamba signed Arrêté ministériel N° 00305/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2026, imposing an immediate and total three-month suspension of all mining activity (industrial, semi-industrial, and artisanal) in the Mwenga and Shabunda territories of South Kivu province. Grounds cited: illegal extraction, mineral fraud, and financing of armed groups through uncontrolled extraction revenues. The General Inspectorate of Mines was deployed on a special verification mission; the moratorium is set to expire approximately 22 August 2026.

The Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) issued Circular No. 12/2026 and Circular No. 13/2026 on 14 May 2026, restructuring Sudan's gold export regime. Circular 12/2026 abolished restrictions on exporters' use of gold and commodity export earnings — permitting proceeds to fund any Ministry of Trade-authorised import via an "intermediate import account" (21-day utilisation window) — and formally terminated the CBOS monopoly on gold purchases, allowing registered private traders to export through official channels. Circular 13/2026 established a daily gold incentive price (international 24-karat benchmark minus USD 10 per troy ounce, converted to USD per gram), published through the XAR electronic system; commercial banks and export-clearing authorities must clear shipments at or above this price.

On 14 May 2026, following an on-site inspection of mining operations in Mpanda Municipality and Nsimbo District Council in Tanzania's Katavi Region, Minister for Minerals Hon. Anthony Mavunde ordered the immediate suspension of all mining activities along the Mtisi River after inspectors found severe environmental degradation, absence of environmental management plans and NEMC permits, and foreign nationals operating machinery directly — in violation of the Mining Act Cap. 123 (R.E. 2019), which restricts foreign parties under Technical Support Agreements (TSAs) to advisory and technical-support roles only. Mavunde simultaneously directed all Resident Mining Offices nationwide to conduct a review of every TSA between local small-scale miners and foreign investors to verify legal compliance and ensure that agreements genuinely benefit Tanzanian citizens. Three large exploration licences recently revoked (linked to the 15 April 2026 mass-revocation) are to be reallocated to small-scale miners in Katavi Region under the Mining for a Brighter Tomorrow (MBT) framework.

Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính issued Directive 38/CĐ-TTg on 5 May 2026, mobilising a cross-ministerial enforcement campaign against intellectual property infringement running 7–30 May 2026 with a 31 May reporting deadline. The directive explicitly responds to the USTR 2026 Special 301 designation of Vietnam as a Priority Foreign Country — the first such designation in eleven years — which triggers a statutory 30-day window for USTR to decide whether to open a Section 301 investigation. Ministries of Public Security, Industry and Trade (Market Surveillance), Information and Communications, and Culture are mobilised for coordinated raids targeting counterfeit-goods exporters, pirated-content platforms, and software-copyright violators, with the Prime Minister signalling enforcement will be permanent rather than a one-off campaign.

The Decreto para la Autorización Inmediata de Inversiones, published in Mexico's Diario Oficial de la Federación on 4 May 2026, creates a streamlined investment-authorization mechanism under President Sheinbaum's Plan México strategy. The decree establishes an Investment Committee — composed of the Secretariats of Economía, Hacienda, SEMARNAT, SCT, Energía, and Bienestar — mandated to issue authorization certificates within 30 business days for qualifying projects, replacing the historic 6–18-month multi-agency backlog. Eligibility covers three tiers: projects in designated Polos de Desarrollo Económico para el Bienestar (Welfare Development Poles), investments of MXN 2 billion (≈USD 100M) or more, and projects in strategic sectors (semiconductors, EV batteries, critical minerals, automotive supply chain, medical devices, biotech, aerospace). This is the procedural- acceleration arm of Plan México, structurally distinct from the January 2025 Plan México tax-incentive decree (the fiscal arm), and operationalises the February 2026 Plan México expansion announced by Sheinbaum.

The Office of the United States Trade Representative released the 2026 Special 301 Report on 30 April 2026, designating Vietnam as a Priority Foreign Country (PFC) — the most severe category under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. § 2242). This is the first PFC designation since Ukraine held the status from 2013 through 2015, a gap of approximately 11 years. The PFC designation triggers a statutory 30-day window (expiring ~30 May 2026) within which USTR must decide whether to initiate a Section 301 investigation under 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(A), which could lead to tariffs, withdrawal of trade benefits, or other Section 301 enforcement remedies against Vietnam. Separately, the EU was added to the Watch List for the first time, citing AI training-data, geographical-indications, and customs-enforcement concerns.

