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Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Order No. 835 on 13 April 2026 promulgating the "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Countering Foreign States' Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction" (20 articles), effective on the date of publication. The Regulations are the first State Council–level administrative regulation to operationalise the PRC's framework for identifying and countering foreign extraterritorial measures on a horizontal basis, complementing the 2021 Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and the March 2025 AFSL implementation regulations. Article 5 establishes a State Council–led inter-agency coordination mechanism; Article 6 vests the State Council legal affairs department (the Ministry of Justice in practice) with authority to identify "improper" foreign extraterritorial measures and to grant exemptions; Article 8 authorises a new Malicious Entity List targeting foreign organisations and individuals that "promote or participate in implementing" such measures, with nine countermeasure categories spanning visa denial, asset freezing, trade restrictions and fines; Article 11 codifies an exemption-application channel under which Chinese persons facing conflicting legal demands may request approval to comply with foreign measures within a defined scope; Article 14 authorises a private right of action for harmed Chinese citizens and organisations to sue parties enforcing such measures; and Article 18 elevates enforcement beyond administrative penalties by referencing potential criminal liability.

On 11 December 2025 the Council of the EU presidency, the European Parliament, and the European Commission reached provisional political (trilogue) agreement on the revision of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union, concluding interinstitutional negotiations on the Commission's proposal of 24 January 2024. The revised regime upgrades the 2019 cooperation-mechanism-only framework into a hybrid harmonised/mandatory regime: all 27 Member States must establish FDI screening mechanisms (replacing the current patchwork in which some Member States have no mechanism at all); mandatory minimum sectoral scope is set EU-wide and covers dual-use items, military equipment, hyper-critical technologies (general-purpose AI with space/defence relevance, quantum technologies, semiconductors), critical raw materials, critical entities in energy/transport/digital infrastructure, electoral infrastructure, and certain financial-system entities; foreign investments routed through EU subsidiaries fall within the perimeter; a shared database prevents Member-State arbitrage; and an optional single electronic-filing portal becomes available if requested by at least nine Member States. Screening decisions remain the exclusive responsibility of the Member State in which the investment is made. Once the Regulation enters into force (after Council and Parliament formal adoption and OJ publication, both pending as of the political-agreement date), the new rules will apply after an 18-month transition period — implementation expected toward the end of 2027.

On 15 October 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, acting under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, designated 39 entities and specified 51 vessels — including, for the first time, Russia's two largest integrated oil majors PJSC Rosneft Oil Company and PJSC Oil Company Lukoil — for supporting Russia's energy, defence and financial sectors. 51 vessels (44 identified as "shadow fleet" tankers) were specified for transporting Russian crude oil and LNG in evasion of the G7 price cap. The package also introduced a ban on importing oil products refined in a third country from Russian-origin crude, closing a refined-product loophole in the price-cap regime.

On 30 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals and entities and identified more than 50 vessels belonging to the shipping empire of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, son of Ali Shamkhani, a top political adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader. Treasury described the action — over 115 sanctions in total — as its largest Iran-related action since 2018. The network launders billions of dollars from sales of Iranian and Russian crude oil and petroleum products (mostly to buyers in China) through vessels and front companies registered across the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Cyprus, Panama, Romania, China, Liberia, the Marshall Islands and Seychelles. Concurrently, the State Department designated 20 entities and identified 10 vessels under E.O. 13846 and E.O. 13902 for trading and transporting Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products.

On 4 February 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-2, "Imposing Maximum Pressure on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Denying Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, and Countering Iran's Malign Influence." The memorandum reimposes the first- term "maximum pressure" framework, directing the Secretaries of State and Treasury and the Attorney General to (i) drive Iran's exports of crude oil and petroleum products — including to the People's Republic of China — to zero; (ii) review and modify or rescind sanctions waivers and general licences (notably the Chabahar port waiver benefiting India); (iii) sanction shadow-fleet vessels, intermediaries, refineries (including PRC "teapot" refiners) and oil traders facilitating Iranian energy exports; and (iv) lead a diplomatic isolation campaign including a snapback of UN Security Council sanctions under JCPOA Resolution 2231 paragraph 11. Since promulgation, OFAC has designated 1,000+ Iran-related persons, vessels and aircraft and four PRC independent ("teapot") refiners alleged to have processed sanctioned Iranian crude. The DOJ is also directed to pursue impoundment of Iranian oil cargoes and seizure of Iranian assets to satisfy US-court terrorism-victim judgments.

