Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2666 actions· ✨ 90 recent

Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandon issued Order No. 06/PM on 7 March 2025 introducing two headline measures: (i) a permanent nationwide ban on all alluvial gold extraction, including gravel- and sand-suction methods, and (ii) a moratorium on approval of any new metallic-mineral projects for the remainder of the current government term. The Order also mandates enhanced monitoring and inspection of existing licensed mining operations, with particular focus on environmental compliance and remediation. Rationale cited by the PM includes recurring landslide and water-contamination incidents attributed to unregulated artisanal and semi-industrial extraction. This is the first instrument issued under the post-2024-Investment-Promotion-Law framework that directly constrains new-mine pipeline development in Laos, reversing the outward-FDI-friendly signal that Law 62/NA had sent to Chinese-backed project sponsors.

Kuwait promulgated Decree-Law No. 7 of 2025 on 10 February 2025, amending Decree-Law No. 74 of 1979 on real estate ownership by non-Kuwaitis. The reform grants investment entities licensed under the Direct Investment Promotion Law (Decree-Law No. 116 of 2013, administered by KDIPA) the right to own real property necessary for carrying out and managing their licensed activities, or for housing their investors or employees — with an explicit prohibition on ownership for speculation purposes. A further Amiri decree will specify the implementing rules and the areas in which such property may be owned. The law is part of a coherent 2024–2025 KDIPA-regime modernisation package alongside the January 2024 branch-office-without-local-agent reform and KDIPA Decision No. 388 of 2024 on investment incentives and exemptions.

The Parliament of Georgia adopted the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence (Law No 4194-XIV) on 14 May 2024 by an 84–4 vote, overriding a presidential veto on 28 May 2024. The law requires NGOs, broadcasters, and online/print media that derive 20% or more of their funding from a "foreign power" in any calendar year to register as "organisations pursuing the interests of a foreign power," with reporting and transparency obligations and fines of up to GEL 25,000 (~EUR 8,400) per violation. The European Council immediately froze Georgia's EU accession negotiations citing the law's incompatibility with EU values, the European Commission suspended EUR 30M+ of annual direct budget support, and the US State Department announced visa restrictions targeting Georgian officials, establishing the measure as a pivotal FDI-climate and geopolitical inflection event for the country.

Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 — the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) — is the EU's first horizontal trade-defence framework explicitly empowering the Union to respond to economic coercion by third countries. Adopted by the European Parliament and Council on 22 November 2023, published in the Official Journal on 7 December 2023, and in force from 27 December 2023, it lets the European Commission (i) determine that a third country is applying economic coercion against the Union or a Member State, (ii) seek dialogue, cessation, and reparation, and (iii) impose Union response measures — including tariffs, services-trade restrictions, IP-rights restrictions, public-procurement restrictions, and FDI restrictions targeting nationals or controlled entities of the coercing state. It complements but does not duplicate the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (which addresses subsidies, not coercion).

Council Directive (EU) 2022/2523, adopted 14 December 2022 and published in OJ L 328 on 22 December 2022, transposes the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework Pillar Two model rules into binding EU law. It requires all 27 Member States to impose a minimum 15% effective tax rate (ETR) on the jurisdictional income of MNE groups with consolidated annual revenue ≥ EUR 750 million via three interlocking charges: an Income Inclusion Rule (IIR) for fiscal years beginning on or after 31 December 2023, an Undertaxed Profits Rule (UTPR) backstop from 31 December 2024, and an optional Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT). The directive is the largest international-tax instrument in EU history and the operative legal anchor for the cross-border Pillar Two architecture inside the single market, structurally rebalancing FDI location decisions for an estimated 12,000+ in-scope MNE groups globally.

