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The UK laid the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2026 (SI 2026/543) before Parliament on 19 May 2026; it came into force on 20 May 2026. The instrument inserts a new Chapter 4KA (regulations 46Z23A-46Z23G) into the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, prohibiting the import into the UK of uranium (HS 2844.10/2844.20/2844.30) that originates in or is consigned from Russia, the direct or indirect acquisition of Russian-origin or Russia-located uranium, and the supply or delivery of uranium from Russia to a third country — plus associated technical assistance, financial services/funds, and brokering services. Each prohibition carries a criminal offence with a reasonable-cause-to- suspect defence, subject to narrow exceptions and licensing grounds at regulations 16-19 of the amending instrument. The same instrument separately extends the existing ban on imports of relevant (2709-origin) Russian crude to cover oil products refined from that crude in a third country (new regulations 46Z9F-46Z9I).

The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced on 18 May 2026 that Adani Enterprises Limited (AEL), a flagship publicly traded entity of India's Adani Group (NSE: ADANIENT), agreed to pay $275,000,000 to settle apparent civil liability for violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR, 31 CFR Part 560) arising from AEL's purchases of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) shipments through a Dubai-based commodity trader between November 2023 and June 2025, where red flags should have placed AEL on notice that the LPG originated from Iran. Approximately $192 million in payments for the Iranian-origin LPG shipments were processed through US financial institutions, providing the US nexus for OFAC jurisdiction. OFAC determined the apparent violations were EGREGIOUS and not voluntarily self-disclosed; AEL did not admit fault but committed to implementing enhanced compliance measures. The settlement is the largest OFAC enforcement action against an Indian corporate entity on record and was announced concurrently with parallel DOJ and SEC resolutions forming part of a broader US legal-relief package for the Adani Group.

On 2 May 2026, MOFCOM issued Announcement No. 21 of 2026 — the first concrete prohibition order ever issued under China's 2021 "Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures" (Blocking Rules) and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL). The order prohibits any Chinese organisation, individual, or foreign party operating in China from recognising, enforcing, or complying with US sanctions imposed under Executive Orders 13902 and 13846 against five Chinese independent ("teapot") refineries — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refining Co., Ltd., Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co., Ltd., Shandong Jincheng Petrochemical Group Co., Ltd., Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd., and Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd. — all designated by OFAC for purchasing Iranian crude. The announcement is the first operational test of the framework built up across the AFSL (2021), the AFSL Implementation Regulations (Order 803, March 2025), and State Council Order 835 on Countering Foreign Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (April 2026), and creates a direct compliance conflict for banks, insurers, traders, and shipping companies operating in or with China that had been winding down their exposure to the listed refineries.

On April 24, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added 19 entities and 19 vessels to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List under Executive Order 13902 (Iran petroleum and petrochemical sectors), in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2 (NSPM-2) of February 4, 2025. The action is the first OFAC designation of a Chinese independent ("teapot") refinery — Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd., described as one of Iran's largest single customers for crude oil and petroleum products, having purchased billions of US dollars' worth since at least 2023 from cargoes brokered by Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (the oil sales arm of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff, controlled by the Ministry of Defense / MODAFL). Co-designations span shipping firms and vessels registered in China, Hong Kong, Panama, Marshall Islands, Liberia, and Vietnam. Concurrent with the designations, OFAC issued Iran-related General License V authorising a 30-day wind-down (through May 24, 2026) of transactions involving Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. and certain majority-owned entities. Treasury press release SB0472 ("Economic Fury Targets Global Network Fueling Iran's Oil Trade and Shadow Fleet") frames the action as part of the maximum-pressure campaign that has sanctioned over 1,000 Iran-related persons, vessels, and aircraft since February 2025. The April 24 designations directly triggered the first-ever operational use of China's Blocking Rules (MOFCOM Announcement No. 21 of May 2, 2026) and preceded a second OFAC Iran wave on May 1, 2026 (General License W + Strait of Hormuz Sanctions Risk Alert).

The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced on 17 March 2026 that TradeStation Securities, Inc. agreed to pay $1,110,661 to settle 481 apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 560), the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 542), and the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 589) that occurred between 21 June 2021 and 15 June 2022. The violations arose from a mobile-platform software update that inadvertently caused the firm's second-tier geo-blocking to screen the IP address of a U.S.-located server rather than the user's IP, allowing customers in Iran, Syria, and Crimea to execute securities-related transactions. OFAC determined the apparent violations were non-egregious and voluntarily self-disclosed, resulting in a significantly reduced settlement amount.