Switzerland's Federal Council promulgated the Verordnung über die Mindestbesteuerung grosser Unternehmensgruppen (Mindestbesteuerungsverordnung, MindStV; French: OIMin), SR 642.161, AS 2023 841, on 22 December 2023, with effect from 1 January 2024. The ordinance enacts a 15% Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT — Ergänzungssteuer) on Swiss constituent entities of MNE groups with consolidated annual revenue ≥ EUR 750 million, enacted under the temporary constitutional authority granted by Swiss voters in a popular referendum on 18 June 2023 (78.5% yes, Art. 129a BV). The Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) and Undertaxed Profits Rule (UTPR) were deliberately deferred to subsequent ordinance amendments, targeting FY 2025 phasing. The Swiss Federal Tax Administration (ESTV / AFC) is the administering authority; first QDMTT returns and GloBE Information Returns due 30 June 2026.

On 3 June 2022 the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/879, the sixth package of sanctions against Russia over the invasion of Ukraine, further amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. It bans the seaborne import of Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products, covering roughly two-thirds of EU oil imports from Russia at adoption (pipeline deliveries via Druzhba were temporarily exempted). It removes Sberbank, Credit Bank of Moscow and Russian Agricultural Bank from SWIFT (Annex XIV), bans EU operators from providing accounting, auditing, bookkeeping, tax consulting, business/management consulting and public-relations services to persons in Russia (new Article 5n), and adds three more Russian broadcasters to the EU broadcasting-suspension list (Annex XV). It entered into force on 4 June 2022, the day after publication in the Official Journal.

On 24 February 2022, hours after Russia's invasion of Ukraine began, the UK Foreign Secretary announced a full asset freeze on VTB, Russia's second-largest bank (£154bn in assets, 95,000 employees), alongside a freeze on all Russian bank assets in the UK and a ban on Russian companies raising finance on UK markets. The package designated more than 100 companies and individuals -- including five major defence firms (Rostec, Uralvagonzavod, Tactical Missile Corporation, United Aircraft Corporation, United Shipbuilding Corporation) and Putin-inner-circle figures such as Kirill Shamalov -- for asset freezes and travel bans. Aeroflot was banned from UK airspace and new export controls were imposed on electronics, telecommunications and aerospace goods to Russia.

Between 22 and 28 February 2022 — coinciding with Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine — OFAC issued a Financial Services Sectoral Determination and four directives under Executive Order 14024 of April 15, 2021. Together they authorise designation of any person operating in Russia's financial sector, prohibit US persons from trading Russian sovereign debt, bar US banks from maintaining correspondent accounts for designated Russian financial institutions (Sberbank, Alfa-Bank and others), prohibit new investment in certain Russia-related entities, and block all transactions involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund, and the Ministry of Finance — effectively freezing approximately USD 640 billion in Russian sovereign reserves held in Western financial systems. The package was formally published in the Federal Register on 31 May 2022.

The Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国个人信息保护法 — PIPL) was adopted at the 30th meeting of the 13th NPC Standing Committee on 20 August 2021 and entered into force on 1 November 2021, constituting the third and final pillar of China's cybersecurity and data-governance regulatory trinity alongside the Cybersecurity Law (2016) and the Data Security Law (2021). The PIPL is China's comprehensive personal-information statute establishing consent-based and necessity-based legal bases for PI processing, a tiered cross-border personal-data transfer regime (CAC security assessment / PI protection certification / Standard Contractual Clauses), extraterritorial application (Art. 3) to non-Chinese controllers offering services to or analysing the behaviour of PRC residents, and a heightened protection regime for sensitive personal information and data of minors under 14. It mandates data-protection impact assessments, personal-information-protection-officer obligations at designated handlers, breach notification, and a full suite of data-subject rights including access, rectification, deletion, portability, objection, and automated- decision-making opt-out. Article 53 requires overseas controllers to establish a domestic representative or designated entity in China, providing a domestic enforcement counterparty.

