Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2663 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On 12 February 2026, Chile's Ministry of Mining and Codelco (via subsidiary Salar de Maricunga SpA) signed the definitive Contrato Especial de Operación de Litio (CEOL) for the Salar de Maricunga, formalising Rio Tinto as strategic partner with a capital commitment of up to US$900 million. The instrument constitutes the second tranche of Chile's 2023 National Lithium Strategy, distinct from the NovaAndino Litio (Codelco–SQM) JV that governs the Salar de Atacama tranche. Rio Tinto was selected as partner in May 2025 following a competitive process; the definitive CEOL modifies the original 2018 exploration contract, expands the concession area (incorporating pre-1979 concessions acquired from Lithium Power International in 2024), and extends the exploration phase by four years. Remaining conditions precedent — including foreign competition-authority approvals — were projected for completion during 2026.

On 27 January 2026 President Gabriel Boric presented Chile's National Critical Minerals Strategy (Estrategia Nacional de Minerales Críticos, NCMS) — the country's first horizontal critical-minerals governance framework, identifying 14 minerals as priorities for development and establishing five strategic pillars: production and diversification of critical minerals; responsible mining; development opportunities based on critical minerals; enabling capacities; and strategic international positioning. The strategy was developed through a multi-year participatory process coordinated through Cochilco and Sernageomin, involving a 16-member high-level advisory committee, 120 specialists from 56 institutions, regional workshops and a public consultation. It materially broadens Chile's mineral policy beyond the 2023 lithium-specific National Lithium Strategy to a cross-cutting framework that underpins future bilateral critical-minerals MOUs and positions Chile as a strategic raw-materials partner for the US, EU and Japan under their respective IRA/CRMA/GX supply-chain frameworks.

On 27 December 2025, Codelco and SQM formally closed NovaAndino Litio SpA, the 50:50 joint venture (with a golden share for state-owned Codelco) mandated by the 2023 National Lithium Strategy to bring the Salar de Atacama under state operational control. The vehicle is formed by merging Codelco's subsidiary Minera Tarar SpA with SQM's SQM Salar SpA, governed by a six-director board (three Codelco, three SQM), and runs until 2060 under a CORFO contract amendment that extends operations beyond SQM's previous 2030 lease expiry. SQM manages operations 2025-2030, Codelco from 2031 onward; the Chilean state captures up to ~70% of operating margins through 2030 and ~85% from 2031. As part of the closing, SQM transferred all of its mining concessions in the Salar de Maricunga to Codelco. President Boric and the Cabinet Económico formally endorsed the venture on 29 December 2025, when the first board meeting was held in Santiago.

On 3 November 2025 the US Department of War's Office of Strategic Capital (OSC), together with the Department of Commerce, announced a joint conditional loan commitment of $700 million to two domestic rare-earth magnet producers: $620 million to Vulcan Elements and $80 million to ReElement Technologies. The loans fund separation, metallization and finished-magnet manufacturing capacity for Neodymium Iron Boron (NdFeB) magnets, targeting up to 10,000 metric tons of annual domestic magnet production. In exchange, the Department of War receives warrants in both companies. This action covers the OSC loan tranche; a related, separately-tracked action covers the Department of Commerce's parallel $50 million CHIPS Act equity stake in Vulcan Elements.

Peraturan Menteri Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral (Permen ESDM) No. 6 of 2024, signed by Minister Arifin Tasrif on 30 May 2024 and published in the Berita Negara Republik Indonesia, establishes the procedural framework governing how holders of Mining Business Licences (IUP) and Special Mining Business Licences (IUPK) for copper, iron, lead, and zinc production may continue to sell processed mineral products abroad during the final phase of domestic smelter construction. Licence holders that previously obtained MEMR export recommendations and whose refining facilities have reached commissioning stage but are not yet at full operational capacity may apply for time-bound extensions to sell concentrate and semi-processed ore offshore through 31 December 2024, subject to quarterly physical inspections by the Director General of Minerals and Coal. The regulation is the MEMR-side companion instrument to the same-day Permendag 10/2024 (Ministry of Trade copper-concentrate and anode-sludge export prohibition), together constituting the complete legal architecture of Indonesia's copper hilirisasi (downstream- processing) mandate. Its scope is broader than the Trade Ministry rule: it covers copper, iron, lead, and zinc whereas Permendag 10/2024 targets copper and anode-sludge only, and it operates as the conditional derogation mechanism (MEMR) to Permendag 10/2024's absolute prohibition regime (Trade Ministry).