Turkey's Ministry of Trade Export General Directorate issued a circular on 6 April 2026 prohibiting exports of sulphur classified under customs tariff position 2503 (excluding sublimed, precipitated, and colloidal sulphur) effective 7 April 2026 through 30 September 2026. The measure was requested by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in response to a 35–40% surge in domestic sulphur prices and supply shortages triggered by Middle East conflict disruptions to global sulphur flows. Turkey exported approximately 226,500 tonnes of sulphur in 2025, primarily to Egypt, Tanzania, Greece, and Lebanon; Tüpraş's regular 8,000-tonne monthly Mediterranean spot tender was suspended immediately. The ban compounds Russia's concurrent sulphur export ban (Decree No. 350, extended to 30 June 2026), compressing Mediterranean and East African sulphur availability during the global spring–summer fertiliser demand peak.

The US Department of Commerce published its final affirmative determination of sales at less-than-fair-value in the antidumping investigation of animal feed-grade L-lysine (lysine) from China (case A-570-215) on 23 July 2026, following a preliminary determination published 6 March 2026 (91 FR 11030). Commerce found a China-wide weighted-average dumping margin of 139.83% (cash deposit rate 139.65% after subsidy-offset adjustment), based on adverse facts available after Commerce found Zhengzhou Longgu Trading Co., the sole company with a calculated margin, and the Eppen Group group of producers/exporters uncooperative and ineligible for a separate rate in the final determination. A group of separate-rate companies — including Anhui BBCA Biochemical, Heilongjiang Wanlirunda Biotechnology, and others exporting through trading intermediaries such as Agromate Sg, Ainore (Tianjin), and Aollen Biotech — received a 73.55% dumping margin (73.37% cash deposit rate). The order covers lysine regardless of form (HCl, sulfate, liquid) under HTSUS 2922.41.0090 and related subheadings. A companion countervailing-duty investigation (preliminary 22 January 2026, 91 FR 2745) was finalized the same day; suspension of liquidation runs from 6 March 2026, with a final AD order contingent on an ITC injury determination due within 45 days of the final LTFV finding.

On 1 May 2026 the trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (the "Interim Trade Agreement", iTA) entered provisional application between the European Union and the four Mercosur states — Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay — following its publication in the EU Official Journal on 27 February 2026 alongside the broader EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA). The iTA covers goods (eliminating duties on more than 90% of bilateral trade over a transition period including immediate cuts on cars, pharmaceuticals, wine and olive oil), services, government procurement at federal and state level, intellectual property (344 EU geographical indications protected), SPS/TBT disciplines, and a sustainability chapter. Mercosur receives tariff-rate quotas on agri-food exports (beef, poultry, sugar, ethanol, honey). Provisional application proceeds pending full ratification of EMPA by the Council, European Parliament and all EU national parliaments and a pending CJEU opinion; only the trade pillar applies provisionally.

On 25 February 2026 Zimbabwe's Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, under Minister Polite Kambamura, announced an immediate and indefinite suspension of exports of all unprocessed minerals — including lithium-bearing spodumene concentrates, which had previously been exempt from the country's December 2022 ban on raw lithium ore (Statutory Instrument 213 of 2022). The directive was communicated by ministerial letter dated 17 February 2026 to the Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe and copied to lithium producers; the suspension took effect on 25 February and explicitly covered consignments already in transit, with the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) and the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) ordered to halt clearance at the border. The measure brings forward by roughly eleven months a lithium-concentrate export ban that had been telegraphed for January 2027, and broadens it to all raw mineral exports. The Minister cited "national interest", in-country beneficiation, transparency, and prevention of mineral export "leakages" (smuggling and under-invoicing) as the rationale. Bloomberg and Reuters reporting noted under-declaration of grade and value as a proximate trigger; the government later (April 2026) clarified that reinstated exports would require Quota Verification certificates, monthly reporting, on-site assay laboratories, and individual producer-level export ceilings — i.e. the suspension functions as a reset to a quota regime rather than a permanent embargo. Zimbabwe is the world's fifth-largest lithium producer (~6-7% of global supply on a contained-LCE basis) and exported 1.128 million tonnes of spodumene concentrate in 2025 (an 11% YoY increase). The producer base is overwhelmingly Chinese-owned: Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (Arcadia / Prospect), Sinomine Resource Group (Bikita Minerals), Chengxin Lithium (Sabi Star), and Sichuan Yahua (Kamativi) together account for the majority of output. The ban therefore primarily disrupts Chinese midstream lithium converters in Sichuan and Jiangxi that depend on Zimbabwean spodumene feedstock, while incrementally tightening the global seaborne concentrate market. The action is structurally a continuation of the EM resource-nationalism / upstream-capture template pioneered by Indonesia's nickel-ore ban (2020) and most recently extended by the DRC's ARECOMS cobalt suspension and quota system (Feb-Oct 2025). It reinforces a pattern in which producing-country governments capture processing margin from consuming-country smelters, and it does so in a commodity (lithium) where ex-China refining capacity is still thin, magnifying near-term price impact even though the headline share of global supply removed is moderate.

