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China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 51 of 2025 on 25 September 2025, adding three US entities — Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. (NYSE: HII, the largest US military shipbuilder), Planate Management Group, and Global Dimensions LLC — to China's Export Control List (出口管制 管控名单), effective the same day. The listing prohibits Chinese exporters from supplying dual-use items to the three firms and requires any ongoing related export activity to cease immediately. MOFCOM cited the firms' "military-technical cooperation with China's Taiwan region" as the trigger, issued in parallel with a same-day Unreliable Entity List designation of three other US firms (Saronic Technologies, Aerkomm, Oceaneering International).

India's Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) issued Notification No. 31/2025-26 on 23 September 2025, revising Appendix-3 of Schedule-II of the ITC(HS) Export Policy to add a new Category 7 — "Certain Emerging Technologies and related items" — to the SCOMET (Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies) list. Category 7 brings under export-licence control: quantum-computing systems (≥34 qubits with controlled error rates), cryogenic CMOS integrated circuits, advanced lithography tools (≤45 nm minimum resolvable feature), additive-manufacturing equipment under vacuum, and related software/technology. The notification took effect 30 days from issuance, on 23 October 2025, and is the first new SCOMET category created since the list's last major restructure, aligning India's strategic-trade-control regime with parallel US BIS, Wassenaar Arrangement, and EU dual-use list updates.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add 32 entities to the Entity List, with the largest bloc — 23 entries — under the destination of China, plus India (1), Iran (1), Singapore (1), Taiwan (1), Turkey (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2). The rule also removed two addresses from one Russian entry (Intertech Rus LLC) and made 27 typographical corrections to existing entries. Several Chinese additions — including Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics, Sino IC Technology, GMC Semiconductor (Wuxi), and Chinese Academy of Sciences units (National Time Service Center; Aerospace Information Research Institute) — were given footnote 4 designations, extending the EAR's foreign-direct-product (FDP) reach to non-US-origin items destined for Russian military end use. Three Turkish entries (Atempo, EB Teknoloji, Dentun Elektronik) and one Indian entry (AR Sales Pvt Ltd) were footnote-3 Russian Procurement Entity designations. The rule is a final rule effective September 12, 2025; all listed parties are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy.

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/2003, adopted by the European Commission on 8 September 2025, published in the Official Journal on 14 November 2025 and entering into force on 15 November 2025, amends Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 to implement the 2024 multilateral decisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, and NSG. The most extensive EU semiconductor-equipment additions since the 2021 framework took effect: ALD, epitaxial deposition, lithography, EUV pellicles/masks/reticles, SEM, and etching equipment, plus tighter controls on quantum computers, advanced FPGAs/ICs for AI training, additive-manufacturing, and cryogenic/superconducting components. The regulation is the EU-side update layer of the Western dual-use export control architecture, structurally aligned with the US BIS advanced- computing/SME packages and the Netherlands DUV-licensing regime.

On 8 September 2025, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced a nine-measure package against Israel over the Gaza war, the centrepiece being urgent approval of a Royal Decree-Law to permanently codify in law the arms embargo Spain had applied de facto since October 2023 — a total ban on buying and selling arms, ammunition, military equipment and dual-use goods with Israel, plus a ban on port transit of fuel for the Israeli military and a ban on Israeli state aircraft carrying defence material transiting Spanish airspace. The package also bans importing, advertising and marketing products originating from Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. The Council of Ministers formally approved the measure as Real Decreto-ley 10/2025 on 23 September 2025; it was published in the BOE on 24 September 2025 (BOE-A-2025-18831) and validated by Congress on 8 October 2025 (178–169). Spain's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Business separately disclosed that 219 defence-material export/import licences to Israel had been denied since October 2023, against a bilateral trade backdrop of roughly €50M in Spanish arms exports to Israel (Jan 2023–Jun 2024) and at least €54.4M in Spanish imports of Israeli arms/munitions (Oct 2023–May 2025, DataComex code 93).

On 8 September 2025, the UK Ministry of Defence published the Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 — "Making Defence an Engine for Growth" (CP 1388) — the first comprehensive cabinet-level UK defence industrial strategy in over a decade and the sector plan for Defence under the UK Modern Industrial Strategy umbrella (IS-8). The strategy was published alongside the Strategic Defence Review 2025 and operationalises the largest sustained defence- spending increase since the Cold War (rising to 2.6% of GDP by 2027 with ambition to 3% in the next Parliament). It defines six priority outcomes (growth, backing UK businesses, defence innovation, resilient industrial base, procurement transformation, enduring partnerships); establishes UK Defence Innovation (UKDI) within the MOD with a ringfenced £400m budget to accelerate dual-use technology; identifies priority defence capabilities (combat air, complex weapons, directed-energy weapons, next- generation land and maritime systems) plus dual-use sub-sectors (quantum, drones/autonomy, space, AI, cyber, engineering biology, advanced connectivity); and flags resilience priorities in steel, construction, energetic materials, batteries, semiconductors and rare earths.