The Council of the EU adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/262, implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1529 concerning restrictive measures in view of Iran's military support to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. The listing adds 4 individuals and 6 entities to the EU asset freeze, bringing the total under this regime to 24 individuals and 26 entities. Newly listed entities include Fanavaran Sanat Ertebatat Company and front-company trader Sahara Thunder (UAV electronic components and guidance systems), and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, Khojir Missile Development and Production, and procurement firm Pishgaman Tejarat Rafi Novin Co. (ballistic missile manufacturing and propellant-precursor procurement). All funds and economic resources of the listed parties are frozen within the EU, and EU persons/entities are barred from making funds available to them.

HM Treasury's Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published a Russia-regime notice on 18 December 2025 designating five individuals and 19 entities under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Of the 19 entities, six are based in Russia, eight in the United Arab Emirates, four in Uzbekistan and one in Kyrgyzstan — reflecting OFSI's continued focus on third-country intermediaries used to route sanctioned Russian trade and finance. Designated persons are subject to a full asset freeze and are barred from commercial transactions and investment instruments with UK persons.

On 12 December 2025 the Swiss Federal Council adopted the first tranche of listings aligning with the EU's 19th Russia sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2033, 23 October 2025), amending the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine and the Belarus Ordinance with effect from 13 December 2025. The decision adds asset freezes and entry/transit bans for 22 natural persons and 42 entities tied to Russia's military-industrial complex, energy sector and shadow-fleet vessel management; extends purchase/sale/insurance bans to over 100 additional tankers; imposes transaction restrictions on 5 Russian banks and 4 Russian-bank branches in Belarus and Kazakhstan for use of specialised financial-messaging services; sanctions Chinese and Hong Kong trading companies and refineries implicated in circumventing the G7 oil price cap; and designates 5 Belarusian persons linked to military-industrial activities. Divestment-exemption deadlines for Swiss persons winding down Russian holdings are extended to end-2026. This is a partial, listings-only tranche — the more substantive measures of the EU's 19th package (Russian LNG import ban, crypto-services prohibition, AI/HPC service bans) were not adopted until the Federal Council's follow-on decision of 25 February 2026.

On 11 December 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated six shipping companies — registered in the Marshall Islands (4), British Virgin Islands (1), and the United Kingdom (1) — and their six crude-oil tankers as blocked property under Executive Order 13850 for operating in Venezuela's oil sector. The vessels (WHITE CRANE, KIARA M, MONIQUE, LATTAFA, H. CONSTANCE, and TAMIA) had loaded Venezuelan crude in September/October 2025 and allegedly used AIS spoofing and other deceptive shipping practices to evade detection. The same action separately designated four individuals — including two nephews of Cilia Flores (Nicolas Maduro's wife) under the counter-narcotics authority EO 14059, a former PDVSA official under EO 13692, and a Panamanian facilitator under EO 13850 — but the shipping-company/tanker designations are the action's primary trade-control component.

On 19 November 2025, the U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in a coordinated action with Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, designated 5 individuals and 7 companies linked to two Russia-based "bulletproof hosting" (BPH) providers, Media Land and Aeza Group, under Executive Order 13694. Media Land and its subsidiaries (Media Land Technology, Data Center Kirishi, ML Cloud) supplied server infrastructure to ransomware groups including LockBit, BlackSuit and Play. The designations also targeted three companies Aeza Group used to evade its July 2025 OFAC designation and rebrand its infrastructure: Hypercore Ltd. (United Kingdom), Smart Digital Ideas DOO (Serbia), and Datavice MCHJ (Uzbekistan). All designated persons' U.S.-nexus assets are blocked and U.S. persons are prohibited from transacting with them.

New Zealand's 33rd sanctions round under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022 designated 65 "shadow fleet" tanker vessels involved in transporting Russian-origin crude oil, together with seven entities and two individuals based in Russia, Belarus, North Korea and Iran that refine or transport Russian oil or facilitate oil-related payments. Designated parties are subject to asset freezes and prohibitions on the supply of services (including port access, insurance, chartering and cargo handling) by New Zealand persons. The measure targets the revenue chain funding Russia's war in Ukraine rather than imposing a new tariff or trade-flow control.

