Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2665 actions· ✨ 90 recent

On 6 January 2026 China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 1 [2026] "On Strengthening Export Controls on Dual-Use Items to Japan" (商务部公告2026年第1号), the first PRC export-control instrument to single out a named country other than the United States. Effective immediately on publication with no wind-down period, the measure prohibits export of all dual-use items under PRC export-control law where the end-user is the Japanese Ministry of Defense or Self-Defense Forces, the end-use is Japanese military, or — under a novel catch-all standard — the transaction would "enhance Japan's military capabilities." The standard is explicitly extraterritorial, covering transfers of PRC-origin dual-use items through third countries and in-country transfers where the end-user / end-use falls within scope. The political trigger was Japanese PM Takaichi's November 2025 Diet remarks framing a Taiwan contingency as a Japanese "survival-threatening situation" justifying SDF deployment.

China's Ministry of Commerce issued Announcement No. 51 of 2025 on 25 September 2025, adding three US entities — Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc. (NYSE: HII, the largest US military shipbuilder), Planate Management Group, and Global Dimensions LLC — to China's Export Control List (出口管制 管控名单), effective the same day. The listing prohibits Chinese exporters from supplying dual-use items to the three firms and requires any ongoing related export activity to cease immediately. MOFCOM cited the firms' "military-technical cooperation with China's Taiwan region" as the trigger, issued in parallel with a same-day Unreliable Entity List designation of three other US firms (Saronic Technologies, Aerkomm, Oceaneering International).

Bureau of Industry and Security final rule (89 FR 84460, Doc 2024-24562) adding 26 entities to the Entity List across four destinations: six in China (aviation simulation for PLA modernisation; procurement for Iran WMD/UAV programs; evasive conduct), one in Egypt and three in the UAE (acquiring US civil aircraft parts for Russian buyers post-Ukraine invasion), and sixteen in Pakistan (nine front companies of Advanced Engineering Research Organization for Pakistan's cruise-missile and strategic-UAV programs, plus seven contributing to Pakistan's ballistic- missile program). The rule also removes two existing entries. All additions are licensed under a presumption-of-denial policy for all EAR-subject items.

Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs amended the Eksportkontrollforskrift (Regulations on the export of defence- related products, dual-use items, technology and services) to add a new national control list — Annex III ("List III") — for emerging and disruptive technologies not yet covered by the EU dual-use list. Exports of items on Annex III require a licence from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regardless of destination, including a catch-all licensing obligation. Controls cover semiconductor manufacturing equipment (including dry-etch apparatus), enriched silicon/germanium substrates, high- performance integrated circuits, quantum computers above specified controlled-qubit thresholds, quantum software and technology, software/technology for reverse-engineering integrated-circuit layouts, and additive-manufacturing equipment for metal/alloy components. The amendment, announced 3 October 2024 and effective 1 November 2024 (with a one-month transitional period), aligns Norway with parallel national measures adopted by the United States (BIS 6 Sep 2024 emerging- technology IFR), the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Japan, Spain, Denmark and Finland.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 71 entities to the Entity List effective May 19, 2023, as part of the continuing US export-control response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Of the 71 additions, 69 are Russian entities (aircraft repair plants, ammunition and gunpowder manufacturers, shipyards, tractor and automobile factories, and engineering centres), one is Armenian, and one is Kyrgyz — the latter two for facilitating diversion of controlled goods to Russia. The majority of Russian entities received "footnote 3" designations as Russian or Belarusian military end users, triggering the Russia/Belarus Military End-User FDP Rule and subjecting them to a license review policy of denial.

The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding seven entities under seven entries to the Entity List, effective February 14, 2022, on nuclear nonproliferation and national security grounds. Five Pakistani engineering and chemical companies, one Chinese metal-powder manufacturer (Jiangsu Tianyuan Metal Powder Co. Ltd.), and one UAE-based trading company (Odyssey General Trading FZC) were determined to be acting contrary to US foreign policy or national security interests. All seven entries impose a license requirement covering all EAR-jurisdiction items, with no license exceptions available; the license review policy is presumption of denial for the Chinese entity and per 15 CFR § 744.2(d) for the Pakistani and UAE entities.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) removed three persons from the Unverified List (UVL) effective January 11, 2021 after completing successful end-use checks that verified their bona fides under §744.15(c)(2) of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The three removed parties are DMA Logistics GmbH (Germany), Halm Elektronik GmbH (Germany), and Integrated Production and Test Engineering / IPTE (Mexico). Removal restores eligibility for EAR license exceptions and eliminates the requirement for US exporters to obtain a signed UVL Statement before shipping items subject to the EAR to these parties.