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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On 30 December 2025 the General Office of the Shanghai Municipal People's Government issued Hufubangui [2025] No. 20, a three-year action plan (1 January 2026 - 31 December 2028) to support the transformation and upgrading of advanced manufacturing. The plan sets quantitative targets — 100 new manufacturing enterprises with annual output above CNY 1 billion by 2028 (cumulative 600+), 500 new above-designated-size supply-chain enterprises, 100+ new national-level green factories, a robot density of 600 units per 10,000 workers, and 70%+ digital-equipment penetration — across next-generation electronics, intelligent connected new-energy vehicles, high-end equipment, advanced materials, green low-carbon and fashion consumer-goods industries, plus emerging bets on the low-altitude economy, commercial aerospace, embodied intelligence (robotics) and biomanufacturing. It is funded through tiered direct subsidies rather than tax relief: one-off R&D subsidies up to CNY 10 million, equipment/new-materials cost-share up to 30% of contract value (capped at CNY 20 million), technical- transformation loan/leasing interest support up to CNY 20 million cumulative, and 0.8-1.3% interest subsidies on component/material backup-inventory financing.
On 26 December 2025, Japan's Cabinet approved the FY2026 (Reiwa 8) national budget, which allocates JPY 122.0 billion (~USD 800m) to the "Next-Generation Innovative Reactor Technology Development and Industrial Base Strengthening Support Project" (次世代革新炉の技術開発・産業基盤強化支援事業), up from JPY 88.9 billion in the FY2025 initial budget plus a JPY 6.0 billion FY2025 supplementary allocation. The programme, administered by ANRE under METI's GX (Green Transformation) Promotion budget, funds technology development and supply-chain build-out for Japan's "innovative light-water reactors" (revised BWR/PWR designs with enhanced passive safety) and small modular reactors under the government's GX2040 Vision. The budget takes effect with Japan's fiscal year on 1 April 2026, subject to ordinary Diet passage in early 2026.
Arrêté ministériel n° 00964/CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2025, signed 19 December 2025 by DRC Mines Minister Louis Watum Kabamba, suspends with immediate effect all activities of entities (notably comptoirs d'achat / buying counters, treatment units and similar structures) involved in the purchase, processing, transformation and commercialisation of copper and cobalt minerals sourced from artisanal exploitation across the country. Industrial, legally established mining operators are excluded. The order requires affected entities to submit compliance documentation within ten days, establishes an ad hoc commission to verify administrative, legal, technical and traceability conformity (15-day review window), and obliges operators to demonstrate the lawful origin of their supplies in line with OECD due-diligence guidance. Framed as a "conservatory" measure to restore order in the cupro-cobaltifère value chain and curb illicit exports.
Section 851 of the FY 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 119-60), signed December 18, 2025, prohibits US federal agencies from procuring biotechnology equipment or services from designated "biotechnology companies of concern" (BCCs), and bars federal contractors from using such equipment/services in work performed under federal contracts, grants, or loans. The final enacted text ties initial BCC designations to DoD's existing §1260H Chinese-military-company list (which currently includes BGI and MGI, but not WuXi AppTec or WuXi Biologics) and directs OMB to designate additional BCCs within one year of enactment; operational prohibitions activate 60-90 days after FAR revision, with a five-year grandfather period for pre-existing contracts — enforcement is expected to begin in 2027-28. The legislation is the successor to H.R.8333 (118th Congress, House-passed September 2024 but stalled in the Senate before adjournment) and represents the first enacted US federal-procurement biotech-supply-chain-resilience statute.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (P.L. 119-60), signed into law on 18 December 2025, expands the Department of Defense's existing "covered materials" domestic- sourcing restriction (which already barred DoD contracting for SmCo/NdFeB magnets, tantalum and tungsten sourced from China, Russia, Iran or North Korea) to add gallium, germanium and molybdenum under Section 844. Restrictions on materials "melted or produced" in a covered nation take effect 31 December 2026, widening on 1 January 2027 to also cover materials "mined, refined, or separated" in a covered nation; the gallium/germanium additions specifically phase in on 18 December 2027. The same NDAA bundles two related supply-chain provisions: Section 867 gives DoD broader authority (contracts, grants, other-transaction agreements, equity-style investments, and anti-market-manipulation subsidies) to invest in the domestic industrial base for critical minerals, microelectronics, machine tools and other defense-relevant capacity, and Section 842 bars DoD from procuring advanced batteries whose cells or key components are owned, sourced, refined or produced by a foreign entity of concern, phased in 2028-2031.