On 13 February 2026 President Bola Ahmed Tinubu signed Executive Order No. 9 of 2026 directing all Production Sharing Contract operators and contractors to remit Royalty Oil, Tax Oil, Profit Oil, and Profit Gas directly to the Federation Account, bypassing prior NNPC Limited intermediated collection. The order simultaneously eliminates NNPC Limited's 30% management fee on profit oil/gas, suspends the 30% Frontier Exploration Fund deduction, and redirects Gas Flare Penalty proceeds to the Federation Account — materially walking back the fiscal architecture established under Petroleum Industry Act 2021 §§ 9 and 53. An Implementation Committee chaired by the Minister of Finance was established to operationalise the order and resolve disputes.

On 12 February 2026, Ambassador Jamieson Greer of the Office of the United States Trade Representative oversaw the signing of the US-Taiwan Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) in Washington, DC. The instrument was signed under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO). Headline terms: (i) US IEEPA reciprocal-tariff rate on Taiwan reduced from 20% to 15% and Section 232 auto-parts/timber/lumber rate cut from 25% to 15%; (ii) Taiwan eliminates or reduces 99% of its tariff barriers on US goods, most immediately and the remainder phased over three years; (iii) Taiwan side commits ~USD 85bn in directed purchases through 2029 (USD 44.4bn LNG/crude, USD 15.2bn civil aircraft and engines, USD 25.2bn power equipment); (iv) sectoral chapters covering tariffs, non-tariff barriers, digital trade, economic security, and high-tech supply-chain resilience. Operationally linked to the 15 January 2026 AIT-TECRO Memorandum of Understanding on investment, under which Taiwan pledges USD 250bn in direct Taiwanese-enterprise investment in the US plus USD 250bn in Taiwan-government credit guarantees (USD 500bn total) to fund US-side industrial parks/clusters in advanced semiconductors, energy, and AI manufacturing. Entry into force is conditional on Taiwan's Legislative Yuan completing its review.

On 18 February 2025 Tailings Dam 15 at Sino-Metals Leach Zambia Limited's Chambishi facility (Copperbelt Province, Kalulushi District) failed, releasing acidic leach residue into the Chambishi Stream and the Mwambashi and Kafue Rivers; the company suspended operations and the Zambia Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA) commissioned an independent Environmental and Social Incident Impact Assessment (ESIIA). ZEMA received the consultant's final report on 19 December 2025 and held a public disclosure meeting in Kitwe on 6 January 2026. On 2 February 2026 the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development announced that the investigation had concluded and that, once ZEMA's review of the findings is complete, stakeholders will be engaged to determine remediation and compensation modalities. Company clean-up operations began in March 2026.

On 15 January 2026 the Government of Vietnam issued Decree No. 20/2026/ND-CP, providing detailed implementing regulations for National Assembly Resolution 198/2025/QH15 (17 May 2025) on special mechanisms and policies for the development of the private economic sector. The decree (6 chapters, 17 articles) introduces a synchronized incentive framework covering corporate and personal income tax exemptions, land-access support, science/technology and digital transformation support, and human-resource training. SMEs registering for the first time are exempt from corporate income tax for three consecutive years; innovative startups receive a full CIT exemption for two years followed by a 50% reduction for four years; eligible experts and scientists at innovative startups, R&D centers, and intermediary organizations receive a personal income tax exemption for two years followed by a 50% reduction for four years. The decree took effect on the date of signature, with CIT/PIT incentive provisions retroactively applicable from 17 May 2025 (the effective date of Resolution 198/2025/QH15).

On 14 January 2026 President Trump issued a Presidential Proclamation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 titled "Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products into the United States". Unlike the parallel 14 January 2026 semiconductor proclamation and the subsequent April 2026 pharmaceutical proclamation, the PCMDP proclamation does NOT immediately impose tariffs. Instead it directs the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative to jointly negotiate bilateral and plurilateral supply agreements with trading partners, with an initial 180-day status report due 13 July 2026. The proclamation reserves residual authority to impose tariffs if negotiations fail or prove ineffective, and explicitly contemplates "price floors" on PCMDP imports as a negotiated instrument.