Venezuela's Constitutional Anti-Blockade Law, adopted by the National Constituent Assembly on 8 October 2020 and published in Gaceta Oficial Extraordinaria N° 6.583 on 12 October 2020, establishes a "special and temporary" horizontal legal framework empowering the Executive Branch to suspend or derogate any law of the Republic when necessary to counteract the effects of unilateral coercive measures imposed against Venezuela (Article 19 — the broadest sanctions- countermeasure derogation authority in the Western Hemisphere). The law also creates the Centro Internacional de Inversión Productiva (CIIP), a special-jurisdiction FDI vehicle empowered to negotiate confidentially with foreign investors, conduct asset-protection mechanisms, and operate entirely outside ordinary public-procurement, accounting, and FX-control law. Constitutes the foundational parent statute for the VE counter-sanctions legal corpus and closes the VE=0 gap on the action register.

On 15 March 2019, the Second Session of the 13th National People's Congress adopted the Foreign Investment Law of the People's Republic of China (FIL), effective 1 January 2020. The statute replaced the prior tripartite FDI regime — the 1979 Equity Joint Venture Law, the 1986 Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law, and the 1988 Contractual Joint Venture Law (collectively the "Three Laws") — with a unified legal framework covering all foreign investment in China. The FIL establishes a pre-establishment national treatment plus negative-list regime jointly administered by NDRC and MOFCOM, a Foreign Investment Information Reporting System replacing the former case-by-case approval regime, a national security review mechanism (China's CFIUS equivalent, codified at Art. 35), and Art. 22 technology-transfer prohibition protections. The State Council Implementation Regulations (Order No. 723, promulgated 26 December 2019) entered force on the same date as the FIL.

Germany's Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG, Foreign Trade and Payments Act; BGBl. I 2013 S. 1482 of 6 June 2013, replacing the original 1961 Act) is the foundational parent statute of the modern German economic-statecraft toolkit, providing the legislative authority for (i) export licensing of dual-use goods and technology administered by BAFA under the Außenwirtschaftsverordnung (AWV) implementing regulation — the national complement to EU Dual-Use Recast Regulation 2021/821; (ii) inward FDI screening by BMWK under §§ 55–62 AWG covering non-EU/non-EFTA acquisitions of ≥ 25% of voting rights cross-sectorally and ≥ 10%/20% in 27 sensitive-sector activities including defence, semiconductors, AI, quantum, biotech, space, and critical infrastructure; and (iii) German implementation of EU-level and autonomous trade and sanctions restrictions. As the EU's largest economy and a top-tier dual-use exporter, Germany's AWG-based regime is structurally peer-foundational to JP FEFTA 1949, UK NSI Act 2021, US ECRA 2018, CN Export Control Law 2020, and NL Wet Vifo 2022 in the G7+CN economic- statecraft parent-statute cluster.

Japan's Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA, Act No. 228 of 1 December 1949; 外国為替及び外国貿易法) is the foundational umbrella statute governing the entire modern Japanese economic-statecraft toolkit. Originally a restrictive positive-list regime for foreign-exchange transactions, FEFTA was fundamentally liberalised by the 1980 revision (positive-list to negative-list shift) and again overhauled in 1998 to establish the modern regulatory architecture. Three principal enforcement arms operate under FEFTA: (i) security export controls administered by METI via the Export Trade Control Order and the Foreign Exchange Order (covering the Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group, MTCR, NSG, and CWC controlled-items lists plus Japan-specific catch-all controls); (ii) inward FDI screening administered jointly by the Ministry of Finance and sector ministries (prior notification and pre-notification regime, substantially expanded 2019–2020 with Core Business Sectors covering semiconductors, critical minerals, advanced materials, cloud computing, and aerospace added 2021); and (iii) autonomous economic sanctions (asset- freeze and payment-restriction designations against Russia, Iran, DPRK, Myanmar, Belarus, and others via Cabinet Orders made under FEFTA authority). Structurally peer-foundational to the US Trade Expansion Act 1962, US Trade Act 1974, UK SAMLA 2018, CN Export Control Law 2020, and CN Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law 2021 as the G7+CN foundational economic- statecraft statute cluster.