The European Commission approved a €4.1 billion Hungarian state aid scheme (SA.120705) under Section 6.1 of the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF), authorising grants and tax advantages for strategic investments that add cleantech-manufacturing capacity across Hungary through 31 December 2030. Eligible activities cover net-zero technologies listed in Annex II of the CISAF — batteries, solar PV, wind turbines, electrolysers, heat pumps, and CCUS equipment — plus their main specific components and the production or recovery of related critical raw materials. The scheme is open to companies across the whole territory of Hungary and is the CISAF-era successor to Hungary's EUR 2.36 billion TCTF net-zero scheme (approved 2023-08-30, aid deadline 31 December 2025), which channelled the bulk of Chinese and Korean battery/EV-supply-chain FDI into the Debrecen–Szeged–Göd–Nyíregyháza industrial cluster.
In the early hours of 11 December 2025 the Council of the EU and the European Parliament reached provisional political agreement in trilogue on the "EU Pharma Package" — the revised pharmaceutical Regulation (COM 2023/0131) and Directive (COM 2023/0132) — the most significant overhaul of EU pharmaceutical legislation in over two decades. The package replaces Directive 2001/83/EC (Community Code on medicinal products for human use) and Regulation (EC) 726/2004 (the EMA Regulation), and consolidates the orphan-medicine (Regulation 141/2000) and pediatric-medicine regulations into a single framework. Headline provisions: (i) a new "8+1(+1)(+1)" IP-incentive architecture — 8 years of regulatory data protection plus 1 year of market protection, with up to two additional 12-month extensions for products addressing unmet medical need or new active substances meeting comparative-trial conditions, capped at 11 years total; (ii) an EU-wide list of critical medicines under enhanced governance via the Medicines Shortages Steering Group (MSSG) and an EMA "list of critical shortages in the EU"; (iii) mandatory shortage-prevention plans on marketing-authorisation holders for prescription medicines and Commission-designated products; (iv) modernisation of clinical-trial requirements, environmental-risk assessment, antimicrobial stewardship, and a transferable-exclusivity-voucher (TEV) regime to incentivise novel antibiotic R&D. The COREPER I committee endorsed the compromise text on 6 March 2026 and final adoption by Parliament and Council is expected during summer 2026, with the regulatory framework becoming applicable in 2028.
On December 9, 2025 in Niamey, Niger's state uranium company TNUC and Uranium One Group JSC (a Rosatom State Corporation subsidiary) signed a Memorandum of Cooperation to jointly obtain permits for new uranium deposits, conduct geological exploration of prospective sites, and establish new uranium mining operations in Niger. The agreement completes Niger's post-coup pivot from French-controlled uranium channels (Orano/SOMAÏR expelled 2024–2025) to Russian-aligned supply, routing future NE yellowcake production through the Rosatom global enrichment network. A companion Rosatom–Niger MoU on peaceful nuclear energy cooperation (NPP feasibility and reactor construction) was signed in the same period.
On 3 December 2025 President Pedro Sánchez presented the Plan España Auto 2030, a five-year roadmap to mobilise EUR 30 bn (public + private) through 2030 to anchor electric-vehicle, battery and charging- infrastructure manufacturing in Spain. The plan is the first comprehensive Spanish auto-industrial policy of the post-COVID era and is structured as three immediate 2026 envelopes plus a multi-year PERTE-track: (i) Plan Auto+ — EUR 400 m in direct consumer-purchase subsidies effective 1 January 2026, replacing the autonomous-region- managed MOVES III with a centralised dealer-discount model run by MINCOTUR; (ii) MOVES Corredores — EUR 300 m for fast-charging-corridor deployment; and (iii) an additional EUR 580 m allocated to the PERTE VEC (Vehículo Eléctrico y Conectado) industrial-finance instrument in 2026, on top of the EUR ~3 bn already mobilised across previous PERTE VEC calls. The headline ambition is a sub-EUR 25,000 "affordable Spanish electric car" and 95% electrified light-vehicle production by 2035.