The 22nd Regulation Amending the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance (Zweiundzwanzigste Verordnung zur Änderung der Außenwirtschaftsverordnung), promulgated in Bundesgesetzblatt I 2025 Nr. 261 and entering into force on 1 November 2025, updates Germany's national export-control list (Ausfuhrliste, Annex AL to the AWV) to align with the 2024-cycle decisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, and NSG. It is the German national implementation layer that parallels Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/2003 — both ingest the same multilateral consensus into the EU+DE dual-use perimeter covering ALD, epitaxial deposition, lithography (EUV pellicles/masks/reticles), SEM and etching equipment, quantum computers, cryogenic components, advanced FPGAs/ICs for AI training, and additive-manufacturing systems. Sets the export-list baseline against which BAFA licence determinations from November 2025 onward are made. Distinct from the parallel AWG Implementing Act (entered into force 2026-02-06) which transposed EU Directive 2024/1226 into German sanctions criminal law.

On 2 September 2025 the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule (90 FR 42315; FR Doc 2025-16724) revising the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to substantially relax export and reexport controls on Syria, consistent with Executive Order 14312 ("Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions", 30 June 2025) and the parallel post-Assad sanctions architecture (PAARSS, OFAC, 25 Sep 2025). The rule (i) revises previously restrictive licence-application review policies for items subject to the EAR to be more favourable, (ii) extends the geographic eligibility of existing license exceptions to Syria, and (iii) adds new license exceptions for Syria including for EAR99 items. The rule is effective on publication; section 6 of EO 14312 had already waived application of section 5(a)(1) of the Syria Accountability Act with respect to items on the Commerce Control List, and section 7 waived CBW Act sections 307(a)(5) and 307(b)(2)(C) restrictions on EAR-subject exports to Syria.

On 8 August 2025, Ukraine's President signed Decree No. 595/2025, enacting an NSDC decision "On the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)" against Russian state nuclear corporation Rosatom and its international corporate network. Sanctions were applied to 18 individuals and 17 legal entities identified as involved in attempts to integrate the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant into Russia's grid, participation in the seizure of the Chornobyl NPP, production and servicing of dual-use nuclear equipment, and export of enriched uranium through Rosatom subsidiaries registered in Switzerland, Cyprus, the Netherlands, and Finland. Named entities include Uranium One Holding N.V. (Netherlands), Rosatom Finance Ltd (Cyprus), and JSC Kirov-Energomash (Russia).

Czech Act No. 265/2025 Sb., promulgated in the Sbírka zákonů on 4 August 2025 and entering into force on 1 November 2025, is the first material amendment of the Czech Republic's foundational FDI screening statute (Act No. 34/2021 Sb.) since its enactment. The amendment broadens the perimeter of mandatory pre-closing FDI screening by cross-referencing the simultaneously-enacted Cybersecurity Act (Act No. 264/2025 Sb., transposing NIS2 Directive 2022/2555): entities designated as providers of "regulated services" under the Cybersecurity Act's "regime of higher obligation" automatically fall within mandatory FDI-screening scope, extending screening reach beyond the prior military-material / dual-use / critical-infrastructure perimeter to cover a broad sweep of digital, technology, healthcare, energy, and financial-services operators. The amendment also adds a confidentiality-sharing channel between MPO and NÚKIB, enabling coordinated supply-chain-security assessments for high-risk-vendor reviews under the new Cybersecurity Act.

On 18 July 2025 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1469, implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006, adding eight Belarusian entities to the Annex I asset-freeze list for supporting Belarus's military-industrial complex. The listed entities — State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice, OKB TSP Scientific Production LLC, KB Unmanned Helicopters (UAVHeli), Legmash Plant OJSC, Research and Production Unitary Enterprise "Scientific and Technical Center 'LEMT' BelOMO", Laser Devices and Technologies LLC, JSC Vistan, and Rukhservomotor LLC — span defence-export trading, artillery-shell and MLRS-rocket manufacture, unmanned military aircraft, optical weapon sights, and dual-use CNC machine tools supplied to Russian defence-related enterprises. Funds and economic resources belonging to the listed entities are frozen within the EU and the EU prohibition on making resources available to them applies with effect from 19 July 2025 (date of publication in the Official Journal). The listing was adopted the same day as the EU's 18th Russia sanctions package, as a parallel complementary measure under the separate Belarus sanctions regime.

