Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2663 actions· ✨ 89 recent

On 3 July 2026 the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) issued a final injury finding in Inquiry NQ-2025-009, determining that dumped (and, for non-cooperating exporters, subsidized) imports of truck bodies from China have caused material injury to the Canadian domestic industry. Final anti-dumping duties of 119.4% (Qingdao CIMC Reefer Trailer Co., Ltd.) and 257.1% (all other exporters) are now collected by CBSA on goods released on or after 3 July 2026. CBSA separately terminated the parallel subsidy (countervailing duty) investigation with respect to CIMC Reefer on 4 June 2026 after finding its subsidy margin (0.9%) insignificant; CBSA and CITT statements indicate the countervailing-duty track continued and duties are being collected for the non-cooperating "all other exporters" category.

Presidential decree signed by President Claudia Sheinbaum and published in the evening edition of the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 23 April 2026, in force 24 April 2026. The decree amends the Tariff of the Ley de los Impuestos Generales de Importación y de Exportación (LIGIE/TIGIE) and the Decreto que establece diversos Programas de Promoción Sectorial (PROSEC), imposing MFN import duties at 5%, 10%, 15%, 25%, 30% or 35% ad valorem on 185 tariff fractions covering chemical products, cosmetics, paper and cardboard, textiles, steel, graphic arts, aluminum manufactures, auto parts, electrical material, bicycles, musical instruments, furniture, wind turbines, and trailers. Goods originating in countries with which Mexico has a free-trade agreement remain eligible for preferential treatment, so practical incidence falls on China and other non-FTA suppliers (Korea, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia, Taiwan, UAE, South Africa). Paired PROSEC modifications add tariff fractions to Article 5 sections I, II.b and XIX (electrical, electronic, automotive and auto-parts industries) at exempt (EX) rates.

On 21 April 2026 the European Commission issued a conditional clearance under the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR, Regulation 2022/2560), requiring the exclusion of CRRC (China's largest rolling-stock manufacturer) from the Lisbon Metro Violet Line procurement — the first-ever FSR procurement remedy ordering a Chinese supplier exclusion from a specific EU public contract. The Commission found that CRRC received foreign subsidies enabling it to submit an unduly advantageous tender, and as a condition of clearance mandated CRRC's removal from the tender. CRRC was replaced by PESA (Polish rail manufacturer) as the selected bidder. Unlike the 2024 Bulgaria/CRRC case (FSP.100147) where CRRC voluntarily withdrew before a formal decision, the Lisbon case produced the first binding FSR exclusion remedy, establishing mandatory supplier-removal as an available enforcement outcome in EU public procurement.

On 2026-01-26 the US Department of Commerce initiated countervailing duty (anti-subsidy) investigations covering van-type trailers and subassemblies thereof from Canada, China, and Mexico, companion to the antidumping investigation covering the same product and countries. On 2026-06-05 Commerce published preliminary affirmative CVD determinations: China received an 82.37% subsidy rate for CIMC Baowell Industries/Qingdao CIMC Reefer Trailer and all other exporters, and a 128.78% adverse-inference rate for non-responsive companies; Mexico received rates of 1.90-1.95% for cooperating respondents (Hyundai de Mexico, Utility Trailer Manufacturing de México) and a 62.67% adverse-inference rate for five non-responsive companies. The Canada CVD investigation was terminated on 2026-05-27 after the petitioner withdrew that portion of the petition. Cash deposits at the preliminary rates began on Federal Register publication; final CVD determinations are scheduled for 2026-08-24 (China) and 2026-10-13 (Mexico).

On 9 December 2025, China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 79 of 2025, reinstating an export-licence management system for ~300 HS-coded steel products effective 1 January 2026. Exporters must obtain a per-contract licence supported by a manufacturer-issued product quality inspection certificate; licences are issued by MOFCOM (for centrally-administered SOEs) and provincial / sub-provincial commerce departments. The regime is the first reinstatement of Chinese steel-export licensing in 16 years (since 2009) and applies the export-licensing instrument — previously used for critical minerals and dual-use goods — to a non-critical bulk commodity for the first time.

On 11 November 2025 President Mamadi Doumbouya officially inaugurated start of operations at the Simandou Integrated Project — Africa's largest greenfield mine-and-infrastructure asset — at a ceremony attended by the presidents of Rwanda and Gabon, China's Vice-Premier, and PMs from Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone. The project comprises Blocks 1–2 (WCS: Winning International / China Hongqiao / Baowu) and Blocks 3–4 (SimFer: Rio Tinto 53% / Chinalco-led JV 47%), connected by 622 km of multi-use trans-Guinean railway to barge and transhipment port facilities at Forécariah, operated by Compagnie du TransGuinéen (CTG). Combined design capacity is up to 120 Mt/yr of high-grade (~65% Fe) iron ore, the largest single addition to seaborne supply since Vale's S11D ramp in 2016, structurally reshaping Australia-Brazil price competition and China's iron-ore import geography.