The US Department of Energy selected the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and Holtec Government Services to receive up to $800 million in combined federal cost-shared funding — $400 million each — to accelerate deployment of advanced light-water small modular reactors (SMRs). TVA's award backs a GE Vernova Hitachi BWRX-300 unit at the Clinch River site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, targeted to be the nation's first commercial SMR (commercial operation targeted early 2030s), with domestic supply-chain partners Scot Forge, North American Forgemasters, BWX Technologies and Aecon. Holtec's award backs deployment of two SMR-300 units at the Palisades Nuclear Generating Station site in Covert, Michigan. The program is intended to expand US SMR manufacturing capacity and seed follow-on domestic and export supply chains.
On 24 November 2025, six Beijing municipal departments — the Bureau of Economy and Information Technology, Development and Reform Commission, Science and Technology Commission, Health Commission, Drug Administration and Medical Insurance Bureau — jointly issued Notice 京经信发〔2025〕50号 ("Several Measures to Promote High-Quality Development of the Beijing Medical Device Industry"), effective immediately through 31 December 2028. The 15-measure package subsidises the full medical-device value chain: early-stage innovation (up to RMB 1m per project), product approval/launch (up to RMB 2m per product, RMB 10m annual enterprise cap), industrial-park and public-service infrastructure construction (up to 50% of investment, capped at RMB 50m), supply-chain-resilience R&D for critical components/materials (up to 30% of investment, capped at RMB 30m), AI-diagnostic-model development (up to RMB 30m), smart-factory digitalisation (up to 30% of investment, capped at RMB 30m per project), and international regulatory approval/market entry (up to RMB 1m per product, RMB 3m annual cap; up to RMB 10m for introducing overseas products to China).
On 21 November 2025, METI Minister Yoji Akazawa designated Rapidus Corporation as the official next-generation semiconductor manufacturer under Japan's Act on Facilitation of Information Processing (情報処理の促進に関する法律, as amended by the Cabinet-approved partial-amendment bill of 7 February 2025), following a public solicitation run 3 September – 2 October 2025. The designation makes Rapidus eligible for a multi-year METI funding envelope reported at roughly JPY 1tn (~USD 6.4bn), with an initial JPY 100bn equity investment by the Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA) planned for FY2025; the funds support Rapidus' Hokkaido (Chitose) IIM-1 fab targeting 2nm GAA mass production from April 2027 and successor 1.4nm / 1nm nodes. The action is the first standalone Rapidus entry in the IPTM register and operationalises the supply-chain pillar of the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act for advanced logic.
Thailand's Board of Investment issued Notification No. 9/2568 on 14 November 2025, amending the Activity List Eligible for Investment Promotion by splitting the prior single data-center category into two tiers based on power-usage efficiency: high-efficiency data centers (PUE ≤ 1.3) qualify for an 8-year corporate income tax (CIT) exemption, while other data centers receive a 5-year CIT exemption. A precursor restructure (Notification No. 5/2568, 5 June 2025) first introduced the two-tier category split; Notification 9/2568 added location-differentiated terms based on the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC). New benefit conditions require applicants to submit a Thailand-benefit plan — training programmes, academic/R&D partnerships, local supply-chain support, or knowledge transfer to Thai nationals — that must be implemented before CIT exemption benefits can be exercised.
On 6 November 2025, the US Department of the Interior (DOI) and the US Geological Survey (USGS) released the final 2025 List of Critical Minerals under the Energy Act of 2020 (30 U.S.C. § 1606), expanding the designation from 50 to 60 minerals. The final list adds 10 newly designated commodities — boron, copper, lead, metallurgical coal, phosphate, potash, rhenium, silicon, silver, and uranium — based on updated supply-chain disruption modelling, public comment, and interagency recommendations. The list constitutes the foundational statutory anchor for downstream US critical-minerals policy instruments including DPA Title III awards, DOE LPO Title 17 loan eligibility, IRA Section 45X Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit eligibility, Section 30D FEOC determinations, BIS export-control predicate assessments, Section 232 trade-investigation predicates, and CFIUS critical-technology triggers under 31 CFR § 800.215.
