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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
On October 22, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added Open Joint Stock Company Rosneft Oil Company ("Rosneft") and Lukoil OAO ("Lukoil") — together with dozens of named Russia-based subsidiaries — to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List under Executive Order 14024 for "operating or having operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy." It is the first US designation of Russia's two largest integrated oil majors since the 2022 invasion-era sanctions architecture began. Under OFAC's 50% Rule, the blocking extends automatically to all entities owned 50% or more, directly or indirectly, by Rosneft or Lukoil — capturing a sprawling global subsidiary network including Lukoil retail/refining assets in Belgium, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, Finland, the West Qurna-2 upstream stake in Iraq, and Lukoil Americas. Rosneft and Lukoil together account for roughly half of Russian crude exports (~5 mb/d combined production) and Lukoil holds a ~9% European retail-fuel market share. OFAC simultaneously issued General License 124 (Caspian Pipeline Consortium / Tengizchevroil / Karachaganak Kazakhstan-pipeline carve-out, no expiry), General License 125 (Lukoil retail service stations outside Russia, wind-down to November 21, 2025), General License 126 (general wind-down to November 21, 2025) and General License 127 (debt/equity divestment and derivatives wind-down to November 21, 2025). GL 131 (issued November 14, 2025) opened a divestment window for Lukoil International GmbH; subsequent GL 134/134A/134B extended cargo-offload authorisations through April–May 2026. The action was coordinated same-day with UK OFSI Rosneft/Lukoil designations and the EU's 19th Russia sanctions package adopted October 23, 2025 — the first major US-led Russia-energy escalation under the second Trump administration.
On 30 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated more than 50 individuals and entities and identified more than 50 vessels belonging to the shipping empire of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, son of Ali Shamkhani, a top political adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader. Treasury described the action — over 115 sanctions in total — as its largest Iran-related action since 2018. The network launders billions of dollars from sales of Iranian and Russian crude oil and petroleum products (mostly to buyers in China) through vessels and front companies registered across the UAE, Hong Kong, India, Cyprus, Panama, Romania, China, Liberia, the Marshall Islands and Seychelles. Concurrently, the State Department designated 20 entities and identified 10 vessels under E.O. 13846 and E.O. 13902 for trading and transporting Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products.
On 4 February 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-2, "Imposing Maximum Pressure on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Denying Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, and Countering Iran's Malign Influence." The memorandum reimposes the first- term "maximum pressure" framework, directing the Secretaries of State and Treasury and the Attorney General to (i) drive Iran's exports of crude oil and petroleum products — including to the People's Republic of China — to zero; (ii) review and modify or rescind sanctions waivers and general licences (notably the Chabahar port waiver benefiting India); (iii) sanction shadow-fleet vessels, intermediaries, refineries (including PRC "teapot" refiners) and oil traders facilitating Iranian energy exports; and (iv) lead a diplomatic isolation campaign including a snapback of UN Security Council sanctions under JCPOA Resolution 2231 paragraph 11. Since promulgation, OFAC has designated 1,000+ Iran-related persons, vessels and aircraft and four PRC independent ("teapot") refiners alleged to have processed sanctioned Iranian crude. The DOJ is also directed to pursue impoundment of Iranian oil cargoes and seizure of Iranian assets to satisfy US-court terrorism-victim judgments.
On January 10, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), acting jointly with the Department of State, designated PJSC Gazprom Neft and PJSC Surgutneftegas as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) under Executive Orders 13662 and 14024, alongside more than 180 oil-carrying vessels (the bulk of Russia's "shadow fleet"), dozens of opaque oil traders, two major Russia-based oilfield service providers, marine insurance companies, and senior Russian energy-sector officials. The package included a new EO 14024 sectoral determination authorizing future designations against any person operating in the Russian energy sector, plus a new EO 14071 determination prohibiting the provision of US petroleum services (extraction, drilling, production support) to persons located in the Russian Federation, effective 12:01 a.m. EST on February 27, 2025. OFAC simultaneously issued General Licenses 117 (wind-down of transactions with the newly blocked entities) and 118 (debt/equity/derivatives wind-down), both expiring February 27, 2025. The action was the largest single Russia energy-sector designation since the 2022 invasion regime began and was coordinated with parallel UK OFSI shadow-fleet designations issued the same week. The action was finalized in the closing days of the Biden administration as a deliberate tightening of the oil-revenue and shadow-fleet vectors before the January 20 transition. Subsequent enforcement and any rollback decisions fell to the incoming Trump administration.
On 3 June 2022 the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/879, the sixth package of sanctions against Russia over the invasion of Ukraine, further amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. It bans the seaborne import of Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products, covering roughly two-thirds of EU oil imports from Russia at adoption (pipeline deliveries via Druzhba were temporarily exempted). It removes Sberbank, Credit Bank of Moscow and Russian Agricultural Bank from SWIFT (Annex XIV), bans EU operators from providing accounting, auditing, bookkeeping, tax consulting, business/management consulting and public-relations services to persons in Russia (new Article 5n), and adds three more Russian broadcasters to the EU broadcasting-suspension list (Annex XV). It entered into force on 4 June 2022, the day after publication in the Official Journal.
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, Act 28 of 2002, assented to by President Thabo Mbeki on 3 October 2002 and commenced on 1 May 2004 (Proclamation R.25 of 2004), is the foundational post-apartheid statute governing all mineral and petroleum resources in South Africa. The Act vests custodianship of all SA mineral and petroleum resources in the State for the benefit of all South Africans, abolishes the old-order private-ownership system of mineral rights, and establishes the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office (MPTRO). It creates the licensing regime for prospecting, mining, exploration, and production rights as limited real rights tied to land under Chapters 3–6, and embeds the Mining Charter BEE-ownership transformation framework via Section 100(2) — subsequently litigated in Chamber of Mines v Minister of Mineral Resources [2018] (SCA). The MPRDA is the parent authority for all subsequent SA mining-sector regulation including the 2008 Royalty Act, the 2018 Mining Charter III, and the 2025 Mineral Resources Development Bill currently pending before Parliament.
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Pub. L. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872), signed into law by President Kennedy on 11 October 1962 and codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1991, is the foundational US statute granting the executive branch broad authority to negotiate tariff reductions and, critically via Section 232 (19 U.S.C. § 1862), to adjust imports of any article found by the Secretary of Commerce to threaten to impair national security. Section 232 empowers the President — on receipt of a Commerce Department affirmative national-security finding — to impose tariffs, quantitative restrictions, or other import-adjustment measures without congressional approval or WTO-required safeguard procedures. From 1962 to the Trump Administration's 2018–2026 wave of Section 232 Proclamations, the authority was invoked primarily for petroleum and machine-tool imports; since 2018 it has become the legal vehicle for national-security tariffs on steel, aluminum, automobiles, copper, timber, critical minerals, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals, with 19+ IPTM-filed implementing instruments citing Pub. L. 87-794 / 19 U.S.C. § 1862 as their statutory parent.