On 29 October 2025 the Swiss Federal Council amended the Ordinance on Measures in Connection with the Situation in Ukraine (SR 946.231.176.72), published as AS 2025 662, completing Switzerland's alignment with the remaining goods, finance and services elements of the EU's 18th Russia sanctions package (Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494, 18 July 2025) and tightening the parallel Belarus regime. The amendment took effect 30 October 2025 and adds: an export ban covering additional structural-metal, general-purpose-machinery and machine-tool goods; an import ban on further petroleum-oil products and waste/scrap categories; and expanded controls on commercial transactions and investment instruments spanning financial services, investment banking, crude-petroleum trade and motor-vehicle/trailer goods. The Federal Department of Economic Affairs (WBF) had already taken over the measures within its own competence on 12 August 2025; this decision closes the remainder. In parallel, the Federal Council's asset-freeze annexes were extended to 14 individuals and 41 companies/organizations.

China's MOFCOM Unreliable Entity List Working Mechanism designated three US firms — Saronic Technologies, Aerkomm Inc., and Oceaneering International — on 25 September 2025, effective the same day, under Article 2 of the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List (MOFCOM Order No. 4 of 2020) and citing the Foreign Trade Law, the National Security Law, and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. MOFCOM's stated trigger is the firms' "so-called military-technical collaboration with China's Taiwan region." Measures bar the designees from China-related import/export activity and new investment in mainland China, with entry/work-permit restrictions on relevant management personnel.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Burma-based arms procurement company Royal Shune Lei Company Limited, its three Burmese executives, and two North Korean nationals linked to the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) for operating an arms-trafficking and revenue-generation network supporting DPRK weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. Royal Shune Lei brokered sales of aerial bomb guidance kits, bombs, and airborne monitoring equipment to Burma's military junta on behalf of KOMID starting in 2022. Designations were made under Executive Order 13687 (DPRK), Executive Order 13551 (DPRK arms trade), and Executive Order 14014 (Burma), blocking all US-jurisdiction property of the six designated parties and barring US persons from transactions with them.

Australia aligned with the EU/G7's 18th-package price cap by lowering its own cap on Russian-origin crude oil from USD 60 to USD 47.60 per barrel, and designated 95 additional "shadow fleet" tanker vessels used to circumvent the cap, under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011. Foreign Minister Penny Wong framed the measure as intended to depress the market value of Russian crude and reduce war-financing oil revenue. The listings bring Australia's cumulative shadow-fleet vessel designations to over 150 since June 2025 and its total Russia-related sanctions actions since 2022 to roughly 1,600.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated two Iranian financial facilitators — Alireza Derakhshan and Arash Estaki Alivand — along with more than a dozen Hong Kong- and UAE-based individuals and entities for operating a shadow-banking network that laundered proceeds from Iranian oil sales through front companies and cryptocurrency. The designated addresses account for over $600 million in total inflows, including more than $100 million in cryptocurrency purchases tied to oil sales between 2023 and 2025. Proceeds are alleged to benefit the IRGC-Qods Force and Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). This is the second round of OFAC sanctions targeting Iran's shadow-banking infrastructure since National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2) directed a maximum-pressure campaign on Iran in February 2025.

New Zealand's 32nd sanctions round under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022 (Russia Sanctions Amendment Regulations (No 4) 2025, SL 2025/195) lowered the price cap on Russian-origin crude oil (HS 2709) from US$60/bbl to US$47.60/bbl, a roughly 21% cut, aligning New Zealand with the EU, UK and Canada's most recent price-cap reductions. The same instrument designated 19 individuals and entities plus 19 vessels, including Russia's GRU cyber unit 29155 (implicated in malware attacks on Ukrainian government networks), actors involved in chemical-weapons use and disinformation, additional "shadow fleet" tankers, alternative payment providers, and third-country facilitators based in North Korea and Iran supporting Russia's war effort.