On 6 November 2025 in Washington, DC, US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick and Kazakhstan's Minister of Industry and Construction Yersayin Nagaspayev signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on Critical Minerals Cooperation during President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's state visit and the C5+1 Presidential Summit. The MoU establishes a framework for joint exploration, processing, and supply-chain transparency for tungsten, uranium, and rare-earth elements, with the explicit objective of building "resilient, non-Chinese supply-chains" for the global energy transition. The instrument is paired with up to USD 900 million in potential US financing to Cove Kaz Capital Group for tungsten development and sits inside a broader USD 17 billion package of Washington-signed agreements that lifts headline US-Kazakhstan economic engagement to a reported USD 117 billion.
On 31 October 2025, Canada's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Tim Hodgson announced — on the sidelines of the G7 Energy & Environment Ministers' Meeting in Toronto — that the federal government will leverage the Defence Production Act (DPA) to designate critical minerals as defence supplies and build a strategic stockpile, with the Crown acting as buyer of last resort and setting confidential minimum prices to insulate Canadian producers from Chinese price suppression. The announcement was paired with an initial round of 26 investments, partnerships and measures totalling C$6.4 billion in unlocked critical-mineral capital (~C$120m direct federal spend plus up to ~C$1.2 bn in offtake agreements, expressions of interest and export guarantees) and aligned with nine allied countries. It is the first time Canada has invoked DPA stockpiling and priority-procurement powers for non-traditional defence inputs (lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper, rare earths, graphite, uranium) and repositions Canada as an allied-aligned strategic supplier parallel to US DPA Title III action under EO 14241.
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order effective 21 October 2025 prohibiting the export of all raw, unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi, covering uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, rutile, gold, copper, diamonds, heavy mineral sands, and all other minerals. Minerals that have been processed, refined, or value-added in Malawi are exempt. The order aligns with an announced National Mining Corporation to oversee mineral production and processing, and introduces fines and sanctions under Malawi law for violations.
France's Ministry of Industry and Energy, under Minister Marc Ferracci, announced a EUR 200 million green-industry tax credit (crédit d'impôt au titre des investissements dans l'industrie verte, C3IV) for Imerys' EMILI project at Échassières (Allier) — France's first domestic lithium mining and refining operation. The award was made as the project's total construction cost was revised up to EUR 1.8 billion. Once operational (targeted 2030), the site is expected to produce 34,000 tonnes of lithium hydroxide per year, enough to supply around 700,000 electric vehicles and cover over 20% of French battery factories' lithium needs. The award was announced alongside a wider package of C3IV support: seven critical-metals projects received a combined ~EUR 809 million in tax credits, part of ~EUR 5.4 billion in supported critical raw materials investment nationally.
On 19 August 2025 the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) opened applications for the Battery Breakthrough Initiative (BBI), an AUD 500 million capital-grant and production-incentive program to build domestic battery manufacturing capability across the value chain, from active materials to finished cells and packs. The program was first announced in the May 2024 Federal Budget as a pillar of the Future Made in Australia agenda and the National Battery Strategy, and is designed to strengthen supply-chain resilience by leveraging Australia's position as the world's largest lithium producer and a major nickel/cobalt/graphite supplier. Funding was subsequently cut to AUD 142.32 million in the 2026 Federal Budget (see amendments).
On 16 August 2025, Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 599/2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against 39 individuals and 55 legal entities identified as involved in developing, manufacturing, or supplying components for Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with artificial-intelligence elements. The list covers 43 Russian entities (including drone makers Prognatik, Rozumni Ptakhy, Zala Aero, and KB Vostok, plus AI research centres Neurolab and TsBST), 10 Chinese suppliers of navigation receivers, engines, cameras, and microchips (including Dongguan Standard Trading, Zhejiang Lianxing Machinery, Shenzhen Sky Bow Navigation Technology, and Topscom Precision Industry), and 2 Belarusian component suppliers. Sanctions impose asset freezes and restrictions on commercial transactions and investment instruments, entered into force immediately upon signature and revocable no later than 15 August 2035.