The Data Security Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国数据安全法) was adopted at the 29th meeting of the 13th NPC Standing Committee on 10 June 2021 and entered into force on 1 September 2021, constituting the second pillar of China's cybersecurity and data-governance regulatory trinity alongside the Cybersecurity Law (2016) and the Personal Information Protection Law (2021). The DSL establishes a tiered data-classification regime — "important data" and "national core data" — with escalating security obligations including risk assessment, risk monitoring, breach reporting, and classified-protection requirements for data handlers. It introduces a data-export security review for "important data" generated or collected within China, the statutory parent authority operationalised by the 2024 CAC Cross-Border Data Flow Provisions, and enacts a §36 blocking statute prohibiting Chinese organisations and individuals from transferring data stored in China to foreign judicial or law-enforcement authorities without prior PRC government approval.

Russia Federal Law No. 127-FZ of 4 June 2018 "On measures (countermeasures) regarding the unfriendly actions of the United States of America and other foreign states" establishes the statutory authority under which the President and Government of the Russian Federation may impose counter-measures against states that engage in "unfriendly actions" toward Russia. The law enumerates permissible countermeasure categories — including import/export prohibitions, restrictions on foreign participation in Russian state procurement, suspension of international cooperation obligations, and prohibition of foreign-company services and transactions — and delegates implementation authority to the President (primary) and Government. It entered into force on the day of official publication (4 June 2018) and is the foundational parent statute for every major Russian counter-sanctions presidential decree and government resolution subsequently issued, including the gas-for-roubles payment regime, capital controls, parallel- imports authorisation, and asset-confiscation counter-mechanism.

The Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国网络安全法) was adopted at the 24th meeting of the 12th NPC Standing Committee on 7 November 2016 and entered into force on 1 June 2017, establishing the foundational legal framework for network security governance across all sectors. The law creates the Critical Information Infrastructure Operator (CIIO) designation and protection regime administered by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), mandates data localisation for personal information and important data collected or generated by CIIOs in China, and establishes cross-border data-transfer security assessment requirements under Article 37 — the provision later operationalised by DSL 2021, PIPL 2021, and the 2024 CAC Cross-Border Data Flow Provisions. The CSL introduced multi-level protection scheme (等级保护制度 / MLPS) obligations for all network operators and network-product/service security-review procedures, under which CAC triggered the cybersecurity review of Didi Global in 2021 and the exclusion of Micron's products from Chinese critical-infrastructure projects in 2023.

Decreto-Legge 15 marzo 2012 n. 21 (GU n. 63 of 15 March 2012), converted with amendments into Legge 11 maggio 2012 n. 56 (GU n. 111 of 14 May 2012), establishes Italy's "Golden Power" special-powers regime — the foundational statute authorising the Italian Government to impose conditions on, veto, or prescribe remedies for corporate transactions in strategic sectors. The decree marked Italy's transition from a golden-share model (applicable only to privatised companies) to a sector-wide golden-power model applicable to any company carrying out activities of strategic relevance. Administered by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (DICA), the regime has been progressively extended from its original defence + national-security + energy/transport/ communications scope to cover 5G, cloud, critical-raw-materials, financial-credit-insurance, agri-food, healthcare, media, space, and AI through a series of amending decrees from 2019 to 2026.

The Federal Act of 22 March 2002 on the Implementation of International Sanctions (Embargogesetz / EmbG, SR 946.231), in force 1 January 2003, is Switzerland's foundational enabling statute authorising the Federal Council to issue coercive-measure ordinances implementing UN Security Council mandatory sanctions (under UN Charter Art. 25 obligations accepted upon Switzerland's 2002 UN accession), OSCE sanctions decisions, and — via the progressive EU-tracking clause — the sanctions of Switzerland's most important trading partners, primarily the EU. The State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) administers all resulting ordinances; FINMA supervises financial-sector compliance and FOEN supervises trade-in-goods compliance. The EmbG is the parent authority for Switzerland's entire portfolio of approximately 25 country-specific sanctions ordinances, including the Ukraine/Russia ordinance (SR 946.231.176.72 implementing EU Russia packages 1-19+), the Iran ordinance (SR 946.231.143.6), the DPRK ordinance (SR 946.231.127.6), the Myanmar ordinance (SR 946.231.157.5), and the Belarus ordinance (SR 946.231.116.9).