On 8 September 2025, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced a nine-measure package against Israel over the Gaza war, the centrepiece being urgent approval of a Royal Decree-Law to permanently codify in law the arms embargo Spain had applied de facto since October 2023 — a total ban on buying and selling arms, ammunition, military equipment and dual-use goods with Israel, plus a ban on port transit of fuel for the Israeli military and a ban on Israeli state aircraft carrying defence material transiting Spanish airspace. The package also bans importing, advertising and marketing products originating from Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. The Council of Ministers formally approved the measure as Real Decreto-ley 10/2025 on 23 September 2025; it was published in the BOE on 24 September 2025 (BOE-A-2025-18831) and validated by Congress on 8 October 2025 (178–169). Spain's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Business separately disclosed that 219 defence-material export/import licences to Israel had been denied since October 2023, against a bilateral trade backdrop of roughly €50M in Spanish arms exports to Israel (Jan 2023–Jun 2024) and at least €54.4M in Spanish imports of Israeli arms/munitions (Oct 2023–May 2025, DataComex code 93).

On 2 September 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Waleed Khaled Hameed al-Samarra'i, a dual Iraqi/St Kitts-and-Nevis citizen, along with his UAE-based shipping manager Babylon and five Marshall Islands-registered shell companies (Tryfo Navigation, Keely Shiptrade, Odiar Management, Panarea Marine, Topsail Shipholding) that hold registered ownership of nine Liberia-flagged tankers (ADENA, LILIANA, CAMILLA, DELFINA, BIANCA, ROBERTA, ALEXANDRA, BELLAGIO, PAOLA). The network blends Iranian crude with Iraqi oil via ship-to-ship transfers in the Arabian Gulf and at Iraqi ports, then markets the blend as solely Iraqi-origin to evade US sanctions, generating hundreds of millions of dollars for the Iranian regime and al-Samarra'i. The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13902 and blocks all US property and interests of the designated individual, entities and vessels.

The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated a Russian national (Vitaliy Sergeyevich Andreyev), a Russia-based DPRK economic and trade consular official (Kim Ung Sun), a Chinese front company (Shenyang Geumpungri Network Technology Co., Ltd), and a DPRK trading company subordinate to the DPRK Ministry of People's Armed Forces General Political Bureau (Korea Sinjin Trading Corporation) for facilitating a fraudulent overseas IT-worker scheme that funds North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. The action expands on the prior designation of Chinyong Information Technology Cooperation Company, an entity tied to the DPRK defense ministry that deploys IT worker delegations in Russia and Laos. Treasury said Andreyev and Kim Ung Sun facilitated cryptocurrency-to-cash conversions worth nearly USD 600,000 since December 2024, and that Shenyang Geumpungri's delegation of DPRK IT workers has earned Chinyong and Sinjin over USD 1 million in profits since 2021. Designations were made under Executive Order 13687, blocking all US-jurisdiction property of the four parties and barring US persons from transactions with them.

On August 12, 2025, OFAC designated four entities — armed group PARECO-FF, Congolese mining cooperative CDMC, and Hong Kong traders East Rise Corporation Ltd. and Star Dragon Corporation Ltd. — pursuant to Executive Order 13413 (amended by EO 13671) for financing armed-group violence and laundering conflict-origin coltan/tantalum from the Rubaya mining area through Rwanda into international markets. The designations freeze US-jurisdictional assets and prohibit US-person dealings with all four entities. Rubaya accounts for approximately 15% of global coltan production, making this the first US action targeting the full armed-group → cooperative → offshore-trader laundering chain for that deposit.

On 31 July 2025 the Slovenian government (under PM Robert Golob) adopted a decision, based on Article 28 of the Regulation on Approvals for Production and Permits for Trade in Military Weapons and Equipment, banning the export and transit of military weapons and equipment from or through Slovenia to Israel, and the import of such equipment from Israel, citing serious violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza. The ban covers items on the EU Common Military List and carves out an exception for equipment necessary for Slovenia's own security and resilience. Slovenia was the first EU/European country to enact such a measure. On 11 June 2026 the successor government under PM Janez Janša revoked the ban, arguing weapons-export conditions are already covered by the Defence Act and that no transit permits to/from Israel had been issued since 2023, and citing a wish to restore normal diplomatic channels with Israel.