Czech Act No. 265/2025 Sb., promulgated in the Sbírka zákonů on 4 August 2025 and entering into force on 1 November 2025, is the first material amendment of the Czech Republic's foundational FDI screening statute (Act No. 34/2021 Sb.) since its enactment. The amendment broadens the perimeter of mandatory pre-closing FDI screening by cross-referencing the simultaneously-enacted Cybersecurity Act (Act No. 264/2025 Sb., transposing NIS2 Directive 2022/2555): entities designated as providers of "regulated services" under the Cybersecurity Act's "regime of higher obligation" automatically fall within mandatory FDI-screening scope, extending screening reach beyond the prior military-material / dual-use / critical-infrastructure perimeter to cover a broad sweep of digital, technology, healthcare, energy, and financial-services operators. The amendment also adds a confidentiality-sharing channel between MPO and NÚKIB, enabling coordinated supply-chain-security assessments for high-risk-vendor reviews under the new Cybersecurity Act.
On 8 July 2025 the European Commission adopted Communication COM(2025) 530 final, the "European Chemicals Industry Action Plan", together with companion staff-working document SWD(2025) 191. The Plan launches a Critical Chemicals Alliance (CCA) of Member States and industry stakeholders to safeguard EU production of strategic base chemicals (ammonia, urea, ethylene, propylene, methanol, chlorine, silicon and other high-volume building blocks) against capacity closures driven by structurally high energy/feedstock costs and third-country oversupply. The package combines (i) accelerated trade-defence on imports of PVC, melamine, glyoxylic acid, ethanolamines and polyols plus extension of the Combined Safeguard Mechanism into chemicals; (ii) energy-cost relief through swift implementation of the Affordable Energy Action Plan and an indirect-CBAM offset for chemicals exposed to high-energy input costs; (iii) a 6th Omnibus simplification package overhauling REACH, CLP labelling, cosmetics and fertilising-product rules with claimed industry savings of at least €363m/year; (iv) a framework for a follow-on Critical Chemicals Act and PFAS restrictions preserving critical applications. The chemicals sector covers ~29,000 EU companies, 1.2m direct jobs, and ~19m dependent supply-chain jobs.
The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $3,882,797 civil settlement with Unicat Catalyst Technologies LLC, an Alvin, Texas-based specialty catalyst supplier, resolving 13 apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR, 31 CFR Part 560) and one apparent violation of the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations (VSR, 31 CFR Part 591). OFAC determined the conduct egregious; Unicat had voluntarily self-disclosed. The settlement was concurrent with separate actions by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). The violations, spanning 2016–2021, involved the supply of catalyst products and consulting services to Iranian customers via a Dutch affiliate and Chinese supplier, and the sale of catalysts to Orinoco Iron S.C.S., a blocked Venezuelan government-owned entity, routed through a Chinese intermediary.
Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 28 Tahun 2025 tentang Penyelenggaraan Perizinan Berusaha Berbasis Risiko ("PP 28/2025") is the cross-sector business-licensing parent statute signed by President Prabowo Subianto on 5 June 2025, replacing PP 5/2021. It expands the Online Single Submission (OSS) risk-based licensing system to six new sectors (creative economy, geospatial information, cooperatives, investment, electronic system & transaction operators, environment), integrates environmental permitting (AMDAL/UKL-UPL) into OSS, and strengthens layered administrative sanctions. Appendix 1F operationalises a de-facto moratorium: the OSS platform now blocks new business-permit applications for intermediate-nickel production lines — nickel matte, mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP), nickel pig iron (NPI), and ferronickel — pushing investment toward higher-value Class-1 / battery-grade nickel sulphate and precursor chemistry. After a four-month grace period, OSS enforcement notifications began October–November 2025, prompting FINI (Indonesian Nickel Smelting Association) exemption petitions on behalf of partially-built projects.
