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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
The European Commission on 4 March 2026 adopted COM(2026) 100 final, the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), the central horizontal industrial- policy instrument of the 2024-29 Commission term. The proposal targets raising EU manufacturing's share of GDP from 14.3% (2024) to at least 20% by 2035 via three pillars: (i) demand-side "Made in EU" and low-carbon public-procurement preferences for strategic sectors; (ii) FDI conditionality on investments above €100 million from countries with >40% global manufacturing share in batteries, EVs, solar PV or critical raw materials; (iii) accelerated permitting through a one-stop-shop and member-state-designated Industrial Acceleration Areas. The IAA is a proposal — co-decision adoption is expected mid-to-late 2027.
On 11 December 2025 the Council of the EU presidency, the European Parliament, and the European Commission reached provisional political (trilogue) agreement on the revision of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union, concluding interinstitutional negotiations on the Commission's proposal of 24 January 2024. The revised regime upgrades the 2019 cooperation-mechanism-only framework into a hybrid harmonised/mandatory regime: all 27 Member States must establish FDI screening mechanisms (replacing the current patchwork in which some Member States have no mechanism at all); mandatory minimum sectoral scope is set EU-wide and covers dual-use items, military equipment, hyper-critical technologies (general-purpose AI with space/defence relevance, quantum technologies, semiconductors), critical raw materials, critical entities in energy/transport/digital infrastructure, electoral infrastructure, and certain financial-system entities; foreign investments routed through EU subsidiaries fall within the perimeter; a shared database prevents Member-State arbitrage; and an optional single electronic-filing portal becomes available if requested by at least nine Member States. Screening decisions remain the exclusive responsibility of the Member State in which the investment is made. Once the Regulation enters into force (after Council and Parliament formal adoption and OJ publication, both pending as of the political-agreement date), the new rules will apply after an 18-month transition period — implementation expected toward the end of 2027.
Council Directive (EU) 2022/2523, adopted 14 December 2022 and published in OJ L 328 on 22 December 2022, transposes the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework Pillar Two model rules into binding EU law. It requires all 27 Member States to impose a minimum 15% effective tax rate (ETR) on the jurisdictional income of MNE groups with consolidated annual revenue ≥ EUR 750 million via three interlocking charges: an Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) for fiscal years beginning on or after 31 December 2023, an Undertaxed Profits Rule (UTPR) backstop from 31 December 2024, and an optional Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT). The directive is the largest international-tax instrument in EU history and the operative legal anchor for the cross-border Pillar Two architecture inside the single market, structurally rebalancing FDI location decisions for an estimated 12,000+ in-scope MNE groups globally.
The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (c.25), receiving Royal Assent on 29 April 2021 and entering full force on 4 January 2022, created the UK's first standalone investment-screening regime, separating national-security review from the Competition and Markets Authority merger-control process. The Act empowers the Secretary of State to call in any acquisition of "control or influence" over a qualifying entity or asset on national-security grounds, and designates 17 sensitive sectors in which acquisitions crossing 25%/50%/75% share-or-voting-rights thresholds (or material influence) require mandatory pre-completion notification to the Investment Security Unit (Cabinet Office); completion before clearance is void and criminal sanctions of up to 5 years imprisonment apply to non-notifying parties. The Act is the structural peer of US CFIUS/FIRRMA (2018), EU Regulation 2019/452, Germany AWG §§55–62, France Décret 2014-479, Netherlands Wet Vifo, and the broader allied FDI-screening parent-statute lattice, and the enabling statute under which all UK mandatory-notification schedule amendments operate.
The modern French FDI-screening regime is codified in Code monétaire et financier (CMF) Art. L151-1 to L151-7, substantially restructured by Loi PACTE n° 2019-486 du 22 mai 2019 (Art. 152-158) and operationalised by Décret n° 2019-1590 du 31 décembre 2019 (in force 1 April 2020) with implementing Arrêté du 31 décembre 2019. The regime requires prior authorisation from DG Trésor for non-EU/EEA acquisitions reaching ≥25% of a French target's voting rights across 17 sensitive sectors enumerated in CMF Art. R151-3, and for ≥10% acquisitions in listed-company targets (threshold made permanent by Décret 2023-1293 from 1 January 2024, having been originally introduced during COVID-19 by Décret 2020-892). Approximately 310 notifications are received annually; the regime closes the last major G7 EU-member-state FDI-screening parent-statute gap after DE AWG §§55-62, IT Golden Power DL 21/2012, NL Wet Vifo, UK NSI Act 2021, US CFIUS, JP FEFTA, AU FATA, and CH IPG.
