Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2665 actions· ✨ 90 recent

The European Commission approved on 30 March 2026 an Italian state aid scheme (SA.118992) worth up to €6 billion to support domestic production of renewable hydrogen for the transport and industrial sectors, running through 31 December 2029. The scheme operates via two-way contracts for difference (CfD): a strike price is set through competitive bidding, with Italy compensating producers when market prices fall below the strike price and producers reimbursing the state when prices exceed it. SA.118992 is the first sectorally-specialised renewable-hydrogen CISAF approval on the register — distinct from the cleantech- manufacturing cohort (solar/wind/batteries) — and at €6 billion is the largest individual CISAF approval to date, roughly 4× the Bulgaria SA.120414 electricity-price precedent and ~2× Germany SA.121215.

The UK Finance Act 2026, which received Royal Assent on 18 March 2026, establishes the primary statutory framework for the United Kingdom Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (UK CBAM), granting HM Revenue & Customs the assessment, collection, and enforcement powers needed to apply a carbon-content levy on imports of aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen, and iron & steel from 1 January 2027. Two tranches of draft secondary legislation (the CBAM Regulations 2026 covering administration, rate calculation/carbon-price relief, emissions and verification, and transitory provisions) were published for technical consultation on 10 February 2026 (closing 24 March 2026) and again in Spring 2026 (closing 21 May 2026). The mechanism imposes a UK ETS-linked benchmark price on the embedded carbon of in-scope imports, with a credit for verified third-country carbon prices already paid, and — unlike the EU CBAM — has no transitional reporting phase and a narrower initial sectoral scope (no electricity).

The Ecuadorian National Assembly approved on 26 February 2026 (vote 77-70, urgent-economic-matter procedure) the Ley Orgánica para el Fortalecimiento de los Sectores Estratégicos de Minería y Energía, the statutory complement to President Daniel Noboa's Decreto Ejecutivo 273 of 31 December 2025. The law was published in the Quinto Suplemento of Registro Oficial on 2 March 2026 with no presidential objection and entered into force the same day. It comprises 28 articles, two general provisions and one transitory provision. The mining title codifies the 3–8% sliding royalty scale and channels 60% of royalty receipts to social investment via decentralised governments (45% provincial / 35% municipal / 20% parochial) — the legislative anchor for the regime introduced by Decree 273. The energy title amends the Ley Orgánica del Servicio Público de Energía Eléctrica to recognise distributed generation, self-supply and autonomous energy districts, and establishes exception-route participation for foreign state-owned enterprises and popular/solidarity-economy organisations alongside private capital. A controversial Galápagos-adjacent provision permitting expedited mining/energy procedures has triggered domestic constitutional challenge.

The Ivorian Council of Ministers adopted on 3 December 2025 the Politique Intégrée des Ressources Minérales et de l'Énergie (PIRME), a 15-year cross-sector extractive and energy industrial-policy strategy requiring CFA 38,000 billion (~USD 68bn) across three five-year phases to 2040. The policy targets doubling the mining-energy sector's GDP contribution from 7% (2022) to 14% by 2040, positioning it as the economy's second pillar after agriculture. Core mandates include a 50% local transformation target for gold, a 10 million-tonne iron-ore production target, a 500,000 bbl/day oil production target, 45% renewable energy integration, and a 38% reduction in energy-sector emissions — backed by national-content and value-addition requirements across mining, hydrocarbons, and electricity sub-sectors.

On 18 September 2025, the Australian Government published the Net Zero Plan 2050 and six sectoral emissions-reduction plans covering Electricity & Energy, Industry, Transport, Built Environment, Agriculture & Land, and Resources. The Net Zero Plan establishes the overarching policy architecture to achieve Australia's 62–70% emissions-reduction target (below 2005 levels) by 2035 and net zero by 2050, structured around five "CLEAN" strategic priorities. The six sector plans provide detailed decarbonisation pathways, capex envelopes, and policy-instrument linkages that frame operation of the Future Made in Australia Act, the Critical Minerals Production Tax Incentive, the Capacity Investment Scheme, and the Safeguard Mechanism for the following decade. The plans were released simultaneously with Australia's updated 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution submitted to the UNFCCC.