On 6 January 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 1 [2026] "On Strengthening Export Controls on Dual-Use Items to Japan" (商务部公告2026年第1号), the first PRC export-control instrument to single out a named country other than the United States. Effective immediately on publication with no wind-down period, the measure prohibits export of all dual-use items under PRC export-control law where the end-user is the Japanese Ministry of Defense or Self-Defense Forces, the end-use is Japanese military, or — under a novel catch-all standard — the transaction would "enhance Japan's military capabilities." The standard is explicitly extraterritorial, covering transfers of PRC-origin dual-use items through third countries and in-country transfers where the end-user / end-use falls within scope. The political trigger was Japanese PM Takaichi's November 2025 Diet remarks framing a Taiwan contingency as a Japanese "survival-threatening situation" justifying SDF deployment.

At its 30 December 2025 regular session, Iraq's Council of Ministers, chaired by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al-Sudani, approved two additional customs duties on imports from all countries of origin: a 40% additional duty on medical and industrial oxygen (gaseous and liquid forms), in effect for four years, and a 30% additional duty on imported yogurt (laban rayeb) and liquid milk. Both measures were framed as protecting domestic pharmaceutical/ industrial-gas production and local dairy manufacturing respectively, and take effect 120 days after issuance (29 April 2026) to give importers an adjustment window. Global Trade Alert logs the dairy duty as principally affecting Germany, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye as leading supplier origins, though the measure itself is non-discriminatory (applies to all origins).

Taiwan's Legislative Yuan passed the Artificial Intelligence Basic Act (人工智慧基本法) on third reading on 23 December 2025, and President Lai Ching-te promulgated the 20-article statute on 14 January 2026, bringing it into force immediately. The Act designates the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) as the central AI-policy competent authority and codifies seven governance principles — sustainability and well-being, human autonomy, privacy protection and data governance, cybersecurity and safety, transparency and explainability, fairness and non-discrimination, and accountability — that apply to all public-sector AI procurement and high-risk sectoral applications. The statute establishes a statutory foundation for the Taiwan AI Action Plan 2.0, mandates an Executive Yuan National AI Strategy Committee, and provides authority for sector-specific implementing regulations by FSC, NCC, MOHW, and MOTC across finance, telecoms, medical, and autonomous-vehicle AI within a two-year window. As the first national AI governance statute in the Greater China region and the third globally after the EU AI Act and South Korea's AI Basic Act, it frames regulatory expectations for the companies at the heart of the global AI hardware supply chain — TSMC, NVIDIA ODM partners, and advanced-packaging incumbents — that are headquartered or operate substantially in Taiwan.

Arrêté ministériel n° 00964/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2025, signed 19 December 2025 by DRC Mines Minister Louis Watum Kabamba, suspends with immediate effect all activities of entities (notably comptoirs d'achat / buying counters, treatment units and similar structures) involved in the purchase, processing, transformation and commercialisation of copper and cobalt minerals sourced from artisanal exploitation across the country. Industrial, legally established mining operators are excluded. The order requires affected entities to submit compliance documentation within ten days, establishes an ad hoc commission to verify administrative, legal, technical and traceability conformity (15-day review window), and obliges operators to demonstrate the lawful origin of their supplies in line with OECD due-diligence guidance. Framed as a "conservatory" measure to restore order in the cupro-cobaltifère value chain and curb illicit exports.

HM Treasury's Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published a Russia-regime notice on 18 December 2025 designating five individuals and 19 entities under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Of the 19 entities, six are based in Russia, eight in the United Arab Emirates, four in Uzbekistan and one in Kyrgyzstan — reflecting OFSI's continued focus on third-country intermediaries used to route sanctioned Russian trade and finance. Designated persons are subject to a full asset freeze and are barred from commercial transactions and investment instruments with UK persons.

On 16 December 2025, Public Services and Procurement Canada implemented the Buy Canadian Procurement Policy Framework, bringing into force (a) the Policy on Prioritizing Canadian Materials in Federal Procurement, which mandates use of Canadian steel, wood products and aluminum in federal defence and construction contracts valued at CAD 25 million or more that contain at least CAD 250,000 of those materials where Canadian supply exists, and (b) the Policy on Prioritizing Canadian Suppliers and Canadian Content in Strategic Federal Procurements, which applies a bid-price discount margin favouring Canadian suppliers in procurements tied to Canada's economic, industrial and innovation priorities. Complementary amendments to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Procurement Inquiry Regulations, effective 15 December 2025, remove CITT jurisdiction to review procurement measures that restrict participation to, or favour, Canadian suppliers, goods, services, materials or subcontractors. The framework applies immediately to procurements of CAD 25 million and above and is scheduled to expand to contracts of CAD 5 million and above by spring 2026. Budget 2025 allocates roughly CAD 186 million over five years to implement the framework, including CAD 79.9 million for a new Small and Medium Business Procurement Program.

