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Structured register of government actions in the geoeconomic space — export controls, tariffs, sanctions, FDI screening, subsidies, industrial-policy laws — cross-referenced into the country, minerals, and ETF surface. Charter: docs/IPTM_CHARTER.md.
Severity 1-5 is the qualitative impact rating (1=minor, 5=structural). The bilateral-trade-grounded quant scorer is the next IPTM milestone. RBI (Register Breadth Index) is a complementary structural-breadth indicator from scripts/py/iptm/breadth.py; divergence between RBI and severity is itself informative (high-sev / low-RBI = strategic chokepoint; low-sev / high-RBI = broad but shallow). Every action has at least one primary source URL. Verify-or-don't-file. See also themes, timeline, graph, sankey, map, country exposure, sector exposure, material exposure (+ graph), weekly briefs, portfolio scan, escalation monitor, trans-shipment hubs. Internal triage tools (RSS-poller candidate feed, source-feed health) live under /admin/candidates + /admin/sources. Subscribe via Atom feed (accepts ?country=CN, ?material=lithium, ?issuer=BIS, ?type=export_control, ?etf=SOXX, ?company=NVDA, ?minSeverity=4, ?year=2026, ?q=…) or pull /api/iptm/actions.
The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations by adding four entities under nine entries to the Entity List, effective November 21, 2023 (FR Doc. 2023-25684). Three entities — Aerofalcon S.L. (Spain), Novax Group S.A. (Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Russia, Venezuela), and Zero Waste Global SA (Panama, Venezuela) — were listed for circumventing US sanctions by supplying Nicolás Maduro's government with US-origin aircraft parts using fraudulent export documentation. A fourth entity, Si2 Microsystems Private Limited (India), was listed for supplying Russian defense-sector consignees with US-origin integrated circuits in violation of Section 746.5(a)(1)(ii) Russia/Belarus export restrictions. All entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR items with a presumption of denial.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security published a correction on 8 November 2023 to a rule it had issued on 17 October 2023 revising the Validated End-User (VEU) authorisations for Samsung China Semiconductor Co. Ltd. and SK hynix Semiconductor (China) Ltd. in the People's Republic of China. The correction fixes two omissions from the October rule: a missing word in the description of eligible items for SK hynix Semiconductor (China) Ltd., and a failure to remove the standalone VEU entry for SK hynix Semiconductor (Wuxi) following its merger into SK hynix Semiconductor (China) Ltd. No substantive policy change is introduced; this is a technical and clerical correction only.
On 25 October 2023 the Bureau of Industry and Security published an interim final rule (88 FR 73424; FR Doc 2023-23055) making substantive revisions to the October 7 2022 advanced-computing IFR, incorporating 43 public comments covering 78 topics. The rule replaced the prior TOPS-based performance metric with a new "Total Processing Performance" (TPP) / performance-density dual-threshold structure for ECCN 3A090, splitting the control into tiers 3A090.a (full licence requirement for highest-capability datacenter AI chips) and 3A090.b (new License Exception NAC with 25-day prior notification for the intermediate tier). Geographic scope was expanded from China-and-Macau to Country Groups D:1/D:4/D:5 to block diversion via third-country intermediaries and offshore datacenters.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security issued an interim final rule on 17 October 2023 that substantially expanded the advanced-computing and semiconductor manufacturing controls first imposed in October 2022. The rule closed the performance-threshold workaround that NVIDIA had used to ship China-specific A800/H800 GPUs, replacing it with a "performance density" metric and adding a new "Notified Advanced Computing" licence category. It expanded controls on chipmaking equipment (additional ECCNs covering deposition, etch, metrology), pulled 21 additional countries (mostly Middle East / Central Asia) into a regional licensing scheme to prevent transshipment, and added 13 Chinese entities to the Entity List including AI-chip designers.
The US Bureau of Industry and Security revised the Validated End-User (VEU) authorizations for Samsung China Semiconductor Co. Ltd. (Xi'an NAND fab) and SK Hynix Semiconductor (China) Ltd. (Wuxi DRAM fab) on 17 October 2023, expanding each from its previous restricted eligible-items list to cover "all items subject to the Export Administration Regulations." Both authorizations exclude EUV equipment and related components: Samsung China is barred from EUV items for NAND production; SK Hynix is barred from EUV items for DRAM production. The revision was published simultaneously with the broader October 2023 advanced- computing chip controls (FR Doc 2023-22560), giving the two South Korean memory fabs a calibrated safe harbour under the newly tightened regime.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 49 entities under 52 entries to the Entity List, effective October 11, 2023. The bulk of additions — 42 of 49 — are Chinese entities determined to be acting contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests, predominantly for supplying US-origin integrated circuits to Russian defense-sector consignees after March 1, 2023 in violation of export controls. Remaining entities span Estonia, Finland, Germany, India, Turkey, UAE, and the United Kingdom and were designated on similar Russia-diversion or end-use violation grounds. All listed parties face a license requirement for all EAR-subject items, reviewed under a presumption of denial.
China's Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs jointly announced an export licensing regime covering eight gallium-related items (including gallium metal, gallium arsenide, gallium nitride wafers and ingots) and six germanium- related items (including germanium metal, germanium oxide, germanium tetrachloride). Effective 1 August 2023, exporters must obtain a dual-use-item licence from MOFCOM citing the end-user and end-use, with licences granted at MOFCOM's discretion. The measure was framed as protecting national security and interests, though the timing immediately followed the Dutch ASML DUV controls and US chip-equipment escalations.