On 18 July 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 18th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1476 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings), Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1495 (vessel listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 (parallel Belarus measures). The package is the largest energy-sector escalation since 2022 and pivots from new-perimeter creation toward enforcement and circumvention closure. Headline measures: (i) the Russian-crude price cap is lowered from USD 60 to USD 47.6 per barrel with a new automatic dynamic mechanism re-indexing the cap to global oil prices every six months at a 15 % discount to the 22-week trailing average (effective 3 Sep 2025, with a transitional exemption to 18 Oct 2025 for pre-20 Jul 2025 contracts compliant with the prior cap); (ii) full transaction ban extended to 22 additional Russian banks, bringing the total cut off from the EU financial system to 45; transaction ban extended to third-country financial institutions and crypto-asset service providers facilitating circumvention; (iii) full transaction ban on Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines; (iv) import ban on refined oil products derived from Russian crude processed in third countries; (v) 105 additional vessels added to the shadow-fleet port-access ban (cumulative total 444); (vi) 26 new entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (15 Russian + 11 from China/Hong Kong/Turkey); (vii) Council Implementing Regulation 2025/1476 lists 14 individuals + 41 entities under asset-freeze, including a major Indian refinery (Nayara Energy, part-owned by Rosneft), three Chinese suppliers of battlefield goods, shadow-fleet operators, and entities involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; (viii) parallel Belarus complementary measures via Regulation 2025/1472. Wind-down periods vary: 90 days for oil-price-cap contracts; banking-software wind-down to 30 Sep 2025; trade-goods wind-downs Oct 2025–Jan 2026 by category. Entry into force on 19 July 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

The Assembly of Albania (Kuvendi i Republikës së Shqipërisë) adopted Law No. 56/2025 on 11 July 2025, published in Fletorja Zyrtare (Official Gazette) No. 124 of the same date, amending Article 10 of Law No. 7764/1993 "On Foreign Investments" to introduce Albania's first-ever mandatory FDI screening mechanism. The law requires investors to submit applications for screening of any foreign investment "related to or affecting critical public infrastructure, critical technologies, dual-use goods, supply of critical inputs, access to sensitive information, or media freedom" — categories aligned with EU Regulation 2019/452 — while delegating thresholds, timelines, and procedural safeguards to a forthcoming Decision of the Council of Ministers (DCM). Albania becomes the first country in the Western Balkans to establish an investment-screening regime aligned with EU Regulation 2019/452, opening a new issuer-country code (AL) on the IPTM register and anchoring a regional cluster that currently stands at RS=1, MK=0, BA=0, ME=0, XK=0.

China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 35 of 2025 on 9 July 2025, adding 8 Taiwan-based entities to its Dual-Use Items Export Control List under the Export Control Law and the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items. The listed firms — spanning aerospace/aviation, unmanned systems, and shipbuilding — are barred from receiving dual-use item exports from China; ongoing export activity to them must cease immediately, with exceptions only via case-by-case MOFCOM approval. The measure took effect the same day it was published.

Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs International Trade Administration (MOEA-ITA) amended the Strategic High-Tech Commodities (SHTC) export-control Entity List on 10 June 2025 (announced 15 June 2025) under Article 13 of the Trade Act, adding 601 new entities — including Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. (SMIC) plus 599 additional entities domiciled in China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and Myanmar. Taiwanese exporters (TSMC, UMC, ASE, KYEC and downstream suppliers) must obtain pre-export government licences for direct or third-party shipments of any SHTC-listed item to the listed entities; the action expands Taiwan's total entity-list population to ~10,844 entities. Two follow-on amendments tightened the regime further: a +279-entity expansion on 18 September 2025 and an 18-item commodity-list expansion on 18 November 2025 covering advanced 3D printers, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, electron microscopes and quantum-computing hardware.

The European Investment Fund (EIF), part of the EIB Group, and the European Commission announced a EUR 40 million (~USD 45.2 million) investment in Keen Venture Partners' European Defence and Security Tech Fund on 22 May 2025. The commitment is made under the InvestEU Defence Equity Facility (DEF), a EUR 175 million joint instrument (EUR 100 million from the European Defence Fund plus EUR 75 million from the EIF) created to close the equity-financing gap for early-stage European defence and dual-use technology companies through 2027. The Keen fund targets a final size of EUR 125 million and plans to back 20-25 early-stage startups across European NATO countries working on information superiority, cyber defence, robotics, AI, autonomous systems and space technologies. Global Trade Alert separately logs the transaction as a "red"-flagged state-linked financial-investment-support intervention.

On 20 May 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 17th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/932 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/933 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings). Sectoral measures include the largest single-package expansion of the shadow-fleet port-access ban (additional vessel listings layered on top of the 153 designations carried over from the 16th package), the addition of 31 entities — including third-country (Chinese, Turkish, UAE, Hong Kong) firms — to the Annex IV list of military end-users barred from receiving dual-use and critical industry goods (covering chemical precursors used in missile propellants and spare parts for high-precision machine tools), and reinforced anti-circumvention "no-Russia" clause obligations on EU exporters. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/933 imposes asset freezes on 17 additional individuals and 58 additional entities, including shadow-fleet vessels and operators, a major Russian oil company, Russian military/defence-sector firms, and persons involved in the looting of Ukrainian cultural heritage. Parallel hybrid-threat, human-rights, and chemical-weapons designations were adopted under separate horizontal regimes on the same day. The Council noted EU shadow-fleet and oil-price-cap measures had reduced Russian revenues by approximately EUR 38 billion since introduction. Entry into force on 21 May 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal).