Vietnam's National Assembly passed Law on Cybersecurity No. 116/2025/QH15 on 10 December 2025 (434 of 443 deputies in favour), effective 1 July 2026. The law supersedes both the 2018 Cybersecurity Law (Law 24/2018/QH14) and the 2015 Law on Cyber Information Security, consolidating cybersecurity, cyber-information-security, and network-information-security into a unified Ministry of Public Security-led framework. It retains data-localization obligations for foreign digital-service providers handling personal data, user-generated content, and relationship graphs of Vietnamese users (minimum 24-month retention), introduces 6-hour urgent / 24-hour standard content take-down windows on MPS request, expressly prohibits AI/deepfake forgery of images, voices, and videos for illegal purposes, and mandates child-safety platform measures.

On 3 December 2025 President Pedro Sánchez presented the Plan España Auto 2030, a five-year roadmap to mobilise EUR 30 bn (public + private) through 2030 to anchor electric-vehicle, battery and charging- infrastructure manufacturing in Spain. The plan is the first comprehensive Spanish auto-industrial policy of the post-COVID era and is structured as three immediate 2026 envelopes plus a multi-year PERTE-track: (i) Plan Auto+ — EUR 400 m in direct consumer-purchase subsidies effective 1 January 2026, replacing the autonomous-region- managed MOVES III with a centralised dealer-discount model run by MINCOTUR; (ii) MOVES Corredores — EUR 300 m for fast-charging-corridor deployment; and (iii) an additional EUR 580 m allocated to the PERTE VEC (Vehículo Eléctrico y Conectado) industrial-finance instrument in 2026, on top of the EUR ~3 bn already mobilised across previous PERTE VEC calls. The headline ambition is a sub-EUR 25,000 "affordable Spanish electric car" and 95% electrified light-vehicle production by 2035.

On 26 November 2025, Scotland's Deputy First Minister and Cabinet Secretary for Economy and Gaelic, Kate Forbes MSP, wrote to the Scottish Parliament's Economy and Fair Work Committee confirming that the preferred bidder for Glasgow Prestwick Airport had withdrawn from the sale process after a "robust commercial deal" had been negotiated. The letter discloses that the proposed acquisition was subject to mandatory notification to the UK Government under the National Security and Investment Act 2021, a reserved matter on which Scottish Ministers cannot comment. Media reporting (Global Trade Alert; Daily Business) identifies the withdrawn bidder as Turkish conglomerate Limak Holding and attributes the collapse directly to the UK national-security review process ("Westminster officials opening an investigation"). The airport, which employs over 500 people directly and anchors an Ayrshire aerospace cluster, remains in Scottish Government public ownership.

On 24 November 2025, six Beijing municipal departments — the Bureau of Economy and Information Technology, Development and Reform Commission, Science and Technology Commission, Health Commission, Drug Administration and Medical Insurance Bureau — jointly issued Notice 京经信发〔2025〕50号 ("Several Measures to Promote High-Quality Development of the Beijing Medical Device Industry"), effective immediately through 31 December 2028. The 15-measure package subsidises the full medical-device value chain: early-stage innovation (up to RMB 1m per project), product approval/launch (up to RMB 2m per product, RMB 10m annual enterprise cap), industrial-park and public-service infrastructure construction (up to 50% of investment, capped at RMB 50m), supply-chain-resilience R&D for critical components/materials (up to 30% of investment, capped at RMB 30m), AI-diagnostic-model development (up to RMB 30m), smart-factory digitalisation (up to 30% of investment, capped at RMB 30m per project), and international regulatory approval/market entry (up to RMB 1m per product, RMB 3m annual cap; up to RMB 10m for introducing overseas products to China).

The Chongqing Municipal Government General Office issued Notice 渝府办发〔2025〕58号 on 2025-11-22, promulgating "Several Policy Measures to Promote High-Quality Development of the Low-Altitude Economy," effective immediately through 2027-12-31. The package comprises eight capped-percentage subsidy tracks covering low-altitude public-service procurement, logistics route operating subsidies (up to RMB 150,000 per route), demonstration projects (up to RMB 20 million), test-flight infrastructure (20% of investment, capped at RMB 5 million), manufacturing R&D and first-of-kind equipment support (up to 30% of receipts, capped at RMB 5 million), national innovation/manufacturing centres (up to RMB 20 million), ground-station infrastructure (20% of investment, capped at RMB 10 million), private-equity fund-manager incentives (1% of invested capital, capped at RMB 10 million cumulative), and AI-compute subsidies (20% of service cost, up to RMB 1 million/year). Global Trade Alert classifies all eight interventions as state aid with a "certainly harmful" (Red) rating.