The Dutch government announced on 30 June 2023 a new national export-licensing requirement covering specific advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, most prominently ASML's TWINSCAN NXT:2000i and subsequent DUV immersion lithography systems used at ≤14/16nm logic, advanced DRAM, and advanced 3D NAND production. Effective from 1 September 2023 via the national Strategic Goods Decree, the rule completes the trilateral US-Japan-Netherlands chip-equipment perimeter initiated by the January 2023 trilateral agreement. Although nominally country-neutral, the BIS Foreign Direct Product Rule means licences for shipments to "countries of concern" — read: China — face a presumption of denial. Subsequent guidance in 2024 expanded coverage to additional TWINSCAN NXT:1970Ci and 1980Di system variants.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 28 entities under 32 entries to the Entity List effective April 12, 2023, targeting front companies and logistics networks attempting to evade US export controls to acquire US-origin items in support of Russia's military and defense industrial base. Twelve of the entities are Chinese electronics and semiconductor distributors operating as procurement intermediaries; ten are Russian logistics and trading firms; six are spread across Armenia, Malta, Singapore, Spain, Syria, Turkey, UAE, and Uzbekistan as diversion facilitators. All listed entities are subject to a license review policy of denial for virtually all EAR-controlled items.
Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) announced on 31 March 2023 amendments to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act adding 23 categories of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to the export-licensing list. The measure, effective from 23 July 2023, is the Japanese counterpart to the US October 2022 BIS rule (filed: 2022-10-07-us-bis-advanced-ai-chip-controls-china) and the Dutch DUV controls. Items covered span lithography (mostly ArF and KrF), deposition (CVD, ALD, sputtering), etch, and cleaning + advanced inspection — broadly the toolset used at ≤14/16nm logic, advanced DRAM, and advanced 3D NAND. The controls are formally non-discriminatory but in practice capture exports to China; non-China destinations get general licences.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 37 entities under 38 entries to the Entity List, effective March 2, 2023, spanning six destinations: China (28), Pakistan (4), Burma (3), Russia (1), Belarus (1), and Taiwan (1). The China tranche — the largest — targets entities supporting the People's Liberation Army's military modernization, including BGI Research and Forensic Genomics International (genomic surveillance/data risk), Inspur Group Co. Ltd. (cloud servers supplied to Chinese military), and Loongson Technology (domestic CPU developer). Three Burmese entities, including the Ministry of Transport and Communications, are designated for providing surveillance equipment enabling the military junta's tracking and targeting of civilians. Pakistani entities Abdul Razaq Asim, Add-On Technology, and Dynamic Engineers are added for contributing to Pakistan's ballistic missile programs; Russian DMT Electronics and Belarusian DMT Trading LLC for export-control evasion. All listed entities are subject to a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR, with the review policy being presumption of denial for the majority of Chinese entries.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 76 Russian entities to the Entity List effective February 24, 2023, spanning three rationale categories: (1) biometric surveillance technology enabling Russian filtration operations in occupied Ukraine; (2) illicit acquisition of U.S.-origin controlled items; and (3) the Russian military-industrial complex encompassing missiles, aviation, shipbuilding, semiconductors, telecom, and defense electronics. All 76 entities are subject to a license requirement for all EAR-subject items with a presumption of denial; 66 entities receive footnote-3 designation as Russian military end-users, subjecting them to the Russia/Belarus Military End-User Foreign Direct Product Rule under §734.9(g). Four existing Entity List entries were simultaneously revised with additional aliases and tightened to a policy of denial. Notable designations include KAMAZ, the Skolkovo Foundation, Skoltech, Ilyushin Aviation Complex, and the State Missile Center Named After Akademika V.P. Makeyev.
BIS amended the Commerce Control List (CCL) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement decisions agreed at the December 2021 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting, revising 16 ECCNs across computing, electronics, lasers, sensors, and aerospace domains. The most operationally significant change raised the Adjusted Peak Performance (APP) threshold for digital computers under ECCN 4A003.b from 29 to 70 Weighted TeraFLOPS (WT), reducing the licensing burden for high-performance computing exports to Wassenaar partner countries while preserving controls to non-partners. Corresponding revisions to License Exception APP (15 CFR Part 740) and License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) align the broader EAR framework with the updated multilateral thresholds.
BIS published an interim final rule on January 18, 2023 (88 FR 2821, FR Doc 2023-00888) extending to Macau the same advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing controls originally imposed on China by the October 7, 2022 rule. The extension closes a diversion loophole created by Macau's status as a Special Administrative Region of China, applying equivalent license requirements for advanced computing ICs, equipment used in ≤14 nm logic and advanced NAND/DRAM fabrication, and supercomputer end-use restrictions. The rule also includes entity list modifications and took effect one day before Federal Register publication (January 17, 2023).
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/66, adopted 21 October 2022 and published in the Official Journal on 11 January 2023 (OJ L 9), replaces Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 (the EU Dual-Use Recast Regulation) with an updated control list implementing the 2022 multilateral decisions of the Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, Australia Group, NSG and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Per GTA's tracking of the CN-code-level change, the update removed 7 six-digit CN codes and added 8 new ones. It entered into force on 12 January 2023, the day after publication.