On 8 May 2025, President Trump and UK Prime Minister Starmer announced the General Terms of the US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal (EPD), the first bilateral framework arrangement of the second Trump administration and the template instrument for subsequent US bilateral framework deals (US-Japan, US-Indonesia, US-Argentina, US-Korea, US-EU). The framework was implemented on 23 June 2025 via Executive Order 14309 (Federal Register doc 2025-11473). Key US concessions: a 100,000-vehicle annual TRQ for UK autos at a 10% combined rate (7.5% + 2.5% MFN, vs. 27.5% Section 232 default); aerospace tariff reduction back to MFN rates; authority delegated to Commerce/USTR to establish UK-only TRQs for steel and aluminum (in lieu of the 50% Section 232 global rate). Key UK concessions: 13,000 mt duty-free beef quota (with 20% tariff removal on the existing 1,000 mt WTO quota); 1.4 billion litre duty-free ethanol quota; commitment to negotiate non-tariff barrier reductions and supply-chain security alignment. The 10% IEEPA "reciprocal" baseline tariff on most other UK goods is preserved by the EPD.
The Legislative Yuan of Taiwan (ROC) passed amendments to Article 22 of the Statute for Industrial Innovation (產業創新條例) and added a new Article 67-3 on third reading on 18 April 2025, promulgated by Presidential Decree on 7 May 2025. The package establishes for the first time a Taiwanese OUTBOUND-investment screening regime under the Statute: outbound investments by Taiwanese entities meeting the amount threshold (NTD 1.5bn, or lower as determined) OR involving designated countries/regions OR specific industries or technologies must obtain prior approval from the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) before implementation. The competent authority may deny approval (in whole or in part) or impose conditional approval where particular circumstances are identified — including risks to national security, harm to economic development or supply-chain resilience, conflict with international treaties, or violation of labour-standards law. The new Article 67-3 establishes enforcement penalties ranging from NTD 50,000 to NTD 1,000,000 for initial non-compliance violations and NTD 500,000 to NTD 10,000,000 per violation for failure to comply with conditions, restrictions, or undertakings imposed by MOEA under Article 22 Paragraph 3. Effective dates of implementing provisions are to be determined by Executive Yuan secondary legislation; the package is structurally novel for Taiwan — the first horizontal outbound-investment-security instrument and the structural parallel to the US Treasury Final Rule on Outbound Investment in Countries of Concern (28 October 2024 / effective 2 January 2025), the EU Commission Recommendation 2025/63, and Korea's MOTIE NCT regime.
On 11 March 2025 the European Commission published its proposal for a Critical Medicines Act (CMA), pillar of the broader EU pharmaceutical-resilience agenda alongside the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (filed: 2024-05-23-eu-crma-entry-into-force) and the IRA-style industrial-policy stack. The proposal targets supply security of an EU "Union List" of critical medicines (antibiotics, anti-thrombotics, oncology, cardiovascular, insulin, painkillers) by introducing four mechanisms: (1) Strategic Project status with expedited funding access for critical-medicine manufacturing or active-substance production; (2) public-procurement preferences favouring resilient supply chains and — in defined cases — EU-based production; (3) collaborative cross-Member-State procurement to address fragmented small markets; (4) state-aid framework guidance + international-partnership diversification to reduce single-country (often China-routed) API dependency.
On 5 March 2025 the European Commission adopted Communication COM(2025) 95 final, the "Industrial Action Plan for the European Automotive Sector", a horizontal sectoral industrial-policy framework structured around five pillars: innovation and digitalisation, clean mobility, competitiveness and supply-chain resilience, skills and the social dimension, and a global level playing field. Headline financial commitments include EUR 1bn under Horizon Europe for SDV/AI in mobility (2025-2027), EUR 1.8bn Innovation Fund earmark for EU battery cell manufacturing, EUR 350m for next-generation battery R&D (2025-2027), and EUR 570m under the Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Facility (2025-2026) for heavy-duty charging corridors. The plan also delivers a targeted CO2-standards flexibility allowing 2025-2027 combined-year compliance for cars and vans, and the launch of the European Connected and Autonomous Vehicle Alliance.