On 18 November 2025, the European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, ESMA, and EIOPA) jointly designated 19 Critical ICT Third-Party Providers (CTPPs) under DORA Article 31, with immediate effect — the first-ever exercise of direct EU financial-regulator supervision over hyperscale cloud and infrastructure providers. The designated entities include Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, Deutsche Telekom, Oracle, SAP, IBM, Bloomberg LP, London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG), Tata Consultancy Services, and Orange, among others. Designation triggers direct oversight by a lead ESA (EBA for banking-critical, ESMA for capital-markets-critical, EIOPA for insurance-critical) via Joint Examination Teams (JETs), with powers to conduct investigations, carry out on-site inspections, and impose fines of up to 1% of average daily worldwide turnover per day for non-compliance.

Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs International Trade Administration (MOEA-ITA) issued a pre-notice (17 November 2025, doc. 經授貿字第 11450120760號) proposing amendments to the "Dual-Use Goods and Technology Export Control List" and the "General Military Goods List" under the Strategic High-Tech Commodities (SHTC) regime, adding or reclassifying items in the basic-inorganic-chemicals, chemical-products, and engines/turbines categories to align with Wassenaar Arrangement list updates. Following the standard 60-day public-comment period, MOEA-ITA published the finalised amendment on 11 February 2026 (doc. 經貿字第 11550200140號), effective immediately, requiring exporters of the newly listed dual-use and military goods to obtain prior export licences regardless of destination.

Cyprus Law 194(I)/2025 "The Establishment of a Framework for the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments Law of 2025" was enacted by the House of Representatives and published in the Official Gazette on 14 November 2025, entering into force on 2 April 2026. It establishes Cyprus's first-ever mandatory pre-approval FDI screening regime, designating the Ministry of Finance as the competent Screening Authority and applying to non-EU/EEA/Swiss investors acquiring ≥25% equity or voting rights in Cyprus entities valued at ≥€2 million across covered strategic sectors. The regime implements EU Regulation 2019/452 and includes a Cyprus-specific sectoral extension covering tourism and real estate — addressing golden-passport-era concerns about non-EU capital flows into the island's financial and hospitality economy.

The Hrvatski sabor (Croatian Parliament) unanimously adopted the Act on Screening of Foreign Direct Investments on 24 October 2025; the law was published in Narodne Novine 136/2025 and entered into force on 13 November 2025. It establishes Croatia's first-ever statutory horizontal FDI-screening regime, implementing EU Regulation 2019/452 in Croatian law. The Act captures direct or indirect acquisitions by non-EU investors of at least 10 % of share capital, voting rights or property rights in Croatian entities operating in sensitive sectors (defence, dual-use, critical infrastructure, critical minerals, emerging tech, sensitive personal data, energy, transport, health, digital infrastructure, media, financial services). The reviewing authority must decide within 120 days, exceptionally 150 days, of a complete application. Croatia was one of the last EU Member States without a horizontal screening law.

China's Ministry of Finance, General Administration of Customs and State Taxation Administration jointly issued Announcement 2025 No. 10, restructuring VAT refund support across the power-generation sector effective 1 November 2025. Offshore wind power producers gain a new 50% immediate VAT refund running through 31 December 2027, while the prior immediate-refund policy for onshore wind power (in force since 2015 under Cai Shui [2015] No. 74) is repealed outright. Nuclear plants approved but not yet commercially operating as of 31 October 2025 receive a 50% collected-then-refunded VAT rebate for ten years from first commercial operation, but nuclear projects approved after 1 November 2025 receive no VAT refund at all. The measure reallocates state fiscal support within China's power sector toward offshore wind and legacy-pipeline nuclear capacity while withdrawing it from onshore wind and future nuclear approvals.

On 15 October 2025 the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC) launched a CAD 700 million loan guarantee program to help softwood sawmills, lumbermills and remanufacturers access new term loans and letters of credit through their existing financial institutions. The guarantees are aimed at easing the collateral and duty-payment strain created by US tariff and countervailing/antidumping exposure, effective immediately from announcement. The program was later topped up by a further CAD 500 million on 26 November 2025 (filed separately), bringing total guarantee capacity to roughly CAD 1.2 billion.