Indonesia's Ministry of Trade promulgated Peraturan Menteri Perdagangan (Permendag) No. 10 of 2024 on 30 May 2024, amending Permendag 22/2023 on Goods Prohibited for Export. The regulation set 31 December 2024 as the final cutoff for copper-concentrate and anode-sludge exports — extending the original 1 June 2024 ban deadline by seven months — and enforced a full prohibition starting 1 January 2025. The measure is paired with ESDM Regulation No. 6 of 2024 covering the upstream mining-product side, completing the legal architecture of Indonesia's copper "hilirisasi" (downstream-isation) mandate. The ban forces all domestically mined copper concentrate to be smelted and refined inside Indonesia. Two operators are directly affected: PT Freeport Indonesia (PTFI), majority-owned by state holding MIND ID with Freeport-McMoRan as minority partner, which operates the Grasberg mine in Papua and the new Manyar/Gresik smelter in JIIPE; and PT Amman Mineral Nusa Tenggara (subsidiary of PT Amman Mineral Internasional, IDX:AMMN), which operates the Batu Hijau mine in Sumbawa with a smelter under commissioning. A fire at Freeport's Gresik smelter in October 2024 disrupted ramp-up and forced the government to grant a discretionary export-permit extension into 2025 for PTFI, signalling that the ban — while now legally in force — is being enforced flexibly during smelter commissioning rather than as a hard stop. Permendag 10/2024 is the copper-sector equivalent of the 2020 nickel- ore export ban (ESDM 11/2019) and the planned bauxite-ore ban (effective June 2023). Together these three measures complete Indonesia's resource-nationalism package across its three highest-value mineral exports: nickel, bauxite, and copper. Combined domestic smelter capex commitments tied to the copper rule (Freeport Manyar + Amman Sumbawa) total ~USD 6 billion. Indonesia's Finance Ministry estimated forgone export revenue of ~Rp 10 trillion (~USD 640 million per year) from the copper-concentrate ban alone, which the government is treating as an acceptable downstream-policy cost. Severity is set at 4: the action is binding, durable, and reshapes a globally relevant supply chain (Indonesia is ~5% of global mined copper, rising), but discretionary export extensions during smelter commissioning soften near-term enforcement and limit the immediate market shock relative to the harder 2020 nickel rule.

Ganfeng Lithium (HKG:1772 / SZE:002460), China's largest lithium producer, has accumulated controlling interests in Argentina's most significant lithium brine operations through a series of transactions since 2019. The key assets are: **Cauchari-Olaroz (Jujuy Province):** Ganfeng holds 46.5% of the project alongside Lithium Americas Corp (53.5%), which commenced commercial production in mid-2023. It is Argentina's largest lithium brine operation, targeting 40,000 tonnes per year of battery-grade lithium carbonate. Ganfeng provides offtake for substantially all lithium carbonate produced and has rights to purchase Lithium Americas' share of output at market prices. **Pozuelos-Pastos Grandes (PPG) basin (Salta Province):** Ganfeng agreed in 2024-2025 to consolidate the PPG lithium basin through a new joint venture in which Ganfeng holds 67% and Lithium Argentina (spun off from Lithium Americas) holds 33%. The basin is one of Argentina's largest undeveloped lithium brine resources. The SEC filing confirming this consolidation was published in April 2025. Combined, Ganfeng's Argentine lithium position gives it a structurally significant share of Argentina's battery-grade lithium output and exploration pipeline — positioned within the lithium triangle alongside Chilean and Bolivian deposits but with operational production at Cauchari-Olaroz already running. The investments were financed through a combination of Ganfeng's corporate balance sheet and China Development Bank-linked project finance. Ganfeng has also established its own lithium hydroxide refining capacity in China fed from the Cauchari-Olaroz brine, creating a vertically integrated supply chain from Argentine salar to Chinese battery-grade product.

Loi n° 2023-973 du 23 octobre 2023 relative à l'industrie verte (the Green Industry Law) is France's first comprehensive industrial-policy framework since France 2030 (2021). Published in the Journal officiel on 24 October 2023, it pursues three objectives: (i) accelerate the siting of strategic industrial projects on French territory, (ii) channel public procurement toward "virtuous" companies, and (iii) mobilise private savings for green-industrial CapEx. Its centrepiece is the new "Projet d'intérêt national majeur" (PINM) status, an exceptional procedure that fast-tracks urban planning, environmental permitting, and grid connection for projects deemed strategic for ecological transition or national sovereignty (gigafactories, hydrogen electrolysers, advanced semiconductor fabs). The law also creates the Plan d'épargne avenir climat (PEAC), a long-duration retail savings product reserved for under-21s and earmarked for European green-industrial financing, and codifies a 2023-2030 national green-industry strategy.

On 20 April 2023, President Gabriel Boric announced Chile's National Lithium Strategy ("Estrategia Nacional del Litio") in a national broadcast from La Moneda. The strategy mandates state majority participation in projects deemed strategic for the country and creates a state-owned National Lithium Company ("Empresa Nacional del Litio", subject to Congressional approval) covering the full productive cycle from exploration through battery cell assembly and recycling. In the interim, the existing state-owned firms Codelco (copper) and ENAMI take the lead — Codelco for the Atacama salar (where SQM and Albemarle operate under existing leases) and ENAMI for the Maricunga salar. The strategy also commits to a network of protected salt flats targeting 30% protection by 2030 and promotes new lower-impact extraction technologies (notably direct lithium extraction, DLE). The full policy document "Estrategia Nacional del Litio — Por Chile y su Gente" was published by the Ministry of Economy on 15 June 2023.

