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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Order No. 834 on 31 March 2026 promulgating the "Provisions on Industrial Chain and Supply Chain Security" (18 articles), adopted at the State Council executive meeting on 13 March 2026 and effective on the date of publication. The Provisions are the first dedicated PRC administrative regulation on industrial- and supply-chain security and consolidate authorities drawn from the National Security Law, Foreign Relations Law, Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, and Foreign Trade Law into a horizontal defensive framework. They establish a cross-agency coordination mechanism spanning roughly 15 central departments (industrial, security, cyberspace, customs and financial regulators) plus provincial governments; create a security-investigation system; and vest broad countermeasure authority over both foreign states (Article 14 — import/export prohibitions and special levies) and foreign organisations and individuals (Article 15 — import/export bans, China-investment bars, transaction prohibitions, entry bars and revocation of work or residence permits, with extension to effectively-controlled subsidiaries). The Provisions also impose compliance, information-sharing, strategic-reserve and emergency-response obligations on PRC organisations and individuals, and authorise requisition, mandated production and directed transportation in the event of supply-chain disruption.
The Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国个人信息保护法 — PIPL) was adopted at the 30th meeting of the 13th NPC Standing Committee on 20 August 2021 and entered into force on 1 November 2021, constituting the third and final pillar of China's cybersecurity and data-governance regulatory trinity alongside the Cybersecurity Law (2016) and the Data Security Law (2021). The PIPL is China's comprehensive personal-information statute establishing consent-based and necessity-based legal bases for PI processing, a tiered cross-border personal-data transfer regime (CAC security assessment / PI protection certification / Standard Contractual Clauses), extraterritorial application (Art. 3) to non-Chinese controllers offering services to or analysing the behaviour of PRC residents, and a heightened protection regime for sensitive personal information and data of minors under 14. It mandates data-protection impact assessments, personal-information-protection-officer obligations at designated handlers, breach notification, and a full suite of data-subject rights including access, rectification, deletion, portability, objection, and automated- decision-making opt-out. Article 53 requires overseas controllers to establish a domestic representative or designated entity in China, providing a domestic enforcement counterparty.
The Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国数据安全法) was adopted at the 29th meeting of the 13th NPC Standing Committee on 10 June 2021 and entered into force on 1 September 2021, constituting the second pillar of China's cybersecurity and data-governance regulatory trinity alongside the Cybersecurity Law (2016) and the Personal Information Protection Law (2021). The DSL establishes a tiered data-classification regime — "important data" and "national core data" — with escalating security obligations including risk assessment, risk monitoring, breach reporting, and classified-protection requirements for data handlers. It introduces a data-export security review for "important data" generated or collected within China, the statutory parent authority operationalised by the 2024 CAC Cross-Border Data Flow Provisions, and enacts a §36 blocking statute prohibiting Chinese organisations and individuals from transferring data stored in China to foreign judicial or law-enforcement authorities without prior PRC government approval.
The modern French FDI-screening regime is codified in Code monétaire et financier (CMF) Art. L151-1 to L151-7, substantially restructured by Loi PACTE n° 2019-486 du 22 mai 2019 (Art. 152-158) and operationalised by Décret n° 2019-1590 du 31 décembre 2019 (in force 1 April 2020) with implementing Arrêté du 31 décembre 2019. The regime requires prior authorisation from DG Trésor for non-EU/EEA acquisitions reaching ≥25% of a French target's voting rights across 17 sensitive sectors enumerated in CMF Art. R151-3, and for ≥10% acquisitions in listed-company targets (threshold made permanent by Décret 2023-1293 from 1 January 2024, having been originally introduced during COVID-19 by Décret 2020-892). Approximately 310 notifications are received annually; the regime closes the last major G7 EU-member-state FDI-screening parent-statute gap after DE AWG §§55-62, IT Golden Power DL 21/2012, NL Wet Vifo, UK NSI Act 2021, US CFIUS, JP FEFTA, AU FATA, and CH IPG.
The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA, Chapter 13) received Royal Assent on 23 May 2018 and established the UK's autonomous post-Brexit sanctions legal framework. Part 1 empowers Ministers (FCDO, HM Treasury) to impose financial, trade, immigration, aircraft, and shipping sanctions by statutory instrument for purposes including UN compliance, national security, foreign-policy objectives, and promotion of human rights and democracy. Part 2 grants Ministers authority to make AML and counter-terrorist-financing regulations aligned with FATF standards, previously derived from EU Anti-Money-Laundering Directives. SAMLA is the parent enabling statute for every UK sanctions regime in force post-Brexit, including 30+ thematic and geographic regulations covering Russia (SI 2019/855), Iran, DPRK, Belarus, Myanmar, Syria, Venezuela, cyber, chemical weapons, global anti-corruption, and global human rights; under SAMLA, OFSI (HM Treasury) holds civil monetary-penalty and criminal-referral enforcement powers. Structurally peer to US IEEPA, EU Council Regulation framework, CN AFSL 2021, and JP FEFTA as the G7+CN foundational sanctions-statute cluster.
The Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国网络安全法) was adopted at the 24th meeting of the 12th NPC Standing Committee on 7 November 2016 and entered into force on 1 June 2017, establishing the foundational legal framework for network security governance across all sectors. The law creates the Critical Information Infrastructure Operator (CIIO) designation and protection regime administered by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), mandates data localisation for personal information and important data collected or generated by CIIOs in China, and establishes cross-border data-transfer security assessment requirements under Article 37 — the provision later operationalised by DSL 2021, PIPL 2021, and the 2024 CAC Cross-Border Data Flow Provisions. The CSL introduced multi-level protection scheme (等级保护制度 / MLPS) obligations for all network operators and network-product/service security-review procedures, under which CAC triggered the cybersecurity review of Didi Global in 2021 and the exclusion of Micron's products from Chinese critical-infrastructure projects in 2023.
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA, Title II of Pub. L. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1708) was signed by President Carter on 28 December 1977 and grants the President sweeping authority to declare a national emergency with respect to "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States" — and then to investigate, regulate, direct, compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit any transaction in, or involving, foreign exchange, banking transfers, importing, exporting, or dealings in property by persons subject to US jurisdiction. IEEPA is the parent enabling statute for every OFAC-administered autonomous sanctions program (Russia, Iran, DPRK, Venezuela, Cuba, Syria, Belarus, Myanmar, cyber, Global Magnitsky, Hong Kong, ICC, and others) as well as the legal basis for the entire Trump-era IEEPA-tariff regime (EO 14193–14195 fentanyl tariffs, Canada/Mexico/China; EO 14257 reciprocal-tariff framework; EO 14323 Brazil; EO 14380 Cuba; EO 14382 Iran; and the US-India interim tariff agreement). Between 1977 and 2025 Presidents invoked IEEPA in 77 national-emergency declarations; of these, 7+ directly parent IPTM-filed implementing actions, with ~dozens of OFAC SDN designation actions tracing their legal root to this statute.