On 23 October 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 19th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral sanctions), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2035 amending Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings — 22 individuals + 42 entities, total 69 listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2041 (parallel Belarus measures). The package closes the Russian-LNG import loophole left open by the 18th package and establishes the architectural template for crypto-asset sanctions. Headline measures: (i) full prohibition on imports of Russian-origin LNG into the EU — short-term contracts banned six months from entry into force (effective 25 April 2026), long-term contracts (> 1 year, executed before 17 June 2025) phased out by 1 January 2027; (ii) full transaction ban on Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (tightening prior partial measures); (iii) five additional Russian banks added to Annex XIV transaction ban (Alfa-Bank, MTS Bank among them; effective 12 November 2025); (iv) full transaction bans on the Mir card payment system and the Faster Payments System (SBP), effective 25 January 2026; (v) first-ever EU sanctions on a stablecoin — the rouble-backed A7A5 (issuer + developer designated) — and a Paraguay-based cryptocurrency exchange used as a circumvention rail; (vi) prohibition on EU operators contracting with 11 listed Russian Special Economic Zones (Annex LII), with mandatory divestment from Alabuga (Tatarstan) and Technopolis Moscow effective 25 January 2026 — no five-year wind-down available; (vii) 45 entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (28 Russian + 17 third-country: 12 Chinese/Hong Kong, 3 Indian, 2 Thai); (viii) new export restrictions on electronic components, microelectronics, acyclic hydrocarbons, pneumatic rubber tires and propellant chemicals (~EUR 155 m of EU 2024 exports); (ix) prohibition on supply of AI, HPC, and quantum-computing services to Russian persons (effective 25 November 2025); (x) tourism-services ban (1 January 2026 wind-down); (xi) 117 additional shadow-fleet vessels listed (cumulative 557, exceeding the 18th package's 444); (xii) four Belarus + Kazakhstan banks listed for SPFS use (effective 2 December 2025); (xiii) binding ownership/control definitions added to Reg. 269/2014 (50 % proprietary-rights threshold + eight-criterion control test). Entry into force on 24 October 2025 (day following publication in OJ L_202502033), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

On 18 September 2025 the Bundestag adopted the Gesetz zur Errichtung eines Sondervermögens "Infrastruktur und Klimaneutralität" (SVIKG), authorising up to EUR 500 bn of additional federal borrowing over a twelve-year horizon outside the constitutional debt brake, on the basis of the new Article 143h Grundgesetz inserted by the March 2025 constitutional amendment. The envelope splits into up to EUR 100 bn for Länder and municipal infrastructure (channelled via the companion Länder- und Kommunal-Infrastrukturfinanzierungsgesetz, LuKIFG, passed 9 October 2025), EUR 100 bn transferred to the Klima- und Trans- formationsfonds (KTF) in annual instalments through 2034, and up to EUR 300 bn for additional federal investments in transport, energy/ heat, hospital, education, digitalisation, civil protection and R&D infrastructure. Investments are eligible retroactively from 1 January 2025 and may be approved through 31 December 2036; loan repayment begins no later than 1 January 2044. SVIKG is the largest single industrial-finance instrument launched by an EU member state in the post-2022 industrial-policy cycle.

On 18 July 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 18th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1476 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings), Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1495 (vessel listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 (parallel Belarus measures). The package is the largest energy-sector escalation since 2022 and pivots from new-perimeter creation toward enforcement and circumvention closure. Headline measures: (i) the Russian-crude price cap is lowered from USD 60 to USD 47.6 per barrel with a new automatic dynamic mechanism re-indexing the cap to global oil prices every six months at a 15 % discount to the 22-week trailing average (effective 3 Sep 2025, with a transitional exemption to 18 Oct 2025 for pre-20 Jul 2025 contracts compliant with the prior cap); (ii) full transaction ban extended to 22 additional Russian banks, bringing the total cut off from the EU financial system to 45; transaction ban extended to third-country financial institutions and crypto-asset service providers facilitating circumvention; (iii) full transaction ban on Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines; (iv) import ban on refined oil products derived from Russian crude processed in third countries; (v) 105 additional vessels added to the shadow-fleet port-access ban (cumulative total 444); (vi) 26 new entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (15 Russian + 11 from China/Hong Kong/Turkey); (vii) Council Implementing Regulation 2025/1476 lists 14 individuals + 41 entities under asset-freeze, including a major Indian refinery (Nayara Energy, part-owned by Rosneft), three Chinese suppliers of battlefield goods, shadow-fleet operators, and entities involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; (viii) parallel Belarus complementary measures via Regulation 2025/1472. Wind-down periods vary: 90 days for oil-price-cap contracts; banking-software wind-down to 30 Sep 2025; trade-goods wind-downs Oct 2025–Jan 2026 by category. Entry into force on 19 July 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

Japan's Cabinet approved an amendment to the Cabinet Order on Inward Direct Investment under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) on 1 April 2025; the order was promulgated 4 April 2025 and entered into force 19 May 2025. The amendment introduces two new investor categories — Type-A (investors legally or contractually obligated to share information with foreign governments) and Type-B (investors effectively in a comparable position without formal legal obligation) — and eliminates or narrows exemptions from mandatory prior-notification screening for both categories. The primary driver is concern over minority-stake acquisitions by Chinese investors in Japanese listed companies operating in sensitive sectors including cloud computing, telecommunications infrastructure, semiconductor equipment, and advanced electronics. The reform is structurally distinct from the outbound FEFTA catch-all controls overhaul (2025-10-09) and from the Economic Security Promotion Act (2022-05-18); it is the inbound FDI-screening complement to that framework.

China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement 2025 No. 3 on 9 January 2025, the Final Determination of its Trade and Investment Barrier (TIB) investigation into the European Commission's enforcement practices under the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR). MOFCOM concluded that EC practices in FSR investigations targeting Chinese enterprises in rail transport, photovoltaics, wind energy, and security-equipment public procurement constitute trade and investment barriers under Article 3 of China's Rules on Trade and Investment Barrier Investigations (对外贸易壁垒调查规则). The determination documents €20.88 billion in estimated economic losses — including €10.18 billion from abandoned bids — and finds de-facto discrimination against Chinese SOEs relative to investors from other jurisdictions. MOFCOM committed to taking "necessary measures" including bilateral consultations, multilateral dispute settlement, or "other appropriate measures" to safeguard Chinese enterprises' legitimate rights and interests.

On 3 February 2024 Guinea's National Transition Council (CNT) ratified three inter-linked conventions structuring the Simandou integrated iron-ore mega-project: (i) the co-development agreement for the 670km Trans-Guinéen rail and Morebaya/Forécariah port, executed via the Compagnie du TransGuinéen (CTG) JV between the Republic of Guinea, Winning Consortium Simandou (WCS) and Rio Tinto Simfer; (ii) the WCS operating framework for blocks 1–2; and (iii) the bilateral adjustments to Simfer's amended-and-consolidated base convention covering blocks 3–4 with Rio Tinto and Chinalco/Baowu participation. Estimated integrated capex USD 15–20bn; first commercial shipment from Forécariah occurred in November 2025 with President Mamadi Doumbouya attending. At full ramp Simandou is designed for ~120 Mt/yr of high-grade (~65% Fe) ore — the largest single addition to seaborne iron-ore supply since Vale's S11D (2016).

On 9 August 2023 the German Federal Cabinet adopted the government draft Wirtschaftsplan 2024 of the Climate and Transformation Fund (Klima- und Transformationsfonds, KTF) and the accompanying 2024–2027 financial plan. The plan envisaged ca. EUR 211.8 bn of programme spending across 2024–2027 (EUR 57.6 bn in 2024 alone), funded by national and European emissions-trading revenues plus federal grants, with major lines for semiconductor production (~EUR 4.0 bn in 2024), hydrogen industry build-out (~EUR 3.8 bn), building renovation (~EUR 18.9 bn), EEG renewables support (~EUR 12.6 bn) and electric mobility. The KTF is the principal German federal vehicle for co-financing the EU Chips Act state-aid envelope, IPCEI Hydrogen, decarbonisation contracts (Klimaschutzverträge) and other net-zero-aligned industrial-policy subsidies.

Angola's Ministry of Transport formalised a 30-year concession to Lobito Atlantic Railway (LAR — Trafigura 49.5% / Mota-Engil 49.5% / Vecturis S.A. 1%) for the operation, management and maintenance of the Lobito Corridor — comprising the 1,300 km Benguela Railway from the Port of Lobito to Luau (Angola-DRC border) and the Lobito port mineral terminal. The international tender was won on 4 November 2022; the concession contract was signed on 4 July 2023 at a ceremony attended by the Presidents of Angola, the DRC and Zambia. LAR commenced operations in January 2024. The concession is paired with the trilateral Lobito Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency Agreement (LCTTFA), signed at Lobito Port on 27 January 2023 by the Transport ministers of Angola, the DRC and Zambia, which establishes the cross-border customs/transit framework for the corridor.

The CHIPS and Science Act (Public Law 117-167), signed into law by President Biden on 9 August 2022, appropriated $52.7 billion in direct semiconductor industry support: $39B in manufacturing incentives administered by the Commerce Department, $13.2B for R&D and workforce, and $0.5B for legacy-chip and supply-chain programs. It also created an Advanced Manufacturing Investment Credit (Section 48D) — a 25% refundable investment tax credit on qualified semiconductor manufacturing property. The law included a "guardrails" clause prohibiting recipients from expanding advanced-node capacity in countries of concern (most prominently China) for 10 years following award.