On 18 July 2025 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1469, implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006, adding eight Belarusian entities to the Annex I asset-freeze list for supporting Belarus's military-industrial complex. The listed entities — State-owned Foreign Trade Unitary Enterprise Belvneshpromservice, OKB TSP Scientific Production LLC, KB Unmanned Helicopters (UAVHeli), Legmash Plant OJSC, Research and Production Unitary Enterprise "Scientific and Technical Center 'LEMT' BelOMO", Laser Devices and Technologies LLC, JSC Vistan, and Rukhservomotor LLC — span defence-export trading, artillery-shell and MLRS-rocket manufacture, unmanned military aircraft, optical weapon sights, and dual-use CNC machine tools supplied to Russian defence-related enterprises. Funds and economic resources belonging to the listed entities are frozen within the EU and the EU prohibition on making resources available to them applies with effect from 19 July 2025 (date of publication in the Official Journal). The listing was adopted the same day as the EU's 18th Russia sanctions package, as a parallel complementary measure under the separate Belarus sanctions regime.

On 18 July 2025, the Council of the European Union adopted the 18th package of restrictive measures against Russia, anchored by Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1494 amending Regulation 833/2014 (sectoral measures), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1476 implementing Regulation 269/2014 (asset-freeze listings), Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1495 (vessel listings), and Council Regulation (EU) 2025/1472 (parallel Belarus measures). The package is the largest energy-sector escalation since 2022 and pivots from new-perimeter creation toward enforcement and circumvention closure. Headline measures: (i) the Russian-crude price cap is lowered from USD 60 to USD 47.6 per barrel with a new automatic dynamic mechanism re-indexing the cap to global oil prices every six months at a 15 % discount to the 22-week trailing average (effective 3 Sep 2025, with a transitional exemption to 18 Oct 2025 for pre-20 Jul 2025 contracts compliant with the prior cap); (ii) full transaction ban extended to 22 additional Russian banks, bringing the total cut off from the EU financial system to 45; transaction ban extended to third-country financial institutions and crypto-asset service providers facilitating circumvention; (iii) full transaction ban on Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines; (iv) import ban on refined oil products derived from Russian crude processed in third countries; (v) 105 additional vessels added to the shadow-fleet port-access ban (cumulative total 444); (vi) 26 new entities added to Annex IV military end-user list (15 Russian + 11 from China/Hong Kong/Turkey); (vii) Council Implementing Regulation 2025/1476 lists 14 individuals + 41 entities under asset-freeze, including a major Indian refinery (Nayara Energy, part-owned by Rosneft), three Chinese suppliers of battlefield goods, shadow-fleet operators, and entities involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; (viii) parallel Belarus complementary measures via Regulation 2025/1472. Wind-down periods vary: 90 days for oil-price-cap contracts; banking-software wind-down to 30 Sep 2025; trade-goods wind-downs Oct 2025–Jan 2026 by category. Entry into force on 19 July 2025 (day following publication in the Official Journal), except for measures with explicit deferred application dates.

On 3 July 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated a network of UAE- and UK-based companies controlled by Iraqi-British businessman Salim Ahmed Said that has smuggled Iranian oil disguised as Iraqi crude since at least 2020, plus five additional shadow-fleet vessel owners based in Seychelles, the Marshall Islands, and the British Virgin Islands. The action, taken pursuant to E.O. 13902 (Iran petroleum sector) and E.O. 13224 (counterterrorism), also identifies several tankers as blocked property and marks the eighth round of sanctions under National Security Presidential Memorandum 2's Iran maximum-pressure campaign. Concurrently, the State Department designated six additional entities and four vessels under E.O. 13846.

Russian Government Resolution No. 969 of 27 June 2025 amends Resolution No. 851 (11 May 2022) to add Daimler Truck AG to Russia's list of foreign legal entities subject to "special economic measures," entering as list item No. 33. The designation imposes an export ban plus a prohibition on commercial transactions and dealings in investment instruments (securities/equity) involving the company. Daimler Truck fully exited its residual stake in Russian truckmaker KamAZ (its last ~15% holding) in early 2024, so the listing is a symbolic/optionality-blocking measure rather than one disrupting a live trade flow.

On 20 June 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated one individual, eight entities, and one vessel pursuant to Executive Order 13382 (WMD proliferators) for procuring and transshipping sensitive machinery to Iran's Rayan Roshd Afzar Company (RRA), a producer of UAV components and aerospace software for the IRGC. The vessel SHUN KAI XING, owned by Hong Kong-based Unico Shipping Co Ltd and chartered by Singapore-based V-Shipping Pte Ltd, was carrying the machinery for RRA and an affiliated firm when its cargo was inspected; the designated network — including China-based Shenzhen Xinxin Shipping, Dongguan Zanyin Machinery and Equipment, Athena Shipping, shipmaster Zhang Yanbing, and Turkiye-based Edisa Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi — then falsified bills of lading to obscure the Iran-bound, RRA-consigned cargo after the inspection.

