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Presidential decree signed by President Claudia Sheinbaum and published in the evening edition of the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 23 April 2026, in force 24 April 2026. The decree amends the Tariff of the Ley de los Impuestos Generales de Importación y de Exportación (LIGIE/TIGIE) and the Decreto que establece diversos Programas de Promoción Sectorial (PROSEC), imposing MFN import duties at 5%, 10%, 15%, 25%, 30% or 35% ad valorem on 185 tariff fractions covering chemical products, cosmetics, paper and cardboard, textiles, steel, graphic arts, aluminum manufactures, auto parts, electrical material, bicycles, musical instruments, furniture, wind turbines, and trailers. Goods originating in countries with which Mexico has a free-trade agreement remain eligible for preferential treatment, so practical incidence falls on China and other non-FTA suppliers (Korea, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia, Taiwan, UAE, South Africa). Paired PROSEC modifications add tariff fractions to Article 5 sections I, II.b and XIX (electrical, electronic, automotive and auto-parts industries) at exempt (EX) rates.

The UK Finance Act 2026, which received Royal Assent on 18 March 2026, establishes the primary statutory framework for the United Kingdom Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (UK CBAM), granting HM Revenue & Customs the assessment, collection, and enforcement powers needed to apply a carbon-content levy on imports of aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen, and iron & steel from 1 January 2027. Two tranches of draft secondary legislation (the CBAM Regulations 2026 covering administration, rate calculation/carbon-price relief, emissions and verification, and transitory provisions) were published for technical consultation on 10 February 2026 (closing 24 March 2026) and again in Spring 2026 (closing 21 May 2026). The mechanism imposes a UK ETS-linked benchmark price on the embedded carbon of in-scope imports, with a credit for verified third-country carbon prices already paid, and — unlike the EU CBAM — has no transitional reporting phase and a narrower initial sectoral scope (no electricity).

On 25 February 2026 Zimbabwe's Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, under Minister Polite Kambamura, announced an immediate and indefinite suspension of exports of all unprocessed minerals — including lithium-bearing spodumene concentrates, which had previously been exempt from the country's December 2022 ban on raw lithium ore (Statutory Instrument 213 of 2022). The directive was communicated by ministerial letter dated 17 February 2026 to the Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe and copied to lithium producers; the suspension took effect on 25 February and explicitly covered consignments already in transit, with the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) and the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) ordered to halt clearance at the border. The measure brings forward by roughly eleven months a lithium-concentrate export ban that had been telegraphed for January 2027, and broadens it to all raw mineral exports. The Minister cited "national interest", in-country beneficiation, transparency, and prevention of mineral export "leakages" (smuggling and under-invoicing) as the rationale. Bloomberg and Reuters reporting noted under-declaration of grade and value as a proximate trigger; the government later (April 2026) clarified that reinstated exports would require Quota Verification certificates, monthly reporting, on-site assay laboratories, and individual producer-level export ceilings — i.e. the suspension functions as a reset to a quota regime rather than a permanent embargo. Zimbabwe is the world's fifth-largest lithium producer (~6-7% of global supply on a contained-LCE basis) and exported 1.128 million tonnes of spodumene concentrate in 2025 (an 11% YoY increase). The producer base is overwhelmingly Chinese-owned: Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (Arcadia / Prospect), Sinomine Resource Group (Bikita Minerals), Chengxin Lithium (Sabi Star), and Sichuan Yahua (Kamativi) together account for the majority of output. The ban therefore primarily disrupts Chinese midstream lithium converters in Sichuan and Jiangxi that depend on Zimbabwean spodumene feedstock, while incrementally tightening the global seaborne concentrate market. The action is structurally a continuation of the EM resource-nationalism / upstream-capture template pioneered by Indonesia's nickel-ore ban (2020) and most recently extended by the DRC's ARECOMS cobalt suspension and quota system (Feb-Oct 2025). It reinforces a pattern in which producing-country governments capture processing margin from consuming-country smelters, and it does so in a commodity (lithium) where ex-China refining capacity is still thin, magnifying near-term price impact even though the headline share of global supply removed is moderate.

On 24 February 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce simultaneously issued Announcement No. 11 and Announcement No. 12 [2026], activating for the first time the Control List (受控名单) mechanism under Article 28 and the Watch List (关注名单) mechanism under Article 26 of the Dual-Use Export Control Regulations (effective 1 December 2024), designating 40 Japanese entities in total. The Control List (20 entities, led by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Shipbuilding Co.) imposes an absolute prohibition on any person or entity worldwide supplying PRC-origin dual-use items to listed parties; the Watch List (20 entities, led by SUBARU Corporation) bars general licensing and requires exporters to file risk assessments and non-military-use commitments. MOFCOM framed both measures as a response to Japan's "remilitarization" trajectory, escalating well beyond the blanket enhanced- review framework established by Announcement No. 1 [2026] in January.