On 15 March 2019, the Second Session of the 13th National People's Congress adopted the Foreign Investment Law of the People's Republic of China (FIL), effective 1 January 2020. The statute replaced the prior tripartite FDI regime — the 1979 Equity Joint Venture Law, the 1986 Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law, and the 1988 Contractual Joint Venture Law (collectively the "Three Laws") — with a unified legal framework covering all foreign investment in China. The FIL establishes a pre-establishment national treatment plus negative-list regime jointly administered by NDRC and MOFCOM, a Foreign Investment Information Reporting System replacing the former case-by-case approval regime, a national security review mechanism (China's CFIUS equivalent, codified at Art. 35), and Art. 22 technology-transfer prohibition protections. The State Council Implementation Regulations (Order No. 723, promulgated 26 December 2019) entered force on the same date as the FIL.
Germany's Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG, Foreign Trade and Payments Act; BGBl. I 2013 S. 1482 of 6 June 2013, replacing the original 1961 Act) is the foundational parent statute of the modern German economic-statecraft toolkit, providing the legislative authority for (i) export licensing of dual-use goods and technology administered by BAFA under the Außenwirtschaftsverordnung (AWV) implementing regulation — the national complement to EU Dual-Use Recast Regulation 2021/821; (ii) inward FDI screening by BMWK under §§ 55–62 AWG covering non-EU/non-EFTA acquisitions of ≥ 25% of voting rights cross-sectorally and ≥ 10%/20% in 27 sensitive-sector activities including defence, semiconductors, AI, quantum, biotech, space, and critical infrastructure; and (iii) German implementation of EU-level and autonomous trade and sanctions restrictions. As the EU's largest economy and a top-tier dual-use exporter, Germany's AWG-based regime is structurally peer-foundational to JP FEFTA 1949, UK NSI Act 2021, US ECRA 2018, CN Export Control Law 2020, and NL Wet Vifo 2022 in the G7+CN economic- statecraft parent-statute cluster.
Decreto-Legge 15 marzo 2012 n. 21 (GU n. 63 of 15 March 2012), converted with amendments into Legge 11 maggio 2012 n. 56 (GU n. 111 of 14 May 2012), establishes Italy's "Golden Power" special-powers regime — the foundational statute authorising the Italian Government to impose conditions on, veto, or prescribe remedies for corporate transactions in strategic sectors. The decree marked Italy's transition from a golden-share model (applicable only to privatised companies) to a sector-wide golden-power model applicable to any company carrying out activities of strategic relevance. Administered by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (DICA), the regime has been progressively extended from its original defence + national-security + energy/transport/ communications scope to cover 5G, cloud, critical-raw-materials, financial-credit-insurance, agri-food, healthcare, media, space, and AI through a series of amending decrees from 2019 to 2026.
The Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA), Act No. 5559, is the foundational statute governing all inbound foreign direct investment into the Republic of Korea. Enacted 16 September 1998 by the National Assembly under President Kim Dae-jung as part of IMF-conditionality-driven economic-liberalisation reforms following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, it replaced the 1966 Foreign Capital Inducement Act (외자도입법). FIPA establishes the MOTIE-chaired Foreign Investment Committee, the Invest Korea (KOTRA) operational arm, and national-security/public-order restrictions on FDI in sensitive industries under Article 4 — the primary legal authority for all inward-FDI screening, conditional-approval, and prohibition decisions. It also creates the Foreign Investment Zone (FIZ) and Cash Grant Programme incentive architecture that continues to underpin major semiconductor and EV-battery FDI into Korea.
Japan's Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA, Act No. 228 of 1 December 1949; 外国為替及び外国貿易法) is the foundational umbrella statute governing the entire modern Japanese economic-statecraft toolkit. Originally a restrictive positive-list regime for foreign-exchange transactions, FEFTA was fundamentally liberalised by the 1980 revision (positive-list to negative-list shift) and again overhauled in 1998 to establish the modern regulatory architecture. Three principal enforcement arms operate under FEFTA: (i) security export controls administered by METI via the Export Trade Control Order and the Foreign Exchange Order (covering the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, MTCR, NSG, and CWC controlled-items lists plus Japan-specific catch-all controls); (ii) inward FDI screening administered jointly by the Ministry of Finance and sector ministries (prior notification and pre-notification regime, substantially expanded 2019–2020 with Core Business Sectors covering semiconductors, critical minerals, advanced materials, cloud computing, and aerospace added 2021); and (iii) autonomous economic sanctions (asset- freeze and payment-restriction designations against Russia, Iran, DPRK, Myanmar, Belarus, and others via Cabinet Orders made under FEFTA authority). Structurally peer-foundational to the US Trade Expansion Act 1962, US Trade Act 1974, UK SAMLA 2018, CN Export Control Law 2020, and CN Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law 2021 as the G7+CN foundational economic- statecraft statute cluster.