New Zealand's Russia Sanctions Amendment Regulations (No 3) 2025, made under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022, came into force on 19 June 2025 designating seven entities and ten individuals -- including North Korean, Iranian and Belarusian actors supporting Russia's war effort and Russian actors involved in drone and weaponry production. The same instrument created a new "restricted ship" category under Regulation 8 and sanctioned 27 vessels in Russia's shadow fleet under it, and expanded the Regulation 12 legal-services exception. Designated parties are subject to asset freezes and prohibitions on New Zealand persons supplying services to them.

Canada made SOR/2025-142, Regulations Amending the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, registered 2025-06-13. The regulations add 34 Russian entities to Part 2 of Schedule 1 alongside Keremet Bank Open Joint-Stock Company (Kyrgyzstan), three UAE-based entities, one Singapore-based entity, and two energy-commodity trading companies (Switzerland, Azerbaijan) — all designated as sanctions-evasion intermediaries for Russian trade. The amendments also add 201 vessels (by IMO number) to Schedule 1.1 as part of Russia's "shadow fleet," triggering a dealings ban, asset freeze, and a new prohibition on providing financial or other services to non-Canadians in relation to a listed vessel.

China's State Council Taiwan Affairs Office announced on 5 June 2025 that it would impose punitive measures on Sicuens International Co Ltd (兆亿有限公司, transliterated "Zhaoyi"), a Taiwan-registered trading company whose responsible person, Shen Tucheng, is the father of Democratic Progressive Party legislator and "die-hard Taiwan independence" figure Shen Po-yang (Puma Shen). TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian said investigations found the company conducted trade and business cooperation with mainland Chinese enterprises to seek economic benefit, and stated the mainland "will never allow enterprises related to die-hard 'Taiwan independence' elements to seek profits on the mainland." The measure prohibits Sicuens International/Zhaoyi from any transactions or cooperation with mainland organizations, enterprises, or individuals, with further unspecified measures reserved.

On 13 May 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated nearly two dozen firms and individuals — including Hong Kong-based intermediary Star Energy International Limited — for operating in Iran's illicit international oil trade on behalf of Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (Sepehr Energy), the Tehran-based oil-sales arm of Iran's Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS). The designated network spans commercial intermediaries and shipping counterparties across China, Hong Kong and Singapore, the last a hub for ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian-origin crude. Designations were made under counter-terrorism (SDGT) and Iran Financial Sanctions Regulations (IFSR) authorities as part of the administration's maximum-pressure campaign to cut off military and IRGC-linked revenue from Iran's oil exports.

India's Directorate General of Foreign Trade issued Notification No. 06/2025-26 on 2 May 2025, inserting new Para 2.20A into the Foreign Trade Policy 2023: direct or indirect import or transit of all goods originating in or exported from Pakistan is prohibited with immediate effect, until further orders, regardless of whether the goods are otherwise freely importable. The government cited national security and public policy grounds; any exception requires prior Government of India approval. The Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs followed on 3 May 2025 with Instruction No. 07/2025-Customs directing field formations to enforce the ban. The measure followed the 22 April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack and preceded a brief India-Pakistan military exchange in early May 2025.

On 1 May 2025 the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), jointly with FinCEN, designated two Mexican nationals — Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva and J. Refugio Ruiz Villagomez — and nine entities they own or control, pursuant to Executive Order 14059 (illicit drug trade) and E.O. 13224 (as amended), for facilitating a Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) fuel-theft and cross-border smuggling scheme ("huachicol fiscal") that falsifies customs documentation to evade Mexico's IEPS fuel-import tax. FinCEN concurrently issued a supplemental alert on fuel-smuggling and fiscal fuel-theft red flags. All property and interests in property of the designees within US jurisdiction are blocked, and US persons are generally barred from transacting with them.