On 9 February 2026 the UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published a comprehensively revised enforcement and monetary-penalties guidance following its July–October 2025 public consultation. The update introduces a Settlement Scheme (20% penalty discount for subjects who agree not to contest OFSI's findings within 30 business days), an Early Account Scheme (up to 20% discount for legal persons providing a timely senior-attested factual account), a revised voluntary-disclosure framework (maximum discount cut from 50% to 30% and renamed to cover both prompt self-reporting and full cooperation), a four-level case-assessment seriousness matrix (severity × conduct), and fixed monetary penalties of £5,000 and £10,000 for information, reporting, and licensing offences. A planned legislative amendment (requiring primary legislation) will subsequently double the statutory civil monetary-penalty cap from £1m / 50%-of-breach to £2m / 100%-of-breach; in the interim the Policing and Crime Act 2017 caps remain in force. The revised guidance is the foundational enforcement architecture for all UK financial-sanctions programs (Russia, Iran, DPRK, Syria, Belarus, Myanmar, and 10+ additional regimes).

The European Commission adopted Communication C(2026) 43 final on 9 January 2026, issuing the first formal interpretive guidelines on the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR, Regulation (EU) 2022/2560). The guidelines codify a four-pillar analytical framework — distortion assessment, public-procurement distortion test, balancing test, and ex officio call-in scope — that DG COMP will apply in every future FSR enforcement proceeding. As the operational blueprint for the FSR regime, the guidelines materially shape Chinese SOE and Gulf SWF EU-market access planning for concentrations, public-procurement tenders, and sub-threshold transactions.

Decree reforming various tariff fractions of the General Import and Export Duties Tariff (TIGIE), published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación on 29 December 2025 and in force 1 January 2026. The reform, approved by Congress as a statutory amendment to the LIGIE (Chamber of Deputies and Senate, Dec 2025) and signed by President Claudia Sheinbaum, raises MFN import duties to between 5% and 50% ad valorem on 1,463 tariff lines covering more than 20 chapters of the TIGIE, spanning automotive, auto parts, textiles, apparel, footwear, steel, aluminum, plastics, paper, leather, furniture, glass, toys, appliances and cosmetics. The increases apply only to goods originating in countries without a free trade agreement with Mexico — principally China, South Korea, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Brazil, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei, the UAE, and South Africa. The decree formalises at statutory level the September 2024 Sheinbaum executive order placing a 50% duty on finished passenger vehicles from non-FTA states and is framed by the Secretaría de Economía and SHCP as the operational tariff instrument of Plan México (2025-01-21).

In the early hours of 11 December 2025 the Council of the EU and the European Parliament reached provisional political agreement in trilogue on the "EU Pharma Package" — the revised pharmaceutical Regulation (COM 2023/0131) and Directive (COM 2023/0132) — the most significant overhaul of EU pharmaceutical legislation in over two decades. The package replaces Directive 2001/83/EC (Community Code on medicinal products for human use) and Regulation (EC) 726/2004 (the EMA Regulation), and consolidates the orphan-medicine (Regulation 141/2000) and pediatric-medicine regulations into a single framework. Headline provisions: (i) a new "8+1(+1)(+1)" IP-incentive architecture — 8 years of regulatory data protection plus 1 year of market protection, with up to two additional 12-month extensions for products addressing unmet medical need or new active substances meeting comparative-trial conditions, capped at 11 years total; (ii) an EU-wide list of critical medicines under enhanced governance via the Medicines Shortages Steering Group (MSSG) and an EMA "list of critical shortages in the EU"; (iii) mandatory shortage-prevention plans on marketing-authorisation holders for prescription medicines and Commission-designated products; (iv) modernisation of clinical-trial requirements, environmental-risk assessment, antimicrobial stewardship, and a transferable-exclusivity-voucher (TEV) regime to incentivise novel antibiotic R&D. The COREPER I committee endorsed the compromise text on 6 March 2026 and final adoption by Parliament and Council is expected during summer 2026, with the regulatory framework becoming applicable in 2028.

Germany's transposition of EU Directive 2022/2555 (NIS2), enacted as the "Gesetz zur Umsetzung der NIS-2-Richtlinie und zur Regelung wesentlicher Grundzüge des Informationssicherheitsmanagements in der Bundesverwaltung." Bundestag passage 13 November 2025; Bundesrat approval 21 November 2025; published as BGBl. I 2025 Nr. 301 on 5 December 2025; entered into force 6 December 2025. The statute designates the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) as the central national supervisory authority over an estimated 29,500 covered entities across 18 critical and important sectors, introduces a mandatory 24h initial / 72h detailed / 1-month final cyber-incident reporting cascade, establishes board-level personal liability for senior management, and applies to SME critical- infrastructure suppliers — with no transitional grace period from entry into force.

On 6 October 2025, President Prabowo Subianto presided over the handover of six confiscated private tin smelters — plus 108 units of heavy equipment, 680.7 tonnes of refined tin, and 22 land parcels — from the Attorney General's Office (Kejaksaan Agung) to state-owned PT Timah Tbk, valued at approximately Rp6–7 trillion (US$362–427M). The six smelters (TIN, RBT, VIP, SIP, MCM, SBS) were seized as proceeds of the landmark PT Timah corruption probe, which found illegal collusion between PT Timah and private smelters causing ~Rp300 trillion in state losses; their transfer to PT Timah effectively consolidates roughly half of Indonesia's refined-tin smelting capacity in state hands, and PT Timah began operating the facilities in early 2026.

Indonesia's Ministry of Industry issued Permenperin No. 35 of 2025 on 11 September 2025, signed by Minister Agus Gumiwang Kartasasmita, on the Provisions and Procedures for Certification of Local Content Level (TKDN) and Company Benefit Weight (BMP). The regulation takes effect on 11 December 2025 and revokes Permenperin No. 16/2011 along with Permenperin No. 46/2022. It unifies TKDN and BMP into a single certificate, standardises a 5-year validity period (previously 3 years), expands scope to industrial services and mixed goods-service activities (e.g. EPC), introduces a 20-percentage-point bonus for R&D-intensive / Industry-4.0 producers, and accelerates issuance via accredited Independent Verification Institutes (Lembaga Verifikasi Independen / LVI) to roughly 10 working days for general industry and 4 working days for SMEs (IKM).

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/2003, adopted by the European Commission on 8 September 2025, published in the Official Journal on 14 November 2025 and entering into force on 15 November 2025, amends Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 to implement the 2024 multilateral decisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, and NSG. The most extensive EU semiconductor-equipment additions since the 2021 framework took effect: ALD, epitaxial deposition, lithography, EUV pellicles/masks/reticles, SEM, and etching equipment, plus tighter controls on quantum computers, advanced FPGAs/ICs for AI training, additive-manufacturing, and cryogenic/superconducting components. The regulation is the EU-side update layer of the Western dual-use export control architecture, structurally aligned with the US BIS advanced- computing/SME packages and the Netherlands DUV-licensing regime.

Poland's Sejm adopted on 25 July 2025 — and the President signed on 5 August 2025 (Dz.U. 2025 poz. 1080, in force 7 September 2025) — a Special Act on Strategic Investments in the Field of National Defence and Public Security that creates an accelerated authorisation track for defence and public- security infrastructure projects: a single combined administrative decision issued within 90 days of application, simplified notification regime inside closed military zones, replacement of full environmental and water-law assessments with targeted mitigation, and an exemption from the Public Procurement Law for Ministry-of-National-Defence-cleared unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned weapon platforms and counter-drone systems. The statute is the procedural backbone for Poland's PLN 187bn 2025 defence budget (≈4.7% of GDP, the highest share in NATO) and dovetails with Poland's €43.7bn EU SAFE defence-loan allocation signed in May 2026.

On 26 June 2025 President Bola Ahmed Tinubu signed four acts constituting Nigeria's most comprehensive fiscal overhaul in decades: the Nigeria Tax Act 2025 (NTA), Nigeria Tax Administration Act 2025 (NTAA), Nigeria Revenue Service (Establishment) Act 2025, and Joint Revenue Board (Establishment) Act 2025. The NTA consolidates and repeals six core statutes — CITA, PITA, PPTA, VAT Act, CGT Act, and Stamp Duties Act — into a single unified code effective 1 January 2026, while the NTAA standardises assessment, filing, and enforcement procedures across all federal taxes. The two establishment acts restructure the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) into the Nigeria Revenue Service (NRS) with a broadened mandate and create an empowered Joint Revenue Board to coordinate federal-state fiscal relations.

South African Cabinet on 25 June 2025 approved a three-part package to revitalise the domestic ferrochrome sector: (i) placement of chrome ore under export control via the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) under the International Trade Administration Act 71 of 2002, requiring an export permit prior to dispatch; (ii) initiation of work on a chrome ore export tax (rate not finalised; market reporting cites 25%); (iii) expanded SEZ incentives for ferrochrome smelters and a negotiated electricity- tariff relief mechanism. The DTIC notice formally placing chrome ore under export control was published in Government Gazette No. 53477 General Notice 6712 on 3 October 2025 with a 30-day public-comment window closing 31 October 2025; the final permit regime takes effect upon subsequent ministerial gazette notice. South Africa accounts for >70% of seaborne chrome ore exports, so the regime is globally material to stainless-steel supply chains.

On 14 June 2025 Vietnam's 15th National Assembly adopted Law No. 71/2025/QH15 on the Digital Technology Industry (DTI Law) at its 9th session. The Law enters into force on 1 January 2026 (with certain provisions phased) and is the world's first standalone primary statute dedicated to the digital technology industry, covering digital-tech production and services, semiconductor manufacturing, artificial-intelligence systems, digital assets (legally recognised as property under the Civil Code), and Concentrated Digital Technology Zones. It codifies sector-specific incentives — multi-year corporate income tax reductions, R&D-cost deductions, preferential public procurement, five-year personal income tax exemption for high-quality digital professionals, five-year visa and work-permit exemptions for foreign experts, and 50% subsidy for SME advanced-technology acquisition — and sets headline targets of 150,000 digital-tech enterprises and USD 74bn digital-economy contribution by 2030/2035 (with USD 43bn / USD 74bn variants in different government summaries).

Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 28 Tahun 2025 tentang Penyelenggaraan Perizinan Berusaha Berbasis Risiko ("PP 28/2025") is the cross-sector business-licensing parent statute signed by President Prabowo Subianto on 5 June 2025, replacing PP 5/2021. It expands the Online Single Submission (OSS) risk-based licensing system to six new sectors (creative economy, geospatial information, cooperatives, investment, electronic system & transaction operators, environment), integrates environmental permitting (AMDAL/UKL-UPL) into OSS, and strengthens layered administrative sanctions. Appendix 1F operationalises a de-facto moratorium: the OSS platform now blocks new business-permit applications for intermediate-nickel production lines — nickel matte, mixed hydroxide precipitate (MHP), nickel pig iron (NPI), and ferronickel — pushing investment toward higher-value Class-1 / battery-grade nickel sulphate and precursor chemistry. After a four-month grace period, OSS enforcement notifications began October–November 2025, prompting FINI (Indonesian Nickel Smelting Association) exemption petitions on behalf of partially-built projects.

Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR) passed the Fourth Amendment to Law No. 4 of 2009 on Mineral and Coal Mining on 18 February 2025, and the government enacted it as Undang-Undang Nomor 2 Tahun 2025 on 19 March 2025. The amendment statutorily entrenches the long-standing hilirisasi (downstream-utilisation priority) doctrine for IUP/IUPK holders at production stage, opens preferential mining-permit allocation pathways for SMEs, cooperatives, religious-organisation business entities, and BUMN/BUMD, and ties licence issuance to approved RKAB production quotas — operationalising the Bahlil/Prabowo supply-management strategy across nickel, bauxite, copper, cobalt, manganese, tin, and zinc.

On 1 February 2025, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced the National Manufacturing Mission (NMM) in the Union Budget 2025-26 as a horizontal umbrella framework extending the 2014 "Make in India" architecture across small, medium and large industries. The mission rests on five focal areas: (i) ease and cost of doing business; (ii) a future-ready workforce for in-demand jobs; (iii) a vibrant and dynamic MSME sector; (iv) availability of technology; and (v) quality manufacturing. It will deliver policy support, execution roadmaps, and a governance/monitoring framework binding central ministries with states. NMM specifically commits to building a clean-tech manufacturing ecosystem with explicit coverage of solar PV cells, EV batteries, motors and controllers, electrolysers, wind turbines, very-high-voltage transmission equipment, and grid-scale batteries — i.e., the full hardware stack for India's Panchamrit (500 GW non-fossil by 2030), FAME-III EV ramp, and National Green Hydrogen Mission. NMM is the first horizontal Indian manufacturing-mission instrument in the IPTM register; existing IND entries are sector-specific PLIs (electronics, batteries, steel, semiconductors) and the National Critical Mineral Mission. Operational rollout flows through subsequent Cabinet-level scheme approvals (e.g. Biopharma SHAKTI ₹10,000 cr, Chemical Parks ₹600 cr in BE 2026-27); the mission itself does not carry a single headline outlay because it is the framework rather than an instrument.

New Zealand's Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), under Resources Minister Hon Shane Jones, launched the country's first national Minerals Strategy and first Critical Minerals List on 31 January 2025 at OceanaGold's Waihi gold mining operation in Hauraki. The Critical Minerals List identifies 37 minerals essential to New Zealand's economy, national security, and technology needs — including gold and metallurgical coal added in the final version (up from 35 minerals in the September 2024 draft consultation). The Minerals Strategy sets a target of doubling New Zealand mineral exports from approximately NZD 1.2 billion/year to NZD 3 billion by 2035, supported by a Wood Mackenzie advisory assessment (December 2024) that identified 21 of the 37 listed minerals as domestically produced or having domestic production potential.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued its largest single export-control package targeting China's semiconductor industry on 2 December 2024, with three layered measures (final rules published in the Federal Register 5 December 2024). First, controls on high-bandwidth memory (HBM) above set performance thresholds — blocking the memory architecture that is foundational to AI training. Second, additions of 24 semiconductor manufacturing equipment item types to the Commerce Control List, covering deposition, etch, ion- implant, advanced packaging, and metrology categories. Third, Entity List designations for 140+ entities, the bulk Chinese semiconductor companies + equipment makers + investment vehicles, including major Chinese fab tooling firms. The package triggered MOFCOM's same-day-following retaliation (filed: 2024-12-03-china-mofcom-ge-ga-sb-export-ban-us).

Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements, signed 23 October 2024 and entering into force 10 December 2024. The CRA is the first EU statutory cybersecurity regime covering all hardware and software products with a direct or indirect data connection placed on the EU market, imposing essential cybersecurity requirements, conformity assessment with CE marking, mandatory vulnerability handling, and 24-hour early-warning notification of actively-exploited vulnerabilities to ENISA. Main manufacturer obligations apply from 11 December 2027; conformity-assessment-body notification provisions apply from 11 June 2026 and reporting obligations from 11 September 2026. Penalties reach EUR 15M or 2.5% of global annual turnover.

Regulation (EU) 2024/2747, adopted on 9 October 2024 and published in the Official Journal on 8 November 2024, establishes the EU's first dedicated framework to anticipate, prepare for and respond to crises affecting the internal market. IMERA creates a two-tier "vigilance" / "emergency" mode architecture, sets up the Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Board (IMERB) to coordinate Member States and advise the Commission, and equips the Commission with last-resort powers including mandatory information requests to economic operators, priority-rated orders for crisis-relevant goods, fast-track conformity-assessment procedures, and rules to safeguard free movement of goods, services and persons. The regulation amends Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 (the "Strawberries Regulation") and becomes applicable on 29 May 2026.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 33 of 2024 on 15 August 2024, imposing an export licensing regime on antimony ore, antimony metal, antimony oxides (purity ≥99.99%), organic antimony compounds, antimony hydride, indium antimonide, and gold-antimony smelting technology, effective 15 September 2024. The announcement also covers six-sided top-press equipment used in superhard-materials (diamond, cubic boron nitride) production. China accounts for approximately 47% of global antimony mine output and an estimated 75-80% of refined antimony supply; in the months following implementation, Chinese antimony export volumes fell by approximately 97% and global antimony trioxide spot prices roughly doubled.

Peraturan Menteri Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral (Permen ESDM) No. 6 of 2024, signed by Minister Arifin Tasrif on 30 May 2024 and published in the Berita Negara Republik Indonesia, establishes the procedural framework governing how holders of Mining Business Licences (IUP) and Special Mining Business Licences (IUPK) for copper, iron, lead, and zinc production may continue to sell processed mineral products abroad during the final phase of domestic smelter construction. Licence holders that previously obtained MEMR export recommendations and whose refining facilities have reached commissioning stage but are not yet at full operational capacity may apply for time-bound extensions to sell concentrate and semi-processed ore offshore through 31 December 2024, subject to quarterly physical inspections by the Director General of Minerals and Coal. The regulation is the MEMR-side companion instrument to the same-day Permendag 10/2024 (Ministry of Trade copper-concentrate and anode-sludge export prohibition), together constituting the complete legal architecture of Indonesia's copper hilirisasi (downstream- processing) mandate. Its scope is broader than the Trade Ministry rule: it covers copper, iron, lead, and zinc whereas Permendag 10/2024 targets copper and anode-sludge only, and it operates as the conditional derogation mechanism (MEMR) to Permendag 10/2024's absolute prohibition regime (Trade Ministry).

Indonesia's Ministry of Trade promulgated Peraturan Menteri Perdagangan (Permendag) No. 10 of 2024 on 30 May 2024, amending Permendag 22/2023 on Goods Prohibited for Export. The regulation set 31 December 2024 as the final cutoff for copper-concentrate and anode-sludge exports — extending the original 1 June 2024 ban deadline by seven months — and enforced a full prohibition starting 1 January 2025. The measure is paired with ESDM Regulation No. 6 of 2024 covering the upstream mining-product side, completing the legal architecture of Indonesia's copper "hilirisasi" (downstream-isation) mandate. The ban forces all domestically mined copper concentrate to be smelted and refined inside Indonesia. Two operators are directly affected: PT Freeport Indonesia (PTFI), majority-owned by state holding MIND ID with Freeport-McMoRan as minority partner, which operates the Grasberg mine in Papua and the new Manyar/Gresik smelter in JIIPE; and PT Amman Mineral Nusa Tenggara (subsidiary of PT Amman Mineral Internasional, IDX:AMMN), which operates the Batu Hijau mine in Sumbawa with a smelter under commissioning. A fire at Freeport's Gresik smelter in October 2024 disrupted ramp-up and forced the government to grant a discretionary export-permit extension into 2025 for PTFI, signalling that the ban — while now legally in force — is being enforced flexibly during smelter commissioning rather than as a hard stop. Permendag 10/2024 is the copper-sector equivalent of the 2020 nickel- ore export ban (ESDM 11/2019) and the planned bauxite-ore ban (effective June 2023). Together these three measures complete Indonesia's resource-nationalism package across its three highest-value mineral exports: nickel, bauxite, and copper. Combined domestic smelter capex commitments tied to the copper rule (Freeport Manyar + Amman Sumbawa) total ~USD 6 billion. Indonesia's Finance Ministry estimated forgone export revenue of ~Rp 10 trillion (~USD 640 million per year) from the copper-concentrate ban alone, which the government is treating as an acceptable downstream-policy cost. Severity is set at 4: the action is binding, durable, and reshapes a globally relevant supply chain (Indonesia is ~5% of global mined copper, rising), but discretionary export extensions during smelter commissioning soften near-term enforcement and limit the immediate market shock relative to the harder 2020 nickel rule.

Act No. 9 of 2025, given Royal Assent on 14 February 2025, enacts the two production tax credits announced in the May 2024 Future Made in Australia package. Schedule 1 creates the Hydrogen Production Tax Incentive (HPTI): A$2/kg refundable tax offset for eligible renewable hydrogen produced with emissions intensity below 0.6 kgCO2e/kg H2. Schedule 2 creates the Critical Minerals Production Tax Incentive (CMPTI): a refundable 10% tax offset on eligible processing and refining expenditure for the 31 minerals on Australia's Critical Minerals List. Both offsets apply to production occurring between 1 July 2027 and 30 June 2040, capped at 10 years per project, administered by the ATO via new Divisions 419 (CMPTI) and 421 (HPTI) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997.

Japan's National Diet enacted the Act on the Protection and Use of Critical Economic Security Information (重要経済安保情報の保護及び活用に関する法律, Act No. 27 of 2024) on 10 May 2024; it was promulgated on 17 May 2024 and came into full operation on 16 May 2025. The law establishes Japan's first peace-time economic-security clearance regime extending to private-sector employees. It designates "Critical Economic Security Information" (CESI) covering threat-intelligence on critical-infrastructure cyber attacks, regulatory-review information on essential infrastructure, and vulnerability data on critical-product supply chains; mandates Cabinet Office "適性評価" (suitability assessment) for cleared personnel; and imposes criminal penalties of up to five years' imprisonment for unauthorised disclosure. The CESI Act complements the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA), closing the information-protection gap and aligning Japan's framework with Five Eyes and EU partners for joint R&D and dual-use cooperation.

Order of the State Council No. 785, adopted at the 31st executive meeting on April 26, 2024 and effective October 1, 2024, is the first comprehensive statutory regulation governing China's entire rare earth industry chain — from mining and smelting through product circulation and import/export. It replaces the 2012 administrative-regulation framework with higher-authority State Council instruments, centralising quota allocation under MIIT+NDRC+MNR, establishing a mandatory national rare earth traceability platform, and extending domestic controls to foreign-origin feedstock refined in China. This regulation is the umbrella enabling instrument for all downstream MOFCOM and MIIT rare earth export-control measures enacted from 2024 onward.

Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data — the "Data Act" — was published in the Official Journal on 22 December 2023, entered into force on 11 January 2024, and applies generally from 12 September 2025 (with longer transitional periods for IoT product-design obligations under Article 3(1), which apply to products placed on the market after 12 September 2026, and for the data-portability standardisation framework, applicable from 12 September 2027). The Data Act is the third pillar of the EU data-economy framework alongside the GDPR (personal data) and the Data Governance Act 2022/868 (data-intermediation services), and is the world's first horizontal statutory regime governing access to and portability of industrial / IoT / non-personal data — covering by-design data-availability obligations on connected-product manufacturers, a mandatory cloud- switching framework with progressive elimination of switching charges, B2G emergency data-sharing in exceptional needs, unfair-contract-terms protection for SMEs, and safeguards against unlawful international government access to non-personal data held in EU cloud.

The Wa State Central Economic Planning Commission (the administrative authority of the United Wa State Army's Special Region No. 2, controlling the Man Maw and Mong Yaw tin zones) issued Notice "Wa Jing Zi No. 2023-06" on April 15, 2023, mandating a comprehensive suspension of all mining, excavation, and mineral processing in Wa State until "mature mining conditions" are in place. A follow-up implementation order on May 20, 2023 confirmed all mines and processing plants—regardless of scale—must cease operations by August 1, 2023. Man Maw alone supplied approximately 10% of global tin concentrate, and LME three-month tin prices rose ~9% in the weeks following the April announcement. The suspension remained in force until mid-2025 when a new three-year licensing regime replaced it (see 2025-02-01-myanmar-wa-state-man-maw-tin-restart-licensing).

The Foreign Investment Reliability Assessment Act (välismaise investori usaldusväärsuse hindamise seadus, VUHS), adopted by the Riigikogu on 25 January 2023 and in force from 1 September 2023, establishes Estonia's first horizontal ex-ante foreign direct-investment screening regime. The Act transposes EU Regulation 2019/452 into Estonian law and designates the Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority (Tarbijakaitse ja Tehnilise Järelevalve Amet — TTJA) as the screening authority. It covers acquisitions of qualifying holdings or material influence in target undertakings operating in defence, dual-use, vital services, energy and communications infrastructure, transport, financial services, media, critical raw materials extraction and other strategic sectors. TTJA can prohibit, condition or unwind non-compliant transactions and impose administrative non-compliance levies.

The Bureau of Industry and Security added 36 entities — 35 in China, 1 in Japan — to the Entity List under a presumption of denial for all EAR-controlled items, effective December 16, 2022. The most consequential additions are Yangtze Memory Technologies (YMTC, simultaneously removed from the Unverified List), eight Cambricon AI-chip subsidiaries, and Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE), China's sole domestic lithography producer. Three existing entries were revised: CETC 13 and two affiliates gained a Footnote 3 Russian-military-end-user designation, bringing them under the Russia/Belarus Foreign Direct Product rule with a blanket denial policy.

Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities, published OJ L 333, 27 December 2022, entered into force 16 January 2023, with Member State transposition deadline 17 October 2024 (rules applicable from 18 October 2024). The CER Directive repeals Council Directive 2008/114/EC on European Critical Infrastructures, extending the scope from two sectors (energy, transport) to eleven essential-service sectors: energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructures, health, drinking water, wastewater, digital infrastructure, public administration, space, and food. Member States must adopt national resilience strategies, conduct risk assessments at least every four years, identify "critical entities" providing essential services whose disruption would have significant cross-border impacts, and ensure those entities implement technical, security, and organisational resilience measures, business-continuity plans, incident-reporting obligations, and personnel-security background checks. The CER Directive is the physical and hybrid resilience twin to the NIS2 Directive (2022/2555) — the two instruments form the binding EU critical-infrastructure-protection architecture replacing the 2008/114/EC regime.

Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act, DSA) was adopted by the European Parliament and Council on 19 October 2022, published in OJ L 277 on 27 October 2022, entered into force on 16 November 2022, and applied in full from 17 February 2024 (with VLOP/VLOSE obligations applying from 25 August 2023 following the Commission's initial designation letters of February 2023). The DSA establishes a graduated intermediary-liability and platform-safety framework covering all online intermediaries serving EU users, with the heaviest obligations falling on designated Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs, ≥45m monthly active EU users) and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs): systemic-risk assessments, annual independent audits, vetted-researcher data access, recommender-system transparency, online-advertising transparency, and crisis-response cooperation mechanisms under Commission coordination. The European Commission holds exclusive enforcement authority over VLOPs and VLOSEs, with fines up to 6% of global turnover. The DSA is the structural twin-pillar to the Digital Markets Act (Reg (EU) 2022/1925): the DMA governs ex-ante competition obligations on designated gatekeepers; the DSA governs ex-post intermediary-liability, content-moderation, and platform-safety obligations across all online intermediaries.

On 6 October 2022 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1904, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, as the EU's eighth package of restrictive measures against Russia. It entered into force 7 October 2022. The regulation's headline measure creates the legal basis for an oil price-cap mechanism: a ban on maritime transport to third countries of Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products, becoming operational once the Council sets an actual cap level by a separate decision (the G7/EU $60/bbl cap followed on 3 December 2022). The package also expands import bans on steel products (phased through 2024), firearms and ammunition, wood pulp and paper, and certain chemicals, cosmetics and jewellery materials; extends export bans on aviation-sector goods; bans the provision of architectural, engineering, IT-consultancy and legal advisory services to the Russian government and Russian companies; and imposes restrictions on Russian-flagged vessels at the Russian Maritime Register.

The Government of Serbia adopted, on 20 January 2022, the "Uredba o prestanku važenja Uredbe o utvrđivanju Prostornog plana područja posebne namene za realizaciju projekta eksploatacije i prerade minerala jadarita 'Jadar'" — a decree terminating the 2020 Spatial Plan of the Special Purpose Area (SPSPA, Sl. glasnik RS 26/2020) that had underpinned Rio Tinto's Jadar lithium-borate project in the Mačva District. Published in Sl. glasnik RS br. 8/2022. Five days later, on 25 January 2022, the Ministry of Environmental Protection separately annulled its decision approving the project's environmental impact assessment study. Together the two acts cancelled all administrative permits, decisions and resolutions tied to the Jadar project, following weeks of nationwide protests against the mine.

The Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国个人信息保护法 — PIPL) was adopted at the 30th meeting of the 13th NPC Standing Committee on 20 August 2021 and entered into force on 1 November 2021, constituting the third and final pillar of China's cybersecurity and data-governance regulatory trinity alongside the Cybersecurity Law (2016) and the Data Security Law (2021). The PIPL is China's comprehensive personal-information statute establishing consent-based and necessity-based legal bases for PI processing, a tiered cross-border personal-data transfer regime (CAC security assessment / PI protection certification / Standard Contractual Clauses), extraterritorial application (Art. 3) to non-Chinese controllers offering services to or analysing the behaviour of PRC residents, and a heightened protection regime for sensitive personal information and data of minors under 14. It mandates data-protection impact assessments, personal-information-protection-officer obligations at designated handlers, breach notification, and a full suite of data-subject rights including access, rectification, deletion, portability, objection, and automated- decision-making opt-out. Article 53 requires overseas controllers to establish a domestic representative or designated entity in China, providing a domestic enforcement counterparty.

The Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国数据安全法) was adopted at the 29th meeting of the 13th NPC Standing Committee on 10 June 2021 and entered into force on 1 September 2021, constituting the second pillar of China's cybersecurity and data-governance regulatory trinity alongside the Cybersecurity Law (2016) and the Personal Information Protection Law (2021). The DSL establishes a tiered data-classification regime — "important data" and "national core data" — with escalating security obligations including risk assessment, risk monitoring, breach reporting, and classified-protection requirements for data handlers. It introduces a data-export security review for "important data" generated or collected within China, the statutory parent authority operationalised by the 2024 CAC Cross-Border Data Flow Provisions, and enacts a §36 blocking statute prohibiting Chinese organisations and individuals from transferring data stored in China to foreign judicial or law-enforcement authorities without prior PRC government approval.

On 22 March 2021, UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum launched Operation 300bn at Qasr Al Watan in Abu Dhabi — a 10-year national industrial strategy delivered by the newly created Ministry of Industry and Advanced Technology (MoIAT, established July 2020). The strategy targets raising the industrial sector's annual GDP contribution from AED 133bn (~USD 36bn) to AED 300bn (~USD 82bn) by 2031, lifting R&D spend from AED 21bn to AED 57bn (1.3% → 2% of GDP), and supporting more than 13,500 industrial SMEs through an AED 30bn (~USD 8.2bn) Emirates Development Bank (EDB) financing portfolio. Eleven priority sub-sectors are organised into three baskets: Stimulating Growth (food/beverage, pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment), Advanced Manufacturing (petrochemicals, rubber/plastics, machinery), and Industries of the Future (hydrogen, medical technology, space technology).

The Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国网络安全法) was adopted at the 24th meeting of the 12th NPC Standing Committee on 7 November 2016 and entered into force on 1 June 2017, establishing the foundational legal framework for network security governance across all sectors. The law creates the Critical Information Infrastructure Operator (CIIO) designation and protection regime administered by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), mandates data localisation for personal information and important data collected or generated by CIIOs in China, and establishes cross-border data-transfer security assessment requirements under Article 37 — the provision later operationalised by DSL 2021, PIPL 2021, and the 2024 CAC Cross-Border Data Flow Provisions. The CSL introduced multi-level protection scheme (等级保护制度 / MLPS) obligations for all network operators and network-product/service security-review procedures, under which CAC triggered the cybersecurity review of Didi Global in 2021 and the exclusion of Micron's products from Chinese critical-infrastructure projects in 2023.