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 18 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 5. Of the 18 additions, 5 are under China, 6 under Finland, 3 under Türkiye, 2 under Kazakhstan, 1 under Italy, and 1 under the United Kingdom — a geographic distribution dominated by Russia-adjacent diversion corridors. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends use of EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. The rule was published and effective the same day, 25 April 2025 (90 FR 17339).

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) overhauled the catch-all export-control framework under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA) — the first comprehensive review of Japan's catch-all controls in 12 years (since 2013). Cabinet decisions were taken on 25 March 2025 and 4 April 2025 with METI's consolidated announcement on 9 April 2025; the amended Cabinet Order entered into force on 9 October 2025. The reform (i) splits catch-all-controlled items into "core items" (high dual-use risk, including certain semiconductors and machine tools) and a general catch-all tier, (ii) adds a new end-user requirement alongside the existing end-use requirement and extends both from UN-arms-embargo countries only to "general countries" (everywhere outside Group A), materially expanding the perimeter of items requiring METI export licences for general-country end-users including China, and (iii) introduces an "informed" condition for exports to Group A countries — once METI notifies an exporter of a defined risk pattern, a Group A export becomes licence-required, addressing transit-export-circumvention to Russia. Structurally distinct from the 23-category equipment-specific 2023 amendment (2023-03-31-japan-meti-semi-equipment-export-controls); this is the underlying horizontal catch-all reform and brings Japan's framework closer to US BIS EAR catch-all controls.

On 24 February 2025, the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union adopted the 16th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 amending Regulation 833/2014 and a cluster of associated regulations (2025/389, 2025/390, 2025/392, 2025/398, 2025/401). The package introduces the EU's first import ban on Russian primary aluminium (CN 7601) under a 275 kt transition quota (~80% of 2024 volumes), expels 13 additional Russian banks from the SWIFT financial-messaging system, adds 74 vessels (153 total) to the shadow-fleet port-access and services ban, prohibits any temporary storage of Russian crude and petroleum products in EU ports, bans transactions with major Russian airports (Moscow Vnukovo, Zhukovsky) and ports (Astrakhan, Makhachkala, Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Novorossiysk) used for sanctions circumvention, extends flight-ban coverage to 25 third-country airlines operating domestic Russian routes, and adds 83 asset-freeze listings (48 individuals, 35 entities) under Regulation 269/2014. Parallel measures cover Belarus and the non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine. Entry into force on 25 February 2025.

South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy issued the 36th amendment to the Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items (전략물자수출입고시) as MOTIE Notice No. 2025-20, with promulgation on 24 February 2025 and effect from 28 February 2025. The amendment adds 21 advanced-technology items and technologies — including quantum computers, AI-class semiconductors, 3D-printing equipment, isotopes for quantum computing, ultra-low-temperature measurement equipment, and high-temperature coatings — to the Strategic Items List, implementing recent updates from the Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Australia Group multilateral export-control regimes. The same amendment introduces a humanitarian-medical-device carve-out for exports of diagnostic X-ray and radiographic imaging equipment to Russia, simplifies end-user verification (intermediaries deemed final end-user where verification is "extremely difficult"), extends the post-transaction reporting period from 7 days to 3 months, creates a self-disclosure system for non-compliance, and allows one-time extensions of individual export licences beyond original validity.

MOFCOM and the General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 10 [2025] on 4 February 2025, imposing dual-use export-licence controls on items related to tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum and indium under the Export Control Law and Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations. The controls cover metals, alloys, powders, compounds and related processing technologies across roughly 25 listed item categories (41 HS 10-digit codes). The measure is global in scope but was issued the same day China announced 10-15% retaliatory tariffs on US LNG, coal, crude and farm equipment in response to the Trump administration's 10% fentanyl-tariff hike — extending the MOFCOM critical-minerals control regime beyond gallium/germanium/graphite/antimony/heavy-REEs.

Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) revised its Foreign End-User List, the reference list of foreign organisations for which concern cannot be eliminated regarding involvement in the development of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, used to support catch-all export-licence requirements. The revision added 42 entities, taking the list to 748 entities from 15 countries and regions, and applies from 5 February 2025.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 11 entities under 11 entries to the Entity List, all listed under the destination of China, People's Republic of (China). The rule also revises one existing entry on the Entity List under the destination of India. BIS determined the added entities have been involved in, are involved in, or pose a significant risk of becoming involved in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. License requirements apply to all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy. The rule was effective on publication, January 16, 2025. This action is the companion piece to the same-day 16-entity Sophgo-cluster addition (FR 2025-00480) — together totalling the "27 Chinese companies" referenced in trade-press coverage.

China's Unreliable Entity List Working Mechanism, led by MOFCOM, issued Announcement [2025] No. 1 on 2 January 2025 designating 10 US defense entities — five Lockheed Martin subsidiaries (Missiles and Fire Control, Aeronautics, Missile System Integration Lab, Advanced Technology Laboratories, Ventures), the Javelin Joint Venture (Raytheon/Lockheed Martin), Raytheon Missile Systems, and three General Dynamics units (Ordnance and Tactical Systems, Information Technology, Mission Systems) — as Unreliable Entities under the 19 September 2020 Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List, citing their participation in US arms sales to Taiwan. The measures prohibit the 10 firms from engaging in import/export activity related to China and from making new investments in China, and bar approval/renewal of work permits and stay/residence qualifications for their senior executives. This is the first multi-entity UEL designation under the 2020 Provisions and was issued the same day as the parallel MOFCOM Announcement [2025] No. 1 of the export-control bureau adding 28 US entities to China's Export Control List — together establishing a coordinated two-track countermeasure template against US defense and dual-use industry.

On 16 December 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/3192 amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014, the 15th package of restrictive measures against Russia. The package adds 84 asset-freeze listings (54 individuals and 30 entities) under Regulation 269/2014 — for the first time including fully-fledged designations of seven Chinese individuals and entities supplying drone components, machine tools, and dual-use goods to the Russian military-industrial complex. It expands the EU shadow-fleet vessel- ban list by 52 tankers (total 79), activates the standalone EU hybrid- threats sanctions regime with its first 16-individual / 3-entity designations, extends the wind-down derogation for divestment from Russian subsidiaries to 31 December 2025, and reinforces anti- circumvention contractual clauses on EU exporters of dual-use goods.

China's Ministry of Commerce announced on 3 December 2024 (MOFCOM Announcement No. 46 of 2024) a formal ban on dual-use exports to the United States of gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials including diamond and cubic boron nitride. The measure also imposed strict end-use review on graphite exports to the US, with extra scrutiny of military end-uses. It came one day after BIS issued a major export- control package on 2 December 2024 expanding controls on Chinese semiconductor equipment and adding 140 entities to the Entity List, and was framed by MOFCOM as a national- security countermeasure.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations to impose a new "Regional Stability – Pakistan" (RS-PAK) licence requirement on exports, reexports, and in-country transfers to Pakistan of items classified under six previously-uncontrolled-for-Pakistan ECCNs: 1B999, 2A992, 2B999 (excluding 2B999.h.2), 3A992, 3A999, and 6A996. The covered items — process-control equipment, high-pressure piping and valves, oscilloscopes, electronic test equipment, magnetometers, and related dual-use industrial gear — are associated with unsafeguarded nuclear and ballistic-missile end-uses. Licence applications are reviewed case-by-case to assess diversion risk to Pakistan's nuclear weapons or ballistic missile programmes, and to entities already on the Entity List or front companies acting on their behalf. Issued as a final rule under ECRA §1762(a) (no notice-and-comment); originally effective 25 November 2024 with the corresponding amendatory instructions, with the substantive licence requirement effective 26 December 2024 (post C1-2024-27648 correction published 29 November 2024).

Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Decree No. 792 on 19 October 2024 promulgating the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Controls for Dual-Use Items, with effect from 1 December 2024. The regulation, organised in six chapters and 50 articles, consolidates the previously fragmented nuclear / biological / chemical / missile dual-use control regimes into a single State Council framework operationalising the 2020 Export Control Law. It introduces a control-list / temporary-control / watchlist architecture, a statutory end-user / end-use commitment regime, transit / transhipment / re-export controls, extraterritorial reach over PRC items downstream, and explicit linkage to the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. On 15 November 2024 MOFCOM, MIIT, GAC and SCA jointly issued Announcement No. 51 of 2024 publishing the consolidated Dual-Use Items Export Control List with a unified five-character ECCN-style coding system, also effective 1 December 2024.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 8 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 2. Of the 8 additions, 3 are under China, 2 under Germany, 1 under Pakistan, and 2 under Türkiye. Of the 2 removals, 1 is under Saudi Arabia and 1 under China. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting any item subject to the EAR. The rule was published and effective the same day, 16 October 2024 (89 FR 83428, FR Doc 2024-23638).

Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs amended the Eksportkontrollforskrift (Regulations on the export of defence- related products, dual-use items, technology and services) to add a new national control list — Annex III ("List III") — for emerging and disruptive technologies not yet covered by the EU dual-use list. Exports of items on Annex III require a licence from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regardless of destination, including a catch-all licensing obligation. Controls cover semiconductor manufacturing equipment (including dry-etch apparatus), enriched silicon/germanium substrates, high- performance integrated circuits, quantum computers above specified controlled-qubit thresholds, quantum software and technology, software/technology for reverse-engineering integrated-circuit layouts, and additive-manufacturing equipment for metal/alloy components. The amendment, announced 3 October 2024 and effective 1 November 2024 (with a one-month transitional period), aligns Norway with parallel national measures adopted by the United States (BIS 6 Sep 2024 emerging- technology IFR), the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Japan, Spain, Denmark and Finland.

MOTIE brought the 35th amendment of the Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Items into force on 9 September 2024, adding 243 items (notice Annex 2-2 numbers 1160-1402) to the situational-licence list for Russia and Belarus, taking that list to 1,402 items. The added items are described as having a high likelihood of military diversion (metal-cutting machinery, machine-tool parts, optical-equipment parts, sensors). Exports of the added items are prohibited in principle from 9 September, with licence applications admitted only for contracts concluded by 8 September and case-by-case categories such as exports to Korean companies' local subsidiaries. The same release tightens administrative penalties for deliberate export-control violations.

Cabinet Resolution No. 97 of 2024 is the implementing regulation of UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 43 of 2021 on Commodities Subject to Non-Proliferation. It operationalises the UAE's horizontal dual-use export-control regime, empowering the Executive Office for Control & Non-Proliferation (EOCN) to designate prohibited and restricted goods on the National Control List and to issue export/transit/re-export permits within 20 working days. The Control List covers nuclear materials, chemicals and precursors, electronics, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation systems, avionics, marine and aerospace equipment, propulsion systems, and "national controlled commodities" (armoured vehicles, autonomous equipment). This is the regulatory architecture under which post-G42 advanced AI-chip outbound flows from the UAE are licensed.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 68544; FR Doc 2024-19130) added 123 entities under 131 entries to the Entity List with destinations Russia (63), China (42), Iran (11), Turkey (8), and one each in Canada, Cyprus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Crimea Region of Ukraine, Ukraine, and the United Arab Emirates. The dominant rationale is Russia-diversion enforcement: Chinese, Turkish and other third-country firms (e.g., MAK Logistics, Megatek Ltd., Wellgo International, AllChips Limited, Chipgoo Electronics) named for supplying U.S.-origin electronics and dual-use items to Russian industry and military, plus designation of large numbers of Russian military manufacturers (e.g., JSC 75 Arsenal, FSE Aleksinsky Chemical Plant) as military end users. License requirement is "all items subject to the EAR" with policy/presumption of denial; case-by-case for EAR99 food and medicine to certain Russian military end users. Effective on publication 2024-08-27.

BIS final rule (FR Doc 2024-19132, 89 FR 68539, published 27 August 2024) expanding the Russia/Belarus-Military End User (MEU) Foreign-Direct Product (FDP) rule under the Export Administration Regulations so that it also applies to transactions involving Entity List entries posing a significant diversion risk to Russia's and Belarus's defense industry or intelligence services — the rule is renamed accordingly. The rule also imposes new export, reexport, and in-country transfer controls on software for the operation of computer numerical control (CNC) machine tools destined for Russia or Belarus, and makes corrections eliminating obsolete cross- references introduced by the BIS 25 January 2024 and 18 June 2024 Russia/Belarus final rules. Effective 27 August 2024, except amendatory instruction 11 effective 16 September 2024.

The Defence and Strategic Goods List (DSGL) 2024 was registered on the Federal Register of Legislation on 16 August 2024 under the Customs Act 1901 and Defence Trade Controls Act 2012, repealing and replacing the DSGL 2021. It comprises the Munitions List (Part 1) and the Dual-Use List (Part 2, nine technology categories including nuclear materials, chemicals, electronics, sensors and marine and aerospace equipment) that Australia controls for export, brokering and intangible transfer. The 2024 instrument periodically realigns the list with changes agreed in the multilateral non-proliferation and export-control regimes Australia belongs to (Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group); most changes are clarifications to existing controls, with a smaller number of items entering or leaving control or having their approval requirements adjusted.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 persons to the Unverified List (UVL) and removing 8. Additions are under five destinations: China (8), Türkiye (2), Cyprus (1), Kyrgyzstan (1), and the United Arab Emirates (1). Removals span China (6), UAE (1) and Russia (1). The single Russian entry (EFO Ltd.) was removed from the UVL because BIS simultaneously moved it to the Entity List, allowing BIS to delete Russia entirely as a UVL destination. UVL placement does not impose a license-denial presumption (unlike the Entity List) but suspends EAR license exceptions for shipments to listed parties and requires US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before exporting items subject to the EAR. Published and effective the same day, 3 July 2024 (89 FR 55036, FR Doc 2024-14642).

On 29 June 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1865 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1864, amending Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 to extend Belarus's sanctions regime so that it mirrors the restrictive measures already in force against Russia, closing routes used to circumvent the Russia sanctions via Belarus. The package bans the import of gold, diamonds, helium, coal and other mineral products (including crude oil) originating in or exported from Belarus; bans the import of goods and technology on the EU Common Military List if of Belarusian origin; extends the export ban on dual-use goods, oil-refining and LNG-liquefaction equipment, maritime-navigation goods and luxury goods to Belarus; prohibits transit via Belarus of EU-exported firearms and ammunition; and broadens the road-transport ban. The measures entered into force on 1 July 2024, the day after publication in the Official Journal.

On 24 June 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745, the 14th package of restrictive measures against Russia, amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014. The package introduces the EU's first targeted measures against Russian LNG (a ban on EU-port transhipment to third countries after a 9-month transition, and a prohibition on EU investment and goods/services exports to Russian LNG projects under construction such as Arctic LNG 2 and Murmansk LNG), bans EU entities outside Russia from using the SPFS Russian financial-messaging system, designates 27 named "shadow-fleet" tankers under a new vessel-specific port-access ban, and imposes a "best-efforts" obligation on EU parents to ensure non-EU subsidiaries do not engage in sanctions circumvention. It adds 116 new listings (69 individuals, 47 entities), including third-country circumvention enablers, to the asset-freeze and travel-ban regime.

BIS final rule (FR Doc 2024-13148, 89 FR 51644, RIN 0694-AJ87) expanding the Export Administration Regulations' Russia and Belarus sanctions architecture. Effective 12 June 2024 (most provisions) and 16 September 2024 (the EAR99 enterprise-software paragraph at §746.8(a)(8)), the rule introduces a new licence requirement for thirteen named categories of EAR99 enterprise software (ERP, CRM, BI, SCM, EDW, CMMS, project management, PLM, BIM, CAD, CAM, ETO) destined for Russia or Belarus; permits address-only Entity List designations to capture high-diversion addresses; adds eight Hong Kong addresses to the Entity List; and refines the Russia/Belarus Industry Sector Sanctions and Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule. Released the day before the G7 Italy summit alongside coordinated OFAC, State, and Treasury actions that together designated 300+ persons and entities.

Japan's National Diet enacted the Act on the Protection and Use of Critical Economic Security Information (重要経済安保情報の保護及び活用に関する法律, Act No. 27 of 2024) on 10 May 2024; it was promulgated on 17 May 2024 and came into full operation on 16 May 2025. The law establishes Japan's first peace-time economic-security clearance regime extending to private-sector employees. It designates "Critical Economic Security Information" (CESI) covering threat-intelligence on critical-infrastructure cyber attacks, regulatory-review information on essential infrastructure, and vulnerability data on critical-product supply chains; mandates Cabinet Office "適性評価" (suitability assessment) for cleared personnel; and imposes criminal penalties of up to five years' imprisonment for unauthorised disclosure. The CESI Act complements the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA), closing the information-protection gap and aligning Japan's framework with Five Eyes and EU partners for joint R&D and dual-use cooperation.

Final rule by the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published in the Federal Register on 10 May 2024 (89 FR 40369; FR Doc 2024-10280; effective 30 May 2024) making conforming and clarifying amendments to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The most substantive change removes Cyprus from EAR Country Group D:5 — codifying in the EAR the suspension of the US arms embargo on the Republic of Cyprus previously announced by the Department of State. The rule also standardises destination names (Swaziland → Eswatini, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of) → North Macedonia, Turkey → Türkiye), corrects inadvertently-listed NS1/RS1/MT1 license requirements for Australia and the United Kingdom, removes obsolete footnote 3 designations, and removes redundant standalone references to "Russia" and "Russian Federation" in EAR provisions that already invoke Country Group D:5 (which encompasses both). The rule is largely administrative; the Cyprus D:5 removal is its only operational change to license requirements.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (IFR) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove list-based license requirements — including National Security Column 1 (NS1), Regional Stability Column 1 (RS1) and Missile Technology Column 1 (MT1) reasons-for-control — for exports, reexports and in-country transfers to or within Australia and the United Kingdom. The IFR also expands the availability of license exceptions and reduces the scope of end-use and end-user-based license requirements for the two AUKUS partners, while leaving firearms-related items (Crime Control / CC) and a narrow set of other ECCNs untouched. The rule is the EAR-side companion to a parallel DDTC proposed rule creating an ITAR §126.7 exemption for defense articles and services traded among authorised AU/UK/US users, and is the foundational regulatory implementation of the AUKUS Pillar 2 advanced-capability cooperation track.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 25503; FR Doc 2024-07760) added 11 entries to the Entity List under China (6), Russia (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2), effective 2024-04-11. The primary rationale for the Russia and UAE tranches — and at least one China entity (Shenzhen Jiasibo Technology) — is procurement of US-controlled dual-use aerospace and UAV components for Iran's Shahed- series UAV programme via the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA); those drones have been used against oil tankers in the Middle East and deployed by Russia in Ukraine. The remaining five China entities were designated for acquiring US-origin items to support China's military modernisation. The rule also adds one alias to the existing entry for Shanghai Biren Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. This action was the first Entity List final rule published after BIS implemented the 50 Percent Rule for controlling foreign subsidiaries of listed entities.

The Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024 (C2024A00021) received Royal Assent on 8 April 2024 and created three new criminal offences in the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012: section 10A (supply of Defence and Strategic Goods List technology in Australia to a non-exempt foreign person); section 10B (secondary supply of DSGL Part 1 Munitions or Part 2 Dual-Use Sensitive/Very Sensitive goods or technology outside Australia when originally exported from Australia); and section 10C (provision of DSGL Part 1 services to foreign nationals outside Australia). All three offences carry maximum penalties of 10 years imprisonment or 2,500 penalty units (~A$782,500), or both. The offence framework commenced 1 September 2024 with a six-month compliance-transition period; criminal liability attached from 1 March 2025. The Act also codifies AUKUS-partnership exemptions, carving out supplies to and from citizens and permanent residents of the United Kingdom and United States, underpinning the licence-free trilateral technology-transfer environment sought under AUKUS Pillar 2.

The Aizsardzības industrijas likums (Defence Industry Law), adopted by the Saeima on 27 March 2024 and published in Latvijas Vēstnesis No. 70 on 10 April 2024, is Latvia's first standalone statute codifying state-support instruments for domestically registered defence-industrial-base firms. The law establishes a strategic-partnership agreement framework between the Ministry of Defence and Latvian-registered defence-tech manufacturers (including the Latvian drone-tech cluster — Atlas Aerospace, UAV Factory, Edge Autonomy Latvia), defines continuity-of-operations and supply-security obligations for strategic-partner firms, and provides a procurement-preference channel for Latvian-registered defence suppliers in MoD and State Defence Logistics and Procurement Centre contracting. The law also streamlines export-licence processing for qualified Latvian strategic- goods exporters and aligns state-support measures with EU Treaty Article 346 defence-exemption and EU European Defence Fund / EDIRPA co-financing rules.

Latvia's Saeima adopted on 27 March 2024 amendments to the National Security Law (Nacionālās drošības likums), entering into force on 24 April 2024, that widen the perimeter of foreign-investment and ownership transactions subject to Cabinet of Ministers pre-clearance over "companies of significance to national security." The amendments expand the universe of regulated subjects beyond registered companies to include foundations and associations, tighten the rules on beneficial-ownership disclosure, and bring additional sensitive activities — energy security including LNG-terminal acquisitions, electronic communications, cybersecurity, and critical-raw-materials processing — under the regime, while clarifying Cabinet authority to impose conditions or unwind transactions retroactively. The law functions as Latvia's horizontal FDI-screening instrument under the EU-wide cooperation framework of Regulation 2019/452.

BIS amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on 15 March 2024 to apply more restrictive dual-use export, reexport, and in-country transfer controls on Nicaragua. The rule adds Nicaragua to Country Group D:5 (U.S. Arms-Embargoed Countries) and moves it from Country Group B to Country Group D:1 (national security concerns), effective the same day. The action aligns EAR country-group treatment with a concurrent State Department decision under ITAR §126.1, driven by the Nicaraguan government's human rights abuses and its deepening military and security cooperation with Russia.

On 29 February 2024 Switzerland's WBF decided to align with the EU's 13th Russia sanctions package by amending the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), effective 1 March 2024 at 18:00 CET. The amendment adds over 100 individuals and nearly 90 entities — mainly Russian military-industrial-complex firms and suppliers of DPRK-sourced weapons to Russia — to the asset-freeze and designation lists, and extends the dual-use/military-technology export ban to 27 additional companies believed to be circumventing existing controls.

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 14403, Doc 2024-03674) adding two entities under seven entries to the Entity List, effective February 27, 2024. Sandvine Incorporated, a Canadian deep packet inspection vendor, is listed across six destinations (Canada, India, Japan, Malaysia, Sweden, UAE) because it supplies DPI technology to the Government of Egypt where it is used for mass web-monitoring and censorship. Chengdu Beizhan Electronics Co., Ltd. is listed under China for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items on behalf of the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC), a PLA-affiliated institution already on the Entity List. All items subject to the EAR require a license with a presumption-of-denial review policy for both entities. The rule also revises entries for two existing Chinese entities and removes one UAE entry.