After a comprehensive two-year mining ban (August 2023–April 2025), Wa State authorities formally opened new three-year licence applications for mining, processing, and prospecting in Man Maw in February 2025, with permits issued to operators from approximately April 2025. The restart regime imposes a 30% universal tax-in-kind on all tin concentrate exports plus an additional 5% first-batch concentrate levy to fund joint mine dewatering, materially re-pricing approximately 10% of global tin concentrate supply. Shipments recovered to ~1,300 tonnes contained tin per month by November–December 2025.
On 29 January 2025 the Union Cabinet of India approved the National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), a seven-year programme running FY2024-25 through FY2030-31 with a headline financial envelope of ₹34,300 crore (≈USD 4.0 bn). The structure is split: ₹16,300 crore of direct government outlay administered by the Ministry of Mines, plus an expected ₹18,000 crore of investment by central public-sector undertakings (PSUs) and other stakeholders. The mission was first announced by the Finance Minister in the Union Budget 2024-25 (23 July 2024) and the Cabinet approval gave it formal sanction. The NCMM covers the full critical-minerals value chain: domestic exploration, mining, beneficiation, processing, recycling from end-of-life products, and acquisition of overseas mineral assets. The Geological Survey of India (GSI) is tasked with executing 1,200 exploration projects over the seven-year window (vs. 368 projects over the prior three years), expanded to offshore polymetallic-nodule provinces containing cobalt, REE, nickel and manganese. More than 100 critical-mineral blocks are slated for auction. Khanij Bidesh India Ltd (KABIL) — the JV of NALCO, HCL and MECL — is the designated vehicle for overseas acquisitions, with active Argentina lithium (CAMYEN SE, 15,703 ha) and Australia lithium/cobalt off-take pipelines. India's official critical-minerals list contains 30 commodities, of which 24 are inscribed in Part D of Schedule I of the MMDR Act 1957 (after the 2023 amendment), reserving central-government auction authority over them. The NCMM sets an explicit recycling target of 15-20% of domestic critical-mineral demand met from secondary sources (e-waste, battery scrap, industrial waste) by 2035. The mission also funds a National Centre of Excellence for Critical Minerals and offers customs-duty waivers on 25 critical minerals (announced in the same FY24-25 budget) to lower import costs while domestic capacity scales. NCMM is India's pull-side complement to the US IRA, EU Critical Raw Materials Act, Canada Critical Minerals Strategy and Australia Critical Minerals Strategy — a coordinated allied response to Chinese dominance over refined cobalt, REE, graphite and gallium/germanium. For India specifically it is framed as the supply-chain underpinning for FAME-III (EV adoption), the Semicon India programme (gallium/germanium/silicon), and the National Solar Mission (silicon, indium, tellurium, gallium for thin-film PV).
BIS published an interim final rule (FR Doc 2025-00711, 90 FR 4544-publication slot; companion to the AI Diffusion Framework signed three days earlier) revising the EAR to add explicit due-diligence procedures for advanced computing integrated circuits captured by ECCN 3A090. The rule (i) creates an Authorized IC Designer / Approved IC Packager regime so that foundries and OSATs can identify trustworthy customers via lists maintained by BIS, (ii) imposes new front-end-fabricator reporting requirements for any 3A090.a IC produced for an authorized IC designer to give the US government supply-chain visibility, and (iii) adjusts the scope of covered advanced-computing items. Effective 16 January 2025; compliance required from 31 January 2025; comment period extended to 14 March 2025. The rule was immediately followed by the 16 January Entity List additions (Sophgo et al.) targeting circumvention paths and was technically amended on 14 February 2025 to narrow the RS license requirement to ECCN 3A090.a only.
BIS (acting through its Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services, OICTS) published a final rule under Executive Order 13873's ICTS authority prohibiting certain connected-vehicle (CV) transactions involving hardware and software designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China or the Russian Federation. The rule reaches the Vehicle Connectivity System (VCS — hardware/software enabling external RF connectivity above 450 MHz) and the Automated Driving System (ADS) software stack. Effective 17 March 2025, with phased prohibitions: import/sale of CVs incorporating covered software prohibited from model year 2027; import of covered VCS hardware prohibited from model year 2030 (or 1 January 2029 for hardware not associated with a model year). Importers and connected-vehicle manufacturers must file annual Declarations of Conformity.