On 30 April 2025 the US Department of State designated seven entities and identified two vessels as blocked property for facilitating trade in Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products, under Executive Order 13846 and in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2, "Restoring Maximum Pressure on the Government of Iran"). The action named four UAE-based sellers and one purchaser of Iranian petrochemicals — including Solvent Organics (over $300 million in exports of Iranian-origin petrochemicals to third countries) and Alseerah Trading (over $150 million) — plus a Turkiye-based petrochemical trader, an Iran-based cargo inspection company, and a marine management company involved in transporting millions of barrels of Iranian crude. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated the goal was to drive Iran's illicit oil and petrochemical exports, including to China, to zero.

Premier Li Qiang signed State Council Order No. 803 on 23 March 2025 promulgating the "Regulations on Implementation of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People's Republic of China" (22 articles), effective on the date of publication (24 March 2025). The Regulations operationalise the 2021 Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law by clarifying the scope of countermeasure tools — explicitly extending "other property" subject to seizure to cash, bank deposits, securities, equity, intellectual property and accounts receivable, and listing the specific transaction and cooperation activities that may be prohibited or restricted (education, S&T, legal services, environment, trade, culture, tourism, health, sports, data and cross-border data transfers). They define inter-agency procedure, evidence and notice requirements for designations, and bind PRC organisations and individuals — including foreign-invested entities operating in China — to implement countermeasures, with sanctions including exclusion from government procurement, import/export and cross-border-data restrictions, and exit/stay restrictions for responsible persons.

On 4 February 2025, President Donald J. Trump signed National Security Presidential Memorandum/NSPM-2, "Imposing Maximum Pressure on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Denying Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon, and Countering Iran's Malign Influence." The memorandum reimposes the first- term "maximum pressure" framework, directing the Secretaries of State and Treasury and the Attorney General to (i) drive Iran's exports of crude oil and petroleum products — including to the People's Republic of China — to zero; (ii) review and modify or rescind sanctions waivers and general licences (notably the Chabahar port waiver benefiting India); (iii) sanction shadow-fleet vessels, intermediaries, refineries (including PRC "teapot" refiners) and oil traders facilitating Iranian energy exports; and (iv) lead a diplomatic isolation campaign including a snapback of UN Security Council sanctions under JCPOA Resolution 2231 paragraph 11. Since promulgation, OFAC has designated 1,000+ Iran-related persons, vessels and aircraft and four PRC independent ("teapot") refiners alleged to have processed sanctioned Iranian crude. The DOJ is also directed to pursue impoundment of Iranian oil cargoes and seizure of Iranian assets to satisfy US-court terrorism-victim judgments.

HM Treasury's Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), with the UK Foreign Office, announced on 13 January 2025 a sanctions package targeting Russia's oil "shadow fleet" — vessels operated outside Western maritime insurance and flag-state registries to evade the G7+ Russian crude price cap (set at $60/bbl since December 2022). The package designated 18 vessels (oil tankers transporting Russian crude in violation of the cap) and traders, with separate designations of two LNG carriers and two oil-services firms. This is the largest single UK shadow-fleet designation to date and was synchronised with EU Council and US OFAC packages in mid-January 2025.

On January 10, 2025, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), acting jointly with the Department of State, designated PJSC Gazprom Neft and PJSC Surgutneftegas as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) under Executive Orders 13662 and 14024, alongside more than 180 oil-carrying vessels (the bulk of Russia's "shadow fleet"), dozens of opaque oil traders, two major Russia-based oilfield service providers, marine insurance companies, and senior Russian energy-sector officials. The package included a new EO 14024 sectoral determination authorizing future designations against any person operating in the Russian energy sector, plus a new EO 14071 determination prohibiting the provision of US petroleum services (extraction, drilling, production support) to persons located in the Russian Federation, effective 12:01 a.m. EST on February 27, 2025. OFAC simultaneously issued General Licenses 117 (wind-down of transactions with the newly blocked entities) and 118 (debt/equity/derivatives wind-down), both expiring February 27, 2025. The action was the largest single Russia energy-sector designation since the 2022 invasion regime began and was coordinated with parallel UK OFSI shadow-fleet designations issued the same week. The action was finalized in the closing days of the Biden administration as a deliberate tightening of the oil-revenue and shadow-fleet vectors before the January 20 transition. Subsequent enforcement and any rollback decisions fell to the incoming Trump administration.