Singapore issued a package of four companion instruments in 2025 to modernise its strategic-goods control architecture: (i) the Strategic Goods (Control) Order 2025 (SGCO 2025), which revokes and replaces SGCO 2024 (S 641/2024) and expands the Singapore Strategic Goods Control List to align with the 2024 Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List and 2024 EU List of Dual-Use Items, effective 1 December 2025; (ii) the Strategic Goods (Control) (Brokering) (Amendment) Order 2025 (S 662/2025), published 1 October 2025, updating Singapore's extraterritorial brokering regime for controlled goods; (iii) Singapore Customs Circular 01/2025 of 8 April 2025, amending import/export declaration requirements to mandate disclosure of the final destination country of goods rather than the consignee address on the commercial invoice; and (iv) a 4 April 2025 joint MTI–Singapore Customs advisory explicitly warning Singapore-based businesses and intermediaries that their compliance obligations extend beyond Singapore's own controls — i.e., that Singapore authorities will not condone deliberate circumvention or violation of US, EU, or Japanese export controls by Singapore-domiciled intermediaries. This package constitutes the first Singapore export-control-architecture filing in the IPTM register and is directly framed by the February 2025 Singapore–NVIDIA–Inspur–DeepSeek GPU-diversion case in which three Singapore residents were charged for fraudulent re-export of restricted AI accelerators to PRC end-users.

China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 51 of 2025 on 25 September 2025, adding three US entities — Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. (NYSE: HII, the largest US military shipbuilder), Planate Management Group, and Global Dimensions LLC — to China's Export Control List (出口管制 管控名单), effective the same day. The listing prohibits Chinese exporters from supplying dual-use items to the three firms and requires any ongoing related export activity to cease immediately. MOFCOM cited the firms' "military-technical cooperation with China's Taiwan region" as the trigger, issued in parallel with a same-day Unreliable Entity List designation of three other US firms (Saronic Technologies, Aerkomm, Oceaneering International).

President Trump signed Executive Order "Saving TikTok While Protecting National Security" on September 25, 2025, certifying a restructuring plan as a "qualified divestiture" under the 2024 PAFACA law and directing the Attorney General not to enforce the Act for 120 days while the transaction closes. The plan creates TikTok USDS Joint Venture LLC, valued at roughly $14 billion, with a new US-investor consortium (Oracle, Silver Lake and MGX at 15% each, plus other investors, totaling 50%), affiliates of existing ByteDance investors holding 30.1%, and ByteDance itself retaining 19.9%. Oracle will run US data storage and algorithm retraining/oversight; the deal closed January 22, 2026.

Tanzania's Minister for Minerals issued the Mining (Local Content) (Amendment) Regulations, 2025 via Government Notice No. 563 of 2025, published on 12 September 2025 and in force on the same day with no grace period. The amendment overhauls the Mining (Local Content) Regulations, 2018 (GN No. 3 of 2018) and introduces a new Regulation 13A empowering the Tanzania Mining Commission to publish — in the Gazette, on its website, and in nationwide media — a list of "reserved" goods and services that may be supplied only by an Indigenous Tanzanian Company (ITC) that is 100% Tanzanian-owned (no joint venture permitted in those reserved categories). For non-reserved categories, non- indigenous suppliers must form a JV with an ITC operating in the same line of business in which the ITC holds at least 20% equity, with the JV agreement subject to prior Mining Commission approval. Sole-sourced contracts above ~USD 10,000 must be notified to the Commission, and Local Content Plans must now include Banking Services and Procurement sub-plans, channelling mining-related financial transactions through Tanzanian-registered banks.

On 12 September 2025 the UK government, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 3 individuals and 27 entities — 19 Russian, plus third-country intermediaries in Thailand (3), Hong Kong (3), India (1) and Türkiye (1) accused of supplying electronics, chemicals and explosives used in Russian missile and weapons production — and proscribed 70 vessels (oil tankers and cargo ships, identified by IMO number) linked to Russia's shadow fleet evading the G7 crude price cap. The package brings the UK's cumulative tanker designations to nearly 500, more than any other single jurisdiction.

On 16 August 2025, Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 599/2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 39 individuals and 55 legal entities identified as involved in developing, manufacturing, or supplying components for Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with artificial-intelligence elements. The list covers 43 Russian entities (including drone makers Prognatik, Rozumni Ptakhy, Zala Aero, and KB Vostok, plus AI research centres Neurolab and TsBST), 10 Chinese suppliers of navigation receivers, engines, cameras, and microchips (including Dongguan Standard Trading, Zhejiang Lianxing Machinery, Shenzhen Sky Bow Navigation Technology, and Topscom Precision Industry), and 2 Belarusian component suppliers. Sanctions impose asset freezes and restrictions on commercial transactions and investment instruments, entered into force immediately upon signature and revocable no later than 15 August 2035.