H.R.1, the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" (Public Law 119-21), was signed into law by President Trump on 4 July 2025. The budget-reconciliation statute is the single largest reversal of the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) industrial-policy framework: it accelerates the termination of IRA-era clean- energy tax credits and overlays a new "Foreign Entity of Concern" (FEOC) / "Prohibited Foreign Entity" (PFE) regime on the credits that survive. The §25E used-EV credit, the §30D new clean-vehicle credit, the §45W commercial clean-vehicle credit, and the §30C alternative-fuel-refueling-property credit terminate for vehicles or property placed in service after 30 September 2025. The §25C energy-efficient home improvement credit and the §25D residential clean-energy credit terminate for property placed in service after 31 December 2025. The §45Y clean-electricity production credit and §48E clean-electricity investment credit are eliminated for wind and solar facilities placed in service after 31 December 2027, with a safe harbour for projects whose construction begins on or before 4 July 2026. From 1 January 2026, projects beginning construction must satisfy "material assistance" thresholds limiting the share of components, subcomponents and critical minerals sourced from prohibited foreign entities (PRC, Russia, Iran, DPRK and entities controlled by them). For §45Y/§48E facilities the threshold starts at 40% non-PFE content in 2026 and steps up by 5 percentage points per year through 2030; for §45X advanced manufacturing PTC the analogous schedule begins at 50% in 2026 and rises through the decade. CBO scored the package's energy-credit terminations as generating roughly USD 280bn of revenue (gross), of which USD 77.4bn from §25D termination, USD 21.2bn from §25C, USD 77.8bn from §30D, USD 104.5bn from §45W, and USD 2bn from §30C, partially offsetting the bill's other tax cuts. The bill simultaneously re-authorises and broadens the §48D advanced manufacturing investment tax credit for semiconductor fabs, raising the credit rate from 25% to 35% for property placed in service after 31 December 2025 (preserving the CHIPS Act-aligned semiconductor leg of the IRA-era stack). The OBBBA therefore reshapes the IRA from a broad-based clean-energy + EV + manufacturing pull-through into a narrower, China-decoupling industrial policy concentrated on semiconductors and (residually) §45X battery / critical- mineral processing.

South African Cabinet on 25 June 2025 approved a three-part package to revitalise the domestic ferrochrome sector: (i) placement of chrome ore under export control via the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) under the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002, requiring an export permit prior to dispatch; (ii) initiation of work on a chrome ore export tax (rate not finalised; market reporting cites 25%); (iii) expanded SEZ incentives for ferrochrome smelters and a negotiated electricity- tariff relief mechanism. The DTIC notice formally placing chrome ore under export control was published in Government Gazette No. 53477 General Notice 6712 on 3 October 2025 with a 30-day public-comment window closing 31 October 2025; the final permit regime takes effect upon subsequent ministerial gazette notice. South Africa accounts for >70% of seaborne chrome ore exports, so the regime is globally material to stainless-steel supply chains.

On 19 June 2025 the Council of Ministers of Niger, presided over by the head of the CNSP transition government, adopted a draft ordonnance nationalising the Société des Mines de l'Aïr (SOMAÏR SA), the joint venture that operates Niger's only currently producing uranium mine at Arlit. The communiqué transfers all SOMAÏR shares and assets to the Nigerien State and provides for compensation to existing shareholders net of legal obligations including mining-site rehabilitation costs. SOMAÏR was 63.40% owned by Orano (the French state-controlled nuclear fuel-cycle company, ex-AREVA) and 36.60% by state-owned SOPAMIN; the government cited "irresponsible, illegal and disloyal" conduct by Orano, the expiry of the prior mining convention on 31 December 2023, and a finding that Orano had taken 86.3% of cumulative production between 1971 and 2024 versus its 63.4% shareholding. The same Council of Ministers also nationalised the electricity utility NIGELEC. Orano announced the same day that it would seek full compensation through arbitration and reserved criminal-action rights against third parties acquiring SOMAÏR uranium stock.

Japan's Cabinet approved an amendment to the Cabinet Order on Inward Direct Investment under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) on 1 April 2025; the order was promulgated 4 April 2025 and entered into force 19 May 2025. The amendment introduces two new investor categories — Type-A (investors legally or contractually obligated to share information with foreign governments) and Type-B (investors effectively in a comparable position without formal legal obligation) — and eliminates or narrows exemptions from mandatory prior-notification screening for both categories. The primary driver is concern over minority-stake acquisitions by Chinese investors in Japanese listed companies operating in sensitive sectors including cloud computing, telecommunications infrastructure, semiconductor equipment, and advanced electronics. The reform is structurally distinct from the outbound FEFTA catch-all controls overhaul (2025-10-09) and from the Economic Security Promotion Act (2022-05-18); it is the inbound FDI-screening complement to that framework.

South Korea's National Assembly passed the Special Act on the Expansion of the National Electricity Network (Law No. 20844) on 19 February 2025 as part of the bipartisan "Energy Trifecta Bill," with promulgation on 25 March 2025 and entry into force on 26 September 2025. The act creates an expedited siting, permitting, and compensation framework for trunk transmission-grid construction, consolidating 35 previously separate regulatory approvals into a single streamlined procedure and targeting a >30% reduction in grid-build timelines. It directly addresses the electricity-infrastructure bottleneck constraining semiconductor fab clusters (Yongin, Pyeongtaek, SK Hynix HBM), sovereign AI datacenter build-out, and EV/battery gigafactory load growth — structurally distinct from the K-Chips Act (fiscal incentives) and the Semiconductor Special Act (regulatory framework), as it unblocks the physical power-delivery constraint those programmes depend on.

