Loading…
Loading…
Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated more than 35 individuals and entities tied to Iranian brothers Mansour, Nasser, and Fazlolah Zarringhalam, whom OFAC says have collectively laundered billions of dollars through the international financial system using Iranian exchange houses (including Zarrin Ghalam, GCM Exchange, and Berelian Exchange) and foreign front companies based in the UAE and Hong Kong. The network is used to move revenue from Iranian oil and petrochemical sales that fund the regime's nuclear and missile programs and terrorist proxies. The action, taken pursuant to Executive Order 13902, is the first designation round under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2's "maximum pressure" campaign since its February 4, 2025 issuance; Treasury's FinCEN concurrently issued an updated advisory on Iranian shadow-banking and oil-smuggling red flags for financial institutions.
On 20 May 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 17th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/932 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/933 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings). Sectoral measures include the largest single-package expansion of the shadow-fleet port-access ban (additional vessel listings layered on top of the 153 designations carried over from the 16th package), the addition of 31 entities — including third-country (Chinese, Turkish, UAE, Hong Kong) firms — to the Annex IV list of military end-users barred from receiving dual-use and critical industry goods (covering chemical precursors used in missile propellants and spare parts for high-precision machine tools), and reinforced anti-circumvention "no-Russia" clause obligations on EU exporters. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/933 imposes asset freezes on 17 additional individuals and 58 additional entities, including shadow-fleet vessels and operators, a major Russian oil company, Russian military/defence-sector firms, and persons involved in the looting of Ukrainian cultural heritage. Parallel hybrid-threat, human-rights, and chemical-weapons designations were adopted under separate horizontal regimes on the same day. The Council noted EU shadow-fleet and oil-price-cap measures had reduced Russian revenues by approximately EUR 38 billion since introduction. Entry into force on 21 May 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal).
On 20 May 2025 the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office updated the UK Sanctions List, adding 82 entries (20 individuals and 62 entities) under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. OFSI's accompanying Financial Sanctions Notice confirms all 82 are now subject to an asset freeze and trust services sanctions. The package covers three clusters: further members of the Kremlin-linked Social Design Agency (SDA) disinformation network (first designated in 2024); Russian financial institutions including the St Petersburg Currency Exchange, the Petersburg Settlement Center, and the State Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency; and individuals and companies supporting Russia's oil "shadow fleet" logistics, including a British national accused of ship procurement and two tanker captains. The measures were published in coordination with the EU's 17th sanctions package, announced the same day.
On 1 May 2025 the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), jointly with FinCEN, designated two Mexican nationals — Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva and J. Refugio Ruiz Villagomez — and nine entities they own or control, pursuant to Executive Order 14059 (illicit drug trade) and E.O. 13224 (as amended), for facilitating a Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) fuel-theft and cross-border smuggling scheme ("huachicol fiscal") that falsifies customs documentation to evade Mexico's IEPS fuel-import tax. FinCEN concurrently issued a supplemental alert on fuel-smuggling and fiscal fuel-theft red flags. All property and interests in property of the designees within US jurisdiction are blocked, and US persons are generally barred from transacting with them.
Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Order No. 803 on 23 March 2025 promulgating the "Regulations on Implementation of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People's Republic of China" (22 articles), effective on the date of publication (24 March 2025). The Regulations operationalise the 2021 Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law by clarifying the scope of countermeasure tools — explicitly extending "other property" subject to seizure to cash, bank deposits, securities, equity, intellectual property and accounts receivable, and listing the specific transaction and cooperation activities that may be prohibited or restricted (education, S&T, legal services, environment, trade, culture, tourism, health, sports, data and cross-border data transfers). They define inter-agency procedure, evidence and notice requirements for designations, and bind PRC organisations and individuals — including foreign-invested entities operating in China — to implement countermeasures, with sanctions including exclusion from government procurement, import/export and cross-border-data restrictions, and exit/stay restrictions for responsible persons.
On 24 February 2025, the third anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union adopted the 16th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/395 amending Regulation 833/2014 and a cluster of associated regulations (2025/389, 2025/390, 2025/392, 2025/398, 2025/401). The package introduces the EU's first import ban on Russian primary aluminium (CN 7601) under a 275 kt transition quota (~80% of 2024 volumes), expels 13 additional Russian banks from the SWIFT financial-messaging system, adds 74 vessels (153 total) to the shadow-fleet port-access and services ban, prohibits any temporary storage of Russian crude and petroleum products in EU ports, bans transactions with major Russian airports (Moscow Vnukovo, Zhukovsky) and ports (Astrakhan, Makhachkala, Ust-Luga, Primorsk, Novorossiysk) used for sanctions circumvention, extends flight-ban coverage to 25 third-country airlines operating domestic Russian routes, and adds 83 asset-freeze listings (48 individuals, 35 entities) under Regulation 269/2014. Parallel measures cover Belarus and the non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine. Entry into force on 25 February 2025.
Canada made SOR/2025-33, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, registered and effective 2025-02-21. The regulations add 32 individuals (Schedule 1, Part 1) and 44 entities (Schedule 1, Part 2) tied to Russia's military-industrial base, sanctions circumvention, disinformation and the forced deportation/filtration of Ukrainian children. A new Schedule 1.1 lists 109 vessels by IMO number — 92 oil tankers and 9 LNG tankers moving Russian energy exports to third countries, plus 8 vessels moving arms and related material between Russia, Iran and North Korea — banning their access to Canadian ports and waters and prohibiting dealings, asset provision and financial/other services in relation to them.
On 4 February 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-2, "Imposing Maximum Pressure on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Denying Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, and Countering Iran's Malign Influence." The memorandum reimposes the first- term "maximum pressure" framework, directing the Secretaries of State and Treasury and the Attorney General to (i) drive Iran's exports of crude oil and petroleum products — including to the People's Republic of China — to zero; (ii) review and modify or rescind sanctions waivers and general licences (notably the Chabahar port waiver benefiting India); (iii) sanction shadow-fleet vessels, intermediaries, refineries (including PRC "teapot" refiners) and oil traders facilitating Iranian energy exports; and (iv) lead a diplomatic isolation campaign including a snapback of UN Security Council sanctions under JCPOA Resolution 2231 paragraph 11. Since promulgation, OFAC has designated 1,000+ Iran-related persons, vessels and aircraft and four PRC independent ("teapot") refiners alleged to have processed sanctioned Iranian crude. The DOJ is also directed to pursue impoundment of Iranian oil cargoes and seizure of Iranian assets to satisfy US-court terrorism-victim judgments.
On 16 December 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/3192 amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014, the 15th package of restrictive measures against Russia. The package adds 84 asset-freeze listings (54 individuals and 30 entities) under Regulation 269/2014 — for the first time including fully-fledged designations of seven Chinese individuals and entities supplying drone components, machine tools, and dual-use goods to the Russian military-industrial complex. It expands the EU shadow-fleet vessel- ban list by 52 tankers (total 79), activates the standalone EU hybrid- threats sanctions regime with its first 16-individual / 3-entity designations, extends the wind-down derogation for divestment from Russian subsidiaries to 31 December 2025, and reinforces anti- circumvention contractual clauses on EU exporters of dual-use goods.
FinCEN issued a final order, published in the Federal Register on 11 October 2024 (signed 26 September 2024), prohibiting US covered financial institutions from engaging in transmittals of funds to or from PM2BTC, a virtual-currency exchange operating outside the United States and identified as a primary money-laundering concern in connection with Russian illicit finance. The order is the first use of FinCEN's special- measure authority under Section 9714(a) of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act, as amended by the FY 2022 NDAA (codified at 31 U.S.C. 5323). The action was coordinated with same-day OFAC SDN designations of related entities (Cryptex) and individuals (Sergey Sergeevich Ivanov of Taleon Holdings).
The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published in the Federal Register reporting instructions implementing Section 104(a) of the Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity (REPO) for Ukrainians Act (P.L. 118-50, Division F, enacted April 24, 2024). All US financial institutions at which Russian sovereign assets are located — or that know or should know of such assets, including in correspondent or payable-through accounts — must report those holdings to OFAC using Form TD-F 93.09. Initial reports were due by August 2, 2024, with rolling reports required within 10 days of detecting newly identified Russian sovereign assets. The notice is the predicate step for any future US seizure or transfer of frozen Russian central bank, National Wealth Fund, or Russian Ministry of Finance assets to benefit Ukraine.
On 24 June 2024 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745, the 14th package of restrictive measures against Russia, amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014. The package introduces the EU's first targeted measures against Russian LNG (a ban on EU-port transhipment to third countries after a 9-month transition, and a prohibition on EU investment and goods/services exports to Russian LNG projects under construction such as Arctic LNG 2 and Murmansk LNG), bans EU entities outside Russia from using the SPFS Russian financial-messaging system, designates 27 named "shadow-fleet" tankers under a new vessel-specific port-access ban, and imposes a "best-efforts" obligation on EU parents to ensure non-EU subsidiaries do not engage in sanctions circumvention. It adds 116 new listings (69 individuals, 47 entities), including third-country circumvention enablers, to the asset-freeze and travel-ban regime.
OFAC final rule (FR Doc 2024-11618, 89 FR 46518) amending the Cuban Assets Control Regulations at 31 CFR Part 515 to further implement the May 2022 Biden administration policy of expanded support for the Cuban people. The rule reinstates the "U-turn" general license (authorizing US banks to process funds transfers that originate and terminate outside the US, neither originator nor beneficiary a US person); replaces "self-employed individual" with the broader "independent private sector entrepreneur" (covering Cuban private businesses up to 100 employees, including private cooperatives); authorizes Cuban nationals in the private sector and located in Cuba to open and operate accounts at US financial institutions (including via online/mobile banking); and expands authorizations for internet-based services to support Cuban civil society and private-sector entrepreneurs. Effective 29 May 2024.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published in the Federal Register "Directive 1 under Executive Order 14014, 'Prohibitions Related to Financial Services to or for the Benefit of Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise.'" The Directive — originally issued on OFAC's website on 2023-10-31 with a 2023-12-15 effective date — determines that MOGE is a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of Burma and prohibits U.S. persons from providing, exporting, or reexporting, directly or indirectly, financial services to or for the benefit of MOGE. The Federal Register publication codifies notice of the Directive in the formal record of agency action; the underlying prohibition has been operative since December 2023.
On 29 February 2024 Switzerland's WBF decided to align with the EU's 13th Russia sanctions package by amending the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), effective 1 March 2024 at 18:00 CET. The amendment adds over 100 individuals and nearly 90 entities — mainly Russian military-industrial-complex firms and suppliers of DPRK-sourced weapons to Russia — to the asset-freeze and designation lists, and extends the dual-use/military-technology export ban to 27 additional companies believed to be circumventing existing controls.
Canada made SOR/2024-32, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, registered and effective 2024-02-21 on the second anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The regulations add 163 persons to Schedule 1 — 10 individuals and 153 entities, predominantly Russian organizations tied to military-industrial production, logistics, insurance and oil-sector support — triggering Canadian dealing/asset bans. A parallel amendment to Schedule 7 adds five new goods categories under the Harmonized System (explosives and pyrotechnics; data-processing units and components; ball and roller bearings; semiconductor manufacturing equipment; optical and navigational instruments), banning their export to Russia or Russian persons.
On 31 January 2024 Switzerland's Federal Council decided to align with the EU's 12th sanctions package (adopted 18 December 2023) by amending the Ordinance on Measures Relating to the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), entering into force the same day at 18:00. The update extends Switzerland's Russia-sanctions perimeter to match the EU's additions — including the Russian diamond, steel and other import-revenue restrictions — and adds a new financial-sector prohibition barring Russian nationals and Russia-resident individuals from controlling Swiss crypto-asset service providers, aimed at closing sanctions-circumvention and enforcement gaps.
The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) reached a $968,618,825 settlement with Binance Holdings, Ltd. — a Cayman Islands–domiciled virtual-currency exchange — to resolve civil liability for 1,667,153 apparent violations of multiple sanctions programs (Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Syria, and the Crimea region of Ukraine) committed between August 2017 and October 2022. OFAC determined the apparent violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and that Binance's conduct was egregious; the settlement requires a five-year independent compliance monitor and was announced concurrently with parallel DOJ, FinCEN, and CFTC resolutions totaling approximately $4.3 billion in aggregate (including criminal forfeiture and BSA/AML penalties), alongside a separate criminal plea by founder Changpeng Zhao. The settlement is the largest civil monetary penalty in OFAC's history.
On 16 August 2023 the Swiss Federal Council amended the Ordinance of 4 March 2022 on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), aligning with the EU's 11th Russia sanctions package. The amendment adds two UAE-headquartered firms to the list of entities barred from exemptions to Switzerland's dual-use export ban on Russia, restricts the sale of securities issued after 6 August 2023 to Russian nationals, residents, entities and businesses regardless of currency, and adds 12 individuals and 87 entities to the asset-freeze list, targeting dual-use/military-tech exporters, FSB-licensed IT firms, propagandists and government officials. It entered into force the same day at 18:00 CEST.
OFAC replaced the abbreviated July 2014 South Sudan Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 558) with a comprehensive final rule that adds interpretive guidance, definitions, and general licenses while implementing the full set of prohibitions in Executive Order 13664 of April 3, 2014. The rule does not expand the underlying blocking authority or add new designations; it codifies the existing program in a complete regulatory framework accessible to the public and regulated community. Target: persons threatening South Sudan's peace, security, or stability, obstructing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or responsible for human rights abuses or conflict-mineral trade that finances armed groups.
On 24 February 2023 the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions on 22 individuals and 83 entities, which Treasury describes as targeting key sectors, evasion efforts and military supplies. Treasury issued a determination under Executive Order 14024 identifying the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy as a sector subject to sanctions, and designated 11 Russian financial institutions, including Credit Bank of Moscow, plus Russian defence and advanced-materials enterprises and third-country evasion facilitators. General Licenses 60 and 61 authorise wind-down of dealings with newly blocked entities through 25 May 2023.
FinCEN issued an order on 18 January 2023, published in the Federal Register on 23 January 2023 (FR Doc 2023-01189), prohibiting US covered financial institutions from transmitting funds to, from, or through Bitzlato Limited, a virtual-currency exchange incorporated in Hong Kong and identified as a primary money-laundering concern in connection with Russian illicit finance. The order invokes Section 9714(a) of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act, as amended by Section 6106 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (31 U.S.C. 5323). The action was coordinated with a DOJ criminal arrest of Bitzlato co-founder Anatoly Legkodymov and a parallel Europol/Eurojust-supported disruption of Bitzlato's infrastructure, effective 18 January 2023.
OFAC published an interim final rule creating 31 CFR Part 599 to implement Executive Order 14059 (December 15, 2021), which declared a national emergency regarding the unusual and extraordinary threat posed by the global illicit drug trade, including fentanyl and synthetic opioid trafficking. The regulations establish blocking prohibitions, SDN List designation procedures, and enforcement mechanisms targeting foreign persons who materially contribute to international drug proliferation. OFAC stated it would supplement this interim rule with more comprehensive final regulations covering licensing, reporting, and penalty procedures.
OFAC issued a determination under Executive Order 14071 (Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions) effective December 5, 2022, establishing a $60/barrel price cap on Russian seaborne crude oil. The measure prohibits US persons from providing six categories of covered services — trading/commodities brokering, financing, shipping, insurance (including reinsurance and P&I), flagging, and customs brokering — for the maritime transport of Russian crude oil unless the oil is purchased at or below $60/bbl. The determination was coordinated with the EU, G7 nations, and Australia as a unified coalition instrument designed to reduce Russian oil revenues while keeping global energy markets supplied. Three general licenses (GL 55, 56, 57) carved out limited exemptions for Japan's Sakhalin-2 imports, certain EU landlocked states, and vessel emergencies.
OFAC reissued the Cyber-Related Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 578) in their entirety on 6 September 2022, replacing the abbreviated placeholder framework first published on 31 December 2015. The reissuance implements Executive Order 13694 (1 April 2015, blocking property of persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities) and Executive Order 13757 (28 December 2016, expanding that authority to include election interference). The full-form regulations add interpretive definitions, general licences, and civil-penalties provisions — providing compliance clarity for US financial institutions and technology companies without expanding the underlying sanctions perimeter.
On 13 July 2022 OFAC formally published in the Federal Register two general licenses (GL 2 and GL 10) that had been issued under the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions program and made available previously only on OFAC's website. Both licenses had already expired by the time of publication: GL 2 (EO 13662 Directive 4 wind-down, expired September 2014) authorised a limited window to wind down contracts involving Russian energy-sector entities subject to sectoral sanctions, while GL 10 (EO 13685 Crimea, expired October 2016) authorised divestiture of holdings in blocked Russian infrastructure entity PJSC Mostotrest. The Federal Register codification is an administrative archival step with no substantive change to the sanctions regime.
The UK laid the Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2022 (UKSI 2022/748), in force 5 July 2022, extending the Belarus sanctions regime to mirror measures already imposed on Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. The regulations ban export to Belarus of dual-use goods and technology for all purposes, and of critical-industry goods and technology including quantum-computing components, microelectronics, marine and navigation equipment, and aircraft/aircraft parts. They widen existing import bans to cover a greater range of petroleum/mineral products and prohibit import of arms, iron and steel products originating in or consigned from Belarus, and extend financial sanctions barring Belarusian companies from issuing debt or securities in London or obtaining loans from UK banks, and barring UK persons from providing financial services to the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus or the Belarusian Ministry of Finance.
OFAC adopted a final rule on 1 July 2022 amending the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR, 31 CFR Part 594) to implement Executive Order 13886 ("Modernizing Sanctions To Combat Terrorism," 9 September 2019). The rule expands the designation criteria in §594.201 to reflect EO 13886's additions, allowing OFAC to block property of foreign persons who act on behalf of, or provide material support to, foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) — broadening the perimeter beyond EO 13224's original focus on persons threatening international peace and stability through terrorism. Supporting amendments update cross-references and the definition of "effective date" throughout Part 594 to reflect the new authority baseline.
The Council of the EU adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/878 of 3 June 2022, implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. The regulation adds 65 individuals and 18 legal entities to Annex I, subjecting them to an EU-wide asset freeze and a prohibition on EU persons or entities making funds or economic resources available to them. The listed entities span Russia's defense-industrial base, military-linked vehicle and tyre manufacturing, and financial-market infrastructure.
On 3 June 2022 the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/879, the sixth package of sanctions against Russia over the invasion of Ukraine, further amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. It bans the seaborne import of Russian crude oil and refined petroleum products, covering roughly two-thirds of EU oil imports from Russia at adoption (pipeline deliveries via Druzhba were temporarily exempted). It removes Sberbank, Credit Bank of Moscow and Russian Agricultural Bank from SWIFT (Annex XIV), bans EU operators from providing accounting, auditing, bookkeeping, tax consulting, business/management consulting and public-relations services to persons in Russia (new Article 5n), and adds three more Russian broadcasters to the EU broadcasting-suspension list (Annex XV). It entered into force on 4 June 2022, the day after publication in the Official Journal.
OFAC final rule (FR Doc 2022-12445, 87 FR 35068) amending the Cuban Assets Control Regulations at 31 CFR Part 515 to implement elements of the Biden administration's May 16, 2022 Cuba policy announcement supporting the Cuban people. The rule reinstates the group people-to-people educational travel general license (suspended under the Trump administration) for organizations sponsoring exchanges that promote meaningful contact with Cubans and support civil society; removes the $1,000 quarterly limit on family remittances to close relatives in Cuba; authorizes donative remittances to Cuban nationals not affiliated with the government or Communist Party; and expands authorizations for professional meetings and conferences in Cuba. Effective June 9, 2022.
On 2 May 2022 OFAC published a comprehensive final rule in the Federal Register renaming the Ukraine Related Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 589) to the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations and replacing the abbreviated regulatory text that had been in place since 2014 with a fully elaborated framework. The new Part 589 incorporates interpretive guidance, definitional provisions, and consolidated general licenses implementing Executive Orders 13660, 13661, and 13662 — the original March 2014 Ukraine/Crimea-crisis authorities. The rule does not introduce new substantive prohibitions; it formalises and makes accessible the regulatory infrastructure that underlies subsequent GL issuances (e.g., GL 13Q/13R, GL 15K/15L) and OFAC designation actions under the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions program.
On 16 March 2022 the Swiss Federal Council adopted a total revision of the Ordinance on Measures against Belarus (SR 946.231.116.9), aligning Switzerland's autonomous sanctions with the EU's Belarus regime. It bans imports of Belarusian petroleum products, potassium chloride ("potash"), wood, iron and steel, and cement and rubber products; bans exports of goods used to manufacture or process tobacco products, weapons, surveillance equipment, and goods usable for Belarus's military or security development; and imposes financial sanctions including a ban on public financing for trade with or investment in Belarus, restrictions on securities/loans/ deposits, a prohibition on transactions with the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus, and exclusion of listed Belarusian banks from SWIFT. The ordinance entered into force on the day it was adopted.
On 15 March 2022 the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/428, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (the fourth package of measures against Russia). It bans imports, purchase and transport of the iron and steel products listed in a new Annex XVII that originate in or are exported from Russia, bans the sale or export of Annex XVIII luxury goods to Russia (above EUR 300 per item unless otherwise specified), and prohibits transactions with the Russian state-controlled entities listed in Annex XIX. The Regulation entered into force on the day after its publication in the Official Journal (OJ L 87 I, 15.3.2022), i.e. 16 March 2022.
On 1 March 2022, OFAC published an interim final rule adding the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (RuHSR) at 31 CFR Part 587, codifying into Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations all prohibitions previously imposed by Executive Order 14024 of 15 April 2021. The regulations were issued in abbreviated form to provide immediate public guidance, with OFAC indicating an intent to supplement them with additional definitions, general licenses, and interpretive guidance. All transactions prohibited under EO 14024 — including prior sectoral determinations and directives targeting Russia's financial services sector, sovereign debt markets, and key state institutions — are formally prohibited under Part 587, giving domestic courts and compliance teams a stable regulatory anchor.
On 24 February 2022, hours after Russia's invasion of Ukraine began, the UK Foreign Secretary announced a full asset freeze on VTB, Russia's second-largest bank (£154bn in assets, 95,000 employees), alongside a freeze on all Russian bank assets in the UK and a ban on Russian companies raising finance on UK markets. The package designated more than 100 companies and individuals -- including five major defence firms (Rostec, Uralvagonzavod, Tactical Missile Corporation, United Aircraft Corporation, United Shipbuilding Corporation) and Putin-inner-circle figures such as Kirill Shamalov -- for asset freezes and travel bans. Aeroflot was banned from UK airspace and new export controls were imposed on electronics, telecommunications and aerospace goods to Russia.
Between 22 and 28 February 2022 — coinciding with Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine — OFAC issued a Financial Services Sectoral Determination and four directives under Executive Order 14024 of April 15, 2021. Together they authorise designation of any person operating in Russia's financial sector, prohibit US persons from trading Russian sovereign debt, bar US banks from maintaining correspondent accounts for designated Russian financial institutions (Sberbank, Alfa-Bank and others), prohibit new investment in certain Russia-related entities, and block all transactions involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund, and the Ministry of Finance — effectively freezing approximately USD 640 billion in Russian sovereign reserves held in Western financial systems. The package was formally published in the Federal Register on 31 May 2022.
The US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published abbreviated Hong Kong-Related Sanctions Regulations at 31 CFR Part 585, codifying the sanctions framework established by Executive Order 13936 of July 14, 2020 ("The President's Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization"). The regulations prohibit all transactions with persons designated under EO 13936 — those determined to have undermined Hong Kong's autonomy or contributed to the erosion of freedoms guaranteed under the Sino-British Joint Declaration — and add designated persons to the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. OFAC published the rules in abbreviated form for immediate public guidance, with intent to supplement with full interpretive guidance, general licenses, and licensing policy.
The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) to exclude entities and sub-entities identified on the Cuba Restricted List from three remittance general licences: §515.570 (outbound remittances), §515.572(a)(3) (remittance forwarding services), and §515.587 (other authorised remittances). The rule additionally amended the ordinarily-incident provision §515.421 to confirm that transactions routed through Cuba Restricted List entities are not covered even where the underlying licence does not expressly exclude them. The effective date was 30 days after Federal Register publication, on 26 November 2020.
On 8 October 2020, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) determined that section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 13902 (10 January 2020) applies to the financial sector of the Iranian economy, exposing non-US persons that operate in or knowingly facilitate significant transactions with that sector to secondary sanctions. Concurrently, OFAC designated eighteen Iranian banks (sixteen under E.O. 13902, one as an owned-or-controlled affiliate, and Hekmat Iranian Bank under E.O. 13382 non-proliferation authority). After a 45-day wind-down, the secondary-sanctions exposure became effective on 22 November 2020. The determination was formally republished in the Federal Register on 1 October 2025 (FR Doc 2025-19123) under Trump 2.0's maximum-pressure restoration; the underlying economic measure dates to the 2020 action.
Russia Federal Law No. 127-FZ of 4 June 2018 "On measures (countermeasures) regarding the unfriendly actions of the United States of America and other foreign states" establishes the statutory authority under which the President and Government of the Russian Federation may impose counter-measures against states that engage in "unfriendly actions" toward Russia. The law enumerates permissible countermeasure categories — including import/export prohibitions, restrictions on foreign participation in Russian state procurement, suspension of international cooperation obligations, and prohibition of foreign-company services and transactions — and delegates implementation authority to the President (primary) and Government. It entered into force on the day of official publication (4 June 2018) and is the foundational parent statute for every major Russian counter-sanctions presidential decree and government resolution subsequently issued, including the gas-for-roubles payment regime, capital controls, parallel- imports authorisation, and asset-confiscation counter-mechanism.