The Anhui Provincial People's Government issued Wanzhengmi [2025] No. 108 (皖政秘〔2025〕108号), "Several Policies (Version 2.0) for Building a General Artificial Intelligence Industrial Innovation and Application Highland," on 2025-08-11, effective immediately and running through 2027-12-31. The package replaces and expands an October 2023 predecessor version, bundling grants, project subsidies and application-scenario support to accelerate large-model and general-AI adoption across the province's industrial base. The first 2025 disbursement batch under the scheme funded 30 of 34 submitted projects for a combined RMB 49.5831 million (approx. USD 6.9 million).

At its 32nd regular session on 10 August 2025, chaired by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al-Sudani, Iraq's Council of Ministers approved two additional customs duties on imports from all countries of origin: a 75% additional duty on the unit measure of imported paper napkins/tissues, and a 30% additional duty on the unit measure of white polystyrene plates and food-storage containers. Both duties run for four years without reduction, with domestic-market monitoring during the application period, and took effect 120 days after issuance (10 December 2025). Global Trade Alert logs China, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye as the principal supplier origins affected, though the measure itself is non-discriminatory (applies to all origins).

The Henan Provincial People's Government issued "Several Policy Measures to Support Enterprise Science and Technology Innovation" (河南省支持企业 科技创新若干政策措施) on 2025-08-08, effective immediately. The package runs a province-wide "unveil-and-lead" (揭榜挂帅) mechanism publishing 100+ key-technology tender projects per year, targeting 200+ core-technology breakthroughs across priority industrial chains, with per-project support of no less than RMB 10 million. It also commits to RMB 160 billion (approx. USD 22 billion) in new 2025 lending to technology enterprises via the province's manufacturing mid/long-term loan pipeline mechanism.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated five entities and one individual based in Iran, Hong Kong, Taiwan and China for procuring CNC (computer numerical control) machine tools on behalf of Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA), the state-owned defense-ministry subsidiary that builds Iran's Ababil-series military UAVs used by the IRGC. Designated parties include Javad Alizadeh Hoshyar, CEO of Iran-based Control Afzar Tabriz Co Ltd, which used Hong Kong-based Clifton Trading Limited as an intermediary to obscure CNC-machine shipments to HESA, and Taiwan-based Mecatron Machinery Co Ltd and Joemars Machinery and Electric Industrial Co Ltd, which shipped CNC machines toward Iran through similar concealment channels. The action was taken pursuant to National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), which directs that Iran be denied conventional and asymmetric weapons capabilities. All designated parties' US property and interests are blocked and US persons are generally barred from transacting with them.

India and the UK signed the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) on 24 July 2025 in Chequers, with Prime Ministers Modi and Starmer presiding. The agreement grants duty-free access on 99% of Indian exports to the UK (textiles, apparel, footwear, auto components, engineering goods and chemicals), and reduces Indian tariffs on UK goods covering ~90% of tariff lines: Scotch whisky duties drop from 150% to 75% on day one and taper to 40% over ten years; high-end UK car tariffs fall from ~110% to 10% under a quota; UK MFN access on a wide industrial-goods envelope. A Double Contribution Convention exempts Indian secondees from UK National Insurance for three years. Bilateral trade currently ~£42 bn / USD 56 bn per year, with the parties targeting doubling by 2030. UK ratification under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (CRaG) ran from January 2026, with the 21-sitting-day scrutiny period concluding 5 March 2026. Entry into force was delayed from the originally targeted May 2026 date and is now confirmed for July 15, 2026 following a UK Prime Minister announcement at the G7 Évian summit sidelines on June 17, 2026. The confirmed EIF covers 64% of UK exports (£1.9bn) duty-free immediately, with an additional £25.5bn/year in projected additional bilateral trade.

China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) jointly issued Announcement No. 28 of 2025 on 15 July 2025, partially adjusting the "Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Export" first published under Announcement No. 57 of 2023. The revision adds new restricted-export entries covering LFP/LMFP cathode electrode material preparation technology, lithium carbonate/lithium hydroxide preparation technology, and gallium processing technology, extending Beijing's export-control perimeter from raw critical minerals into upstream battery-material process technology. The same revision removed three unrelated entries (traditional Chinese architectural technology and building environment-control technology) from the prohibited/restricted lists. The catalogue took effect immediately upon publication and followed a January 2025 public-consultation draft.