Indonesia banned the export of raw bauxite ore (including washed bauxite) effective 10 June 2023, extending the "hilirisasi" (downstream-isation) doctrine that previously prohibited nickel-ore exports (effective 1 January 2020) to the country's second-largest mineral export. The ban is implemented through the existing Mining Law framework (UU 3/2020 amending UU 4/2009) and operationalised via Ministry of Trade Regulation Permendag 18/2022 on Provisions for Mining-Product Exports. President Joko Widodo formally announced the bauxite-export-ban schedule on 21 December 2022, citing forecast revenue uplift from IDR 21 trillion to IDR 62 trillion (~USD 1.35bn → ~USD 3.9bn) once domestic alumina/ aluminium refining ramps.

On 18 October 2022, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman launched Saudi Arabia's National Industrial Strategy (NIS) under the Vision 2030 umbrella, with delivery led by the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources (MIM). The strategy prioritises 118 segments within 12 industrial sub-sectors (including downstream chemicals, automotive, aerospace, machinery, and metals), identifies more than 800 investment opportunities estimated at ~USD 266bn, and sets binding 2030/2035 targets: triple manufacturing GDP by 2030, raise industrial exports to SAR 557bn (~USD 148bn), bring cumulative additional investment to SAR 1.3 trillion, and grow factories from ~10,000 to ~36,000 by 2035. NIS sits alongside the National Industrial Development and Logistics Program (NIDLP, 2019) and the Public Investment Fund's strategic-sector mandates as the third leg of the Kingdom's non-oil-economy build-out.

On 22 March 2021, UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum launched Operation 300bn at Qasr Al Watan in Abu Dhabi — a 10-year national industrial strategy delivered by the newly created Ministry of Industry and Advanced Technology (MoIAT, established July 2020). The strategy targets raising the industrial sector's annual GDP contribution from AED 133bn (~USD 36bn) to AED 300bn (~USD 82bn) by 2031, lifting R&D spend from AED 21bn to AED 57bn (1.3% → 2% of GDP), and supporting more than 13,500 industrial SMEs through an AED 30bn (~USD 8.2bn) Emirates Development Bank (EDB) financing portfolio. Eleven priority sub-sectors are organised into three baskets: Stimulating Growth (food/beverage, pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment), Advanced Manufacturing (petrochemicals, rubber/plastics, machinery), and Industries of the Future (hydrogen, medical technology, space technology).

Indonesia accelerated the implementation of its raw nickel ore export ban, originally scheduled for 2022, to take effect on 1 January 2020. Announced 30 August 2019 by Minister Ignasius Jonan via ESDM Regulation No. 11/2019, the ban prohibits the export of nickel ore with grades below 1.7% Ni (effectively all Indonesian saprolite and limonite ore that previously flowed to Chinese stainless-steel and ferronickel mills) and forces ore to be processed domestically into intermediate products (nickel pig iron, ferronickel, mixed hydroxide precipitate, nickel sulfate). The policy is part of the long-running "hilirisasi" (downstream-isation) strategy and was the trigger for the >$30B wave of Chinese-led nickel- processing investment in Sulawesi (Morowali, Weda Bay) that has since made Indonesia the dominant global nickel producer.

On 9 May 2016 CMOC Group (China Molybdenum Co., HKG:3993 / SHA:603993) signed agreements to acquire Freeport-McMoRan's 56% stake in Tenke Fungurume Mining (TFM) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for USD 2.65 billion, with additional financing from China Development Bank. A concurrent transaction acquired TF Holdings' 24% stake, bringing CMOC's total to 80% with Gécamines retaining 20%. The transaction closed on 16 November 2016 following regulatory approvals from the DRC Ministry of Mines, the US CFIUS (approved without conditions), and Chinese MOFCOM. Tenke Fungurume is the world's second-largest cobalt mine and fifth-largest copper mine, located in Lualaba Province. At the time of acquisition it produced approximately 16,000 tonnes of cobalt per year (hydroxide) and 180,000 tonnes of copper cathode, representing roughly 20% of global mined cobalt supply. CMOC subsequently expanded production to approximately 50,000 tonnes of cobalt per year by 2023-2024 through the Kisanfu (KFM) discovery development — bringing combined TFM+KFM output to ~115,000 tonnes of cobalt annually, or roughly 38% of DRC cobalt production and approximately 25% of global supply from a single operator. The acquisition was the largest Chinese overseas mining transaction of 2016 and established China's dominant structural position in the cobalt supply chain at the mine level — upstream of both DRC export controls (ARECOMS quota system, filed 2025-02-22) and Chinese processing/re-export controls on battery-grade cobalt compounds. CMOC is simultaneously the world's largest cobalt producer and an entity subject to Chinese government export licensing for the same materials — a concentration structure without precedent in critical minerals. The China Development Bank provided a $2.68 billion loan facility financing the majority of the acquisition, making this an explicit policy-bank-backed strategic asset purchase consistent with NDRC guidelines on overseas critical mineral investment priorities. Sinosure provided political-risk insurance cover on the DRC exposure.