The US Treasury and IRS published the final regulations implementing §45V of the Inflation Reduction Act, establishing the Clean Hydrogen Production Tax Credit. The rule codifies the 45VH2-GREET lifecycle-emissions methodology and three electricity-sourcing pillars — additionality (new-build requirement within 36 months), temporal matching (annual until 2030, then hourly), and deliverability (same grid-balancing region) — that determine credit eligibility for electrolytic pathways. Credits range from $0.60/kg (2.5–4.0 kg CO₂e/kg H₂) to $3.00/kg (below 0.45 kg CO₂e/kg H₂), representing the primary US hydrogen industrial-policy instrument for the 2025–2034 cycle and the global benchmark for green-hydrogen additionality rules.

On 2 August 2024, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva sanctioned Lei nº 14.948/2024 (with partial veto, Mensagem nº 741) at a ceremony in the Pecém Industrial-Port Complex in Ceará, following Senate and Chamber approval of PL 2308/2023; the law was published in the Diário Oficial da União on 5 August 2024. The statute establishes Brazil's first comprehensive legal framework for low-carbon hydrogen: it (i) creates the National Low-Carbon Hydrogen Policy (PNH2BC) under the National Energy Policy umbrella, (ii) sets a statutory definition of "low-carbon hydrogen" as fuel/industrial input with lifecycle GHG intensity ≤ 7 kg CO₂e/kg H₂, (iii) institutes the Brazilian Hydrogen Certification System (SBCH2) for origin and emissions accreditation, (iv) creates the Special Incentive Regime for Low-Carbon Hydrogen Production (Rehidro), suspending PIS/Pasep and Cofins for five years on capital-goods, raw-materials and services purchases by qualified producers, and (v) authorises the Programa de Desenvolvimento do Hidrogênio de Baixa Emissão de Carbono (PHBC) — a tax-credit envelope capped at BRL 18.3 bn between 2028 and 2032 (subsequently regulated by Lei nº 14.990/2024 sanctioned 30 September 2024). ANP gains regulatory authority over hydrogen transportation, storage and import/export licensing, while the law amends Leis nºs 9.427/1996 (ANEEL) and 9.478/1997 (Petroleum Law) to integrate hydrogen into the energy-policy and electricity-regulation framework. Industry reporting at sanction cited >USD 30 bn in announced project pipeline, concentrated in Northeast renewable-rich states (Ceará, Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte) leveraging Pecém, Suape and Açu as hydrogen-derivative export terminals.

Uttar Pradesh notified its first dedicated state-level Semiconductor Policy on 12 February 2024 (cabinet-cleared 30 January 2024), making it the fourth Indian state with a sectoral semiconductor incentive regime after Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Gujarat. The policy stacks a 50% additional state capital subsidy on top of the central India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 50% subsidy — yielding an effective ~75% capex coverage for qualifying fab, display-fab, compound-semiconductor, ATMP/OSAT, and sensor units approved by ISM. It adds a 75% land rebate on the first 200 acres for ATMP/OSAT (30% on additional land), a 5% interest subsidy (capped at ₹1 cr/year for 7 years) on investments up to ₹200 cr, 100% stamp-duty and registration-fee exemption, and a 10-year electricity-duty exemption. Within months of notification the state attracted ₹40,038 cr in investment proposals (Tarq Semiconductor, Kaynes Semicon, Aditech, Vamasundari) with ~32,000 projected jobs, prompting the cabinet to later approve mega-project incentives for investments ≥ ₹3,000 cr.

Regulation (EU) 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council, published in OJ L 130 on 16 May 2023 and entering into force on 17 May 2023, establishes the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) — the Union's primary instrument for preventing carbon leakage at the external border. The regulation applies an equivalent carbon price to embedded greenhouse gas emissions in imports of six sector groups (iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen) from non-EU/EEA/Swiss counterparts, complementing the EU Emissions Trading System's domestic coverage. A transitional reporting-only phase operated from 1 October 2023 through 31 December 2025; the definitive certificate-purchase-and-surrender regime entered full application from 1 January 2026.

The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) entered its definitive phase on 1 January 2026 following a transitional reporting period that began October 2023. Under Regulation (EU) 2023/956, importers of goods in six carbon-intensive sectors (iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen) must now purchase CBAM certificates corresponding to embedded carbon emissions. The Q1 2026 certificate price was set at EUR 75.36 per tonne CO2, calculated from EU ETS auction prices. In 2026, the adjustment factor is 2.5%, rising annually to 100% by 2034.

The Inflation Reduction Act (Public Law 117-169), signed by President Biden on 16 August 2022, contains the largest single package of clean-energy and clean-manufacturing subsidies in US history — Congressional Budget Office scored the energy and climate provisions at $369B over 10 years, with subsequent Treasury / academic estimates reaching $800B-$1.2T as uptake exceeded baseline. Core mechanisms include the Section 30D Clean Vehicle credit ($7,500 per qualifying EV), the Section 45X Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit (per-unit credits for domestically-produced battery cells, modules, electrodes, and critical-mineral processing), the Section 48E Clean Electricity Investment Credit, and the Section 45V Clean Hydrogen Production Credit. Critically, the law contains Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) provisions barring credit eligibility for vehicles or components linked to entities controlled by China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea.