Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2667 actions· ✨ 89 recent

The UK Trade Remedies Authority initiated antidumping investigation AD0071 on 6 June 2025 into hot-rolled steel plate (flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel, 600mm+ width, hot-rolled, not clad/plated/coated, not in coils, 4.75mm+ thickness) originating in South Korea, following an application by UK producer Spartan UK Ltd. The TRA found South Korean imports grew from ~14,000 tonnes in 2021 to over 40,000 tonnes the following year. In April 2026 the TRA published its Statement of Essential Facts proposing duties of 7.04%-22.27% on narrow plates (600mm-2500mm width) — its preferred option — or 5.98%-24.28% if applied to the full scope, after an Economic Interest Test found full-scope duties would harm UK downstream sectors (renewable energy, shipbuilding, defence) reliant on wider-plate imports.

President Trump signed Executive Order 14307 on 6 June 2025 establishing the first whole-of-government Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) industrial-policy framework. The order (i) directs federal agencies to prioritise procurement and operation of US-manufactured UAS and to identify and rescind purchases of foreign-made drones where consistent with national security; (ii) tasks the FAA with proposing a Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) rule within 30 days and publishing a final BVLOS rule within 240 days; (iii) creates an eVTOL Integration Pilot Program (eIPP) with at least five projects selected within 180 days; and (iv) instructs the Federal Acquisition Security Council to publish a "Covered Foreign Entity List" within 30 days, operationalising the §1709 FY24 NDAA architecture that targets Chinese drone manufacturers (DJI, Autel and successor entities). Published in the Federal Register on 11 June 2025 (90 FR 24727).

On 4 June 2025 the Verkhovna Rada adopted Law No. 4473-IX, amending the Customs Code of Ukraine to exempt from import (customs) duty goods brought into Ukraine's customs territory for security and defence needs. The law entered into force on 15 June 2025. Coverage includes optical fibre and fibre-optic cable imported by enterprises for the manufacture or repair of unmanned aerial systems (drones) and other defence equipment, as well as materials supplied to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other authorised defence entities, removing a cost input for Ukraine's wartime domestic drone-manufacturing base. A companion law, No. 4474-IX, grants a parallel VAT exemption for the same import category.

On 4 June 2025 the Verkhovna Rada adopted Law No. 4474-IX, amending subsection 2 of section XX ("Transitional Provisions") of the Tax Code of Ukraine to exempt from value-added tax the import into Ukraine's customs territory of goods for security and defence needs, including optical fibre and fibre-optic cable used in the manufacture and repair of unmanned aerial systems (drones). The law entered into force on 15 June 2025. It is the VAT-side companion to Law No. 4473-IX (filed separately), which grants the equivalent customs-duty exemption for the same import category — the Rada split duty relief and VAT relief into two parallel statutory amendments passed the same day.

The UK Ministry of Defence announced a £5 billion technology investment package to accelerate domestic defence innovation, split between more than £4 billion (including over £2 billion in new funding) for autonomous systems and nearly £1 billion this Parliament for directed-energy weapons (DEW). The package funds acceleration of the DragonFire high-power laser toward fielding on Royal Navy Type 45 destroyers from 2027, establishment of a new Drone Centre to speed deployment of small uncrewed air systems informed by lessons from Ukraine, and is projected to create 300 skilled jobs on top of 200 already supported by DEW work. The announcement followed the government's Strategic Defence Review published the same day, which recommends UK forces adopt unmanned and autonomous systems at scale over the next five years.

On 27 May 2025 the Council of the EU adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1106 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument. Published in the Official Journal of the EU and entering into force on 29 May 2025, SAFE is the EU's flagship financial pillar of the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan: it provides up to EUR 150bn in competitively priced long-maturity loans — raised by the Commission on capital markets via NGEU-style EU borrowing — to Member States for joint procurement of defence capabilities. Funded equipment must meet a 65% EU/EEA/Ukraine local-content rule, and procurement must involve at least one SAFE-beneficiary Member State plus another Member State (Ukraine, EEA-EFTA members and SAFE-associated countries also eligible).

The European Investment Fund (EIF), part of the EIB Group, and the European Commission announced a EUR 40 million (~USD 45.2 million) investment in Keen Venture Partners' European Defence and Security Tech Fund on 22 May 2025. The commitment is made under the InvestEU Defence Equity Facility (DEF), a EUR 175 million joint instrument (EUR 100 million from the European Defence Fund plus EUR 75 million from the EIF) created to close the equity-financing gap for early-stage European defence and dual-use technology companies through 2027. The Keen fund targets a final size of EUR 125 million and plans to back 20-25 early-stage startups across European NATO countries working on information superiority, cyber defence, robotics, AI, autonomous systems and space technologies. Global Trade Alert separately logs the transaction as a "red"-flagged state-linked financial-investment-support intervention.

Greece enacted Law 5202/2025 on 22 May 2025, published in Government Gazette ΦΕΚ A' 84 on 23 May 2025 and effective the same day, establishing the country's first national mandatory and suspensory foreign direct investment screening mechanism, aligned with Regulation (EU) 2019/452. The Interministerial Committee for the Control of Foreign Direct Investment (ICC-FDI), with initial procedure run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reviews non-EU acquisitions in "sensitive" sectors (energy, transportation, healthcare, ICT, digital infrastructure) and "particularly sensitive" sectors (national security, defence, cybersecurity, AI, ports and critical subsea infrastructure, borderland tourism). A two-phase review applies — 30 days Phase I, up to 150 days Phase II with EU Cooperation Mechanism notification — and the regime became fully operational on 11 November 2025.

On 20 May 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 17th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/932 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/933 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings). Sectoral measures include the largest single-package expansion of the shadow-fleet port-access ban (additional vessel listings layered on top of the 153 designations carried over from the 16th package), the addition of 31 entities — including third-country (Chinese, Turkish, UAE, Hong Kong) firms — to the Annex IV list of military end-users barred from receiving dual-use and critical industry goods (covering chemical precursors used in missile propellants and spare parts for high-precision machine tools), and reinforced anti-circumvention "no-Russia" clause obligations on EU exporters. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/933 imposes asset freezes on 17 additional individuals and 58 additional entities, including shadow-fleet vessels and operators, a major Russian oil company, Russian military/defence-sector firms, and persons involved in the looting of Ukrainian cultural heritage. Parallel hybrid-threat, human-rights, and chemical-weapons designations were adopted under separate horizontal regimes on the same day. The Council noted EU shadow-fleet and oil-price-cap measures had reduced Russian revenues by approximately EUR 38 billion since introduction. Entry into force on 21 May 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal).

On April 29, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated twelve Iran- and PRC-based entities and individuals under Executive Order 13382 for a network procuring ballistic-missile propellant ingredients for Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Treasury names sodium perchlorate, dioctyl sebacate and sodium chlorate as the procured chemicals; sodium perchlorate is a precursor of ammonium perchlorate, which is MTCR-controlled. No shipment quantities or trade values were disclosed.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced the Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve (CMSR) on 24 April 2025 as a A$1.2bn election commitment in the 2025-26 Budget. The Department of Industry, Science and Resources released the design package on 12 January 2026, prioritising antimony, gallium, and rare earth elements as the initial focus minerals (A$1bn for offtake transactions drawn from an expanded A$5bn Critical Minerals Facility, plus A$185m for physical stockpiling and implementation). The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Amendment (Strategic Reserve) Act 2026 passed Parliament on 31 March 2026 with effect 1 April 2026, giving Export Finance Australia (EFA) statutory power to enter offtake agreements, contracts for difference, forward contracts, and physical stockpiles for fuel and critical minerals. CMSR becomes operational in second half 2026.

The Tamil Nadu Cabinet, chaired by Chief Minister M.K. Stalin, cleared the Tamil Nadu Space Industrial Policy 2025 on 17 April 2025, with the policy text published by TIDCO in May 2025. The policy targets INR 10,000 crore (~USD 1.2bn) in space-sector investment over five years and 10,000 jobs, anchored around four designated Space Bays in Madurai, Thoothukudi, Tirunelveli, and Virudhunagar. Key instruments include a INR 500 crore Tamil Nadu Emerging Sector Seed Fund (TNESSF) for space-sector startups, payroll subsidies for R&D and Global Capability Centre operators, and a TIDCO–IN-SPACe MoU to coordinate manufacturing and research facilitation. The policy operationalises the Union Indian Space Policy 2023 (ISP-2023) at the state level and establishes Tamil Nadu as a third space-sector sub-national policy node alongside Karnataka and Gujarat.

China's MOFCOM Unreliable Entity List Working Mechanism designated six US firms on 9 April 2025, effective 12:01 Beijing time 10 April 2025, under MOFCOM Order No. 4 of 2020. Cited trigger: participation in arms sales to Taiwan or military-technology cooperation with Taiwan in disregard of China's stated opposition, "seriously harming China's national sovereignty, security and development interests." Measures prohibit the six entities from import/export activities related to China, new investments in China, and impose entry/work-permit restrictions on senior management.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs announced on 4 April 2025 export licensing requirements on seven medium and heavy rare-earth elements: samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium. Exporters must apply for individual licences citing the end-user and end-use, with licences granted at MOFCOM's discretion. The announcement came two days after the 2 April Trump reciprocal-tariff package and was widely interpreted as a proportional response. Unlike the December 2024 Ga/Ge/Sb ban this is not US-specific on its face — but in practice licence approvals through April-June 2025 were heavily skewed away from US-bound shipments.

China's MOFCOM Unreliable Entity List Working Mechanism designated 11 US drone-sector companies on 4 April 2025 — Skydio Inc., BRINC Drones Inc., Kratos Unmanned Aerial Systems Inc., Insitu Inc., Red Six Solutions LLC, SYNEXXUS Inc., Firestorm Labs Inc., HavocAI, Neros Technologies, Domo Tactical Communications LLC, and Rapid Flight LLC — citing military-technology cooperation with Taiwan in violation of China's One-China principle. Designations prohibit the 11 firms from import/export activity related to China, bar new investments in China, and restrict senior-executive entry. Issued on the same date as the MOFCOM heavy rare-earth export-licensing measure, the designations formed a paired retaliation package responding to the 2 April 2025 US "Liberation Day" reciprocal-tariff escalation. On 15 May 2025 MOFCOM suspended the UEL restrictions on all 11 companies for 90 days in line with the US-China Geneva tariff truce.

Stortinget adopted Norway's new Minerals Act (Lov om mineralvirksomhet og forvaltning av mineralressurser) on 12 June 2025, replacing the 2009 Minerals Act and entering into force 1 July 2026. The statute introduces a national-security review pillar enabling authorities to deny or condition projects that threaten national preparedness, reduces exploration-licence duration from seven to three years to accelerate project initiation, expands Sámi consultation protections from Finnmark to all traditional Sámi areas (Sápmi), and mandates explicit alignment with the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA, Regulation (EU) 2024/1252). The Act covers Norway's most strategically significant mineral assets including the Fen carbonatite REE field (Europe's largest known REE deposit) and major copper-zinc deposits.

On 25 March 2025 the European Commission adopted the first list of 47 Strategic Projects inside the EU under Article 7 of the Critical Raw Materials Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1252), followed on 4 June 2025 by 13 Strategic Projects located in third countries — 60 designations in total. The 47 EU projects span 13 Member States and 14 strategic raw materials, with an expected EUR 22.5bn capital-investment envelope; the 13 third-country projects require a further EUR 5.5bn. Designation triggers fast-track permitting (max 27 months for extraction, 15 months for processing/recycling), preferential access to EU/EIB/EBRD finance, and Member State priority status, operationalising the CRMA's 2030 benchmarks (≥10% extraction, ≥40% processing, ≥25% recycling, ≤65% single-country dependence).

On 19 March 2025 the European Commission adopted the European Steel and Metals Action Plan (COM(2025) 122 final, IP/25/805) — the first standalone sector-specific industrial-policy framework for the EU steel and base-metals industries (~2.6m direct + indirect jobs). The Plan bundles six work strands — affordable energy, trade defence and circularity (including announced replacement of the post-30 Jun 2026 steel safeguard with a "highly effective" successor measure and a melt-and-pour origin requirement), lead-market measures (Steel and Metals Industrial Decarbonisation Bank with a EUR 100bn target and a EUR 1bn pilot auction in 2025, "Made in EU" criteria in public and defence procurement), capacity and investment funding, scrap and critical-input circularity (including CBAM extension to downstream steel and aluminium products by end-2025), and skills / just transition.

On 27 February 2025, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova adopted Law No. 33/2025 amending Law No. 174/2021 on the mechanism for examining investments of importance for state security. The law entered into force on 20 April 2025 after publication in Monitorul Oficial Nr. 144-147 of 20 March 2025 (promulgated by Presidential Decree No. 118-X of 17 March 2025). Key operative changes expand the protected-sector perimeter to explicitly enumerate 17 categories covering data processing and storage, AI, robotics, cybersecurity, semiconductors, quantum, nanotechnology and biotechnology alongside the pre-existing energy, transport, communications, defence and aerospace pillars; add new grounds for refusal (money-laundering suspicion, corruption convictions, foreign-government control, cybersecurity risk, access to personal data of citizens); introduce enhanced Council powers including retroactive review of previously approved investments and fines of up to 5% of annual turnover (capped at MDL 5 million); and carve out intra-group transactions, asset sales below EUR 1 million, and state-owned-enterprise dealings. The Screening Council became operational in July 2025.

Canada made SOR/2025-33, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, registered and effective 2025-02-21. The regulations add 32 individuals (Schedule 1, Part 1) and 44 entities (Schedule 1, Part 2) tied to Russia's military-industrial base, sanctions circumvention, disinformation and the forced deportation/filtration of Ukrainian children. A new Schedule 1.1 lists 109 vessels by IMO number — 92 oil tankers and 9 LNG tankers moving Russian energy exports to third countries, plus 8 vessels moving arms and related material between Russia, Iran and North Korea — banning their access to Canadian ports and waters and prohibiting dealings, asset provision and financial/other services in relation to them.

Denmark's Forsvarsministeriet announced on 19 February 2025 a DKK 50 billion (~EUR 6.7 bn / USD 7.3 bn) Accelerationsfonden (Acceleration Fund) to be exhausted across 2025–2026, supplementing the existing 2024–2033 defence agreement (forsvarsforlig). A broad cross-party political agreement was formalised on 22 February 2025, confirming Danish defence spending will exceed 3% of GDP in both 2025 and 2026. The Fund operates as a fiscal procurement envelope granting enlarged direct-award authority to the Defence Procurement and Logistics Organisation (FMI), relying on the Article 346 TFEU essential-security-interest exemption to bypass standard EU competitive-tender rules for accelerated kit acquisition. Direct-award contracts already executed under the Fund include DKK 1.9 bn for 130 Patria 6×6 armoured personnel carriers and DKK 880m for ESSM Block 2 air-defence missiles.

The Government of Karnataka, Department of Industries and Commerce, notified the Karnataka Industrial Policy 2025-30 in the Karnataka Gazette on 11 February 2025, with the policy taking legal effect from 8 February 2025 and valid for five years (or until superseded). It supersedes the prior Karnataka Industrial Policy 2020-25. The umbrella state-level framework targets ₹7.5 lakh crore (~USD 90 bn) in fresh investment and 20 lakh (2 million) new jobs by 2030, positioning Karnataka as a top-Asia destination for high-technology manufacturing — semiconductors, EVs, aerospace, defence, biotech, medical devices, textiles and renewable energy. It introduces zone-based incentive categorisation (Zone 1/2/3 district classification), capital subsidies, stamp-duty exemption, electricity-tax exemption, interest subsidy, ESDM-specific top-up incentives that layer onto central PLI/ECMS/Semicon Mission schemes, and a Cabinet Sub-Committee under the Chief Minister to sanction bespoke "Anchor Investor" and "Mega/Ultra-Mega" customised incentive packages.

Japan's National Diet enacted the Cyber Response Capability Enhancement Act (重要電子計算機に対する不正な行為による被害の防止に関する法律, Law No. 42 of 2025) on 16 May 2025, together with companion arrangement legislation. Commonly known as the Active Cyber Defense (ACD) Law, the statute authorises (i) government monitoring of foreign-origin internet traffic transiting designated Japanese communication infrastructure for national-security threat indicators, (ii) pre-emptive access and neutralisation operations against attacker infrastructure abroad by the National Police Agency and the Self-Defense Forces under unified command, and (iii) mandatory cyber-incident reporting and government cooperation duties on critical-infrastructure operators. Implementation is phased through November 2027, with the NISC reorganised into the National Cybersecurity Office (NCO) under the Cabinet Secretariat from July 2025.

MOFCOM and the General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 10 [2025] on 4 February 2025, imposing dual-use export-licence controls on items related to tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum and indium under the Export Control Law and Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations. The controls cover metals, alloys, powders, compounds and related processing technologies across roughly 25 listed item categories (41 HS 10-digit codes). The measure is global in scope but was issued the same day China announced 10-15% retaliatory tariffs on US LNG, coal, crude and farm equipment in response to the Trump administration's 10% fentanyl-tariff hike — extending the MOFCOM critical-minerals control regime beyond gallium/germanium/graphite/antimony/heavy-REEs.

On 29 January 2025 the Union Cabinet of India approved the National Critical Mineral Mission (NCMM), a seven-year programme running FY2024-25 through FY2030-31 with a headline financial envelope of ₹34,300 crore (≈USD 4.0 bn). The structure is split: ₹16,300 crore of direct government outlay administered by the Ministry of Mines, plus an expected ₹18,000 crore of investment by central public-sector undertakings (PSUs) and other stakeholders. The mission was first announced by the Finance Minister in the Union Budget 2024-25 (23 July 2024) and the Cabinet approval gave it formal sanction. The NCMM covers the full critical-minerals value chain: domestic exploration, mining, beneficiation, processing, recycling from end-of-life products, and acquisition of overseas mineral assets. The Geological Survey of India (GSI) is tasked with executing 1,200 exploration projects over the seven-year window (vs. 368 projects over the prior three years), expanded to offshore polymetallic-nodule provinces containing cobalt, REE, nickel and manganese. More than 100 critical-mineral blocks are slated for auction. Khanij Bidesh India Ltd (KABIL) — the JV of NALCO, HCL and MECL — is the designated vehicle for overseas acquisitions, with active Argentina lithium (CAMYEN SE, 15,703 ha) and Australia lithium/cobalt off-take pipelines. India's official critical-minerals list contains 30 commodities, of which 24 are inscribed in Part D of Schedule I of the MMDR Act 1957 (after the 2023 amendment), reserving central-government auction authority over them. The NCMM sets an explicit recycling target of 15-20% of domestic critical-mineral demand met from secondary sources (e-waste, battery scrap, industrial waste) by 2035. The mission also funds a National Centre of Excellence for Critical Minerals and offers customs-duty waivers on 25 critical minerals (announced in the same FY24-25 budget) to lower import costs while domestic capacity scales. NCMM is India's pull-side complement to the US IRA, EU Critical Raw Materials Act, Canada Critical Minerals Strategy and Australia Critical Minerals Strategy — a coordinated allied response to Chinese dominance over refined cobalt, REE, graphite and gallium/germanium. For India specifically it is framed as the supply-chain underpinning for FAME-III (EV adoption), the Semicon India programme (gallium/germanium/silicon), and the National Solar Mission (silicon, indium, tellurium, gallium for thin-film PV).

The European Commission imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of self-propelled mobile access equipment (MAE — aerial work platforms and similar machinery for lifting persons to heights of 6 metres or more) from China via Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/45 of 8 January 2025, with duties ranging from 20.6% to 54.9% depending on the exporting producer. A companion countervailing-duty (anti-subsidy) regulation, CR (EU) 2025/796 of 24 April 2025, added CVD layers of 7.3%–14.2%, bringing the combined AD+CVD duty range to 20.6%–66.7%. The combined package is the second EU trade-defence-against-China initiative completed in the first half of 2025, following the biodiesel AD case (CR 2025/261), and significantly raises the cost barrier for Chinese MAE producers — principally Sany, Zoomlion, and XCMG — in the EU market.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 entities under 13 entries to the Entity List, listed under the destinations of Burma (1), China (11), and Pakistan (1). The PRC additions concentrate on the optics/photonics, RF/microwave, and military-civil-fusion research-institute layer of China's military-modernization stack — including CAS Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics and Physics (CIOMP), Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (SIOM), Peng Cheng Laboratory, Ji Hua Laboratory, and the Yaguang/Chengdu RML defense-electronics cluster — with explicit references to support for hypersonic-weapons development. The Burma entity is Telecom International Myanmar (Mytel), added for providing surveillance services and financial support to the post-coup military regime; the Pakistan entity (Emerging Future Solutions Pvt Ltd) was added for contributions to Pakistan's ballistic-missile programme. All 13 entries carry a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR with a presumption-of-denial review policy and no license exceptions. The rule was effective on publication, January 6, 2025, with a savings clause through February 5, 2025 for goods already en route.

China's Unreliable Entity List Working Mechanism, led by MOFCOM, issued Announcement [2025] No. 1 on 2 January 2025 designating 10 US defense entities — five Lockheed Martin subsidiaries (Missiles and Fire Control, Aeronautics, Missile System Integration Lab, Advanced Technology Laboratories, Ventures), the Javelin Joint Venture (Raytheon/Lockheed Martin), Raytheon Missile Systems, and three General Dynamics units (Ordnance and Tactical Systems, Information Technology, Mission Systems) — as Unreliable Entities under the 19 September 2020 Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List, citing their participation in US arms sales to Taiwan. The measures prohibit the 10 firms from engaging in import/export activity related to China and from making new investments in China, and bar approval/renewal of work permits and stay/residence qualifications for their senior executives. This is the first multi-entity UEL designation under the 2020 Provisions and was issued the same day as the parallel MOFCOM Announcement [2025] No. 1 of the export-control bureau adding 28 US entities to China's Export Control List — together establishing a coordinated two-track countermeasure template against US defense and dual-use industry.

The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea passed on 27 December 2024 a comprehensive amendment to the Act on Prevention of Divulgence and Protection of Industrial Technology (산업기술의 유출방지 및 보호에 관한 법률, the "ITA" or "Industrial Technology Protection Act"), effective 22 July 2025. The amendment grants MOTIE direct statutory authority to block or reverse unapproved exports and overseas transactions involving National Core Technologies (NCTs) — including M&As, technology-transfer transactions, and foreign-investment events — without requiring interdepartmental coordination that was necessary under prior enforcement-decree authority. Entities already verified as NCT holders must complete formal registration with MOTIE within six months of the effective date (by approximately 22 January 2026). Punitive damages for wilful NCT infringement are raised from 3x to 5x actual damages, and criminal fines for overseas NCT leakage are raised from KRW 1.5 billion to KRW 6.5 billion.

China's Ministry of Commerce announced on 3 December 2024 (MOFCOM Announcement No. 46 of 2024) a formal ban on dual-use exports to the United States of gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials including diamond and cubic boron nitride. The measure also imposed strict end-use review on graphite exports to the US, with extra scrutiny of military end-uses. It came one day after BIS issued a major export- control package on 2 December 2024 expanding controls on Chinese semiconductor equipment and adding 140 entities to the Entity List, and was framed by MOFCOM as a national- security countermeasure.

The National Assembly of Vietnam passed the Law on Data (Luật Dữ liệu), No. 60/2024/QH15, on 30 November 2024; it enters into force on 1 July 2025. The Law is Vietnam's first comprehensive horizontal data-governance statute, extending regulation beyond personal data (already covered by Decree 13/2023/ND-CP) to all digital data — public, private, and sectoral. It introduces statutory categories of "important data" (dữ liệu quan trọng) and "core data" (dữ liệu cốt lõi) tied to national-defence and national-security review for cross-border transfer, and establishes the National Data Centre under the Ministry of Public Security plus a statutory data-broker / data-services licensing framework.

By Government Decision No. 1533 of 27 November 2024 (published in the Official Monitor No. 1232 of 9 December 2024), the Government of Romania adopted the National Strategy for the Defence Industry 2024-2030. The strategy commits Romania to a 2.5%-of-GDP defence budget through 2030 with 35% earmarked for equipment procurement, sets ten sectoral objectives spanning powders/explosives, munitions, armoured vehicles, naval and aeronautical production, military C4I/cybersecurity, SME advancement, R&D, and a regulatory framework for autonomous combat vehicles and loitering munitions, and invokes Article 346 TFEU to anchor industrial-participation cooperation between foreign primes and national industry. A flagship target is domestic production of two million artillery projectiles per year by 2030.

Tanzania's Parliament passed the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Act, 2024 (Bill No. 15 of 2024, published in the Special Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania No. 34 Vol. 105 on 5 November 2024), which amends eight statutes including the Mining Act, Cap. 123. The mining-related provisions: (i) empower the Minister for Minerals, on recommendation from the Geological Survey of Tanzania (GST), to declare specific minerals as "critical" (essential to national economic, geopolitical, technology, or industrial use with limited or threatened supply) or "strategic" (mineral resources with diplomatic or defence importance) — the first Tanzanian statutory authority to do so; (ii) raise the minimum capital investment for a Mining Licence from USD 100,000 to USD 5,000,000 (a 50× hike pricing out junior explorers); (iii) authorise gemstone export following government-organised mineral auctions or international gem fairs while reaffirming the general beneficiation-in-Tanzania requirement on raw minerals and concentrates; (iv) require GST verification of mineral data on samples exported by mineral right holders; and (v) impose penalties for inaccurate or false mineral-data submissions. The Act establishes the gateway statutory authority for any future Tanzania critical- mineral export-control or stockpiling regime.

On 31 October 2024, South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced strengthened export controls in response to North Korea's long-range ballistic missile launch earlier that day. The measure designates 15 "North Korea-customized" watch-list items across the solid-fuel missile production chain — including ammonium perchlorate, sodium chloride, liquid thiokol, carbon fiber, glass fiber fabric, thermal batteries and inertial-guidance components — that North Korea finds difficult to produce domestically. It operates under Korea's existing Special Notice on Trade for Fulfilling International Peace and Security Obligations, building on the June 2016 Nuclear and Missile Surveillance Items framework and Korea's NSG/MTCR commitments.

Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Decree No. 792 on 19 October 2024 promulgating the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Controls for Dual-Use Items, with effect from 1 December 2024. The regulation, organised in six chapters and 50 articles, consolidates the previously fragmented nuclear / biological / chemical / missile dual-use control regimes into a single State Council framework operationalising the 2020 Export Control Law. It introduces a control-list / temporary-control / watchlist architecture, a statutory end-user / end-use commitment regime, transit / transhipment / re-export controls, extraterritorial reach over PRC items downstream, and explicit linkage to the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. On 15 November 2024 MOFCOM, MIIT, GAC and SCA jointly issued Announcement No. 51 of 2024 publishing the consolidated Dual-Use Items Export Control List with a unified five-character ECCN-style coding system, also effective 1 December 2024.

Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs amended the Eksportkontrollforskrift (Regulations on the export of defence- related products, dual-use items, technology and services) to add a new national control list — Annex III ("List III") — for emerging and disruptive technologies not yet covered by the EU dual-use list. Exports of items on Annex III require a licence from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regardless of destination, including a catch-all licensing obligation. Controls cover semiconductor manufacturing equipment (including dry-etch apparatus), enriched silicon/germanium substrates, high- performance integrated circuits, quantum computers above specified controlled-qubit thresholds, quantum software and technology, software/technology for reverse-engineering integrated-circuit layouts, and additive-manufacturing equipment for metal/alloy components. The amendment, announced 3 October 2024 and effective 1 November 2024 (with a one-month transitional period), aligns Norway with parallel national measures adopted by the United States (BIS 6 Sep 2024 emerging- technology IFR), the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Japan, Spain, Denmark and Finland.

Cabinet Resolution No. 97 of 2024 is the implementing regulation of UAE Federal Decree-Law No. 43 of 2021 on Commodities Subject to Non-Proliferation. It operationalises the UAE's horizontal dual-use export-control regime, empowering the Executive Office for Control & Non-Proliferation (EOCN) to designate prohibited and restricted goods on the National Control List and to issue export/transit/re-export permits within 20 working days. The Control List covers nuclear materials, chemicals and precursors, electronics, telecommunications, sensors and lasers, navigation systems, avionics, marine and aerospace equipment, propulsion systems, and "national controlled commodities" (armoured vehicles, autonomous equipment). This is the regulatory architecture under which post-G42 advanced AI-chip outbound flows from the UAE are licensed.

The Defence and Strategic Goods List (DSGL) 2024 was registered on the Federal Register of Legislation on 16 August 2024 under the Customs Act 1901 and Defence Trade Controls Act 2012, repealing and replacing the DSGL 2021. It comprises the Munitions List (Part 1) and the Dual-Use List (Part 2, nine technology categories including nuclear materials, chemicals, electronics, sensors and marine and aerospace equipment) that Australia controls for export, brokering and intangible transfer. The 2024 instrument periodically realigns the list with changes agreed in the multilateral non-proliferation and export-control regimes Australia belongs to (Wassenaar Arrangement, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group); most changes are clarifications to existing controls, with a smaller number of items entering or leaving control or having their approval requirements adjusted.

China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly issued Announcement No. 33 of 2024 on 15 August 2024, imposing an export licensing regime on antimony ore, antimony metal, antimony oxides (purity ≥99.99%), organic antimony compounds, antimony hydride, indium antimonide, and gold-antimony smelting technology, effective 15 September 2024. The announcement also covers six-sided top-press equipment used in superhard-materials (diamond, cubic boron nitride) production. China accounts for approximately 47% of global antimony mine output and an estimated 75-80% of refined antimony supply; in the months following implementation, Chinese antimony export volumes fell by approximately 97% and global antimony trioxide spot prices roughly doubled.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) finalized amendments to its Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS) regulation at 15 CFR Part 700, originally proposed February 7, 2024. The final rule clarifies long-standing standards and procedures by which BIS provides Special Priorities Assistance (SPA) under the Defense Production Act of 1950, revises Schedule I to delineate Department of Commerce DPAS jurisdiction from other agencies' priority-rating authorities, and applies non-substantive technical edits reflecting updates since the regulation was last amended in 2014. The rule takes effect August 21, 2024.

Japan's National Diet enacted the Act on the Protection and Use of Critical Economic Security Information (重要経済安保情報の保護及び活用に関する法律, Act No. 27 of 2024) on 10 May 2024; it was promulgated on 17 May 2024 and came into full operation on 16 May 2025. The law establishes Japan's first peace-time economic-security clearance regime extending to private-sector employees. It designates "Critical Economic Security Information" (CESI) covering threat-intelligence on critical-infrastructure cyber attacks, regulatory-review information on essential infrastructure, and vulnerability data on critical-product supply chains; mandates Cabinet Office "適性評価" (suitability assessment) for cleared personnel; and imposes criminal penalties of up to five years' imprisonment for unauthorised disclosure. The CESI Act complements the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA), closing the information-protection gap and aligning Japan's framework with Five Eyes and EU partners for joint R&D and dual-use cooperation.

Final rule by the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published in the Federal Register on 10 May 2024 (89 FR 40369; FR Doc 2024-10280; effective 30 May 2024) making conforming and clarifying amendments to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The most substantive change removes Cyprus from EAR Country Group D:5 — codifying in the EAR the suspension of the US arms embargo on the Republic of Cyprus previously announced by the Department of State. The rule also standardises destination names (Swaziland → Eswatini, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of) → North Macedonia, Turkey → Türkiye), corrects inadvertently-listed NS1/RS1/MT1 license requirements for Australia and the United Kingdom, removes obsolete footnote 3 designations, and removes redundant standalone references to "Russia" and "Russian Federation" in EAR provisions that already invoke Country Group D:5 (which encompasses both). The rule is largely administrative; the Cyprus D:5 removal is its only operational change to license requirements.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), within the U.S. Department of Commerce, published an interim final rule (FR Doc 2024-08813) on April 30, 2024 amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to restructure export controls on firearms, ammunition, parts, accessories, and related technology and software (EAR Categories 0 and 1). The rule created new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) for semi-automatic firearms, added Crime Control / Detection (CC) license requirements, narrowed license-exception eligibility, introduced a presumption of denial for many non-government end-users, and imposed a default 1-year license validity for semi-automatic firearms. Effective May 30, 2024; later rescinded (except for the new ECCNs) by FR Doc 2025-18992 on September 30, 2025.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (IFR) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to remove list-based license requirements — including National Security Column 1 (NS1), Regional Stability Column 1 (RS1) and Missile Technology Column 1 (MT1) reasons-for-control — for exports, reexports and in-country transfers to or within Australia and the United Kingdom. The IFR also expands the availability of license exceptions and reduces the scope of end-use and end-user-based license requirements for the two AUKUS partners, while leaving firearms-related items (Crime Control / CC) and a narrow set of other ECCNs untouched. The rule is the EAR-side companion to a parallel DDTC proposed rule creating an ITAR §126.7 exemption for defense articles and services traded among authorised AU/UK/US users, and is the foundational regulatory implementation of the AUKUS Pillar 2 advanced-capability cooperation track.

The US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) final rule (89 FR 25503; FR Doc 2024-07760) added 11 entries to the Entity List under China (6), Russia (3), and the United Arab Emirates (2), effective 2024-04-11. The primary rationale for the Russia and UAE tranches — and at least one China entity (Shenzhen Jiasibo Technology) — is procurement of US-controlled dual-use aerospace and UAV components for Iran's Shahed- series UAV programme via the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA); those drones have been used against oil tankers in the Middle East and deployed by Russia in Ukraine. The remaining five China entities were designated for acquiring US-origin items to support China's military modernisation. The rule also adds one alias to the existing entry for Shanghai Biren Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd. This action was the first Entity List final rule published after BIS implemented the 50 Percent Rule for controlling foreign subsidiaries of listed entities.

The Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024 (C2024A00021) received Royal Assent on 8 April 2024 and created three new criminal offences in the Defence Trade Controls Act 2012: section 10A (supply of Defence and Strategic Goods List technology in Australia to a non-exempt foreign person); section 10B (secondary supply of DSGL Part 1 Munitions or Part 2 Dual-Use Sensitive/Very Sensitive goods or technology outside Australia when originally exported from Australia); and section 10C (provision of DSGL Part 1 services to foreign nationals outside Australia). All three offences carry maximum penalties of 10 years imprisonment or 2,500 penalty units (~A$782,500), or both. The offence framework commenced 1 September 2024 with a six-month compliance-transition period; criminal liability attached from 1 March 2025. The Act also codifies AUKUS-partnership exemptions, carving out supplies to and from citizens and permanent residents of the United Kingdom and United States, underpinning the licence-free trilateral technology-transfer environment sought under AUKUS Pillar 2.

The Aizsardzības industrijas likums (Defence Industry Law), adopted by the Saeima on 27 March 2024 and published in Latvijas Vēstnesis No. 70 on 10 April 2024, is Latvia's first standalone statute codifying state-support instruments for domestically registered defence-industrial-base firms. The law establishes a strategic-partnership agreement framework between the Ministry of Defence and Latvian-registered defence-tech manufacturers (including the Latvian drone-tech cluster — Atlas Aerospace, UAV Factory, Edge Autonomy Latvia), defines continuity-of-operations and supply-security obligations for strategic-partner firms, and provides a procurement-preference channel for Latvian-registered defence suppliers in MoD and State Defence Logistics and Procurement Centre contracting. The law also streamlines export-licence processing for qualified Latvian strategic- goods exporters and aligns state-support measures with EU Treaty Article 346 defence-exemption and EU European Defence Fund / EDIRPA co-financing rules.

On 5 March 2024 the European Commission and EU High Representative jointly published the first-ever European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) via Joint Communication JOIN(2024) 10 final. EDIS sets binding benchmarks for EU member-state procurement: ≥40% of defence equipment acquired cooperatively by 2030, ≥35% of defence trade conducted intra-EU by 2030, and ≥50% of EU-member defence expenditure directed to European-origin products by 2030 rising to ≥60% by 2035. The strategy is the programmatic framework underpinning EDIP (Regulation (EU) 2025/2643), EDF, ASAP and EDIRPA, and marks the first comprehensive attempt to embed defence industrial objectives into EU single-market and budgetary architecture.

On 29 February 2024 Switzerland's WBF decided to align with the EU's 13th Russia sanctions package by amending the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), effective 1 March 2024 at 18:00 CET. The amendment adds over 100 individuals and nearly 90 entities — mainly Russian military-industrial-complex firms and suppliers of DPRK-sourced weapons to Russia — to the asset-freeze and designation lists, and extends the dual-use/military-technology export ban to 27 additional companies believed to be circumventing existing controls.

On 23 February 2024, two years after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/745, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and comprising the EU's 13th Russia sanctions package. It adds new CN codes to the export-ban annexes (dual-use and advanced-technology goods) and adds 27 entities — including firms based in China, Hong Kong, India, Sri Lanka, Serbia, Kazakhstan, Thailand and Turkiye — to the list of parties barred from any exemption from the export ban, on the basis they are assessed to be supporting Russia's military-industrial complex via circumvention routes. Asset-freeze listings (106 individuals, 88 entities) under the parallel Council Decision took effect 23 February 2024; the sectoral trade measures took effect 24 February 2024.