On 23 February 2024, two years after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2024/745, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and comprising the EU's 13th Russia sanctions package. It adds new CN codes to the export-ban annexes (dual-use and advanced-technology goods) and adds 27 entities — including firms based in China, Hong Kong, India, Sri Lanka, Serbia, Kazakhstan, Thailand and Turkiye — to the list of parties barred from any exemption from the export ban, on the basis they are assessed to be supporting Russia's military-industrial complex via circumvention routes. Asset-freeze listings (106 individuals, 88 entities) under the parallel Council Decision took effect 23 February 2024; the sectoral trade measures took effect 24 February 2024.

The Council of the EU adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2023/2878 of 18 December 2023, the EU's 12th sanctions package against Russia, entering into force 19 December 2023. The package introduces a direct EU import ban on Russian non-industrial natural and synthetic diamonds and diamond jewellery effective 1 January 2024, followed by a phased indirect ban on Russian diamonds processed in third countries (from 1 March 2024, complete by 1 September 2024), developed as part of a G7-coordinated diamond restriction. The package also extends import bans on steel and other products generating significant revenue for Russia, and adds further trade and economic restrictions.

On 23 June 2023 the Council of the European Union adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1214, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and comprising the EU's 11th Russia sanctions package. It extends the list of goods generating significant revenue for Russia subject to import bans, adds further export-ban categories (including additional industrial goods, dual-use and advanced-technology items), and introduces a new anti-circumvention tool (Article 12g) allowing the EU to restrict exports of specified sanctioned goods and technology to third countries assessed as high-risk transshipment routes for Russia. Asset-freeze listings under the parallel Council Decision took effect 23 June 2023; the sectoral trade measures took effect 24 June 2023.

OFAC replaced the abbreviated July 2014 South Sudan Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 558) with a comprehensive final rule that adds interpretive guidance, definitions, and general licenses while implementing the full set of prohibitions in Executive Order 13664 of April 3, 2014. The rule does not expand the underlying blocking authority or add new designations; it codifies the existing program in a complete regulatory framework accessible to the public and regulated community. Target: persons threatening South Sudan's peace, security, or stability, obstructing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, or responsible for human rights abuses or conflict-mineral trade that finances armed groups.

OFAC published an interim final rule creating 31 CFR Part 599 to implement Executive Order 14059 (December 15, 2021), which declared a national emergency regarding the unusual and extraordinary threat posed by the global illicit drug trade, including fentanyl and synthetic opioid trafficking. The regulations establish blocking prohibitions, SDN List designation procedures, and enforcement mechanisms targeting foreign persons who materially contribute to international drug proliferation. OFAC stated it would supplement this interim rule with more comprehensive final regulations covering licensing, reporting, and penalty procedures.

Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1903 amends Regulation (EU) 2022/263 so that its import ban and export restrictions, previously limited to the non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, also cover the non-government-controlled areas of Ukraine's Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. It was adopted on 6 October 2022 alongside the eighth Russia sanctions package and entered into force the day after publication in the Official Journal.

On 21 April 2022 the UK announced import bans on Russian silver, wood products and other high-value goods (incl. caviar), alongside a 35-point tariff increase on selected Russian and Belarusian goods. The ban was legislated by the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) (No. 10) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022/689, made 20 June, in force 23 June 2022), which inserted a new Schedule 3D ("revenue generating goods") and prohibitions 46T-46W: import of Schedule 3D goods originating in or consigned from Russia, their acquisition, supply/delivery into the UK and related technical assistance are prohibited, subject to Part 7 exceptions and licences. Schedule 3D covers all of HS chapter 44 (wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal), HS 7106 silver, plus e.g. caviar, cement, potassium chloride and NPK fertilisers, pulp and kraft paper, glass, and aluminium plate.

On 16 March 2022 the Swiss Federal Council adopted a total revision of the Ordinance on Measures against Belarus (SR 946.231.116.9), aligning Switzerland's autonomous sanctions with the EU's Belarus regime. It bans imports of Belarusian petroleum products, potassium chloride ("potash"), wood, iron and steel, and cement and rubber products; bans exports of goods used to manufacture or process tobacco products, weapons, surveillance equipment, and goods usable for Belarus's military or security development; and imposes financial sanctions including a ban on public financing for trade with or investment in Belarus, restrictions on securities/loans/ deposits, a prohibition on transactions with the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus, and exclusion of listed Belarusian banks from SWIFT. The ordinance entered into force on the day it was adopted.