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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
In a final rule effective December 9, 2021 (FR Doc 2021-26633), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add Cambodia to Country Group D:5 (US arms-embargoed destinations), consistent with a simultaneous Department of State final rule adding Cambodia to ITAR §126.1. The rule also subjects Cambodia to military end-use (MEU) controls under EAR §744.21 and military-intelligence end-use/end-user (MIEU) controls under EAR §744.22. The stated rationale was deepening Chinese military presence at Ream Naval Base, growing corruption, and human-rights abuses by the Cambodian government.
The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding six Russian technology entities to the Entity List, all designated consistent with Executive Order 14024 on blocking property associated with harmful foreign activities of the Russian government. The designated entities operate in Russia's technology sector and have been determined to support Russian intelligence services, including notable cybersecurity firms and defense-innovation institutions. All items subject to the EAR require a BIS licence for export, reexport, or transfer to these parties, subject to a presumption-of-denial review policy with no licence exceptions available. The rule also corrects an existing FSB entry to reference updated General Licence No. 1B.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on April 9, 2021 to extend military-intelligence end-use and end-user controls to Burma (Myanmar) and to apply U.S.-person activity prohibitions to Burma's military-intelligence entities — specifically the Office of Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA) and the Directorate of Signal. The rule also corrected technical errors introduced by BIS's January 15, 2021 interim final rule (FR Doc 2021-01879), which had originally established the military-intelligence end-use and end-user control framework covering China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela. The addition of Burma responded directly to the February 1, 2021 SAC military coup and the Burmese military's use of surveillance technology to oppress civil society, restrict internet access, and imprison protesters.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule on January 15, 2021 substantially expanding the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Part 744 end-use and end-user control framework to cover military-intelligence entities in China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela. The rule created a new license requirement for exports of ANY EAR-subject item to named military-intelligence end-users — including EAR99-classified items — and separately imposed restrictions on U.S. persons worldwide providing "support" to military-intelligence end-uses or end-users without a BIS licence. It also broadened chemical and biological weapons controls from "will directly assist" to "will support," expanding the reach of §744.4 and §744.3 on WMD-delivery systems. A technical correction published March 17, 2021 (FR Doc 2021-05623) fixed a drafting error in Instruction 9 that would have inadvertently deleted §744.3(a)(3)(i)-(ii), the rocket systems and UAV provisions.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) extended for one year the temporary unilateral export control on software classified as ECCN 0D521 — "software specially designed for training a Deep Convolutional Neural Network to automate the analysis of geospatial imagery and point clouds" — adding a second year of control through January 6, 2022. The extension was required because COVID-19 prevented the Wassenaar Arrangement from formally convening in 2020 to consider the US multilateral control proposal submitted that year. Only License Exception GOV (§ 740.11(b)(2)(ii)) is available; all other exports require a specific licence from BIS.